



THE CANADIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION
L'ASSOCIATION DU
BARREAU CANADIEN

Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission

CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

April 2021

PREFACE

The Canadian Bar Association is a national association representing 36,000 jurists, including lawyers, notaries, law teachers and students across Canada. The Association's primary objectives include improvement in the law and in the administration of justice.

This submission was prepared by the Judicial Issues Subcommittee, with assistance from the Advocacy Department at the CBA office. The submission has been reviewed by the Policy Committee and approved as a public statement of the CBA.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE	2
III.	PROCESS FOR REVIEW OF JUDICIAL COMPENSATION	3
	A. Risk of Politicized Process	3
	B. Past Quadrennial Commissions – Importance of Timelines	4
IV.	JUDICIAL COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS	6
	A. Prevailing economic conditions in Canada	8
	B. Cost of living	9
	C. Overall economic and current financial position of the federal government.....	9
	D. Supporting Diversity on the Bench	9
V.	PROTHONOTARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.....	10
VI.	CONCLUSION	11

Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission

I. INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Bar Association (CBA) welcomes the opportunity to make submissions to assist the sixth quadrennial Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission in its task of determining fair and just judicial and prothonotary compensation and benefits, pursuant to the *Judges Act*.¹

The CBA, through its Judicial Issues Subcommittee, has made regular submissions to the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commissions and to the Special Advisors on federal prothonotary compensation. We are pleased that prothonotary compensation now falls within the mandate of the sixth Quadrennial Commission.

The CBA's mandate includes two important objectives that guide its role in this process:

- promotion of improvements in the administration of justice; and
- maintenance of a high quality system of justice in Canada.

An independent judiciary is an essential ingredient of both objectives.

The Supreme Court of Canada has explained that “[i]ndependence [of the judiciary] is necessary because of the judiciary’s role as protector of the Constitution and the fundamental values embodied in it, including the rule of law, fundamental justice, equality and preservation of the democratic process.”² The CBA has a long tradition of speaking in defense of judicial independence and of working actively against potential political interference in the appointment and compensation of judges in Canada.

The CBA has an independent role in the work of judicial compensation commissions. Our submissions support and reinforce the two broad objectives above. The CBA does not represent or advocate on behalf of either the government or the judiciary, nor does it speak

¹ *Judges Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. J-1, s. 26

² *Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice)*; *Ontario Judges’ Assn. v. Ontario (Management Board)*; *Bodner v. Alberta*; *Conference des juges du Québec v. Québec (Attorney General)*; *Minc v. Québec (Attorney General)*, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 (Provincial Court Judges Assn. of New Brunswick).

on behalf of any other external group. Rather, our submissions are intended to assist the Commission in its work, so the process of determining judicial compensation and the substantive outcome of that process properly and fairly reflect the imperative of appropriate judicial compensation.

The CBA's primary concern is to ensure that judicial compensation and benefits are structured to fulfill a dual purpose:

- Protecting and promoting the independence of the judiciary through the institution and maintenance of appropriate financial security for members of the judiciary; and
- Strengthening and advancing the judiciary through sufficient financial independence of its members and providing adequate compensation to attract the best and most qualified candidates for appointment.

II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Independence of the judiciary is an essential ingredient of Canadian democracy. The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that an independent judiciary is an integral component of federalism by protecting one level of government from encroachment into its jurisdiction by another, and by serving to protect citizens against the abuse of state power.³

Judicial independence is “the lifeblood of constitutionalism in democratic societies.”⁴ It serves “not as an end in itself, but as a means to *safeguard our constitutional order and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.*”⁵ [emphasis added]

The principle of judicial independence is a fundamental right for all citizens. The principle was well-stated by then-Chief Justice Antonio Lamer in his 1999 address to the CBA annual meeting in Edmonton, Alberta:

An independent judiciary is the right of every Canadian. A judge must be seen to be free to decide honestly and impartially on the basis of law and the evidence, without external pressure or influence from anyone.⁶

³ *Reference Re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island*, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [P.E.I. Reference].

⁴ *Beauregard v. Canada*, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 70.

⁵ *Ell v. Alberta*, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857 at para. 29.

⁶ Chief Justice Lamer, *Address to the Canadian Bar Association*, 1999 (not published).

Judicial independence comprises three components: security of tenure; administrative independence; and financial security. Financial security embodies the three following *constitutional* requirements:

- Judicial salaries can be maintained or changed only by recourse to an independent commission;
- No negotiations are permitted between the judiciary and the government; and
- Salaries may not fall below a minimum level.⁷

Not only must the judiciary be independent, it must also be seen to be independent and free from interference and influence from the other branches of government and from other external sources. To ensure that this requirement of independence is met, the executive, legislative and judicial branches must remain separate. This principle extends to the determination of judicial salary and benefits undertaken by an objective, independent commission that is beholden to none. The commission process is often described as being an “institutional sieve,”⁸ and “a structural separation between the government and the judiciary.”⁹

III. PROCESS FOR REVIEW OF JUDICIAL COMPENSATION

A. Risk of Politicized Process

The process for determining judicial compensation and benefits can either foster or erode the principle of judicial independence. The CBA has intervened in cases dealing with judicial compensation, including the *P.E.I. Reference*,¹⁰ *Provincial Court Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick*,¹¹ and, most recently, *BC (AG) v. Provincial Court Judges’ Association of British Columbia* and *NS (AG) v. Judges of the Provincial Court and Family Court of Nova Scotia*¹², primarily to highlight the importance of the principles at stake, i.e., judicial independence, democracy and the rule of law, and to emphasize the important role the commission review process plays in preserving those principles.

The creation of judicial compensation commissions arose from the need for an effective and non-partisan method of reviewing and setting judicial remuneration. Under the process established in

⁷ *Supra* note 3

⁸ *Supra* note 3 at paras. 170, 185 and 189.

⁹ *Supra* note 2 at para. 14.

¹⁰ *Supra* note 3.

¹¹ *Supra* note 2.

¹² 2020 SCC 20 and 2020 SCC 21

section 26 of the *Judges Act*, the Commission must submit a report to the Minister of Justice, the Minister must table the report in Parliament, and Parliament must refer the report to a committee that considers matters related to justice. The Parliamentary committee may conduct inquiries and public hearings and, if it does, must report its findings back to Parliament.

The Scott Commission¹³ observed that a Parliamentary committee review of the Commission's recommendations generally increases rather than decreases the likelihood of politicizing judicial compensation issues. Any links between judicial decisions, either specific or general, and compensation issues will have the deleterious effect of eroding judicial independence and should not be countenanced.

The CBA urges the Commission to caution Parliament that the consideration of its report involves special constitutional factors that risk being endangered by a politicized process and by making any links, intended or unintended, between judges' remuneration and judges' decisions. Setting judicial compensation must be carried out in an objective, dispassionate and rational manner.

B. Importance of Timelines

Since the enactment of section 26 of the *Judges Act*, there have been five quadrennial commissions. Other than in 2012, the government failed in each process to meet legislated deadlines in section 26(7) (response to the Commission's report within a set time and implementation within a reasonable period).

In 2000, the Drouin Commission's recommendations were accepted by the government, except for the recommendations on supernumerary status and reimbursement for the judiciary's costs. Ultimately, the recommendation on supernumerary status was accepted, but not until 2003 and it was only implemented by the government in 2006.

In 2004, the McLennan Commission's recommendations were initially accepted by government, but were subsequently rejected in a second response following a change in government. In the end, the new government implemented its own increase 18 months after the Commission delivered its report. No provision in the *Judges Act* permits a new government to reject a former government's response and then issue its own response well past the deadline.

In 2008, the government rejected the Block Commission's recommendations. In its response, delivered nearly nine months after the Commission Report and well beyond the statutory

¹³ Scott Report (1996)

timeframe for response, the government stated that economic conditions made it “unreasonable to implement” the recommendations.

In 2012, the government responded in a timely manner. The Commission delivered its report on May 15, 2012. The Minister of Justice provided the government’s response to the Commission’s report on October 12, 2012, one month in advance of the statutory deadline. Shortly after the response was provided, section 26(7) of the *Act* was amended¹⁴ to reduce the timeframe for the government response from six months to four months.

In 2016, the Commission was required to commence an inquiry by October 1, 2015 and report by July 1, 2016. The appointment of the Commissioners was announced on December 18, 2015. The Commission began its inquiry on January 25, 2016. The CBA acknowledges that the general election and change of government contributed to this delay by the government.¹⁵

This Commission was required to commence an inquiry by June 1, 2020. However, counsel for the Canadian Superior Court Judges Association, with support from the government and the Federal Court protonotaries, requested a deferral to December 1, 2020. This was granted pursuant to the Commission’s discretion under s. 26(3) of the *Judges Act*. The COVID-19 pandemic created significant uncertainty. In accepting the request to postpone the the inquiry, the Commission noted the “disruption within and around the administration of justice and workplaces coupled with the need of the parties to best place their respective positions before the Commission to assist it in its inquiry all support such an order.”¹⁶

Recognizing the need to address the particular challenges caused by the pandemic, the CBA emphasizes the importance to the ongoing integrity of the judicial compensation process that the Commission abide by the statutory timelines (seeking necessary consents for extensions) and that the government respond to the Commission’s report and recommendations within the four-month period required by the section 26(7) of the *Judges Act*.

The CBA believes that, if the judicial compensation review process is to succeed, all parties must respect the process and timeframes in the *Judges Act*. The timeframe in section 26(7) was established by Parliament to ensure that the government’s review and response occurs in a

¹⁴ *Jobs and Growth Act*, S.C. 2012, c. 31, s. 212 (2)

¹⁵ Section 26(3) of the *Judges Act* allows the Commission to postpone the commencement date of a quadrennial inquiry with consent of the Minister of Justice and the judiciary. The CBA trusts this consent was secured. Also, section 26(5) requires the Commission to receive the consent of the Governor in Council to submit its report after nine months following commencement of the inquiry.

¹⁶ [Ruling Respecting Request for Deferral of Commencement Date of June 1, 2020](#)

timely manner. Unexplained delay by one party undermines the integrity of the process, casting doubt on the degree of importance placed on judicial independence and the rule of law.

IV. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

The Commission process for determining fair and just judicial compensation must consider the specific statutory criteria in s. 26(1.1) of the *Judges Act*:

- (a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government;
- (b) the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence;
- (c) the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary; and
- (d) any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.

The statute does not give dominance to any criterion. It suggests that each one must be given due weight and consideration.

The proper functioning of our justice system depends on a high level of judicial competence. Judges' salaries and benefits must be at a level to attract and retain the best and most qualified candidates. They must also be commensurate with the position of a judge in our society and must reflect the respect given our courts in light of their unique role as a separate and independent branch of government in a democratic society.

The requirement of a minimum salary level is explained in the *Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Independence of the Judiciary in Canada*:¹⁷

[I]t is difficult to state precisely what is an adequate level for judges' salaries. The amount must be sufficient that neither the judge nor his dependents suffer any hardship by virtue of his accepting a position on the bench. It must also be sufficient to allow the judge to preserve the mien of his office. And it should be sufficient to reflect the *importance of the office of judge*.¹⁸ [emphasis added]

The CBA recognizes that financial benefits are not – and should not – be the predominant (and certainly not the only) factor aimed at attracting outstanding candidates for judicial appointment. But attracting candidates for judicial appointment requires judicial salaries to be competitive with the other options available to candidates in our professional world.

¹⁷ *Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the Independence of the Judiciary in Canada* (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1985) (de Grandpre Report).

¹⁸ *Ibid* at 18.

The CBA believes that the appropriate gauge for determining the level of judicial salaries is the compensation of senior lawyers in private practice and those at senior levels in the public service, as these individuals generally comprise the pool from which judges are selected and appointed and are their professional peers.

To the extent that prevailing market conditions have increased relevant comparator salaries in excess of inflation, the Commission should ensure that judicial salaries are consistent with these market conditions.

Considering private practice as a comparator does not, of course, mean considering the compensation of senior practitioners from only the largest and most profitable firms in large cities. Judges are appointed from a wide cross-section of the legal community and from varied practice backgrounds and locations. They cut across gender, age and regions, both urban and rural. The data should reflect this reality, to the greatest extent possible. Further, when comparing compensation for judges and prothonotaries with that of lawyers in private practice, the Commission should consider the total compensation to which federally-appointed judges are entitled. As an example, on retirement, judges are entitled to an annuity equal to two-thirds of their former salary. In private practice, many lawyers fund their own retirement through RRSPs or other investments, effectively reducing their disposable income. However, those investments are subject to market volatility with potentially uncertain returns; that uncertainty does not attach to a judicial annuity. At the same time, lawyers in private practice may have a wider range of tax planning opportunities that are not available to judges.

On that point, public sector lawyers may have more certainty around retirement planning, through pensions. However, their salaries are often significantly lower than their peers in private practice. Finally, in-house counsel have a wide variety of compensation packages depending on the size and financial capacity of their employer. All of which is to say that the compensation of lawyers in Canada covers a broad range and includes, in different circumstances, a variety of benefits that can create some financial security over time.

Financial security in every aspect is an essential component of judicial independence.¹⁹ However, the objective is not to provide judges with the same level of financial benefit they may have enjoyed prior to appointment, particularly given the range of income to which a judge may have been entitled in their prior professional practice. Rather, it is to ensure that judges do not experience significant, and discouraging, economic disparity between pre-

¹⁹ *Supra*, note 15

appointment and post-appointment compensation levels. Judicial compensation and benefits must, therefore, be at a level that attracts outstanding candidates and those who consider as part of their reward the satisfaction of serving society on the bench.

The CBA believes it is important to recognize the sacrifices judges make to control their financial well-being upon appointment to the bench. Once appointed, judges must focus solely on the discharge of their duties and are not permitted to supplement their income, through additional employment or other means. Judges rely on the government's willingness and duty to maintain reasonable judicial compensation for the rest of their lives. Without confidence that the process of determining judicial compensation will consider their financial security as a high priority, outstanding candidates may be discouraged, thereby reducing the pool of highly qualified applicants who apply to the bench.

The CBA also emphasizes the importance of the remaining criteria in section 26 of the *Judges Act*: prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including cost of living, overall economic and current financial position of the federal government. And, in our view, the need to attract outstanding candidates includes the importance of supporting diversity on the bench.

A. Prevailing economic conditions in Canada

Giving due consideration to the prevailing economic conditions in Canada is important to ensure that candidates who seek appointment to the bench are confident that, if selected, they will be adequately compensated, financially secure, and well able to discharge their duties with no threat to their independence.

The most notable prevailing economic condition at present is the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has had a significant impact on the Canadian economy which is yet to be fully measured and will take years to resolve. We urge the Commission to consider the generalized financial impact of COVID-19 on the Canadian economy and to recognize that the impact will be felt on judicial salaries for many years to come, at least through the current judicial compensation review period.

The existence of extraordinary economic circumstances should be cogently demonstrated and should be used only as a limited, short-term rationale to defer the responsibility of ensuring that judicial compensation is sufficient.²⁰

²⁰ e.g. *Aalto v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2009 FC 861, affd. 2010 FCA 195

B. Cost of living

Judicial compensation should, at a minimum, keep pace with increases in the cost of living.

Escalating judicial salaries annually based on the Consumer Price Index, or another appropriate and reliable industry index, is the minimum standard to ensure that sitting judges do not experience erosion in their salaries. Without financial accountability, retention of qualified and experienced judges could be compromised. There is at least anecdotal evidence from the United States that non-competitive judicial salaries may increase attrition of experienced judges.²¹

The extent to which private sector or public sector lawyer compensation increases beyond the cost of living should also be taken into account when determining the annual escalation for judicial compensation.

Income tax rates have also increased significantly since 2016 and, as a result of COVID-19 economic supports, are likely to increase at a material rate over the next several years. This additional economic impact ought to be considered when the base level of compensation is established as this impact is incremental and will affect the after-tax benefit retained by judges.

C. Overall economic and current financial position of the federal government

Judicial independence is not just another important government priority. *It is a constitutional imperative.* Competing public and government priorities are always present. Although the government must have latitude to strike an appropriate balance,²² the burden is on the government to give compelling evidence that other competing fiscal obligations justify infringing upon a constitutional imperative²³ Only after the government has satisfied this burden may the Commission consider this factor and reduce what would otherwise be appropriate judicial compensation.

D. Supporting Diversity on the Bench

Fair and just judicial compensation also serves a further important objective criterion: enhancing diversity on the bench.

²¹ *Pay Frozen, More New York Judges Leave Bench*, New York Times, July 4, 2011

²² *Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan*, [2015] 1 SCR 245

²³ *Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.* [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 is an example of an unexpected and severe financial crisis that justified infringing on the constitutional imperative of equality under s. 15 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

The judiciary must reflect the Canadian population, including women, Black, Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPOC), disabled persons, persons of all gender and sexual identities, and members of other under-represented groups (collectively, “diverse”). Without diversity, the bench erodes its credibility among all Canadians and lacks first-hand knowledge of the racism and systemic discrimination these communities face. Appointing candidates to the judiciary from diverse groups would offer perspectives grounded in lived experience and thereby enrich the Canadian judiciary.

The CBA has long called for the governments to put into action a commitment to diversity in leadership by appointing more diverse candidates to the courts. As of 2019, only three percent of federal judicial appointees identified as Indigenous and only eight percent identified as visible minorities. There has never been a BIPOC judge appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Many diverse lawyers are involved in organizations that support and promote their members in various sectors, including the legal profession and the judiciary. For some outstanding candidates, the decision to apply to the bench means stepping back from some personal involvements and loyalties. Diverse lawyers may or may not be willing to give up their role in promoting, advocating for, and supporting their communities’ endeavours for a career on the bench. Reasonable compensation can create confidence so they can step away from these commitments without regret and demonstrate leadership for their communities, and the rest of Canada, by becoming a judge.

With fair and just compensation, the federal government will ensure it is casting its net as wide as possible in seeking candidates for the bench. The number of diverse candidates will expand to include more lawyers who have overcome systemic barriers to find success in private or public practice and who bring their lived experience to their duties on the bench.

V. PROTHONOTARY COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

The CBA asserted in submissions to Special Advisors on Federal Court Prothonotaries’ Compensation in 2008 and again in 2013²⁴ that principles of judicial independence should extend to judicial officers, like prothonotaries, who combine administrative functions with significant judicial decision-making responsibilities.²⁵

²⁴ [2008 submission](#); [2013 submission](#)

²⁵ *Supra*, note 19, para. 7

Prothonotaries' salaries and benefits must be at a level to attract the most qualified candidates. It must be commensurate with compensation for comparable judicial officers in other courts, such as traditional masters. And their compensation must reflect the respect with which the Federal Court is regarded, but at a level subordinate to Federal Court judges.

The CBA also urged a fixed, independent review process for setting prothonotary compensation and benefits, as a solution to prothonotaries negotiating their salary with government, a frequent litigant before them.

We are pleased that in 2014 the government included prothonotaries in the *Judges Act*:²⁶ prothonotary compensation is to be determined in future by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission; conduct governed by the Canadian Judicial Council; administration of salaries and benefits assumed by the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs; and training delivered through the National Judicial Institute.

The same principles applied in setting judicial compensation and benefits, as expressed above, should be applied when setting prothonotary compensation and benefits, recognizing that their level of compensation will be subordinate to Federal Court judges.

VI. CONCLUSION

The importance and intent of section 26 of the *Judges Act* cannot be overstated. If government declines to embrace fully the Commission's recommendations on judicial compensation and benefits, or delays acting on them, the integrity of the process for setting judicial compensation will be compromised. Ultimately, judicial independence may be threatened.

To summarize, the CBA urges the Commission to adopt the following principles:

1. Judicial salaries should be reasonable and responsive to economic conditions, to attract the most outstanding candidates for appointment. The Commission should recommend salaries consistent with prevailing market conditions. It should continue to use as a "comparable" the salary range of lawyers who are senior private practitioners and senior public servants as representative of the legal peers of the appointed justices.

²⁶ *Judges Act*, s. 2.1

2. Appropriate compensation levels should ensure that judges do not experience significant economic disparity between pre-appointment and post-appointment levels and that the most capable applicants for judicial appointments are not deterred from applying.
3. The same principles of judicial independence apply to prothonotary compensation. Their salaries and benefits must be at a level to attract the most qualified candidates, commensurate with compensation for comparable judicial officers in other courts. Their compensation must reflect the respect with which the Federal Court is regarded, but at a level subordinate to Federal Court judges.
4. Judicial compensation should be sufficient to attract the widest pool of outstanding candidates and, by extension, expand the number of outstanding candidates from diverse groups. Applying for judicial appointment must represent leadership and inclusion to these candidates so the bench reflects the diversity of Canadian society.
4. We urge the Commission to remind the government that its response to the Commission's Report must comply with section 26(7) of the *Judges Act*. Delays in response past the four-month timeframe will cast doubt on the importance the government assigns to judicial and prothonotary compensation, judicial independence and the rule of law. This is particularly relevant this year with the delays to this process caused by the pandemic.
5. The Commission may not consider reducing what would otherwise be considered appropriate judicial compensation because of competing financial priorities, without compelling evidence from the government that those competing priorities justify infringing on the constitutional imperative of judicial independence.
6. Parliament should be cautioned that its review of the Commission's report involves consideration of *constitutional principles*, such as the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary from the other branches of government. These considerations risk being endangered by a politicized process and by making any links between judicial remuneration and judicial decisions.

The CBA trusts that these remarks will assist the Commission in its important deliberations.