

IN THE MATTER OF THE *JUDGES ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1

**2020 JUDICIAL COMPENSATION  
AND BENEFITS COMMISSION**

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**GOVERNMENT'S BOOK OF DOCUMENTS**

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**March 29, 2021**

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9. Statistics Canada, “Standard Geographical Classification (SGC) 2016 – Volume I, The Classification”, (excerpts) online: <https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/subjects/standard/sgc/2016/introduction#a5.1>

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First Session  
Thirty-sixth Parliament, 1997-98

Première session de la  
trente-sixième législature, 1997-1998

SENATE OF CANADA

SÉNAT DU CANADA

*Proceedings of the Standing  
Senate Committee on*

*Délibérations du comité  
sénatorial permanent des*

## Legal and Constitutional Affairs

## Affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles

*Chairman:*  
The Honourable LORNA MILNE

*Présidente:*  
L'honorable LORNA MILNE

Wednesday, September 30, 1998

Le mercredi 30 septembre 1998

Issue No. 32

Fascicule n° 32

**Third meeting on:**  
Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act and to  
make consequential amendments to other Acts

**Troisième réunion concernant:**  
L'étude du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi  
sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence

WITNESSES:  
(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:  
(Voir à l'endos)

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON  
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

The Honourable Lorna Milne, *Chairman*

The Honourable Pierre Claude Nolin, *Acting Deputy Chairman*

and

The Honourable Senators:

Beaudoin	Kinsella
Bolduc	Lavoie-Roux
Bryden	* Lynch-Staunton
Fraser	(or Kinsella (acting))
* Graham, P.C. (or Carstairs)	Moore
Joyal, P.C.	Pépin

\* *Ex Officio Members*

(Quorum 4)

*Changes in membership of the committee:*

Pursuant to Rule 85(4), membership of the Committee was amended as follows:

The name of the Honourable Senator Milne substituted for that of the Honourable Senator Butts (*September 24, 1998*).

The name of the Honourable Senator Lewis resigned from the committee (*September 30, 1998*).

The name of the Honourable Senator Pépin substituted for that of the Honourable Senator Grafstein (*September 30, 1998*).

LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DES  
AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES ET CONSTITUTIONNELLES

*Présidente:* L'honorable Lorna Milne

*Vice-président intérimaire:* L'honorable Pierre Claude Nolin

et

Les honorables sénateurs:

Beaudoin	Kinsella
Bolduc	Lavoie-Roux
Bryden	* Lynch-Staunton
Fraser	(ou Kinsella (suppléant))
* Graham, c.p. (ou Carstairs)	Moore
Joyal, c.p.	Pépin

\* *Membres d'office*

(Quorum 4)

*Modifications à la composition du comité:*

Conformément à l'article 85(4) du Règlement, la liste des membres du comité est modifiée, ainsi qu'il suit:

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Milne est substitué à celui de l'honorable sénateur Butts (*le 24 septembre 1998*).

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Lewis résigné du comité (*le 30 septembre 1998*).

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Pépin est substitué à celui de l'honorable sénateur Grafstein (*le 30 septembre 1998*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

OTTAWA, Wednesday, September 30, 1998

(36)

[English]

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, met this day in Room 257, East Block, at 3:37 p.m., the Honourable Lorna Milne, Chairman, presiding.

*Members of the committee present:* The Honourable Senators Beaudoin, Bryden, Fraser, Joyal, P.C., Milne, Moore and Pépin (7).

*Other senators present:* The Honourable Senators Cools, Lawson, Murray, P.C., St. Germain, P.C. and Sparrow (5).

*In attendance:* Nancy Holmes, Research Officer, Research Branch, Library of Parliament.

Pursuant to the Order of Reference adopted by the Senate on Tuesday, September 22, 1998, the committee continued its consideration of Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts. (For full text of Order of Reference, See Issue No. 31, Wednesday, September 23, 1998).

## WITNESSES:

Mr. David Scott, Chair, 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits.

*From Gahrns & Laliberté:*

Ms Lucie Laliberté, Lawyer.

The Chairman made an opening statement.

Mr. David Scott answered questions.

Mr. Scott agreed to provide material to the Clerk about how judicial salaries are set in other jurisdictions.

At 5:01 p.m., the committee suspended.

At 5:07 p.m., the committee resumed.

The Chairman made an introductory statement.

Ms Lucie Laliberté made a statement and answered questions.

At 6:06 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

## ATTEST:

## PROCÈS-VERBAL

OTTAWA, le mercredi 30 septembre 1998

(36)

[Traduction]

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles se réunit aujourd'hui, à 15 h 37, dans la pièce 257 de l'édifice de l'Est, sous la présidence de l'honorable Lorna Milne (*présidente*).

*Membres du comité présents:* Les honorables sénateurs Beaudoin, Bryden, Fraser, Joyal, c.p., Milne, Moore et Pépin (7).

*Autres sénateurs présents:* Les honorables sénateurs Cools, Lawson, Murray, c.p., St. Germain, c.p. et Sparrow (5).

*Également présente:* Nancy Holmes, attachée de recherche, Direction de la recherche parlementaire, Bibliothèque du Parlement.

Conformément à l'ordre de renvoi adopté par le Sénat le mardi 22 septembre 1998, le comité poursuit son examen du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence. (*L'ordre de renvoi figure dans le fascicule n° 31 du mercredi 23 septembre 1998.*)

## TÉMOINS:

M. David Scott, président, Commission de 1995 sur le traitement et les avantages des juges.

*De Gahrns & Laliberté:*

Mme Lucie Laliberté, avocate.

La présidente fait une déclaration.

M. David Scott répond aux questions.

M. Scott accepte de fournir au greffier des renseignements sur la façon dont les salaires des juges sont fixés dans les autres compétences.

À 17 h 01, la séance est suspendue.

À 17 h 07, la séance reprend.

La présidente fait une déclaration.

Mme Lucie Laliberté fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

À 18 h 06, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

## ATTESTÉ:

*La greffière du comité,*

Heather Lank

*Clerk of the Committee*

## EVIDENCE

OTTAWA, Wednesday, September 30, 1998

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, to which was referred Bill C-37, to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, met this day at 3:37 p.m. to give consideration to the bill.

**Senator Lorna Milne** (*Chairman*) in the Chair.

[*English*]

**The Chairman:** We have before us Mr. David Scott, the author of the 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits.

We await your comments with some interest, Mr. Scott.

**Mr. David Scott, Chair, 1995 Commission on Judges' Salaries and Benefits:** I wish to reaffirm that I am one of the authors of this report. The other two authors are Michel Vennat, a distinguished lawyer with Stikeman Elliot in Montreal, and Barbara Rae, a very distinguished businesswoman from Vancouver. Ms Rae was an enormous resource for us, because she brought her background in personnel management to the job without the baggage of a connection to the judiciary. Since I have spent all of my life in the courts, I have a certain amount of baggage about the judiciary.

[*Translation*]

**Senator Beaudoin:** Your report is very interesting. I have a question about page 28 of your report, where you recommend that the Judges Act provide for the payment of a lifetime annuity to a common law spouse under legally applicable circumstances. I don't have any trouble with the whole question of paying out pensions, because that comes under section 100 of the Constitution. Everything is fine from that point of view.

When it comes to common law spouses, what do you mean by, "we recommend that the Judges Act allow for payments to a common law spouse, under legally applicable circumstances."

[*English*]

Does this refer to provincial law or to federal law? What do you mean by that?

**Mr. Scott:** We mean legal situations in which a person qualifies as a common-law spouse, which assumes a certain period of cohabitation. Our intent was not to define any circumstances in particular, but rather to take common-law spouses who had established rights in accordance with provincial law in all of the provinces, and to carry that forward for the benefit of the common-law spouses of judges.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Some of my colleagues will return to the issue of a common-law spouse.

**Senator Murray:** It is assumed that both parties to the common-law union are legally free to marry; that is to say, not married to someone else.

## TÉMOIGNAGES

OTTAWA, le mercredi 30 septembre 1998

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles, auquel a été renvoyé le projet de loi C-37, modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence, se réunit aujourd'hui à 15 h 37 pour l'étude du projet de loi.

**Le sénateur Lorna Milne** (*présidente*) occupe le fauteuil.

[*Traduction*]

**La présidente:** Notre témoin est M. David Scott, président de la commission de 1995 sur le traitement et les avantages des juges.

Nous sommes impatients d'entendre vos remarques, monsieur Scott.

**M. David Scott, président, Commission de 1995 sur le traitement et les avantages des juges:** Je tiens à réaffirmer que je suis l'un des auteurs de ce rapport. Les deux autres auteurs sont Michel Vennat, éminent avocat chez Stikeman Elliot à Montréal, et Barbara Rae, très réputée femme d'affaires de Vancouver. La contribution de Mme Rae nous a été précieuse, car elle nous a fait profiter de son expérience en matière de gestion du personnel sans le moindre rapport avec la magistrature. Étant donné que, personnellement, j'ai passé toute ma vie dans les tribunaux, il m'est difficile d'être complètement détaché de ce monde.

[*Français*]

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Votre rapport est très intéressant. Ma question concerne la page 28 de votre rapport où vous recommandez que la Loi sur les juges prévoit le versement au conjoint de fait, dans les circonstances légalement applicables, d'une rente viagère de conjoint survivant. Je n'ai pas de difficulté avec la question du paiement des pensions parce que cela tombe sous l'article 100 de la Constitution. Tout est parfait sur ce plan.

Pour les conjoints de fait, que voulez-vous dire par la phrase: «nous recommandons que la Loi sur les juges prévoit le versement au conjoint de fait, dans les circonstances légalement applicables.»

[*Traduction*]

S'agit-il de la législation provinciale ou fédérale? Qu'entendez-vous par là?

**M. Scott:** Il s'agit de situations juridiques où une personne est considérée comme un conjoint de fait, ce qui suppose une certaine période de cohabitation. Nous n'avions pas l'intention de définir certains cas précis, mais plutôt d'appliquer aux conjoints de fait des juges les règles concernant les conjoints de fait ayant établi des droits conformément aux lois provinciales dans toutes les provinces.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Certains de mes collègues reviendront à la question du conjoint de fait.

**Le sénateur Murray:** On parle du principe que les deux conjoints d'une union libre sont légalement libres de se marier; autrement dit, ils ne sont pas mariés à une autre personne.

**Mr. Scott:** Let me begin by saying that I am not a family law lawyer. However, I do not think that the definition of a common-law spouse assumes freedom to marry. If I understand your question, you are saying that if the person is already married, he or she is incapable of being a common-law spouse.

**Senator Murray:** Well, he or she is certainly incapable or legally marrying someone else.

**Mr. Scott:** I could be quite wrong, but I do not think that precludes someone from being a common-law spouse. In my understanding such a person can qualify as a common-law spouse.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Let us return to the first question on the commission. I do not have any problem with the commission as such. Whether we like it or not, the fact is that the Supreme Court has already said that, in order to protect judicial independence, we need an organization such as the commission. I know that Mr. Justice La Forest is dissenting on this, but the majority of the court is of the opinion that to have judicial independence we need a commission such as this one.

What is your opinion on this? I understand that the report is not binding on the legislative and the executive branches, but that if Parliament or the government disagrees, they must justify themselves, and even in court if necessary.

Did you study that problem for your report?

**Mr. Scott:** Senator, as a result of reading some of the debates which were held here, the only thing that alarmed me somewhat was the suggestion from some witnesses that the triennial commission system works fine and that we should stick with it.

My colleagues and I were in complete agreement that the triennial commission system not only did not work well, but that it did not work at all. It might have looked very appealing, but nothing ever happened. We felt very strongly that it became, as we said in our report, a mechanism that allowed the government of the day to do nothing about the judges, because doing something about the judges is a very unpopular thing.

The discussion that we are now having is most unique. Previously, no one wanted to do anything for the judges because people believe that judges were well looked after. That is, they have tenure and pensions and everything else, so there is no reason no bother with them. Politically, it is very unappetizing to be preoccupied with judges.

When we were appointed and began our work, we read what had happened before. Every previous commission had said that the system did not work. The government not take up any of the meaningful ideas for reform in terms of issues such as pay and allowances, nor did it take up any of the suggestions for reforming the triennial commission system. The thrust of our report is that this must be fixed.

**M. Scott:** Permettez-moi de dire d'entrée de jeu que je ne suis pas avocat spécialisé en droit de la famille. Toutefois, je ne pense pas que la définition d'un conjoint de fait suppose la liberté de se marier. Si je comprends bien votre question, vous dites que si la personne est déjà mariée, il lui est impossible d'être un conjoint de fait.

**Le sénateur Murray:** Il ou elle n'est absolument pas en mesure de se marier légalement avec quelqu'un d'autre.

**M. Scott:** Je me trompe peut-être, mais je ne pense pas que cela empêche qui que ce soit d'être un conjoint de fait. D'après mon interprétation, cette personne peut tout à fait être considérée comme un conjoint de fait.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Revenons-en à la première question sur la commission. Je n'ai rien à redire à l'existence de celle-ci. Que nous le voulions ou non, il n'en demeure pas moins que la Cour suprême a déjà statué que pour protéger l'indépendance de la magistrature, il nous faut une institution comme la commission. Je sais que le juge La Forest a exprimé une opinion divergente sur ce point, mais la majorité des juges de la cour sont d'avis que cette commission est nécessaire pour garantir l'indépendance judiciaire.

Qu'en pensez-vous? Sauf erreur, le rapport n'est pas obligatoire pour les appareils législatif et exécutif, mais si le Parlement ou le gouvernement ne sont pas d'accord, ils doivent fournir une justification, au besoin devant un tribunal.

Avez-vous étudié le problème pour votre rapport?

**M. Scott:** Sénateur, après avoir lu la transcription de certaines de vos délibérations, la seule chose qui m'ait quelque peu inquiété, ça a été d'entendre certains témoins déclarer que le système de la commission triennale est satisfaisant et qu'il ne faut rien y changer.

Mes collègues et moi étions parfaitement d'accord pour dire que le système de la commission triennale est non seulement imparfait, mais qu'il est carrément inutile. Cela paraît peut-être très attrayant à première vue, mais rien ne s'est jamais passé. Nous étions fermement convaincus que, comme nous l'affirmons dans notre rapport, c'est devenu un simple mécanisme qui permet au gouvernement de l'heure de ne rien faire au sujet des juges, car prendre des mesures à l'égard des juges est une initiative très peu populaire.

Le débat actuel est presque unique en son genre. Auparavant, personne ne voulait rien faire pour les juges croyait qu'ils étaient très bien lotis. Étant donné qu'ils ont un emploi garanti, droit à pension, et cetera, il n'y a aucune raison de s'occuper d'eux. Sur le plan politique, ce n'est pas très bien vu de se préoccuper des juges.

Lorsque notre commission a été nommée et que nous avons débuté nos travaux, nous avons lu ce qui s'était produit auparavant. Toutes les commissions précédentes avaient déclaré que le système ne fonctionnait pas. Le gouvernement n'a donné suite à aucune des idées intéressantes de réforme dans les domaines comme la rémunération et les indemnités, pas plus qu'il n'a retenu les propositions de remaniement du système de



Luckily, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the P.E.I. case came along at the same time. We certainly were not anticipating that, nor would we have developed any such notion, although I would defend it. We felt that the government should be forced to react to the views of the triennial commission. Further, we felt that it should be forced to table a bill; that the government should be forced to do something in order to legitimize the process of inviting citizens to take part in this lengthy study and then allowing it to drift off before a committee and disappear.

The most important thing to me is for this committee and anyone charged with responsibility to recognize that the triennial commission system does not work.

As I understand it, the bill does not provide for what the commission suggested, which was a requirement to table the bill — and I understand that that may be an unrealistic expectation — but that the government will have to respond in some way. Therefore we now have this overlay from the court, and the whole process will be subject to judicial review and the test will be rationality.

I confess that I read the very impressive statements before you from the law professors. I am not nearly as alarmed about it as they are. Constitutional substance aside, I believe that a test of rationality for a commission report such as this one will be a very easy threshold for the government of the day to meet. If it cannot meet rationality, then, constitutional imperatives aside, what is wrong with the notion that the court advanced?

As a member of this commission, I believe that something must be done to fix this problem. The bill goes a certain way to fixing it. The Supreme Court overlay is another question.

**Senator Beaudoin:** I understand your point of view, and I have great respect for it. The question is, what happens if the government does not like it? A strong majority of the court said that the executive and the legislative branches must justify their points of view. At the end, if there is what in French is called une impasse, then the court may rule on the basis of rationality.

**Mr. Scott:** Should the government be told that it has to give reasons? The judges do not like to be told that they have to give reasons, so for the judges to tell Parliament that they have to give reasons may be a bit offensive.

The bottom line is that it is a rationality test, and I am not nearly as alarmed about that as others are.

**Senator Joyal:** We have tried to understand the fundamental changes to the principle of our Constitution stemming from this proposal in Bill C-37. To put the issue simply, section 100 of the Constitution vested the responsibility to ensure appropriate compensation for judges in the Parliament of Canada. The triennial commission did not produce a satisfactory result in a reasonable period of time. It seems to us that, in the judges'

commission triennale. L'idée principale de notre rapport c'est qu'il faut changer ce système.

Heureusement, la Cour suprême du Canada a rendu en même temps sa décision dans l'affaire de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard. Ce fut une vraie surprise pour nous, car nous n'avions pas envisagé une telle chose, même si elle me paraît tout à fait justifiable. À notre avis, le gouvernement devrait être obligé de réagir aux opinions exprimées par la commission triennale. En outre, nous avons estimé qu'il devrait être obligé de déposer un projet de loi et de faire quelque chose pour légitimer le processus de consultation des Canadiens dans le cadre de cette étude prolongée, pour que ce projet de loi ne soit pas simplement renvoyé par un comité et qu'il disparaisse de la circulation.

Ce qui importe le plus à mes yeux, c'est que ce comité et tous ceux qui seront responsables du processus, reconnaissent que le système de commission triennale n'est pas satisfaisant.

D'après ce que je sais, le projet de loi ne prévoit pas ce qu'a proposé la commission, à savoir une exigence pour déposer le projet de loi — et je pense que c'est peut-être une attente peu réaliste — mais le gouvernement devra répondre d'une façon ou d'une autre. C'est pourquoi à la suite de la décision du tribunal, tout le processus fera l'objet d'une révision judiciaire et le critère sera la rationalité.

Je dois avouer que j'ai lu les témoignages très impressionnants fournis par des professeurs de droit devant votre comité. Je ne suis pas aussi inquiet qu'eux. Mis à part l'aspect constitutionnel, un critère de rationalité pour un rapport de commission comme celui-ci sera à mon avis un seuil très facile à atteindre pour le gouvernement du jour. S'il est impossible de remplir ce critère, mises à part toutes les exigences constitutionnelles, qu'y a-t-il de mal avec l'idée avancée par le tribunal?

En tant que membre de cette commission, je crois qu'il faut faire quelque chose pour résoudre le problème. Le projet de loi y contribue en partie. La décision de la Cour suprême et ce qu'elle implique sont une autre question.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Je comprends votre point de vue que je respecte vivement. Toutefois, que se passe-t-il si le gouvernement n'est pas d'accord? La grande majorité des juges de la Cour suprême ont déclaré que les appareils exécutif et législatif devraient justifier leur opinion. En fin de compte, si on en arrive à ce qu'on appelle une impasse, la cour pourra trancher en fonction de la rationalité.

**M. Scott:** Faut-il dire au gouvernement qu'il doit indiquer ses motifs? Les juges n'aiment pas qu'on leur dise qu'ils doivent fournir des motifs, et il est donc un peu choquant que les juges disent au Parlement de le faire.

En un mot, il s'agit d'un critère de rationalité et cela ne m'affole pas autant que d'autres.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Nous avons essayé de comprendre les modifications fondamentales au principe de la Constitution découlant de cette proposition dans le projet de loi C-37. En un mot, aux termes de l'article 100 de la Constitution, c'est au Parlement du Canada qu'il incombe de faire en sorte que les juges obtiennent une rémunération adéquate. La commission triennale n'a pas fourni un résultat satisfaisant au cours d'un délai

opinions, we ought to go to the other extreme whereby Parliament abandons its responsibility to have the final say in the vote for the appropriation to pay the salaries. In my opinion this is wrong. It is one thing to say that Parliament filibustered, but to amend the system by including a time frame within it so that there is an end result, either in the affirmative or in the negative, is the proper way to manage Parliament's responsibility. I can understand that and I think a reasonable citizen can understand that.

What goes beyond common sense is that the commission has no parameters to decide what constitutes a proper increase. The bill contains no criteria that defines the scope of the commission to decide upon what is a fair increase for whatever reasons they think are just. The other problem is that if the government does not give effect to the recommendations of the House of Commons or the Senate committee, or its own financial policies criteria, then the court might decide that there is litigation and the government must justify its decision in the court. We are both judges and parties in a decision like that. That is where the fine-tuning of the solution that is proposed to us must be investigated.

You have spent a lot of time with learned peoples to study the compensation for judges. Is it the same way in other countries — that is, do the judges have the last word on their pay increase and must the governments in those countries abide by commission reports because they do not have the capacity to say "No"? In Canada, the government civil service and the armed forces, among others, have had their salaries frozen. Judges are like other people; they make an effort. I am not against an increase in salaries at all. In fact, judges are underpaid in my opinion. However, in order not to go to the other extreme, we must protect the principles in the new system that we are putting into place. Can we not find a middle balance compared to what existed before, which did not produce a satisfactory result for the learned justices? Can we go the other way? There might be another way to fine-tune this.

**Mr. Scott:** The way you divide it out is the way to divide it. The decision of the court that the judges will have the last word on their salaries is one question; the whole question of the government having to meet a rationality test as proposed by the court is another question.

As far as the commission is concerned and the analysis of what is appropriate compensation, this has a historical base. Before 1981, there was no independent assessment of any kind. The triennial commission was established by statute as the basis of getting some independent input for Parliament about what is appropriate. Criteria for that would not be a good idea. How would you establish it? Would there be limits? No. The commission — that is, assuming that it is appropriately selected in terms of make-up — should be able to free-wheel in terms of what they think should happen. They then make a report. Up to that point, we have an appropriate historical basis for doing this.

raisonnable. Il nous semble que, de l'avis des juges, nous devrions en arriver à l'autre extrême, à savoir que le Parlement renonce à sa responsabilité d'avoir le dernier mot en votant les crédits nécessaires au paiement des traitements. C'est mal, à mon avis. C'est une chose de dire que le Parlement a fait de l'obstruction, mais si l'on veut que le Parlement assume comme il se doit sa responsabilité, il faut modifier le système en prévoyant un délai au bout duquel il faut en arriver à un résultat, qu'il soit positif ou négatif. Je peux le comprendre et je pense que tout citoyen raisonnable peut le comprendre également.

Ce qui échappe à l'entendement, c'est que la commission n'ait aucun paramètre pour décider de ce que représente une juste augmentation. Le projet de loi ne renferme aucun critère définissant la marge de manoeuvre dont dispose la commission pour décider de ce qui constitue une augmentation raisonnable, quelles que soient les raisons qu'elle trouve justes. Notre problème, c'est que si le gouvernement ne donne pas suite aux recommandations du comité de la Chambre des communes ou du Sénat, ni même aux critères de ses propres politiques financières, le tribunal pourra décider qu'il y a litige et le gouvernement devra justifier sa décision devant le tribunal. Nous serons donc à la fois juge et partie dans ce genre de cause. C'est pourquoi il faut trouver une façon de perfectionner la solution qui nous est proposée.

Vous avez passé beaucoup de temps aux côtés de personnes érudites à étudier la rémunération des juges. En va-t-il de même dans d'autres pays — c'est-à-dire, les juges ont-ils le dernier mot quant à leur augmentation de traitement et les gouvernements des pays en question doivent-ils respecter les rapports des commissions parce qu'il leur est impossible de dire «non»? Au Canada, la fonction publique et les forces armées, entre autres, se sont vu imposer un gel des salaires. Les juges sont comme les autres: ils font un effort. Je ne m'oppose pas à l'idée d'une augmentation de traitement. En fait, les juges sont même sous-payés à mon avis. Toutefois, pour ne pas en arriver à l'autre extrême, il faut protéger les principes dans le nouveau système que nous mettons en place. Ne peut-on pas trouver un juste milieu par rapport au système précédent, qui n'a pas donné de résultats satisfaisants pour nos érudits juges? Peut-on opter pour l'autre solution? Il y a peut-être une autre façon d'améliorer le système.

**M. Scott:** La distinction que vous faites est la bonne. La décision du tribunal selon laquelle les juges doivent avoir le dernier mot quant à leur traitement est une question; le fait que le gouvernement doive remplir un critère de rationalité comme le propose le tribunal en est une autre.

Pour ce qui est de la commission et de l'analyse qui constitue une rémunération, il y a des précédents. Avant 1981, il n'existait aucune évaluation indépendante. La commission triennale a été créée en vertu de la loi en vue de donner au Parlement un avis indépendant sur ce qui constituait une juste rémunération. Se fonder sur des critères ne serait pas une bonne idée. Comment procéder? Faudrait-il fixer des plafonds? Non. La commission — c'est-à-dire, à supposer que les membres qui la composent soient bien choisis — devrait avoir les coudées franches quant aux solutions qu'elle propose. Elle doit ensuite présenter un rapport. Jusque-là, il y a des précédents à cette façon de procéder.

What happens next? In our brief, we say that instead of nothing happening, something must happen.

**Senator Moore:** Within a set time-frame?

**Mr. Scott:** Yes. Otherwise, it is a screen of some design. Something must happen.

I accept the proposition that under the Constitution, Parliament will decide. Parliament should have the last word. We are talking about the mechanism for ensuring that something happens. This bill, which does not go as far as we hoped it would, says that within a fixed period of time government must react with a position statement. The court is saying that they must give reasons and the court will have this judicial review power. Whether or not people find that desirable is an interesting question. The court has spoken, so what happens next?

The task here is to fix on the nature of the commission, its make-up and its jurisdiction. It is important that that not get lost in the minds of some who are outraged about what the judges are doing to the vehicle of this judgment. I am more interested in what happens down the road and having a workable, practical commission that does the job.

**Senator Joyal:** I totally agree with you, as do some of my colleagues around the table, when you talk about a time-frame and trying to establish some kind of compelling agenda so that we arrive at the end of that process to have it resolved. That is a common understanding.

I have a slight reservation about your statement that you do not want criteria. Even the Supreme Court of Canada said that the commission should have some criteria. The judgment of the majority of the court was that the body must convene if a fixed period of time has elapsed since its last report in order to consider the inadequacy of judges' salaries in light of the cost of living and other relevant factors. Even the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that there must be some factors.

We cannot abandon to a commission the overall open-ended door to say, "Let us discuss whether or not we must increase judges' salaries." Perhaps judges in Australia had an increase last year. Our judges may say, "We work as hard as them, so we should have the same increase." There must be some criteria. Treasury Board negotiates with the union and they have criteria. The Government of Quebec will open negotiations with teachers, with unions, and with all the other services. They have some criteria such as equity, pay, and a lot of other principles that they want to implement.

It does not hurt my sense of democracy or fairness with judges if the commission is bound to follow specific criteria rather than offering us a general report that judges are nice people who are learned and forego part of their freedom to live in society because they are seen as symbols of rectitude, and so on. We all know that.

Que se passe-t-il ensuite? Dans notre mémoire, nous disons que quelque chose doit se produire, et qu'il ne faut pas en rester là.

**Le sénateur Moore:** Dans un certain délai?

**M. Scott:** Oui. Autrement, ce n'est que de la théorie. Il faut que quelque chose se produise.

J'accepte le postulat selon lequel aux termes de la Constitution, c'est au Parlement qu'il revient de décider. Le Parlement devrait avoir le dernier mot. Nous parlons du mécanisme qui garantit que quelque chose se passe. Le projet de loi, qui ne va pas aussi loin que nous l'espérions, stipule que dans un délai fixe, le gouvernement doit réagir par un énoncé de principe. Le tribunal affirme que le gouvernement doit justifier sa décision et que le tribunal aura ce pouvoir de révision judiciaire. Il serait intéressant de savoir si les gens estiment que c'est souhaitable. Le tribunal s'est prononcé, et que va-t-il se passer maintenant?

Il s'agit maintenant de prendre une décision quant à la nature de la commission, à sa composition et à son champ de compétence. Il importe que ceux qui sont choqués par l'attitude des juges ne perdent pas cela de vue. Ce qui m'intéresse davantage, c'est ce qui se passera ensuite et la garantie que nous aurons une commission pratique et en mesure de faire son travail.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous, tout comme certains de mes collègues autour de la table, quand vous parlez de délai et de l'adoption d'une sorte d'échéancier obligatoire, de sorte qu'une solution soit atteinte lorsque le délai est écoulé. Tout le monde est d'accord.

J'ai une petite réserve quant à votre déclaration selon laquelle il ne faut pas adopter de critères. Même la Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré que la commission devrait se fixer certains critères. La majorité des juges se sont dits d'avis que l'organisme devait se réunir si un certain délai s'était écoulé depuis son dernier rapport afin d'étudier l'insuffisance du traitement des juges en tenant compte du coût de la vie et d'autres facteurs pertinents. Même la Cour suprême du Canada a admis qu'il doit exister certains facteurs.

On ne peut pas laisser ainsi toute liberté à une commission en disant «discutons pour voir s'il faut ou non augmenter le traitement des juges». Les juges de l'Australie ont peut-être eu une augmentation de traitement l'an dernier. Les nôtres diront peut-être: «Nous travaillons aussi fort qu'eux, et nous avons donc droit à la même augmentation.» Il faut qu'il existe des critères. Le Conseil du Trésor négocie avec le syndicat et il y a des critères. Le gouvernement du Québec va entreprendre des négociations avec les enseignants, les syndicats et tous les autres services. Il se fondera sur des critères comme l'équité, la rémunération, et une foule d'autres principes qu'il souhaite mettre en vigueur.

À mon sens, il n'est ni antidémocratique ni injuste envers les juges d'exiger que la commission respecte des critères précis, au lieu de nous présenter un rapport général en disant que les juges sont des gens très bien qui sont érudits et qui renoncent à une partie de leur liberté de vie au sein de la société parce qu'ils sont considérés comme des symboles de droiture, et cetera. Nous le savons tous.

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Let us frame the mandate of the commission so that Parliament has a fair perception that those people are not just looking for any kind of increase — especially if we bound them to have a result at the end of the road. It is one thing to have everything on one side and nothing on the other side. I think it is a fair balance of the two. Even the court has recognized that.

**Mr. Scott:** I am not disagreeing with you. I am not saying that the commission should function arbitrarily. I am not sure how much needs to be said. The court said, “and other relevant criteria.” Will we now statutorily define the criteria? These previous triennial commissions — and let us exclude ours for the moment — followed the same process, namely, analyzing what salaries were in the private sector, what they were in the practising bar, and what they were in the government. They were then compared, as were the cost-of-living increases. That is the relevant criteria.

If you talk about hard criteria, such as whether the judges' salaries should be measured against the salaries of civil servants, our American friends are in the process of trying to disengage that right now. There is a kind of lock-step arrangement there and they are trying to eliminate it. I am not saying that there should not be any criteria, but once you start down the road of developing criteria, you may create a monster. These commissions should take into account all the relevant factors — certainly not irrelevant factors or arbitrary factors. You would not confine it to cost-of-living increases, although it would be a logical thing to consider. I am not sure what the relevant criteria would be.

**Senator Joyal:** When you did your report, you followed a certain number of criteria. What are they?

**Mr. Scott:** Those were exactly the criteria that anyone would use to complete this task. No one provided us with criteria. The criteria were: what the judges are making now, what they made previously, what they are making elsewhere, what groups comparable to them are making, and the judges' situation. The problem of what to consider was not a large one. The process of determining what to consider was important, but we were not stuck on it.

We were stuck on the question of whether we should be bound by some public service compensation level. That has been a traditional debate in these commissions. However, that aside, I do not think there was much problem deciding what to consider.

**Senator Bryden:** It is my understanding that under the bill the recommendation of government, based on the commission's report, will be presented to Parliament and enacted by Parliament. Is that correct?

**Mr. Scott:** Yes.

**Senator Bryden:** It is also my understanding that there are at least two places where the court now says clearly that it can intervene. First, it can intervene if the commission itself, like any other administrative tribunal, is alleged to have gone outside its jurisdiction. In such a case, it can quash the decision reached by

Façonnons le mandat de la commission pour que le Parlement ait l'impression que ces personnes ne sont pas simplement à la recherche d'une augmentation quelconque — surtout si nous exigeons qu'elle fournisse un résultat à la fin du processus. C'est une chose d'avoir tout d'un côté et rien de l'autre. À mon avis, cela représente un juste équilibre entre les deux et même la Cour suprême l'a admis.

**M. Scott:** Je ne suis pas en désaccord avec vous. Je ne prétends pas que la commission doive fonctionner de façon arbitraire. Je ne sais pas s'il faut être très précis. Le tribunal a dit: «et les autres critères pertinents». Faudra-t-il désormais définir les critères dans la loi? Les commissions triennales précédentes — et oublions la nôtre pour l'instant — ont suivi le même processus, c'est-à-dire qu'elles se sont penchées sur les niveaux de traitement dans le secteur privé, parmi les membres du barreau, et au gouvernement. Puis elles ont fait des comparaisons en tenant compte de la hausse du coût de la vie. Voilà le critère pertinent.

Si vous parlez de critères stricts, par exemple savoir si le traitement des juges doit être évalué par rapport à celui des fonctionnaires, nos amis américains sont justement en train de laisser tomber ce système. Ils appliquent un régime de rémunération par échelon et essaient de le supprimer. Je ne dis pas qu'il ne devrait y avoir aucun critère, mais lorsqu'on commence à élaborer des critères, on risque de créer un monstre. Ces commissions devraient tenir compte de tous les facteurs pertinents — et évidemment pas de facteurs futiles ou arbitraires. Il ne faut pas qu'elles se limitent aux hausses du coût de la vie, même si cela paraît logique à première vue. Je ne sais pas quel devrait être le critère pertinent.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Lorsque vous avez rédigé votre rapport, vous vous êtes fondés sur un certain nombre de critères. Lesquels?

**M. Scott:** C'étaient exactement les critères que l'on utiliserait pour faire ce genre de travail. Personne ne nous a fourni de critères. Nous avons tenu compte du niveau de rémunération actuel des juges, de leur rémunération antérieure, de la rémunération des juges dans d'autres pays, de celle de groupes comparables aux juges et de la situation des juges. La question à prendre en ligne de compte ne posait pas de problème. Le processus de détermination des questions à étudier était important, mais il n'y avait rien de définitif pour nous.

Ce qui nous tenait à coeur, c'était de savoir s'il fallait nous en tenir à un niveau de rémunération en vigueur dans la fonction publique. Cela a toujours été un sujet de discussion traditionnel au sein de ces commissions. Cela mis à part, il n'a pas été trop difficile de choisir les questions à étudier.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Sauf erreur, aux termes du projet de loi, la recommandation du gouvernement, fondée sur le rapport de la commission, sera présentée au Parlement et adoptée par ce dernier. Est-ce exact?

**M. Scott:** Oui.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Si je ne m'abuse, il y a au moins deux cas où le tribunal affirme clairement qu'il peut intervenir. Tout d'abord, il peut le faire si la commission proprement dite, à l'instar de tout autre tribunal administratif, est accusée d'avoir outrepassé son champ de compétence. Dans ce cas-là, le tribunal

the commission. The court probably cannot substitute its own position, but it can ask the commission to take the matter up again. That is the normal administrative law procedure.

The courts appear to be taking the position that, if the government acts on the commission's report and someone says that the government has made an irrational decision, that person can make an application to the court for a judicial review of the government's decision. That review could, in a proper case, allow for the quashing of that decision. Is that true?

**Mr. Scott:** Yes. My understanding is that the theme of the judgment is that the rationality test is tied to undermining independence. In other words, the basis for going this route is the question of preserving independence. I do agree with what you have said, however.

**Senator Bryden:** I do not want to bring in "the ubiquitous reasonable man," which is where the rationality test takes us, but I would like to go one step further.

The commission makes its recommendation, which is accepted by the government. The government drafts a bill and presents it to Parliament. Parliament debates the bill and rejects it. On the independence test under the Constitution, is it possible for an application to be made to a judge to quash the act of Parliament because it is in violation of the Constitution Act, which gives independence to judges?

**Mr. Scott:** Forgive me, because I am the furthest thing from a parliamentarian. If Parliament rejects the bill, however, is there an act of Parliament at all?

**Senator Bryden:** Let me just vary the question a bit. Let us say that the act of Parliament is passed, but it grants the judges only \$1.

The concern that some of us have is that, after documents such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Parliament has been allowed to keep very few real parliamentary rights vis-à-vis the courts. The time when Parliament was supreme went out the window with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Parliament has always jealously guarded its right to appropriate taxes — the citizens' dollars.

That is what is troubling a number of us. Are the courts now saying, under the guise of protecting the independence of the judiciary, that the judiciary can override decisions made at the parliamentary level, and say that a particular judgment is irrational and interferes with the constitutional independence of the judiciary?

**Mr. Scott:** I believe that is what is being said. I will come to the reasons for that in a moment. If the government tables a bill that is not highly recommended by the commission, and the bill becomes law, it is my understanding that the case is saying that the courts, on judicial review, can intervene. That is a bit of a misnomer in terms of judicial review, because it would be questioning the constitutionality of a statute. However, that is the way the court would intervene. It would be confronted with this statute, and it would be exactly the same if the government proposed that the recommendations be followed and Parliament

peut casser la décision de la commission. Il ne peut sans doute pas imposer sa propre décision à la place, mais il peut demander à la commission de se pencher à nouveau sur la question. C'est la procédure normale en droit administratif.

Le tribunal semble partir du principe que, si le gouvernement donne suite au rapport de la commission et que quelqu'un déclare qu'il a pris une décision illogique, cette personne peut demander au tribunal de procéder à une révision judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement. Cette révision pourrait, selon le cas, permettre l'annulation de cette décision. Est-ce bien vrai?

**M. Scott:** Oui. D'après mon interprétation, le principe de la décision est que le critère de rationalité est lié à l'empiètement sur l'indépendance. Autrement dit, si l'on agit de cette façon, c'est pour préserver l'indépendance de la magistrature. Je suis toutefois d'accord avec ce que vous avez dit.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Je ne veux pas faire intervenir le critère de «la personne raisonnable omniprésente», sur lequel débouche le critère de la rationalité, mais j'aimerais aller un peu plus loin.

La commission formule ses recommandations qui sont acceptées par le gouvernement. Ce dernier rédige un projet de loi et le présente au Parlement. Ce dernier débat du projet de loi et le rejette. En fonction du critère de l'indépendance prévu dans la Constitution, est-il possible de demander à un juge d'annuler la loi du Parlement parce qu'elle enfreint la Loi constitutionnelle, laquelle garantit l'indépendance des juges?

**M. Scott:** Pardonnez-moi, car je ne connais rien au régime parlementaire. Si le Parlement rejette le projet de loi, toutefois, y a-t-il une loi du Parlement?

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Permettez-moi de reformuler la question. Disons que la loi du Parlement est adoptée, mais elle accorde aux juges seulement 1 \$.

Ce qui inquiète certains d'entre nous c'est que, après l'adoption de documents comme la Charte des droits et libertés, le Parlement a été autorisé à conserver très peu de droits parlementaires réels par rapport aux tribunaux. L'entrée en vigueur de la Charte des droits et libertés a marqué la fin de la suprématie du Parlement. Ce dernier a toujours protégé jalousement son droit à l'égard des impôts et taxes — les deniers publics.

C'est ce qui préoccupe un certain nombre d'entre nous. Les tribunaux affirment-ils maintenant, sous prétexte de protéger l'indépendance de la magistrature, que les décisions des juges peuvent l'emporter sur celles du Parlement, et qu'une décision particulière est illogique et entrave l'indépendance constitutionnelle de la magistrature?

**M. Scott:** Je crois que c'est ce qui se dit. Je vais vous expliquer pourquoi dans un instant. Si le gouvernement dépose un projet de loi qui n'est pas chaleureusement recommandé par la commission, et que le projet prend force de loi, sauf erreur, il est dit que les tribunaux peuvent intervenir au moyen d'une révision judiciaire. En fait, c'est un euphémisme car cela reviendrait à mettre en cause la constitutionnalité d'une loi. Toutefois, c'est de cette façon que le tribunal interviendrait. Il serait confronté à cette loi et il en irait exactement de même si le gouvernement proposait de donner suite aux recommandations et que le Parlement rejetait cette

rejected it. I believe that you have analyzed that correctly. I may have this wrong, but that is my reading of it.

What happens if Parliament passes a bill which is deliberately drafted with a view to controlling the behaviour of judges by attacking them economically? What happens if the commission says that the judges have not had a pay raise for 40 years and they are on the poverty lines, yet Parliament attempts to further reduce their salaries? What mechanism do we have to deal with that?

**Senator Bryden:** The answer to your question is that you would get another Parliament. In a democracy, the final arbiter used to be the people who elected the parliamentarians and if the parliamentarians acted that ridiculously, the parliamentarians got voted out of office.

I hope I am not over-simplifying this, but the concern is that, in addition to all the other powers that now reside in the Supreme Court, we will now give the justices the power to tax. That is, they will be in a position to reject Parliament's decision that the people of Canada cannot afford to do a certain thing, even though it was recommended by the commission and by the government, and to increase the amount of money allocated for judges. We can go through this whole process and have the court say that the result is not acceptable.

Do the justices then fix the amount, or do they do the normal thing, which is to say, "Go back and try again"?

**Mr. Scott:** I think they say, "Go back and try again."

**Senator Bryden:** That is of real concern to many of us who grew up believing that Parliament had some power.

**Mr. Scott:** I understand that, and I suppose it depends upon one's point of view. I look at it entirely from the point of view of the independence of the judiciary. To take a far-fetched example, if a Parliament duly elected by the citizenry concluded that the judiciary was out of control and that therefore Parliament would undermine it economically, it would be modest comfort only to know that the Governor General might not sign the bill into law, or that we could have an election. Presumably, by this time Parliament is uttering the will of the people.

I understand what you are saying. I understand the concern.

I would be very surprised if the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, and their numbers who supported this notion, contemplated it extending as far as you have described it.

**Senator Bryden:** I am sure they did not. We are here to try to make sure that we understand all the implications of what is being stated here.

It bothers me as an individual that this is the only time in 130 years that, to preserve the independence of our judiciary, the Supreme Court is requesting the right to review. It was never required before. Why is it necessary, all of a sudden, at this stage?

proposition. Je pense que votre analyse est bonne. Je me trompe peut-être, mais c'est mon interprétation de la question.

Que se passe-t-il si le Parlement adopte un projet de loi délibérément rédigé dans le but de contrôler le comportement des juges en les attaquant sur le plan économique? Que se passe-t-il si la commission déclare que les juges n'ont pas eu d'augmentation depuis 40 ans et qu'ils vivent au seuil de la pauvreté, et que pourtant le Parlement essaie de réduire encore leur traitement? Quel mécanisme existe-t-il pour résoudre ce problème?

**Le sénateur Bryden:** La réponse à votre question, c'est qu'il y aurait un autre Parlement. En démocratie, c'est la population chargée d'élire les parlementaires qui est l'arbitre en dernier recours et, si les parlementaires agissaient de façon aussi ridicule, ils seraient remplacés aux prochaines élections.

J'espère ne pas m'exprimer de façon trop simpliste, mais ce qu'il est à craindre c'est que, outre tous les autres pouvoirs dont jouit actuellement la Cour suprême, nous donnions désormais aux juges le pouvoir de percevoir des impôts. Autrement dit, ils seront en mesure de rejeter la décision du Parlement selon laquelle les Canadiens n'ont pas les moyens de faire telle ou telle chose, même si cela a été recommandé par la commission et par le gouvernement, et d'accroître la rémunération des juges. Il peut arriver que, une fois le processus terminé, le tribunal décide que le résultat est inadmissible.

Les juges vont-ils alors fixer le montant de leur rémunération, ou feront-ils ce qu'il est normal de faire, à savoir déclarer: «Remettez-vous au travail»?

**M. Scott:** Je pense que c'est ce qu'ils diront.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Cela inquiète vivement bon nombre d'entre nous qui ont grandi dans la conviction que le Parlement détenait certains pouvoirs.

**M. Scott:** Je comprends bien, et je suppose que tout dépend du point de vue de chacun. J'aborde la question sous l'angle de l'indépendance de la magistrature. Pour prendre un exemple tiré par les cheveux, si un Parlement élu en bonne et due forme par les électeurs concluait que les magistrats agissent de façon débridée et qu'il décidait de leur nuire sur le plan économique, il serait réconfortant de savoir que le Gouverneur général pourra refuser de donner force de loi au projet de loi ou que l'on pourra avoir des élections. Sans doute que cette fois-là le Parlement exprimera la volonté du peuple.

Je comprends ce que vous voulez dire. Je comprends votre préoccupation.

Je serais très surpris que les juges de la Cour suprême du Canada, et les autres qui ont appuyé cette idée, aient envisagé de pousser les choses aussi loin que ce que vous nous dites.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Je suis sûr qu'ils ne l'ont pas fait. Notre rôle, c'est de faire en sorte que l'on comprenne bien toutes les répercussions de ces déclarations.

À titre personnel, je suis préoccupé de voir que, pour la première fois en 130 ans, pour préserver l'indépendance de la magistrature, la Cour suprême demande le droit d'examen. Elle ne l'a jamais fait auparavant. Pourquoi est-ce soudain nécessaire à ce stade?

**The Chairman:** To follow up in the same area, if the court quashed a bill of this nature, they would not then have the power to tax, because what would stand at that point would be the previous bill, would it not?

**Senator Bryden:** Quashing it means that we must try it again.

**Mr. Scott:** It means that the existing regime would continue.

**Senator Bryden:** It is an indirect ability, because they could go back and say, "Add another 10 and another 10 until we get something that is acceptable."

If the judges rule and say that they will quash the bill for Constitutional reasons, does the notwithstanding clause then come into effect, or is there no ability for it to operate in that situation?

**Mr. Scott:** No, it does not come into effect in that situation.

**Senator Murray:** The process that is provided for in this bill is that the commission submits its report and the Minister of Justice is obliged to table it in each of the Houses of Parliament within 10 days, effectively. The report must then be referred to this committee, to the Senate, and to our counterparts in the House of Commons. They have 90 sitting days to report their findings. It then says that "the Minister of Justice shall respond to a report within six months after receiving it."

Are we certain that the obligation is there is for the Minister of Justice to respond to the commission's report or to the parliamentary committee? If you look at the marginal notes on page 4 there is "Report by Committee," "Definition of 'sitting day'," and then "Response to report." I ask the question because it is quite normal under the rules in the House of Commons that the government is obliged to respond to reports of parliamentary committees within a certain period of time. We do not have a similar rule in the Senate.

I am not aware that ministers or the government are obliged by statute to respond to reports of other commissions, although they may be obliged to do so.

**Mr. Scott:** The intent is that the minister respond to the report of the commission. Whether that is regarded by senators as desirable or otherwise, I believe that is the intent. That is because we, and a succession of commissions before us, were of the view that the government should be required to respond rather than simply say nothing. That is my understanding, but I could be wrong.

**Senator Murray:** We should probably ask the minister.

**The Chairman:** That is a good question to ask the representatives of the department when they return here.

**Mr. Scott:** I think that is correct.

**Senator Beaudoin:** In the same line as the one taken by Senator Bryden, is it true that if the government is resisting the commission's recommendation, the government may have to justify its stand? If I understand the bill correctly, it means that the

**La présidente:** Dans la même veine, si le tribunal annulait un projet de loi de ce genre, les juges n'auraient pas de pouvoir en matière d'imposition puisque les mesures législatives en vigueur seraient celles de la loi précédente, n'est-ce pas?

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Annuler le projet de loi signifie qu'il nous faut essayer à nouveau.

**M. Scott:** Cela signifie que le régime actuel restera en vigueur.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Ils disposent indirectement de ce pouvoir car ils pourraient revenir à la charge en disant «Ajoutez encore 10 et 10 encore jusqu'à ce que nous obtenions un montant acceptable.»

Si les juges tranchent et déclarent qu'ils vont annuler le projet de loi pour des raisons constitutionnelles, la clause dérogatoire prend-elle alors effet ou est-il impossible qu'elle s'applique en l'occurrence?

**M. Scott:** Non, elle ne s'applique pas dans ces cas-là.

**Le sénateur Murray:** En vertu du processus prévu dans le projet de loi, la commission présente son rapport et le ministre de la Justice est obligé de le déposer devant les deux Chambres du Parlement dans les 10 jours. Le rapport doit ensuite être renvoyé à notre comité, au Sénat et à nos homologues de la Chambre des communes. Les comités ont 90 jours ouvrables pour présenter le rapport de leurs conclusions. Il est dit ensuite que «le ministre de la Justice donne suite au rapport au plus tard six mois après l'avoir reçu».

Sommes-nous certains que le ministre de la Justice a l'obligation de donner suite au rapport de la commission ou au comité parlementaire? Si vous examinez les notes en marge de la page 4, elles mentionnent «Étude en comité et rapport», «Définition de "jour de séance"» et «Suivi». Je pose la question parce que le Règlement de la Chambre des communes oblige le gouvernement à répondre aux rapports des comités parlementaires dans un certain délai. Nous n'avons pas la même règle au Sénat.

À ma connaissance, les ministres ou le gouvernement ne sont pas tenus, par la loi, de donner suite aux rapports des autres commissions, même s'ils peuvent être tenus de le faire.

**M. Scott:** Cette disposition vise à faire en sorte que le ministre donne suite au rapport de la commission. Que les sénateurs jugent cela souhaitable ou non, je crois que c'est le but recherché. C'est parce que, comme diverses commissions qui nous ont précédés, nous estimions que le gouvernement devrait être tenu de donner suite au lieu de se contenter de ne rien dire. C'est ainsi que j'ai compris les choses, mais je me trompe peut-être.

**Le sénateur Murray:** Nous devrions sans doute poser la question à la ministre.

**La présidente:** C'est une bonne question à poser aux représentants du ministère lorsqu'ils reviendront.

**M. Scott:** En effet.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Dans le même esprit que la question du sénateur Bryden, est-il vrai que, si le gouvernement s'oppose à la recommandation de la commission, il peut avoir à se justifier? Si j'ai bien compris le projet de loi, cela veut dire que le fardeau

burden of evidence is on the shoulders of the legislated branch of the state. It is not often that we have that, but it is there. The court ruled on this in the provincial court judges reference.

However, the court may intervene only if it is not rational. That is the way I read the statute. It does not mean — and I would object strongly to this — that the court itself would fix the salaries. That would be quite unacceptable. I cannot see how we can go that far.

What is your understanding of this? In other words, the court may say: Your refusal is not rational. That means you must try again.

**Mr. Scott:** That is correct.

**Senator Beaudoin:** That does not mean more, which is quite something.

**Mr. Scott:** As Senator Beaudoin says, it is quite something.

**Senator Beaudoin:** At least the power of the court is on the irrationality, not on the question of taxation or things of that sort. I know it is close.

**Mr. Scott:** Rightly or wrongly, it is on rationality as measured by the undermining of independence. It is not economic rationality or some other rationality. I could be wrong, but that is the way I read the judgment. The court is concerned only with the issue of independence, so the rationality is at issue.

**Senator Beaudoin:** What was raised by Senator Bryden is that the last word is given to a court in a court case.

**Mr. Scott:** Yes, but it is not given to them to fix their salaries.

**Senator Beaudoin:** It is not to fix the salaries, so it means to try it again?

**Mr. Scott:** That is correct.

**Senator Beaudoin:** The court was not unanimous, but they do not need to be unanimous on this. There was a strong majority to that effect in the court.

**Mr. Scott:** That is correct.

**Senator Beaudoin:** We cannot go further than that on that precise question. We may like it or dislike it, but the fact is that there is already one advisory opinion of the court that says that the mechanism of a commission is good. We must abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.

I cannot see how we may use the notwithstanding clause in this because it is not a Charter case. It is a basic principle of the Canadian Constitution that is judicial independence. This is a difficult debate. The legislative area and the judiciary have been separate in Canada for 300 years. It is one of the basic principles of our Constitution. However, in a case like this it is a bit technical. I am glad that we must solve an interesting question like that.

de la preuve incombe au pouvoir législatif. Ce n'est pas souvent le cas, mais c'est ce qui est prévu ici. La Cour suprême s'est prononcée sur cette question dans le renvoi des juges de la Cour provinciale.

Néanmoins, la cour ne peut intervenir que si la décision n'est pas rationnelle. C'est ainsi que je comprends la loi. Cela ne veut pas dire — et je m'y opposerais énergiquement — que la cour fixerait elle-même la rémunération. Ce serait tout à fait inacceptable. Je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions aller aussi loin.

Comment comprenez-vous la situation? Autrement dit, la cour pourrait dire: votre refus n'est pas rationnel. Cela veut dire qu'il faut réexaminer votre position.

**M. Scott:** C'est exact.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Cela ne veut pas dire plus, ce qui est déjà quelque chose.

**M. Scott:** Comme le dit le sénateur Beaudoin, c'est déjà quelque chose.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Au moins, le pouvoir du tribunal porte sur le fait que la décision est irrationnelle et non pas sur la question de l'imposition, ce genre de choses. Je sais que la nuance est mince.

**M. Scott:** À tort ou à raison, il détermine si la décision est rationnelle ou non en fonction de la mesure dans laquelle l'indépendance des juges se trouve limitée. La décision n'a pas à être rationnelle sur le plan économique ou autre. Je me trompe peut-être, mais c'est ainsi que je comprends le jugement. La cour se préoccupe uniquement de la question de l'indépendance et c'est sur ce plan que la décision doit être rationnelle.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Le sénateur Bryden a fait valoir que le tribunal avait le dernier mot.

**M. Scott:** Oui, mais ce n'est pas lui qui fixe la rémunération.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Il ne fixe pas la rémunération, mais il demande que l'on réexamine le dossier?

**M. Scott:** C'est exact.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Les juges de la Cour suprême n'étaient pas unanimes, mais l'unanimité n'est pas nécessaire. Il y avait une forte majorité.

**M. Scott:** En effet.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Nous ne pouvons pas aller plus loin sur cette question précise. Que cela nous plaise ou non, le fait est que la Cour suprême s'est déjà prononcée en faveur du mécanisme que représente la commission. Nous devons nous conformer à cette décision.

Je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions invoquer la clause dérogatoire étant donné que la Charte n'est pas en cause. Il s'agit là d'un principe fondamental de la Constitution canadienne, celui de l'indépendance de la magistrature. C'est un débat complexe. Le pouvoir législatif et le pouvoir judiciaire sont séparés au Canada depuis 300 ans. C'est un des principes fondamentaux de notre Constitution. Néanmoins, dans un cas comme celui-ci, le problème est quelque peu technique. Je me réjouis que nous ayons à résoudre une question aussi intéressante.



**Senator Sparrow:** Let us say that there were no recommendations in the report that the status quo be maintained. What would happen then?

You suggested that that report must go to Parliament. If there was a status quo, you suggest that it still must go to Parliament with no changes. If they did in some way or other go to the house, the judge would determine whether Parliament had made an irrational decision.

Could the irrational decision have been made by the commission? That recommendation had gone, and now the government — Parliament — backed that decision, and it was irrational in both cases? Does the court still decide that the commission was irrational, as well as Parliament? If in fact there was no report, could that be considered an irrational decision because there was no recommendation for any changes?

**Mr. Scott:** I think that Senator Bryden's point is the correct one. If the commission exceeds its jurisdiction by irrationality, if that is possible, then judicial review would lie anyway.

My sense of the rationality here at issue is the government's response to the commission's report rather than the commission's report itself. In other words, the point of the independent commission is that it will be an independent adviser to government, and the concern is that governments are arbitrarily ignoring it. If the commission itself, by its methodology or what it says, is demonstrably irrational or lacks in jurisdiction or whatever, I believe that judicial review would lie anyway, whatever this case provides.

The irrationality or rationality is in the government's reaction to the commission's report. That is what I understand the Supreme Court of Canada is dealing with in the P.E.I. case.

**Senator Sparrow:** But if both decisions were irrational, in the opinion of a judge, what then?

**Mr. Scott:** I suppose that if the commission's decision were irrational to a level which merited judicial review, that would be the first step. Obviously, if the judges were challenging it, the first step is to either be supporting the commission's decision or attacking it. This is all premised on the proposition, as I appreciate it, that this independent commission will make a rational recommendation that will be arbitrarily rejected by government.

[Translation]

**Senator Pépin:** According to clause 45, a judge who is in receipt of an annuity can leave his pension to his common law spouse whom he has lived with for at least one year. Some people have pointed out to us that in most provinces, the requirement is three year's cohabitation. Could you explain this to us?

[English]

**Mr. Scott:** I have read what has been said to your committee about this. Certainly, three years is the provincial standard in many jurisdictions. I am not an expert in this area so I will be of no use to you. However, my understanding is that this is an expression of the regime in place in other areas. However, I have

**Le sénateur Sparrow:** Disons que le rapport ne recommande pas de maintenir le statu quo. Que se passerait-il alors?

Vous dites que ce rapport doit être soumis au Parlement. Si le statu quo est maintenu, vous dites qu'il faut quand même le soumettre au Parlement sans proposer de changement. Si c'est le cas, le juge établirait si le Parlement a pris une décision irrationnelle.

Cette décision irrationnelle pourrait-elle avoir été prise par la commission? La recommandation a été faite et maintenant le gouvernement et le Parlement l'appuient et, dans les deux cas, on a agi de façon irrationnelle. Le tribunal estimera-t-il que la commission a pris une décision irrationnelle, de même que le Parlement? S'il n'y a pas eu de rapport, peut-on considérer que cette décision est irrationnelle étant donné qu'aucun changement n'a été recommandé?

**M. Scott:** Je pense que le sénateur Bryden a raison. Si la commission outrepassé son mandat en prenant une décision irrationnelle, il y aurait de toute façon un examen judiciaire.

Ce dont il faut tenir compte ici, selon moi, c'est de la réponse du gouvernement au rapport de la commission plutôt que du rapport de la commission comme tel. Autrement dit, la commission indépendante doit agir comme conseiller indépendant auprès du gouvernement et l'on craint ici que ce dernier décide arbitrairement de ne pas en tenir compte. Si la commission se montre irrationnelle, par sa méthodologie ou par ses propos ou encore parce qu'elle outrepassé son champ de compétence, je crois que la révision judiciaire aura lieu de toute façon.

Ce qu'il y aura de rationnel ou d'irrationnel, ce sera la réaction du gouvernement au rapport de la commission. Si je comprends bien, c'est dans cet esprit que la Cour suprême du Canada a abordé la cause de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard.

**Le sénateur Sparrow:** Mais si le juge estime que les deux décisions sont irrationnelles, que se passe-t-il?

**M. Scott:** Si la décision de la commission est irrationnelle au point de justifier un examen judiciaire, ce sera la première étape. Bien entendu, si les juges la contestent, il s'agit d'abord d'appuyer ou de réfuter la décision de la commission. Tout cela part du principe que cette commission indépendante va faire une recommandation rationnelle que le gouvernement rejettera arbitrairement.

[Français]

**Le sénateur Pépin:** L'article 45 indique que les juges pensionnés peuvent laisser leur pension à leur conjoint de fait avec lequel ils ont cohabité depuis au moins un an. Des personnes ont attiré notre attention sur le fait que dans les régimes de la plupart des provinces, on parle d'une période de trois ans. Pouvez-vous nous éclairer à ce sujet?

[Traduction]

**M. Scott:** J'ai lu ce qui a été dit à votre comité à ce sujet. Trois ans représentent sans doute la norme dans de nombreuses provinces. Comme je ne suis pas expert en la matière, je ne peux pas vous éclairer. Néanmoins, si j'ai bien compris, cela reflète le régime en place ailleurs. J'ignore toutefois si cela s'éloigne ou

no idea whether this is a departure or whether this is an expression of the statutory regime in place in the provinces. I am just not on top of this. My recollection was that it was three years, but obviously this one-year provision is defensible based on the survivors' benefits, which do not apply to judges. I am sorry that I am of no help.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Someone said that this bill is harmonizing the situation of judges with that of people in other areas of the public service, such as the RCMP.

**The Chairman:** I believe that it is harmonizing it with the public service.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Yes, and even members of Parliament.

**The Chairman:** Yes. We will hear from another witness who is knowledgeable in this area. We can ask the question again then.

**Senator Joyal:** Did you study how other common-law systems comparable to Canada deal with this issue of judges' compensation to protect the principle of the judiciary's independence?

**Mr. Scott:** We did. While walking here from my office, I was wondering where our research papers had gone. They have all gone back to the judicial affairs centre and I will see if I can find them.

We did a study of that. As I am sure you have been told, in some Australian states they have negative resolution. I believe they have that in New South Wales. In others, they have commissions that have powers to recommend only. I could not list them for you, but the one most aggressively favourable to the judges is the negative resolution system, which is in place in New South Wales, Australia. The report is tabled and if there is no bill rejecting it, it becomes law.

**Senator Joyal:** Do you know the system in the U.K. generally?

**Mr. Scott:** I cannot recollect it. We did a study of that, but I cannot now remember what we learned. I will find out and send it up to the clerk.

**Senator Joyal:** I should like to come back to the question of rationality. As you realize, it is something that bothers us a lot. You say that the test would be rationality in reference with the maintenance of independency of the judiciary.

Let us take an example that we have experienced in the last years. We were in a difficult economic situation in terms of budgetary issues in Canada and the government decided to institute freezes all over the place. The judges were frozen, too, in terms of compensation.

Let us imagine that some time in the future the same situation arises and the government once again institutes freezes. The commission studies the workload of the judges and concludes that their workload has increased and they request a 2 per cent increase, which seems reasonable in a difficult time. However, the committees of the House of Commons and the Senate recommend against the commission's request, as does the Minister of Justice.

non du régime en place au niveau provincial. Je ne suis pas très au courant. Si je me souviens bien, c'était trois ans, mais cette disposition qui prévoit un an est certainement défendable pour ce qui est de la prestation de survivant, qui ne s'appliquait pas aux juges. Je regrette de ne pas pouvoir vous aider.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Quelqu'un a dit que ce projet de loi harmonisait la situation des juges avec celle des employés d'autres secteurs de la fonction publique comme la GRC.

**La présidente:** Je crois qu'elle l'harmonise avec la fonction publique.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Oui, et même les parlementaires.

**La présidente:** Oui. Nous allons entendre un autre témoin qui connaît bien ce domaine. Nous pourrions poser cette question.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Avez-vous étudié la façon dont d'autres systèmes de common law comparables à celui du Canada abordent la question de la rémunération des juges pour protéger l'indépendance de la magistrature?

**M. Scott:** Nous l'avons fait. En venant ici, je me demandais où étaient passés nos documents de recherche. Ils ont tous été envoyés au Centre des affaires judiciaires et je vais voir si je peux les trouver.

Nous avons étudié la question. Comme on vous l'a dit certainement, certains États australiens ont la procédure de résolution négative. Je crois que c'est le cas en Nouvelle-Galles du Sud. Dans d'autres États, il y a des commissions qui ont seulement un pouvoir de recommandation. Je ne peux pas vous les énumérer, mais l'une des formules les plus en faveur des juges est la procédure de résolution négative qui existe en Nouvelle-Galles du Sud. Le rapport est déposé et si aucun projet de loi ne le rejette, il obtient force de loi.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Connaissez-vous de façon générale le système en place au Royaume-Uni?

**M. Scott:** Je ne m'en souviens pas. Nous en avons fait une étude, mais je ne me souviens pas de ce que nous avons appris. Je vais vérifier et envoyer ces renseignements à la greffière.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je voudrais en revenir à la question de la rationalité. Comme vous le savez, cela nous ennuie parfois beaucoup. Vous dites que le critère de rationalité vise au maintien de l'indépendance de la magistrature.

Prenons un cas que nous avons connu ces dernières années. Nous avons connu une situation économique difficile au Canada et le gouvernement a alors décidé d'imposer un gel des prix et des salaires. La rémunération des juges a également été gelée.

Imaginons qu'un jour, la même chose se reproduit et que le gouvernement recourt de nouveau à ce genre de mesure. La commission étudiera la charge de travail des juges et, estimant qu'elle a augmenté, elle demandera une augmentation de 2 p. 100, ce qui semble raisonnable. Toutefois, le comité de la Chambre des communes et du Sénat se prononcera contre la recommandation de la commission, de même que le ministre de la Justice.

In such a context, where everyone is hit, where, in your opinion, does the maintenance of the rationality principle in relation to the independency of the judiciary stand?

**Mr. Scott:** A freeze across the board is rational. However, the judges did not always think that. It is very interesting what the Chief Justice said in the P.E.I. case. He said that a freeze across the board, although effectively a reduction, would be defensible.

The judges did not always think that. They did not like to be aligned with the executive branch of government, so they did not like to be swept in with other public servants. In respect of this last freeze, there was a lot of criticism on the part of the judges.

I read in the judgment that the chief justice acknowledges that an across-the-board freeze, where everyone bears the burden, would be rational. I regard that as an advance in judicial thinking. It would be rational, but the question is: What would be irrational? I am not sure of the answer to that question. I suppose that is part of the troubling nature of the problem, because what would be irrational in the face of what is perceived in society as unwarranted judicial activism is a massive reduction in compensation affecting only judges. The judges might regard that as an obvious attempt to undermine their independence and to control their behaviour.

Cases such as the one in P.E.I. have involved efforts include some independence problem associated with salaries. It arose from the fact that the executive branch set the salaries for judges, and the judges had no say whatsoever in the matter. There is always an effort to get the hook of independence into the question. That is why it is not just rationality per se, but rationality as tested by the stability of the independence of the judiciary.

**Senator Joyal:** On the same basis of your answer, a judge would recognize that when an effort is requested from everyone, it ought to be borne fairly by the judiciary, too. They are part of society as such.

Why are people so reluctant to have the criteria that the commission would follow mirror the criteria that Treasury Board follows when putting forward proposals that are within the framework of the government purse? Essentially, that is what Treasury Board must do when putting together a proposal for the unions. It would seem to be in accordance with the capacity of the taxpayers to pay at this point in time.

**Mr. Scott:** Perhaps I am pushing this point too far. I am not saying that there should not be any criteria, but at a certain point the criteria become developed enough that you do not need an independent commission. That is, you need only apply the criteria. You could say that the remuneration for the judiciary should be measured by the salaries of deputy ministers or by the incomes or benefits received by deputy ministers. That is the end of it.

I believe in the notion that for the judiciary, who are independent of government, there should be some mechanism for determining what is appropriate in terms of compensation.

Dans ce genre de situation, où tout le monde est touché, que fait-on, selon vous, du principe de la rationalité en ce qui concerne l'indépendance de la magistrature?

**M. Scott:** Un gel général des salaires est rationnel. Néanmoins, les juges n'ont pas toujours été de cet avis. Ce que le juge en chef a déclaré dans l'affaire de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard est très intéressant. Il a dit qu'un gel général serait défendable, même si cela revenait à une réduction de salaire.

Les juges n'ont pas toujours eu cette opinion. Ils ne voulaient pas s'aligner sur le pouvoir exécutif pas plus que sur les autres fonctionnaires. Le dernier gel a été largement critiqué par les juges.

D'après le jugement, le juge en chef reconnaît qu'un gel général qui amènerait tout le monde à faire sa part, serait rationnel. Je considère que c'est là un progrès. Ce serait rationnel, mais la question à se poser est la suivante: qu'est-ce qui serait irrationnel? Je ne suis pas certain de la réponse à cette question. C'est ce qui contribue au problème étant donné qu'une décision qui serait irrationnelle aux yeux de la société serait une baisse de salaire massive qui ne toucherait que les juges. Les juges pourraient voir là une tentative évidente de saper leur indépendance ou de contrôler leur comportement.

Des affaires comme celle de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard ont soulevé le problème de l'indépendance. Cela vient du fait que le pouvoir exécutif établit la rémunération des juges tandis que ces derniers n'ont pas voix au chapitre. On cherche toujours à mettre sur le tapis la question de l'indépendance. Voilà pourquoi ce n'est pas la question de la rationalité comme telle qui se pose. Cette rationalité est établie en fonction de la mesure où l'indépendance de la magistrature est maintenue.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Pour aller dans le même sens que votre réponse, un juge reconnaîtrait que si l'on demande à tout le monde de faire sa part, la magistrature devrait faire un effort elle aussi. Elle fait partie de la société.

Pourquoi hésite-t-on tellement à demander à la commission de suivre les mêmes critères que le Conseil du Trésor lorsqu'elle présente une proposition qui fait appel aux deniers publics? C'est ce que doit faire le Conseil du Trésor lorsqu'il présente une proposition aux syndicats. Cela tiendrait compte de la capacité de payer des contribuables.

**M. Scott:** Je vais peut-être trop loin, mais je ne dis pas qu'on peut se passer totalement de critères. Toutefois, à un moment donné, les critères sont suffisamment développés pour qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire d'avoir une commission indépendante. Autrement dit, il vous suffit d'appliquer des critères. Vous pourriez dire que la rémunération des juges doit s'aligner sur celle des sous-ministres ou encore le salaire ou les avantages sociaux des sous-ministres et cela n'ira pas plus loin.

Je crois que la magistrature étant indépendante du gouvernement, il faudrait un mécanisme pour déterminer la rémunération qui convient.

I am not saying that we do not need criteria. What I am saying is that we need to determine the nature of the criteria. Will we consider the benefits received by deputy ministers? If so, at what levels? If you get to that point, then you do not need an independent commission, do you?

**Senator Joyal:** In the United States they have criteria, and they fix the level of compensation to avoid that kind of discretionary involvement of elected people, thereby protecting the independence of the judiciary.

When you put forward some criteria, is that not a way to contain the independence of the judiciary? In that situation you apply the criteria and then there is no discussion.

**Mr. Scott:** Except for the fact that such a solution presumes that criteria provide the complete answer. There is some judgment in here somewhere, and where there is judgment there is an opportunity to lobby for the judgment to go one way or the other. The way we get into this area is that judges cannot lobby; therefore, you must have an independent commission.

In the United States, there is an enormous boon from removing the link between judges' salaries and bureaucrats' salaries. That is not entirely the work of the judiciary. There is a feeling that the judiciary, as a separate branch of government, should be dealt with separately. The criteria change from time to time, depending upon the attractions of the bench. About four years ago, it was much more attractive to consider an appointment to the bench than it is now. People flocked to be appointed to the bench over the last 10 years. Before that, they did not do so, and they certainly are not doing so now.

You are trying to develop a system that matches what is available outside the judiciary in order to attract the right people. I would not favour simply establishing a set of criteria that says that judges will be treated like a certain group of people with all the same criteria. If you do that, you do not need an independent commission.

**Senator Joyal:** You said that there is a movement in the United States to deregulate the compensation mechanism for judges. Is that not a way for those people who fight for judicial activism to submit judges to the appreciation of discretionary compensation decisions?

**Mr. Scott:** The first group pushing for the removal of such a linkage is the judges. They feel that their situation and the need to attract the right people to the judiciary will not be addressed by putting them into a category with federal public servants and that, since they are a separate branch of government, they should be dealt with separately. The motives of others is another question, but that is a hot topic in the U.S. now.

**Senator Joyal:** I understand your point. Besides the cost of living index, the economic growth of Canada, and the objective that the government is pursuing in its budgetary policy involving salaries, you add the criteria of putting enough money on the table so that there will be enough candidates interested in the profession.

**Mr. Scott:** Yes, the right candidates.

Je ne dis pas que les critères sont inutiles. Je dis seulement qu'il faut déterminer la nature de ces critères. Allons-nous tenir compte des avantages sociaux qu'obtiennent les sous-ministres? Si c'est le cas, à quels niveaux? Si vous en arrivez là, vous n'avez pas besoin de commission indépendante, n'est-ce pas?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Aux États-Unis, il y a des critères et l'on fixe le niveau de rémunération afin d'éviter l'intervention discrétionnaire des élus et protéger ainsi l'indépendance de la magistrature.

Lorsque vous proposez des critères, n'est-ce pas une façon de limiter l'indépendance de la magistrature? Vous appliquez alors les critères et il n'y a pas de discussion.

**M. Scott:** Si ce n'est que cette solution part du principe que les critères suffisent à eux seuls. Il y a un certain jugement à porter et il est donc possible d'exercer des pressions dans un sens ou dans l'autre. Comme les juges ne peuvent pas exercer des pressions, il faut une commission indépendante.

Aux États-Unis, il y a tout un mouvement pour la suppression du lien entre la rémunération des juges et celle des bureaucrates. La magistrature n'en est pas seule responsable. On estime que la magistrature étant une branche distincte du gouvernement, elle doit être traitée séparément. Les critères changent de temps à autre, selon l'attrait que représentent ces nominations. Il y a quatre ans environ, une nomination à la magistrature était beaucoup plus attrayante que ce n'est le cas maintenant. Un tas de gens souhaitaient se faire nommer juge ces 10 dernières années. Cela présentait beaucoup moins d'attrait avant cela et en tout cas maintenant.

Nous essayons de mettre au point un système de rémunération comparable à ce qui est offert à l'extérieur afin d'attirer des gens compétents. Je ne serais pas en faveur de l'établissement d'une série de critères disant que les juges seront traités comme tel autre groupe de personnes présentant les mêmes critères. Si vous le faites, vous n'avez pas besoin d'une commission indépendante.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Vous dites qu'il y a, aux États-Unis, un mouvement en faveur de la déréglementation de la rémunération des juges. N'est-ce pas, pour ceux qui se battent pour l'activisme judiciaire, une façon de soumettre les juges à des décisions discrétionnaires concernant leur rémunération?

**M. Scott:** Les premiers à demander l'élimination de ces liens sont les juges. Ils estiment qu'on ne répondra pas à leur situation et à la nécessité d'attirer des gens compétents en les associant aux fonctionnaires fédéraux et que, la magistrature étant une branche distincte du gouvernement, elle devrait être traitée comme telle. Quant à ce qui motive les autres, c'est une autre question, mais cela suscite actuellement la controverse aux États-Unis.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je comprends ce que vous dites. En dehors de l'indice du coût de la vie, de la croissance économique du Canada et des objectifs de la politique budgétaire du gouvernement, ce qui comprend les salaires, vous voulez qu'on offre suffisamment d'argent aux juges afin qu'il y ait suffisamment de candidats qui s'intéressent à la profession.

**M. Scott:** Oui, les bons candidats.

**Senator Joyal:** In other words, we must make the package attractive enough to attract those we want to have, and not those who are looking for another job because they feel they are underpaid. Is that what you have in mind?

**Mr. Scott:** Yes.

**The Chairman:** I am rather surprised, Mr. Scott, to hear you say that this is not a position that people are avidly seeking. Most members of Parliament would be surprised to hear that, too.

**Mr. Scott:** But are they the right people? That is the question. From sea to sea, we have had a tremendous judiciary in this country. In my province of Ontario, the Court of Appeal has always had the top lawyers in the profession. This is not true in other countries. In other countries, the judiciary is frequently made up of people who have been appointed to the bench early in their lives. There is a completely different atmosphere in the judiciary. I make no apology for pushing hard for the idea that there should be enough independence in the effort to assess what judges should be paid to attract the right people. The right people are not necessarily Bay Street people, but people from communities across the country. We need to have the top people in the judiciary.

**Senator Lawson:** On the issue of criteria, I agree with Mr. Scott. I think it would be a serious mistake to try to have fixed criteria. I heard Senator Joyal say that the Treasury Board has some criteria, and I am sure that the executive board does. Every union does, but it is floating, flexible criteria that works on each individual occasion. You keep the ones which work, and if they do not work next time, you change them to meet the changing circumstances.

I have been involved in negotiations for over 40 years and I have learned that it is impossible to have fixed, rigid criteria. One or two criteria are obvious, such as the cost of living, but you simply cannot work within a strict framework.

Those parties with bargaining rights have flexible criteria. To attempt to apply it in this situation would be impossible. I agree with you that there is no point in having a commission if you are to have rigid criteria. Rather, it should be binding arbitration or binding conciliation, as it was in the old days: Fix it and leave it, with no appeal.

**Mr. Scott:** I do not think that a lot of people genuinely believe that there is a problem in attracting the right people to the bench. However, in reality, the opposite is true. We have some of the most wonderful people on the bench. Yet, every once in a while you get a rush of people who want to be judges and you see a hint of the other side of the coin, which is very unappealing. You see people who want to be judges because they perceive it to be easier work and because they are attracted by the pension, et cetera. Those people we positively do not want. They end up losing their spirit for it in no time at all, and the result is a disaster.

However, taking the point about the criteria, we do always have to be measuring how we compensate our judges against that body of people from which we are drawing to ensure that we are

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Autrement dit, il faut rendre les conditions de rémunération suffisamment attrayantes pour attirer les personnes que nous voulons avoir, et non pas celles qui recherchent un autre emploi parce qu'elles estiment être sous-payées. Est-ce bien ce que vous voulez dire?

**M. Scott:** Oui.

**La présidente:** Je m'étonne, monsieur Scott, de vous entendre dire que ce n'est pas un poste très convoité. La plupart des parlementaires seront également étonnés de l'entendre.

**M. Scott:** Mais s'agit-il des bonnes personnes? Tout est là. Nous avons, d'un bout à l'autre du pays, une magistrature extrêmement compétente au Canada. Dans ma province, l'Ontario, la Cour d'appel a toujours eu les meilleurs avocats de la profession. Ce n'est pas vrai dans d'autres pays. Ailleurs, la magistrature est souvent composée de gens qui ont été nommés très jeunes. L'atmosphère y est totalement différente. Je n'hésite pas à faire valoir que le processus de détermination du salaire versé aux juges pour attirer des gens compétents doit être suffisamment indépendant. Les bonnes personnes ne seront pas nécessairement des gens de Bay Street, mais plutôt des gens des divers coins du pays. Notre magistrature doit être composée des meilleurs éléments.

**Le sénateur Lawson:** Pour ce qui est des critères, je suis d'accord avec M. Scott. Ce serait une grave erreur, selon moi, que d'avoir des critères fixes. Le sénateur Joyal dit que le Conseil du Trésor applique certains critères et je suis certain que le comité de direction aussi. Chaque syndicat a des critères souples s'appliquant à chaque circonstance. Vous conservez ceux qui donnent de bons résultats et, s'ils laissent à désirer la prochaine fois, vous les modifiez pour tenir compte de l'évolution des circonstances.

J'ai participé à des négociations pendant plus de 40 ans et j'ai appris qu'il était impossible d'avoir des critères fixes et rigides. Certains critères sont évidents tels que le coût de la vie, mais il n'est pas possible d'avoir des paramètres très stricts.

Les parties qui ont le droit de négocier ont des critères souples. Il serait impossible de chercher à les appliquer dans ce genre de situation. Je conviens avec vous qu'il ne sert à rien d'avoir une commission si vous avez des critères rigides. Il faudrait plutôt recourir à l'arbitrage ou à la conciliation obligatoire, comme dans l'ancien temps. La décision est sans appel.

**M. Scott:** Je ne pense pas que beaucoup de gens croient vraiment qu'il soit difficile d'attirer des gens compétents dans les rangs de la magistrature. C'est plutôt le contraire. Nous avons des gens exceptionnels dans la magistrature. Néanmoins, vous avez parfois des gens qui veulent devenir juges et vous voyez alors l'autre côté de la médaille, qui n'est pas très beau à voir. Certaines personnes veulent devenir juges parce qu'elles pensent que ce sera un travail plus facile ou parce qu'elles sont attirées par la pension et le reste. Nous ne voulons certainement pas de ces gens-là. Ils perdent très rapidement leur enthousiasme et le résultat est désastreux.

Néanmoins, pour ce qui est des critères, il faudra toujours mesurer la façon dont nous rémunérons nos juges en faisant une comparaison avec le secteur dans lequel nous les recrutons afin

competitive. We obviously do not pay anything like the incomes that are given up, but we must pay enough to ensure that it will not be such an enormous step down that people will not do it.

**Senator Bryden:** It is interesting that the tremendous courts that we all know and have practised before have all come about without this type of protection. I do not know why we have to go further with it at this particular time. There was an old saying in law school that A students make professors, B students make judges, and C students make money.

As you know, the fact that a given lawyer is making \$500,000 a year doing estates and commercial law in no way indicates that he is better than the carefully practising lawyer, even an independent practitioner, who is eking out enough to pay his secretary and his overhead and clear \$80,000 or \$100,000.

**Mr. Scott:** That is so.

**Senator Bryden:** I should like to go back to the issue of criteria or guidelines. Senator Lawson and I have both been in the labour business for a long time. The ability to go to economic warfare is in some instances removed in the public interest. For example, firefighters and sometimes police have the right to strike removed from them and replaced by arbitration.

In most statutes that make arbitration the final decision-maker, there are criteria laid out. If there are not criteria, you cannot take into account the employers' ability to pay. Therefore, the fact that the Province of Prince Edward Island could not afford to pay a 25 per cent increase would not be a factor that an arbitrator could take into consideration. Now they must because it is on the list. In other words, in your deliberations you must take the following into account.

There are criteria for the commissions in many provinces already. The Provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec and Prince Edward Island have them. The act of Prince Edward Island, for example, includes as criteria the need to provide fair and reasonable compensation to judges, the management board policy and other relevant considerations respecting judges' expenses, any changes in the cost of living, the need to attract excellent candidates, the prevailing economic conditions in the province and the overall state of the provincial economy, and the salaries and benefits paid to other provincial court judges in other Canadian jurisdictions. I do not see it here, but it says probably "and any other relevant criteria," but under the *ejusdem generis* rule you do not get too far away from that sort of stuff.

New Zealand's statute includes very interesting criteria. They are: the need to achieve and maintain fair relativity with the levels of remuneration received elsewhere; the need to be fair, both to the persons or group of persons whose remuneration is being determined, and to the taxpayer or ratepayer; and the need to recruit and maintain competent persons. Those are criteria which the commission must take into account.

d'être concurrentiels. Nous ne payons évidemment pas de salaires comparables aux revenus auxquels les juges doivent renoncer, mais nous devons payer une rémunération suffisante pour que le sacrifice ne soit pas énorme au point d'être dissuasif.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Il est intéressant de constater que les merveilleux tribunaux que nous connaissons tous ont été établis sans ce genre de protection. Je ne vois pas pourquoi nous devrions aller plus loin pour le moment. Selon un vieil adage qui avait cours à la faculté de droit, les étudiants qui ont des A deviennent professeurs, ceux qui ont des B deviennent juges et ceux qui ont des C gagnent beaucoup d'argent.

Comme vous le savez, ce n'est pas parce qu'un avocat gagne 500 000 \$ par an en droit immobilier et commercial qu'il est plus compétent que l'avocat prudent qui gagne juste assez pour payer sa secrétaire et ses frais généraux et empocher 80 000 \$ ou 100 000 \$.

**M. Scott:** En effet.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Je voudrais en revenir à la question des critères ou des lignes directrices. Le sénateur Lawson et moi-même avons travaillé dans le milieu syndical pendant longtemps. Le droit de défendre ses intérêts économiques vous est parfois supprimé dans l'intérêt public. Par exemple, dans le cas des pompiers et parfois des policiers, le droit de grève a été remplacé par l'arbitrage.

La plupart des lois qui imposent l'arbitrage énoncent certains critères. S'il n'y a pas de critères, vous ne pouvez pas tenir compte de la capacité de payer de l'employeur. Par conséquent, le fait que la province de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard ne pourrait pas se permettre de payer une augmentation de 25 p. 100 n'est pas un facteur dont un arbitre pourrait tenir compte. Il doit maintenant le faire car c'est sur la liste. Autrement dit, c'est une chose dont vous devez tenir compte.

Les commissions d'un grand nombre de provinces ont déjà des critères à appliquer. L'Ontario, la Colombie-Britannique, l'Alberta, le Québec et l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard en ont. La loi de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard, par exemple, prévoit la nécessité de payer aux juges une rémunération juste et raisonnable et contient également des critères visant la politique du conseil de gestion et d'autres éléments concernant les dépenses des juges, des changements dans le coût de la vie, la nécessité d'attirer d'excellents candidats, la situation économique dans la province et l'état général de l'économie provinciale ainsi que les salaires et avantages sociaux versés à d'autres juges de la Cour provinciale dans d'autres provinces canadiennes. Ce n'est pas précisé ici, mais cela fait sans doute partie de «tout autre critère pertinent». Néanmoins, conformément à la règle *ejusdem generis*, on ne doit pas trop s'éloigner de ce genre de critères.

La loi néo-zélandaise comprend des critères très intéressants. Ce sont la nécessité d'assurer un niveau de rémunération assez comparable aux autres; la nécessité d'être équitable envers les personnes dont on détermine la rémunération et envers le contribuable ainsi que la nécessité de recruter et de retenir des personnes compétentes. Tels sont les critères dont la commission doit tenir compte.

**Mr. Scott:** I started this by sounding as if I do not agree with Senator Joyal on this. I am saying that those are as obvious as they can be. It is not as though they are very earth shattering. While you were speaking, I wrote: "What would the criteria be? What others are being paid, what is being paid elsewhere, what is the cost of living, what is needed to attract the right candidates, and what is the state of the economy."

**Senator Bryden:** Then put it in the statute.

**Mr. Scott:** I have no problem with that, but once you go beyond that the problems arise.

**Senator Bryden:** The commission is to be comprised of three people — one nominated by the judiciary, one nominated by the Minister of Justice of Canada, and a third, who will be the chairman, agreed upon by the first two.

As Senator Lawson and I know, in the real world people sometimes cannot agree on who the third person will be. There is no provision in the bill for what happens in that circumstance.

I asked the minister what would happen in such a case and her response was that the first two people chosen would be fired and the process would start all over.

I presume that if one party — presumably the government — wanted to stonewall the process, it simply would not agree to the chair.

**Mr. Scott:** That is interesting because most arbitration statutes provide that in the event of a deadlock you apply to a judge — which would be inappropriate in this case.

**Senator Bryden:** That is my next point. To break a deadlock you apply to a judge, and the judge would have some degree of interest in who is appointed as chair. That is odd.

**Mr. Scott:** It is odd. The minister may be right. The minister could tell the two persons who were appointed that if they cannot agree within 10 days, their appointment will be revoked and two will be found who can agree.

**Senator Bryden:** The minister does not have the power to do that under the statute. They would just have to come to some agreement.

If the judiciary continued to quash recommendations of the government to Parliament, or if they had the ability to quash or find *ultra vires* under the Constitution a decision of Parliament, I assume that the status quo would remain in place until a change was finally effected through legislation. Therefore, it is not particularly in their interest to be totally unreasonable.

**Senator Moore:** They can still change the legislation.

**Senator Bryden:** That is right, but I am a little concerned in that this whole issue basically grew out of judicial disobedience in P.E.I., where the provincial court judges took the position that they could not handle these cases because they were biased.

**M. Scott:** J'ai commencé en donnant l'impression que je n'étais pas d'accord avec le sénateur Joyal sur ce point. Je dis seulement que ce sont des critères évidents. Cela n'a rien de bien nouveau. Pendant que vous parliez, j'ai écrit: «Quels seraient les critères? Ce que les autres touchent, ce qui est payé ailleurs, le coût de la vie, le montant requis pour attirer des candidats compétents et l'état de l'économie.»

**Le sénateur Bryden:** Alors inscrivez-le dans la loi.

**M. Scott:** Je n'y vois pas d'objection, mais si vous allez plus loin, cela soulève des problèmes.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** La commission doit être composée de trois personnes. La première sera nommée par la magistrature, la deuxième par le ministre de la Justice du Canada et la troisième, qui assumera la présidence, sera nommée avec l'accord des deux premières.

Le sénateur Lawson et moi-même savons que, dans la vraie vie, les gens ne sont pas toujours d'accord sur le choix de la troisième personne. Le projet de loi ne contient aucune disposition en pareille circonstance.

J'ai demandé à la ministre ce qui se passerait en pareil cas et elle m'a répondu que les deux premières choisies seraient congédiées et que le processus recommencerait à zéro.

Si l'une des parties — en principe le gouvernement — voulait saboter le processus, il lui suffirait de ne pas être d'accord sur le choix du président.

**M. Scott:** C'est intéressant, car la plupart des lois sur l'arbitrage portent qu'en cas d'impasse, vous vous adressez à un juge — ce qui ne conviendrait pas dans ce cas.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** J'y arrive. Pour rompre une impasse vous faites appel à un juge et ce dernier sera intéressé au choix de la personne nommée à la présidence. C'est curieux.

**M. Scott:** En effet. La ministre a peut-être raison. Elle pourrait dire aux deux personnes qui ont été nommées que si elles n'arrivent pas à se mettre d'accord dans les 10 jours, leur nomination sera révoquée et elles seront remplacées par deux autres personnes qui pourront s'entendre.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** La loi ne confère pas ce pouvoir au ministre. Il faudrait simplement que les deux personnes s'entendent.

Si la magistrature continuait à s'opposer aux recommandations du gouvernement ou si elle pouvait déclarer une décision du Parlement *ultra vires* en vertu de la Constitution, je suppose que le statu quo serait maintenu jusqu'à ce qu'un changement soit finalement effectué en légiférant. Les juges n'ont donc pas intérêt à se montrer parfaitement déraisonnables.

**Le sénateur Moore:** Ils peuvent quand même modifier la loi.

**Le sénateur Bryden:** C'est exact, mais ce qui m'inquiète un peu c'est que toute cette question découle de la désobéissance de la magistrature à l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard où les juges de la Cour provinciale ont estimé qu'ils ne pouvaient pas se pencher sur ces causes parce qu'ils manquaient d'objectivité.

They were biased because the person who paid them was either reducing their pay or was not prepared to increase it. Therefore, in any case where you had the Crown, Regina, against Joe Blow, the judge might very well be prejudiced against Regina and let the guy off. To my mind, that is judicial disobedience, like civil disobedience. Finally, it bubbled up and the issue arrived here.

We are back at the arena of Senator Lawson and myself: Who has the most power? Parliament has the ability to refuse to pass the legislation, and the judges have the ability to say that, if that is true, they will not hear any cases. Somehow we have to be sure to avoid those circumstances.

About the question of criteria, there are some criteria already established by the courts. One of them we have not discussed because it does not happen very often. To my knowledge, it has happened only in one case at the inferior level.

In the case of provincial judges, the Supreme Court declared a reduction of salaries as invalid, as *ultra vires*. It forced the government to reimburse the judges.

When we read the question of independence of judges, we must take into account the fact that, in that case, we were concerned with the real problem because there were some reductions of judges at the provincial level.

I do not know in which constitution this is found but I remember having read a constitution that makes it impossible to reduce the salary of a judge. It is unconstitutional right at the beginning. There is no such thing in our country, but I guess we may infer from that that if there is a reduction, that is at least strike two for the government because it seems, *prima facie*, to go against the principle of the independence of the judiciary. What do you think?

**Mr. Scott:** I have two points on that. It is interesting that, in the P.E.I. case, the court concluded that an across-the-board freeze is, theoretically, a reduction. Because the cost of living is increasing, it is a reduction.

In the *Beauregard* case, the argument was that, after the judge's appointment, a change in the law requiring contributory pensions was a reduction. Chief Justice Dickson concluded that it was a reduction but it was a legitimate reduction. That case came from the Quebec Court of Appeal. There had been a bill in the house and, literally weeks after the judge's appointment, the law was proclaimed to the effect that judges, who before had free pensions, now had to make contributions. He interpreted that, not surprisingly, as a form of reduction of his salary. He sued Her Majesty and it went through to the Federal Court. He was successful at every level until the Supreme Court divided and he lost.

The court concluded — and this was really the beginning in Chief Justice Dickson's notion of across-the-board, even-handed treatment. The conclusion was that everybody contributes to his or

En effet, leur employeur s'apprêtait à réduire leur traitement, ou n'était pas disposé à l'augmenter. En conséquence, dans toutes les affaires plaidées par la Couronne, le juge risquait d'avoir un préjugé favorable à l'adversaire de la Couronne et de lui donner gain de cause. À mon avis, on peut parler ici de désobéissance judiciaire comme on parle de désobéissance civile. Finalement, la situation a continué à mitonner, et voilà où on en est rendu.

Je suis dans la même situation que le sénateur Lawson: qui a le gros bout du bâton? Le Parlement a la possibilité de refuser d'adopter le projet de loi, et les juges ont la possibilité de dire que si tout cela est vrai, ils refuseront de juger. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut absolument éviter les circonstances de ce genre.

Sur la question des critères, les tribunaux en ont déjà fixé un certain nombre. Il y en a un dont nous n'avons pas parlé, car il n'est pas appliqué très souvent. À ma connaissance, il n'a été appliqué qu'une fois par une juridiction inférieure.

Dans le cas des juges provinciaux, la Cour suprême a déclaré que toute réduction de salaire était invalide et qu'elle outrepassait les pouvoirs de l'exécutif. La cour a obligé le gouvernement à rembourser les juges.

En ce qui concerne l'indépendance des juges, il faut tenir compte du fait qu'en l'occurrence, nous nous sommes intéressés au véritable problème, car les salaires des juges ont subi des réductions au niveau provincial.

Je ne me souviens plus de quelle partie de la Constitution il s'agit, mais j'ai vu un jour une disposition qui interdit de réduire le salaire d'un juge. D'emblée c'est une mesure anticonstitutionnelle. C'est impossible dans notre pays, mais il faut en déduire qu'en termes de réduction, le gouvernement sera automatiquement condamné car de toute évidence, une telle réduction va à l'encontre du principe de l'indépendance de la magistrature. Qu'en pensez-vous?

**M. Scott:** J'ai deux choses à dire à ce sujet. On remarque avec intérêt que dans l'arrêt concernant l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard, la cour a considéré qu'un gel de salaire équivaut théoriquement à une réduction. À cause de l'augmentation du coût de la vie, c'est une réduction de salaire.

Dans l'arrêt *Beauregard*, on a considéré qu'après la nomination d'un juge, tout changement législatif qui impose un régime de pensions contributif équivaut à une réduction de salaire. Le juge en chef Dickson a considéré qu'il s'agissait d'une réduction, mais d'une réduction légitime. C'est un arrêt de la Cour d'appel du Québec. L'Assemblée nationale avait adopté un projet de loi et quelques semaines après la nomination d'un juge, le gouvernement a promulgué une loi prévoyant que les juges, qui bénéficiaient antérieurement des régimes de pension gratuits, devaient désormais verser des contributions. Naturellement, le juge a interprété cette mesure comme une forme de réduction de salaire. Il a poursuivi la Couronne jusqu'en cour fédérale. Il a obtenu gain de cause à tous les niveaux, jusqu'à ce que la Cour suprême se prononce sur division et lui donne tort.

La cour a considéré — et c'était là le premier argument du juge en chef Dickson, qui a parlé de traitement uniforme — que tout le monde contribuait à son régime de pension et qu'il n'y avait



her pension so why should not judges contribute to theirs? They found there was nothing unconstitutional.

The argument was a constitutional one — that salaries must be fixed and provided and that it is inappropriate to reduce them. It was rejected. A reduction without more is not necessarily, in contemporary terms, evidence of anything.

**Senator Beaudoin:** There may be a case where it might be justified.

**Mr. Scott:** It might be justifiable. I think it is the juxtaposition. In an interesting example, a bill was discussed in Arizona where, on the one hand, there was a lot of talk about judges being out of control — which is the way it develops — while, coincidentally, over here, there was a discussion about the level of their income being too high. If these things are discussed at the same time, it gives you pause and it is troubling. That is the kind of thing where a reduction may be seen.

**Senator Fraser:** Almost identical to that, I have been sitting here brooding about how this would play out in practice. I am really troubled by the notion of giving a profession the right to, effectively, control its own pay when its salaries are paid out of public money.

**Senator Lawson:** That is what MPs do.

**Senator Fraser:** MPs must go back to the public, which is why they get in such a dither every time they have to think about a pay increase. Judges do not.

I was comforted by the observation of the chairman that, if we are talking about salary increases, when a judge says no to a bill, he does not get any increase at all. He is stuck with the status quo. However, when it comes to reduction, I seriously wonder because then, if a judge says no to the bill, he does not get a pay-cut. He gets to keep what he has.

I have enormous respect for judges but it seems to me that some of their wisdom — and the pension case you cited is one example — goes out the window when their own interests are at stake. There was a situation in Montreal a few years ago where judges were actually arguing that, in order to preserve their judicial independence, they had to continue to have indoor parking spots, free, near the elevator.

**Mr. Scott:** Surely there must be more to the argument than that.

**Senator Fraser:** No, they were busy persons and did not want to have to walk the length of the garage nor pay for the space.

You have outlined a couple of interesting elements that suggest that, ultimately, the judiciary has come a long way, such as Justice Lamer's reference to an across-the-board freeze being fair, in particular.

I am trying to find out whether, in our present state, we could reasonably assume that, faced with cuts across the board, affecting everybody, in the situation of deflation or of dire budgetary stringency where government needs to reduce pay for everyone, the courts would sit still for that or stonewall.

aucune raison pour que les juges ne contribuent pas au leur. Une telle mesure n'a rien d'inconstitutionnel.

L'argumentation portait sur la constitution: les salaires doivent être fixes et ne peuvent être réduits. L'argument a été rejeté. Dans le contexte contemporain, une simple réduction ne prouve rien.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Il peut arriver qu'elle soit justifiée.

**M. Scott:** Elle peut être justifiée. On essaye de juxtaposer deux notions. Dans un autre exemple intéressant, on a présenté en Arizona un projet de loi à un moment où, d'une part, on parlait beaucoup des juges qui échappaient à tout contrôle — c'est ce qui se passe là-bas — et où, parallèlement, on disait aussi que les revenus des juges étaient trop élevés. Quand des sujets de cette nature font simultanément l'objet d'un débat public, la situation prête à confusion. On peut alors parler d'une véritable réduction.

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Dans le même ordre d'idées, j'étais en train de me demander ce que cela pouvait donner en pratique. Je trouve gênant de conférer à une profession le droit de déterminer sa propre rémunération, alors même que les salaires de ses membres proviennent du Trésor public.

**Le sénateur Lawson:** C'est pourtant ce que font les députés.

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Les députés doivent s'exposer à l'opinion publique, et c'est pourquoi ils sont si nerveux à chaque fois qu'ils envisagent d'augmenter leur rémunération. Ce n'est pas le cas des juges.

J'ai bien apprécié la remarque de la présidente, qui a dit que lorsqu'il est question d'une augmentation de salaire, si un juge s'oppose à un projet de loi, il n'obtient aucune augmentation. Il conserve le même salaire. Mais lorsqu'il est question d'une réduction, j'ai des doutes, car si un juge s'oppose au projet de loi, il évite une réduction de salaire. Il conserve ses acquis.

J'ai beaucoup de respect pour les juges, mais il me semble qu'une partie de leur sagesse — par exemple dans le cas des pensions que vous avez cité — s'envole en fumée lorsqu'il est question de leur propre intérêt. Il y a quelques années, à Montréal, les juges ont prétendu que pour préserver leur indépendance, il fallait continuer de leur accorder gratuitement des places dans un stationnement intérieur, à proximité de l'ascenseur.

**M. Scott:** Cela ne devait pas être leur seul argument.

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Non, ils ont dit qu'ils étaient très occupés et qu'ils ne voulaient pas avoir tout un stationnement à traverser, et qu'ils n'accepteraient pas de frais de stationnement.

Vous avez présenté divers facteurs intéressants qui semblent indiquer qu'en définitive, l'opinion de la magistrature a déjà évolué considérablement, par exemple lorsque le juge Lamer reconnaît qu'un gel de salaire n'est pas injuste.

J'aimerais savoir si les tribunaux resteraient sans bouger dans un contexte de déflation ou de difficulté budgétaire grave qui obligerait le gouvernement à réduire tous les salaires.

**Mr. Scott:** I am confident that they would sit still now. I do not know that they would have done so 10 years ago.

**Senator Fraser:** You think we have come that far?

**Mr. Scott:** Yes, I do.

**Senator Fraser:** You think we can read that into Justice Lamer's comments?

**Mr. Scott:** Yes. I do not have the language at hand, but he virtually says that. If you have an across-the-board treatment that affects everyone based on economic conditions, of course the judges would be required to accept it. It seems self-evident.

**Senator Fraser:** Of course, but parking spots near the elevator also seems self-evident to me.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Mr. Scott, for your help. You have kept the ball in our court.

Our next witness, Madame Lucie Laliberté, is a lawyer who has been doing research on women and pensions over the past 13 years. Her practice is focussed on family law. She is also the president of the Organization of Spouses of Military Members and has presented briefs on their behalf to the Government of the Province of Ontario, the House of Commons and the Senate Finance Committee. Ms Laliberté asked to appear before this committee because many of the proposed amendments in Bill C-37 are similar to those that she did research on for Bill C-35 and she thought that her experience would be of value to the committee, and the steering committee agreed.

Madame Laliberté, the floor is yours.

**Ms Lucie Laliberté, Lawyer, Gahrns & Laliberté:** I should like to raise one preliminary matter that arose from my discussions with the clerk before being allowed to appear here. I raised the issue that there is litigation on this matter before the courts at this time, and the clerk of the committee expressed some concern about that. For that reason I would like some direction.

I propose not to deal with the substance or the merits of the case, but it does relate specifically to the definition of "survivor benefit." I will keep my remarks limited to those issues that are raised in the case and also relate them to the issues that I found under Bill C-57.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Legally speaking, I do not see a big problem with this, if you are simply giving us the information you have in mind. As a committee of the Senate we have the right to hear witnesses. I understand your concern, but if you are prudent in your presentation, I do not see any problem.

**Ms Laliberté:** My concern was with the fact that the way it was presented to me, I might have declined to appear or I might have limited my presentation. I am a lawyer, so I worked my way around that. I appreciate your comments.

I will be speaking only to the issues relating to pension division and death benefits, including the survivor benefits in Bill C-57. I propose to start with a brief general comparison of the main provisions of the public service plans. The ones I am most

**M. Scott:** Je suis sûr qu'ils resteraient sans bouger aujourd'hui, alors que les choses auraient peut-être été différentes il y a 10 ans.

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Pensez-vous qu'on ait progressé à ce point?

**M. Scott:** Oui.

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Pensez-vous qu'on puisse interpréter en ce sens les commentaires du juge Lamer?

**M. Scott:** Oui, je n'ai pas son arrêt par-devers moi, mais c'est presque ce qu'il a dit. Lorsqu'une décision générale fondée sur le contexte économique a des conséquences pour tout le monde, les juges sont obligés de l'accepter. C'est l'évidence même.

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Bien sûr, mais les places de stationnement près de l'ascenseur me semblent aussi évidentes.

**La présidente:** Merci de votre aide, monsieur Scott. Vous avez gardé la balle de notre côté.

Notre témoin suivant, Mme Lucie Laliberté, est avocate; elle se consacre depuis plus de 13 ans à des recherches sur les femmes et la retraite. Elle est spécialisée en droit de la famille. Elle est également présidente de l'Organization of Spouses of Military Members, qu'elle a représentée auprès du gouvernement de l'Ontario, de la Chambre des communes et du comité sénatorial des finances. Mme Laliberté a demandé à comparaître devant notre comité parce que de nombreux amendements concernant le projet de loi C-37 sont semblables à des amendements concernant le projet de loi C-35 qu'elle a étudiés et elle a pensé que son expérience pouvait intéresser le comité; notre comité directeur lui a donné raison.

Madame Laliberté, vous avez la parole.

**Mme Lucie Laliberté, avocate, Gahrns & Laliberté:** Je voudrais soulever tout d'abord une question préliminaire dont j'ai parlé avec la greffière avant d'être autorisée à comparaître devant vous. J'ai signalé que cette question est actuellement devant les tribunaux et la greffière du comité s'en est inquiétée. Voilà pourquoi j'aimerais avoir votre avis.

Je me propose de ne traiter ni du fond, ni du bien-fondé de la question, mais tout porte spécifiquement sur la définition de la «prestation au survivant». Je limiterai mon propos aux questions soulevées dans cette affaire, dans le contexte des éléments découverts lors de l'étude du projet de loi C-57.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Sur le plan juridique, il ne devrait pas y avoir de problème si vous nous faites simplement part de l'information que vous avez à l'esprit. En tant que membres d'un comité sénatorial, nous avons le droit d'entendre des témoins. Je comprends vos craintes, mais si vous faites preuve de prudence dans votre exposé, il ne devrait pas y avoir de problème.

**Mme Laliberté:** Ce que je craignais, c'est que compte tenu de la façon dont l'invitation avait été présentée, je pouvais refuser de comparaître ou décider de limiter mon exposé. Je suis avocate, et j'ai donc résolu la difficulté. Je vous remercie de vos remarques.

Je ne vais parler que des questions concernant la division de la pension et des prestations de décès, y compris des prestations au survivant telles qu'elles apparaissent dans le projet de loi C-57. Je commencerai par comparer brièvement les principales dispositions



CANADA

# House of Commons Debates

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OFFICIAL REPORT  
(HANSARD)

Friday, November 6, 1998

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Speaker: The Honourable Gilbert Parent

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## HOUSE OF COMMONS

Friday, November 6, 1998

The House met at 10 a.m.

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*Prayers*

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### GOVERNMENT ORDERS

• (1000)

[*English*]

#### JUDGES ACT

**Hon. Don Boudria (for the Minister of Justice)** moved the second reading of, and concurrence in, amendments made by the Senate to Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts.

**Ms. Eleni Bakopanos (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Lib.):** Mr. Speaker, Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act, has come back to this House with amendments from the other House. The Senate and the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs gave serious consideration to all aspects of this important bill and heard from a number of witnesses who contributed a range of perspectives on certain issues of concern to the Senate.

On behalf of the government and the Minister of Justice I want to commend the senators for their diligent review of the issues. Here is an example of the necessity of having a Senate to review House legislation. According to this government the Senate did an excellent job.

The key elements of Bill C-37 were passed by the Senate, including important improvements to the judicial compensation and benefits commission process, necessary increases to current judicial salaries after years of salary freezes and a major expansion of unified family courts in Canada.

However, the Senate proposed and passed two substantive changes to Bill C-37 that relate to the definition of surviving spouse and the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission. The government is prepared to support these amendments for the following reasons.

With respect to survivor benefits, the Senate did not pass the provision in the bill relating to the change in definition of

surviving spouse to include common law spouses. The Scott commission recommended that survivors' annuities be extended to common law spouses "where legally appropriate".

• (1005)

However, the commission did not systematically review all of the ramifications of extending the entitlement to survivors' annuities. It was these ramifications that gave rise to concern and debate at Senate committee.

I want to point out that no one disagrees with extending the benefit to common law spouses. Rather, the issue that caused some public debate and a lot of debate in the Senate is the method by which this recognition is implemented.

[*Translation*]

In accepting the recommendation made by the Scott commission, the government had to consider its impact on specific cases, including the formula to be used when there are two surviving spouses.

In the public service sector, the solution chosen is to divide the pension between the two surviving spouses. This is the approach taken in the public service pension plan and in the pension plan for members of Parliament and senators. We felt this was a reasonable solution which ensured consistency with other federal pension plans.

[*English*]

However, before the Senate committee there was much discussion and disagreement on what was the best approach to be used in this case.

After due consideration the Senate committee did not feel that all of the issues had been sufficiently resolved and recommended that the new judicial compensation and benefits commission take a fresh look at the issue of judicial pensions and their treatment after marriage breakdown.

The Senate also heard arguments which suggested that the federal government has no constitutional authority to legislate over survivors' annuities.

It is important to indicate that the government's concurrence in this amendment is not to be taken as agreement with such a suggestion. The federal government does have the clear authority to deal with pension matters, including matters ancillary to the creation and administration of those pensions. We do not accept

*Government Orders*

the argument that the government is acting outside of its jurisdiction on this matter.

[*Translation*]

However, in light of the concerns expressed, we accept that it would be useful to have the new judicial compensation and benefits commission look at possible solutions for the specific case where there are two surviving spouses.

The purpose of this commission is to remove the political element in determining the benefits and compensation to be paid to judges. The commission will hear the opinions of a number of experts in pension plans and family law, and those of other concerned parties, before making recommendations on a formula for surviving spouses that is fair and consistent with the general practices in the area of pensions.

[*English*]

The Senate also gave very careful consideration to and ultimately approved the new commission process in Bill C-37. However, the Senate was of the view that the process would be further strengthened by the inclusion of certain express statutory criteria that would help define and clarify the scope of the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission.

The Senate amendment will provide, in the statute, for objective criteria that the commission must consider in reaching its recommendations.

[*Translation*]

The objective criteria cited were the following: the state of Canada's economy, including the cost of living, as well as the government's overall economic and financial situation; the role played by the financial security of judges in maintaining judicial independence; the need to recruit the best candidates for the bench; and any other objective factor it deems pertinent.

• (1010)

[*English*]

As a matter of practice, the mandate letters of prior triennial commissions have always specified express objective criteria that should be considered.

For the government and the minister there was never any doubt that this practice would continue. However, putting these criteria into the statute will make it clear to everyone that objective criteria will continue to be used in coming to recommendations on judicial compensation.

This amendment will, therefore, reinforce the objective nature of the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission.

[*Translation*]

The Senate also proposed a number of technical amendments regarding the wording of provisions in the bill, which do not

change its content but which clarify the original intention of the bill. The government also supports these amendments.

In conclusion, the government is in favour of these amendments to Bill C-37. Eliminating the definition of surviving spouse will allow the new commission to examine all the options for recognizing common-law spouses and to make recommendations for a fair and logical approach in cases where there are two surviving spouses.

The inclusion of obligatory criteria will help to clarify the mandate of the new judicial compensation and benefits commission and, as a result, will enhance the credibility and independence of this commission.

[*English*]

Bill C-37 will strengthen what is already one of the best judicial systems in the world. The improvements to the judicial compensation process will ensure continued public confidence in the independence of our judiciary.

The bill provides reasonable and fair compensation for our judges consistent with the important role they play in protecting the key values in our democratic society.

Increased judicial resources for unified family courts combined with provincial commitment of support services will improve the way our courts respond to families and children in crisis. The increase in the number of court of appeal judges will improve access to justice generally.

This bill will both enhance the independence of our courts and improve access to justice. These are goals which I am sure all Canadians support.

**Mr. Chuck Cadman (Surrey North, Ref.):** Mr. Speaker, I rise today to debate the government's concurrence motion on Senate amendments to Bill C-37.

For the record, this is the second occasion I have had the opportunity to state Reform's opposition to this bill. This is a bill which grants judges an unprecedented salary increase of 8.3% and establishes a judicial compensation and benefits commission.

The official opposition is grateful for the amendment put forward by our colleague from Crowfoot. We are grateful that it was supported and passed in this House during report stage of Bill C-37.

The Reform amendment ensures that every four years the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights has the opportunity to review the report of the commission on judges' salaries and benefits. This task will not be left solely to the Minister of Justice as originally contemplated by the government.

However, this amendment has not swayed our opposition to the bill. It has simply made it more palatable. The Reform Party still stands firmly opposed to Bill C-37.

As stated repeatedly in this House during all stages of the bill, other public servants and Canadians in general have not been afforded the same wage increase as that granted to the judges by Bill C-37. At a time when Canadian incomes continue to decline we cannot support such an unprecedented hike in salary.

According to a June 10 Ottawa *Citizen* article, family incomes are still dropping and as a result Canadians need to stretch the family budget to keep a roof over their heads. While housing costs eased during the first half of the decade, family income declined even more. That nudged a proportion of Canadians who spend at least 30% of their income on shelter to one in four households, or almost 2.8 million households. These findings, released by Statistics Canada, were derived from the 1996 census.

Another *Citizen* article, published on the same date, revealed that more and more two-parent families had both parents in the workforce in 1996, while at the same time the number of children left at home was increasing.

• (1015)

Statistics Canada reported that the overall lower income among Canadians in 1996 was the reason both parents were being forced into the labour market. Stats Canada has also reported that the majority of Canadian children, 4.8 million under the age of 15, lived in two parent families in 1996. Of those children 60% had both parents in the workforce, up from 43% in 1981.

In light of this information regarding the income of Canadians, in good conscience the Reform Party cannot support the bill. In the same vein we cannot support the government's concurrence in the Senate amendments.

I recognize the thorough job the Senate did in reviewing the bill and the substantive amendments put forward by the upper house. In particular I single out Liberal Senator Anne Cools for her diligent efforts in revealing the inadequacies of the bill.

Senator Cools rightfully exposed the fact that Bill C-37 effectively allows judges to set their own salaries and perks. In doing so it sets up the possibility of there being a showdown between parliament and the judiciary because it allows judges to appeal parliament's decision regarding a recommended salary increase in the courts. Essentially judges could have the final say over whether parliamentarians are giving them a sufficient raise.

Although former judicial pay commissioner David Scott has said that it is unlikely judges would be setting their own salaries, he has not ruled out the possibility of the judiciary challenging parliament's response to the commission's recommendations.

The judiciary would have to prove, however, in a court that the refusal to increase salaries or a decision to lower them was

motivated by a wish to diminish the independence of judges. Mr. Scott said that even if the judges won in such a case the court could only declare parliament's motion on the issue void, which may result in a stalemate.

As pointed out by the Liberal senator this will:

—deprive Canadians of their undoubted constitutional right to the representative assembly's control over the public purse in respect of judicial salaries.

Clearly control of the public purse rests with parliament and not with the judiciary. Section 100 of the 1867 Constitution Act states in part:

The salaries, allowances and pensions of the judges... shall be fixed and provided by the Parliament of Canada.

Clause 6 of Bill C-37 potentially abolishes the true parliamentary role in the fixing of judges salaries. We must obviously question why the Minister of Justice has bestowed such potentially wielding powers on the judiciary in Bill C-37.

One can only surmise, and again I use the thoughts and words of Senator Cools when she said:

The real intent (of Bill C-37) is to remove parliament from the process.... There is a problem in that certain particular judges seem to crave a closeness to certain individuals in the Department of Justice and are trying to cling, closer and closer, to the executive rather than to parliament. In other words, honourable senators, what is happening here is that 200 years of history are being turned on their head, and we are being told in this judgment that, quite frankly, judges prefer their fate to be in the hands of the executive rather than in the hands of parliament. It is a most curious and interesting subject matter.

I will turn specifically to the amendments put forward by the Senate. Amendments 1, 5, 6, 7 and 8 delete all the clauses referring to two spouses. Bill C-37, as originally drafted by the Department of Justice, created a legal right for a judge to have two spouses. The two spouses clause was meant to deal with a circumstance in which a married judge separates from his or her partner, moves into a common law relationship with another person and then dies. Once law, it would allow a judge to have both spouses, married and common law, eligible for the lucrative pension payouts and divide the money between them when the judge dies.

Additionally the common law spouse would collect the one time payout of one-sixth of the judge's annual salary at the time of death.

Former Supreme Court Justice Willard Estey has said that these particular Bill C-37 amendments would give his former colleagues on the bench the right to a kind of home-made harem. It would, Estey said:

—effectively create two separate sets of family law—one for judges and one for everyone else.

It has been well established that situations such as the one contemplated in Bill C-37 are rare. One therefore must question why such a clause was put in Bill C-37. Critics have suggested that this clause was tailor made for Chief Justice LeSage who is

*Government Orders*

separated from his wife and has resided for about one year with Judge Lang. If Chief Justice LeSage were to die, the new amendment would allow both Judge Lang and Mrs. LeSage to qualify as his surviving spouses and share his pension.

• (1020)

As pointed out earlier, Senator Cools, as well as many others, have surmised that Bill C-37 appears tailored to fit particular individuals. Senator Cools said:

We have a situation in the country where certain individuals have access to the legislative writing machine. That is bothersome.

This certainly is not the first time the government has tailor made legislation. Previous amendments to the Judges Act introduced during the last parliament under Bill C-42 set out terms in which Canadian judges could participate in international activities, although it was never explicitly admitted by the government—it was no secret—that those amendments to the Judges Act arose due to the appointment of Madam Justice Louise Arbour to the United Nations as prosecutor for the War Crimes Commission.

I commend the Senate and support those amendments eliminating this tailor made clause of Bill C-37, clauses which, as stated by Senator Cools, “script their sins into the laws of the nation”.

We do not support, however, Amendment No. 3 which adds subclauses to clause 6 of Bill C-37. Clause 6 establishes the judicial compensation and benefits commission. These subclauses effectively expand the powers of the commission, powers which were not contemplated or countenanced in the original bill. Specifically we take issue with section (1.1)(a) which reads:

In conducting its inquiry, the commission shall consider (a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government.

What exactly does this mean? How expansive are the powers of the commission? Does the reference to the current financial position of the federal government mean the commission will have the power to call the Minister of Finance before it to question him on our financial status? If such powers are vested with the commission, it is setting a dangerous precedent, a precedent the official opposition cannot support.

During his appearance before the Senate committee reviewing Bill C-37 former commission chairman David Scott clearly questioned statutorily defining criteria as proposed by the Senate. In fact Mr. Scott went so far as to say:

I am not sure what the relevant criteria would be.... I am not saying that there should not be any criteria, but once you start down the road of developing criteria, you may create a monster.

Clearly the Senate's amendment goes against the advice of the former commissioner.

As stated earlier, the official opposition does not support the government's concurrence motion. Nor do we support any expansion of the commission's powers, powers which were not originally contemplated by the government and the House.

A decision of the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island forced the federal government to establish a judicial compensation commission. Bill C-37, as originally introduced, meets that legal obligation. Senate Amendment No. 3 is therefore unnecessary.

I caution the government's wisdom in accepting all the Senate amendments, particularly given the expanded powers of the commission which may involve additional time and travel for their inquiries, time and travel which may cost additional expenditure of funds that were not originally contemplated by the royal recommendation of Bill C-37. I am not emphatically stating that there is a violation. I am simply raising a flag for the record.

In closing, I reiterate the Reform Party's position. We stand opposed to Senate Amendment No. 3. We stand opposed to the outrageous salary increase for judges at a time when financial pressures on Canadian families continue to increase as their quality of life decreases.

It is incredible that we sit in this place in consideration of a windfall increase in pay for judges while in my home province of British Columbia public safety is being put at risk through reduced law enforcement due to the gutting of RCMP budgets.

In my constituency a police car which sustains more than \$4,000 damage is parked because there is no money to get it repaired. There is not enough money to replace worn tires on patrol cars, putting both police and public at risk. Store owners fear loss of business as customers run a gauntlet of crack cocaine dealers because police lack the money and resources to deal effectively with them.

We stand opposed to the concurrence motion.

[*Translation*]

**Mr. Richard Marceau (Charlesbourg, BQ):** Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to Bill C-37, as amended by the Senate.

It is often said that what is clearly understood can be clearly expressed. With this in mind, let me outline the Bloc Québécois' position. We oppose Bill C-37. However, while the amendments put forward by our brave colleagues in the Senate are a step in the right direction, we think many more amendments would be required and much more work would have to be done on this bill before the Bloc Québécois could consider supporting it.

• (1025)

On October 22, the Senate made eight amendments to the bill. We are opposed to the principle of raising federal judges' salaries



*Government Orders*

by approximately 13%, which is unacceptable to us in the Bloc Quebecois, and that is why we oppose the bill.

On the other hand, we are in favour of establishing the Judicial Benefits and Compensation Commission. We are also in favour of the Senate amendments for the following reasons: a number of these amendments would bring the French and English versions of the bill more in line with one another, while one other amendment clarifies the mandate of the commission being established by the federal government.

This amendment explicitly sets out what we believe was the implicit mandate of the Judicial Benefits and Compensation Commission. In our view, these explicit criteria are positive and fair.

For the Bloc Quebecois, the most crucial of these amendments is the one deleting clause 1 of Bill C-37. Clause 1 defines the term "surviving spouse" and, for constitutional reasons, we are opposed to the inclusion of surviving spouses in Bill C-37.

In this respect, we support the explanation given to the committee by Professor Jamie Cameron of Osgoode Hall. According to Professor Cameron, while it is the responsibility of the federal government to set benefits for federally appointed judges, the provinces have a similar responsibility with respect to matrimonial property and the division of assets in an estate.

Pensions are included in matrimonial property under family and estate distribution law. This raises the question of whether the federal government has jurisdiction to legislate the division of estate assets by defining the expression "surviving spouse" and with all the rights accorded subsequently in the bill according to the definition of "surviving spouse".

According to Ms. Cameron, and the Bloc Quebecois completely supports this position, the federal government is encroaching on provincial jurisdiction over matrimonial and estate property.

Accordingly, we support the amendments eliminating clause 1, which defines "surviving spouse" and the clauses pertaining to the rights of surviving spouses.

The purpose of the bill is to amend the Judges Act in order to increase judges' salaries and to change the criteria governing pension plan eligibility. The bill also establishes the Judicial Benefits and Compensation Commission.

Finally, the bill provides for more judges in appeal and unified family courts. The bill is the Liberal government's response to the 1995 triennial commission on judges' salaries and benefits, also known as the Scott commission.

In 1981, Parliament provided for the creation of independent commissions with a mandate to confirm that the pay and benefits of judges were sufficient in view of the importance of judicial

independence and the unique role given judges by the Canadian Constitution.

On September 18, 1997, in a reference regarding the remuneration of provincial court justices in Prince Edward Island, which pertained to the independence and impartiality of these justices, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of these independent commissions, which establish a vital link between two government powers: the executive and the judicial. The court also pointed out the constitutional obligation to set magistrates' salaries.

The commission's recommendations are not binding on the government, but the court judgment requires a reasonable and public justification to be provided if the recommendations are rejected, before a court of law if necessary.

The 1995 Scott Commission I have already referred to recommended a progressive 8.3% increase, and the Liberal government accepted that recommendation in its bill by proposing 4.1% yearly for two years.

Moreover, in determining what was reasonable, the Scott Commission acknowledged that a complex and broad range of factors needed to be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate pay level, including the need of pay levels capable of attracting and retaining the most qualified candidates for the office of judge.

The report is based on the relationship between judges' salaries and those of lawyers in private practice, since this is the source of most candidates for the office of judge.

Section 25 of the Judges Act calls for annual adjustments to judges' salaries based on the increase in the industrial aggregate, up to a maximum of seven per cent.

• (1030)

Judges' salaries were frozen between December 1992 and March 31, 1997, under the Public Service Compensation Restraint Act.

Our objection to the Scott report is that it is based solely on federal economic activity indicators, and not on the economic sectors most heavily affected since the 1993 cuts. In our opinion, the most fundamental question is whether we should be putting books back into the schools and beds back into the hospitals, or raising the salaries of high court judges already earning \$155,800. These are hardly starvation wages, after all.

To sum up the Bloc Quebecois' position on Bill C-37, we think that the Liberal government has already achieved its zero deficit, but we all know it did so on the backs of the provinces, unemployed workers and the most disadvantaged members of our society.

The Minister of Justice may well want to reward judges by increasing their salaries, but she would do better to persuade her colleague, the Minister of Finance, to compensate the provinces

*Government Orders*

for the cuts to health, welfare and post-secondary education transfer payments.

The Bloc Québécois puts other priorities ahead of raising judges' salaries. None of us is in any doubt that judges work hard, but they are far from the only ones doing so.

It is for these reasons that the Bloc Québécois is opposed to the principle of increasing judges' salaries. We are in favour of creating an independent commission, but we cannot go along with this lapse in solidarity and vision in an economic context where the provinces have borne the brunt of the federal government's fight to eliminate the deficit.

Naturally, we have heard the government's arguments that the most competent lawyers must be attracted to the bench, and we fully agree. But judges too are members of society, and as such must take part in the collective effort. Even though the federal deficit has been eliminated, the \$500 billion debt is still hanging over our heads.

Instead of increasing judges' salaries, the government could have given the money to the provinces to buy hospital beds and to help the most disadvantaged members of our society.

The supplementary estimates tabled last Wednesday also indicate that the Canadian unity group at Justice, one of whose responsibilities is the reference to the Supreme Court, is costing Canadian and Quebec taxpayers \$700,000. Again, this money could have paid for many hospital beds and many meals on the tables of the most disadvantaged members of our society.

Today, therefore, I am calling on the Minister of Justice to withdraw her bill and to use the money instead to compensate the provinces for the unjust cuts they have suffered since this Liberal government took office.

[English]

**Mr. Peter Mancini (Sydney—Victoria, NDP):** Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the Senate amendments to Bill C-37.

I reviewed some of the comments that I made on behalf of my party some time ago when this bill was first introduced. I compared this piece of legislation to a recipe that my grandfather brought to this country from Italy some time ago. I said that as much as my grandfather would try to pass that recipe onto his children, when he would taste the sauce he would say "You got a little bit of it right and whole lot of it wrong". I said that this bill was very similar to that sauce.

The Senate has added a dash a salt but nothing particularly to improve the flavour of this legislation. What remains tragic is that with this legislation there was an opportunity for the government to address some fundamental issues.

I will pick up on the comments of my colleague from Charlebourg. He talked about cutbacks in the provinces. He talked about hospital beds. He talked about the kinds of things that matter to Canadians at a time when this government is determined that we should give judges a substantial increase in their salaries.

I am not going to talk so much about hospital beds. I am going to talk about the justice system and where those funds might be better funnelled at a time of increasing demands on the courts, at a time when we are looking at a role for victims to play in the courts, at a time when crown prosecutors who have to enforce the laws are finding their hands tied because of lack of resources, and at a time when the RCMP and law enforcement agencies are finding their budgets slashed.

• (1035)

When we are determining how the very sparse funds have to be divided up, increasing the judges' salary at this point in time when this country has other problems is perhaps not the wisest and most judicial, if you will, use of funds.

I sit on the custody and access committee. One complaint we have heard continually is that when there is a dispute in family law it cannot be resolved for months because of the backlog in cases. There is a lack of legal aid availability for parties who are seeking to bring their matters before the court. There is a lack of court clerks. There is a lack of all kinds of necessary instruments to bring matters to court and to have them resolved quickly. When matters are not resolved quickly before the courts, it results in increased tension between the parties. The parties take matters into their own hands and there is increased concern.

These funds might have been better spent in improving the justice system in the provinces. That is in the family law courts. Let us look at the criminal courts.

More and more powers are being delegated to provincial court judges with fewer and fewer resources. Again this means longer waiting times for court hearings. It does no good for the accused, who lives under a cloud of suspicion while waiting for his or her day in court. It does no good for the victim, who waits for months and months in a system he or she never asked to end up in the first place.

The cuts to the provinces have resulted in increased waiting times in both the criminal and family courts.

Also, as has been raised by this side of the House, the RCMP training centre out west is being closed down. I am meeting with a group of people in my own riding next Monday when the House is down. Seniors in my riding have been told that when they press an alarm, it will only be responded to if the person pressing the alarm can guarantee that there is a break and enter.

*Government Orders*

I practised criminal law for some time. It was a rare occasion when one could say to the criminal breaking into the home "Hold on for a minute while I call the police to confirm that you are here. Would you take the phone and let the RCMP know that there is a reason for them to come". I do not blame the RCMP officers for this. The reality is that they do not have the resources to respond unless they can be sure there is a crime taking place. At the same time that this is happening, we are increasing the wages for some of the wealthiest people in this country. I again question whether that is the best use of resources.

There was also a golden opportunity, which I have spoken to the Minister of Justice about, to review the method of appointment of judges. The parliamentary secretary has said in support of some of the Senate amendments that the criteria in terms of determining judicial compensation ought to be accepted and it is something the government looks favourably on. I would suggest we ought to revamp the criteria for the appointment of judges before we revamp the criteria for increasing their salaries and determining whether they ought to get it.

This country has some very good judges. I do not want to diminish that for a moment. The late Justice Dickson was an example of a fine judge. He moved this country forward in his position as a supreme court justice. There are hundreds of good judges in this country.

Every now and then we hear about an appointment to the court that is simply a patronage appointment. It is well known certainly on the east coast and in the province I come from that part of how one gets to the judiciary is to make the right contributions to the parties in power.

• (1040)

Just this summer there was an appointment of a judge to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. Prior to her being a judge, she started her career as a lawyer and a keen organizer for the Liberal Party. The reward for that was an appointment to the public utility board in Nova Scotia which paid some \$75,000 a year up until the age of 75. This was a pretty nice plum and everybody thought she was satisfied with that. As it turned out, she was a classmate of the Minister of Justice, I think the year behind. She was not too happy on the utility board and found herself appointed to the supreme court. That appointment met with considerable criticism in the province. It was not the only one.

That is unfair to the judges who legitimately serve this country well, who achieve their appointment on merit. We need to have a discussion about this. I have indicated to the Minister of Justice that there ought to be a subcommittee of the justice committee that can explore and ensure a fair method of the appointment of the judiciary. Citizens look to the judiciary in some ways to set the moral standards of the country. They look to parliamentarians. They look to people in authority.

This is a time when we are talking about youth crime and young offenders who appear before judges. It is very difficult to present to them the argument that the society we want them to participate in is one that is fair and just if some of the very people they appear before received their positions on the bench not because of their understanding of criminal, family or contract law, but because of their connections to particular parties. This was a missed opportunity.

Some of the amendments that were put forward by members of the justice committee from the Reform Party and the Bloc party were good. It is too bad that the government could not have supported them. It did support one of those amendments. The amendment put forward by the Bloc which had to do with the actual pay increase would have been well received. It is too bad that the government did not choose to accept that in the same way it accepted the amendments from the Senate.

**Mr. Mark Muise (West Nova, PC):** Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak on the Senate amendments to Bill C-37, an act to amend the Judges Act and other consequential acts.

It is nice to see the upper chamber bringing forth amendments that we believe will only benefit this bill. This is further proof that the other place continues to play a vital role in Canadian politics. It is also proof that although the Liberal government likes to ram bills through with little consultation, it does not always work.

Nevertheless, our party is encouraged by the provisions contained in Bill C-37. These amendments will improve the independence, the objectivity and the effectiveness of the salary and benefits commission process.

Clause 6 of the proposed amendments will for the most part strengthen the judiciary. For example, the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary will not only enhance the credibility of the judiciary but it will also enhance the process.

The Progressive Conservative Party is encouraged by the provisions which make the appointments less bureaucratic and more democratic.

This commission will consist of three people, of which one will be appointed by the Minister of Justice. The other would be appointed or nominated if you will, by the judiciary, while the chair would be named by the two previously mentioned.

I stand by my remarks from last March when I first spoke on this bill. I believed then as I do now that a better, more accountable way of appointing people to this committee would be to enable the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to nominate a member to sit on the commission. Such a process would not only

*Government Orders*

improve the transparency, but it would also eliminate some of the patronage that goes on during these appointments.

As for the deletion of section 45 of the act, the joint and survivor provisions, it will rightfully entitle the respective provincial governments to handle the salary and benefits situation as it relates to spouses according to the province in which the judge respectfully works.

An example of this is in Quebec where common law marriages are not recognized. Should Quebec judges be penalized for working in Quebec? No, they certainly should not be. This amendment will ensure equality for all judges right across the country as it relates to their place of work and residency.

• (1045)

By keeping central control in the confines of the provincial government, we believe it is more practical to apply a case by case process as it pertains to individual judges. Narrowing the scope eliminates the possibility for difficulty and confusion down the road. This legislation has invoked a great deal of passion and provocative commentary within the House, and to some extent a great deal of righteous indignation on the part of some.

It is important to focus on the role of judges and the important tasks they are charged to perform. We have previously debated the important question of the separation of power in society. My party strongly believes judicial independence is the cornerstone of our democracy. There is no question that we as parliamentarians may not always agree with a court's decision, but it is our job to respect and uphold the system in place for the good of the country and the citizens we represent.

However, it cannot be stated strongly enough or with enough emotion the importance of having our judges remain independent of the elected body. We as parliamentarians are elected as opposed to appointed judges. A balance needs to be struck to eliminate the practice of governments, in particular majority governments, using heavy handed measures the judiciary is called to investigate.

My party is comfortable supporting the amendments brought forth today because they give guidelines to the commission that will ultimately strengthen the judiciary and present guidelines for the way salaries are set. Furthermore, we believe in an independent commission setting the judges' salaries. The provisions regarding spousal pension benefits are nothing but beneficial to the law and the process. Therefore I would ask that the other parties here today agree to the amendments brought forth.

**The Deputy Speaker:** Is the House ready for the question?

**Some hon. members:** Question.

**The Deputy Speaker:** The question is on the motion. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?

**Some hon. members:** Agreed.

**Some hon. members:** No.

**The Deputy Speaker:** All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.

**Some hon. members:** Yea.

**The Deputy Speaker:** All those opposed will please say nay.

**Some hon. members:** Nay.

**The Deputy Speaker:** In my opinion the yeas have it.

*And more than five members having risen:*

**The Deputy Speaker:** Pursuant to Standing Order 45, the vote is deferred until Monday, November 16 at the ordinary time of adjournment.

\* \* \*

**FIRST NATIONS LAND MANAGEMENT ACT**

The House resumed from November 5 consideration of the motion that Bill C-49, an act providing for the ratification and the bringing into effect of the framework agreement on first nation land management, be read the second time and referred to a committee; and of the amendment.

**Mr. Roy Bailey (Souris—Moose Mountain, Ref.):** Mr. Speaker, I will continue my delivery from yesterday. I was discussing some of the many injustices that have taken place in the past. I will deal specifically with the land claims agreement in Saskatchewan and how it continues to fail daily in terms of the obligation of this government. It drives the wedge, a feeling of inequality, between rural Saskatchewan and this government. I am talking about a debt owed by this government to the rural areas of Saskatchewan.


Let us go back 10 years.

• (1050)

A promise was made to the rural governments of Saskatchewan that when the natives would acquire Indian land, the RMs would be paid 22.5 times the assessment for the land taken out of the assessment role.

In other words, the deal was that they would get 22.5 years of taxes in lieu of services they provided. When this government came into power, it changed this so that the rural municipalities of Saskatchewan get a mere 5 years taxes.

That is an injustice. The debt owed to the RMs is owed by the government and the people of Canada. It is a national debt.



First Session  
Thirty-sixth Parliament, 1997-98

Première session de la  
trente-sixième législature, 1997-1998

SENATE OF CANADA

SÉNAT DU CANADA

*Proceedings of the Standing  
Senate Committee on*

*Délibérations du comité  
sénatorial permanent des*

## Legal and Constitutional Affairs

## Affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles

*Chairman:*  
The Honourable LORNA MILNE

*Présidente:*  
L'honorable LORNA MILNE

Thursday, October 22, 1998

Le jeudi 22 octobre 1998

Issue No. 37

Fascicule n° 37

**Sixth and last meeting on:**  
Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act  
and to make consequential amendments  
to other Acts

**Sixième et dernière réunion concernant:**  
L'étude du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi  
sur les juges et d'autres lois  
en conséquence

INCLUDING:  
THE FOURTEENTH REPORT OF THE  
COMMITTEE (Bill C-37)

Y COMPRIS:  
LE QUATORZIÈME RAPPORT DU COMITÉ  
(projet de loi C-37)

THE STANDING SENATE COMMITTEE ON  
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

The Honourable Lorna Milne, *Chairman*

The Honourable Pierre Claude Nolin, *Acting Deputy Chairman*

and

The Honourable Senators:

Balfour	Johnstone
Beaudoin	Joyal, P.C.
Buchanan, P.C.	* Lynch-Staunton
Eyton	(or Kinsella (acting))
Fraser	Moore
Grafstein	Pépin

\* Graham, P.C. (or Carstairs)

\* *Ex Officio Members*

(Quorum 4)

*Changes in membership of the committee:*

Pursuant to rule 85(4), membership of the committee was amended as follows:

The name of the Honourable Senator Grafstein was added (October 22, 1998).

The name of the Honourable Senator Johnstone was substituted for that of the Honourable Senator Bryden (October 22, 1998 — 11:25 a.m.)

LE COMITÉ SÉNATORIAL PERMANENT DES  
AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES ET CONSTITUTIONNELLES

*Présidente:* L'honorable Lorna Milne

*Vice-président suppléant:* L'honorable Pierre Claude Nolin

et

Les honorables sénateurs:

Balfour	Johnstone
Beaudoin	Joyal, c.p.
Buchanan, c.p.	* Lynch-Staunton
Eyton	(ou Kinsella (suppléant))
Fraser	Moore
Grafstein	Pépin

\* Graham, c.p. (ou Carstairs)

\* *Membres d'office*

(Quorum 4)

*Modifications à la composition du comité:*

Conformément à l'article 85(4) du Règlement, la liste des membres du comité est modifiée, ainsi qu'il suit:

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Grafstein est ajouté (le 22 octobre 1998).

Le nom de l'honorable sénateur Johnstone est substitué à celui de l'honorable sénateur Bryden (le 22 octobre 1998 — 11 h 25).

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The question being put on the motion by Senator Nolin, it was agreed.

After debate on the motion by Senator Joyal, it was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That the motion be amended, in the English version, new subclause 1.1, paragraph *d*), to read:

“any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.”

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That the motion be further amended, in the French version, new subclause 1.1, paragraph *d*), to read:

«tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.»

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That Bill C-37 be further amended in clause 6, on page 4, by replacing line 14 with the following:

“a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.”

The question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was agreed — That clause 6, as amended, carry.

It was agreed — That clause 7 carry.

It was agreed — That clause 8 carry.

It was agreed — That clause 9 not carry.

It was agreed — That clause 10 not carry.

It was agreed — That clause 11 not carry.

After debate, it was agreed — That clauses 12 to 20 carry.

It was moved by the Honourable Senator Joyal — That Bill C-37 be amended in clause 21, on page 13, by replacing lines 1 to 3 with the following:

“21. Sections 2, 3 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or”.

After debate, the question being put on the motion, it was agreed.

It was agreed — That clause 21, as amended, carry.

It was agreed — That the Title carry.

It was agreed — That the Bill, as amended, carry.

It was agreed — That the clauses be renumbered appropriately.

La question, mise aux voix par le sénateur Nolin, est adoptée.

Après discussion de la motion du sénateur Joyal, il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que la motion soit modifiée dans sa version anglaise et que l'alinéa *d*) du nouveau paragraphe 1.1 soit le suivant:

«any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.»

Après discussion, la question mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que la motion soit modifiée, dans sa version française, et que l'alinéa *d*) du nouveau paragraphe 1.1 soit le suivant:

«tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.»

Après discussion, la question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 6, soit modifié, à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13 de ce qui suit:

«(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au».

La question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 6 ainsi modifié soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 7 soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 8 soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 9 ne soit pas adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 10 ne soit pas adopté.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 11 ne soit pas adopté.

Après discussion, il est convenu — Que les articles 12 à 20 soient adoptés.

Il est proposé par l'honorable sénateur Joyal — Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié par substitution aux lignes 3 à 5, à la page 13, de ce qui suit:

«21. Les articles 2, 3, 7 et 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date».

Après discussion, la question, mise aux voix, est adoptée.

Il est convenu — Que l'article 21 ainsi modifié soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que le titre soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que le projet de loi ainsi modifié soit adopté.

Il est convenu — Que les articles soient renumérotés en conséquence.

It was agreed — That Bill C-37 be reported to the Senate, as amended.

At 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

*ATTEST:*

Il est convenu — Qu'il soit fait rapport au Sénat du projet de loi C-37 ainsi modifié.

À 12 h 20, le comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation de la présidence.

*ATTESTÉ:*

*La greffière du comité,*

Heather Lank

*Clerk of the Committee*



## REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

THURSDAY, October 22, 1998

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs has the honour to present its

## FOURTEENTH REPORT

Your Committee, to which was referred Bill C-37, An Act to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, has, in obedience to the Order of Reference of Tuesday, September 22, 1998, examined the said Bill and now reports the same with the following amendments:

1. *Page 1, Clause 1:* Delete Clause 1 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
2. *In the French version, Page 3, Clause 6:* Replace line 4 with the following:  
 «de la rémunération des juges chargée».
3. *Page 3, Clause 6:* Add after line 7, on page 3, the following:  
 «(1.1) In conducting its inquiry, the Commission shall consider
  - (a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government;
  - (b) the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence;
  - (c) the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary; and
  - (d) any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.»
4. *Page 4, Clause 6:* Replace line 14 with the following:  
 «a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.»
5. *Page 6, Clause 9:* Delete Clause 9 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
6. *Pages 6, 7 and 8: Clause 10:* Delete Clause 10 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
7. *Page 8, Clause 11:* Delete Clause 11 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.
8. *Page 13, Clause 21:* Replace lines 1 to 3 with the following:  
 «21. Sections 2, 3, 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or».

Respectfully submitted,

*La présidente,*

LORNA MILNE

*Chair*

## RAPPORT DU COMITÉ

Le JEUDI 22 octobre 1998

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles a l'honneur de présenter son

## QUATORZIÈME RAPPORT

Votre comité, auquel a été déféré le projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence, a, conformément à l'ordre de renvoi du mardi 22 septembre 1998, étudié ledit projet de loi et en fait maintenant rapport avec les modifications suivantes:

1. *Page 1, article 1:* supprimer l'article 1 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
2. Dans la version française, Page 3, article 6: substituer la ligne 4 par ce qui suit:  
 «de la rémunération des juges chargée».
3. *Page 3, article 6:* ajouter après la ligne 9, page 3, ce qui suit:  
 «(1.1) La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:
  - a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;
  - b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;
  - c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;
  - d) tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.»
4. *Page 4, article 6:* substituer la ligne 13, par ce qui suit:  
 «(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au».
5. *Page 6, article 9:* supprimer l'article 9 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
6. Pages 6 et 7, article 10: supprimer l'article 10 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
7. Page 8, article 11: supprimer l'article 11 et faire les changements de désignation numérique qui en découlent.
8. Page 13, article 21: substituer les lignes 3 à 5 par ce qui suit:  
 «21. Les articles 2, 3, 7 et 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date».

Respectueusement soumis,

## EVIDENCE

OTTAWA, Thursday, October 22, 1998

The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, to which was referred Bill C-37, to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, met this day at 11:05 a.m. to give consideration to the bill.

**Senator Lorna Milne** (*Chairman*) in the Chair.

[*English*]

**The Chairman:** This meeting of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs is now in session. We will proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37, to amend the Judges Act and to make consequential amendments to other acts.

**Senator Moore:** Honourable senators, I move that the committee complete clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37.

**Senator Cools:** Before we move to clause-by-clause consideration, I wish to raise a question of privilege.

**Senator Grafstein:** To be fair, Senator Cools did declare her intention in advance of the motion. I would hope that Senator Moore could withhold his motion so that Senator Cools has an opportunity to make her statement.

**The Chairman:** That is quite right.

Senator Cools, the floor is yours.

**Senator Cools:** Thank you for your consideration. In any event, it has always been my understanding that questions of privilege take precedence.

We had an interesting situation yesterday where, as a committee, we engaged in some unusual methodology. In hearing from Department of Justice officials, certain senators indicated their intention to bring forward motions. The content and intent of the motions were worthy. However, I questioned the procedural technique that was being used. I have never really encountered a situation where there is a public discussion between department officials and members about their intentions to bring certain motions.

I will agree with the motions when they are actually brought forth.

Yesterday, we had a discussion, without the motion, to discuss the subject matter being before us. Those questions were raised briefly and not as sufficiently as I would have liked because I did not want to resort to the technique of formally making a point of order or any more strenuous procedural technique. I thought the appeal to common sense and to our customs would have prevailed.

My concern about the techniques used yesterday has been heightened. Information has come into my possession that many of the interested judges — those who would be affected by these provisions — have known for quite some time that these clauses — what I have learned to call the “spousal clauses” — will be deleted.

## TÉMOIGNAGES

OTTAWA, le jeudi 22 octobre 1998

Le comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles, auquel a été renvoyé le projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence, se réunit aujourd'hui à 11 h 05 pour en étudier la teneur.

**Le sénateur Lorna Milne** (*présidente*) occupe le fauteuil.

[*Traduction*]

**La présidente:** Je déclare ouverte cette séance du comité sénatorial permanent des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles. Nous procéderons à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-37, Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges et d'autres lois en conséquence.

**Le sénateur Moore:** Honorables sénateurs, je propose que le comité procède à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-37.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Avant de passer à l'étude article par article, j'aimerais soulever une question de privilège.

**Le sénateur Grafstein:** En toute justice, le sénateur Cools avait fait part de son intention avant le dépôt de la motion. J'espère que le sénateur Moore peut différer sa motion de manière à ce que le sénateur Cools puisse faire sa déclaration.

**La présidente:** C'est tout à fait juste.

Sénateur Cools, vous avez la parole.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Merci. De toute façon, j'ai toujours cru que les questions de privilège avaient préséance.

Il s'est passé quelque chose d'intéressant hier alors qu'à ce comité, nous avons fait quelque chose d'inhabituel. Lors de l'audition de hauts fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice, certains sénateurs ont manifesté leur intention de déposer des motions dont le contenu et l'intention étaient louables. Cependant, je mets en doute la façon de procéder. Il ne m'est jamais arrivé d'assister à un débat public entre des hauts fonctionnaires du ministère et des membres d'un comité au sujet de leur intention de déposer certaines motions.

J'appuierai les motions lorsqu'elles seront bel et bien déposées.

Hier, nous avons parlé, sans la motion, de discuter du sujet du projet de loi qui nous a été confié. Ces questions ont été soulevées brièvement et pas autant que je l'aurais voulu parce que je ne n'ai pas voulu en venir à formuler officiellement une objection ou à recourir à une procédure beaucoup plus ardue. J'ai cru que l'appel à notre sens commun et à nos coutumes aurait prévalu.

Mon inquiétude au sujet des méthodes employées hier s'est accrue. Selon les renseignements dont je dispose, bon nombre des juges intéressés — ceux qui seraient visés par ces dispositions — savaient depuis un certain temps que ces articles — ce que j'appelle maintenant les «dispositions relatives au conjoint» — seront supprimées.

As far as I am concerned, when one has had a political victory, one never does complain. I am pleased that reason, common sense, and judiciousness have prevailed and that certain individuals have recognized that these clauses were indeed very questionable and suspicious, not to mention embarrassing, and that they were sadly in need of amendment. I am also pleased that, after several weeks of effort, the minister has finally conceded that something was very wrong and that she herself was prepared to accept changes, mainly the deletion of those clauses from Bill C-37.

However, having said that, I believe that some "impropriety", and perhaps that is not the appropriate word, but a less-than-parliamentary occurrence has taken place. That, I believe, should be brought to the attention of members of this committee. To me, it is most distressing and vexing that certain interested judges and other interested parties will have information about the deletion or amendment of these clauses far in advance of the members of the Senate themselves knowing, or far in advance of any formal, procedural, or parliamentary activity to implement those wishes.

As I said before, this is not the first time that I have worked on committees and encountered this situation. For example, last year before our committee reached its clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-41, certain persons at the Department of Justice, or whoever, had already put certain information into the public domain.

Let me be clear so no one would, for a moment, suggest that I am opposed to freedom of the press: I am a great believer in freedom of the press. My concern is that this information has been made available to interested judges and that there are currently separation agreements, and whatever other agreements being entered into, based on information which certain people have received. I find that very questionable.

It seems to me that, if we are doing proper and judicious work, which we have been doing, the formal process of Parliament should be allowed to function without the unnecessary, inconvenient or inappropriate release of information to interested individuals. This question is usually raised quite publicly when the Minister of Finance is preparing a budget.

I raise this as a question of privilege. I believe that there has been an impropriety, that there has been a breach, and that it is indeed unfortunate that information is out and available before senators have been informed, or before any senator has moved a motion in this committee to basically delete those clauses.

An additional consideration is that, frequently in committee and in the chamber, I raise the issue of constant, ongoing, persistent, and insistent contact between certain persons, whomever they may be, at the Department of Justice and certain judges of this land. I find it extremely disturbing and unhelpful that this information is in the hands of certain parties prior to it being in my hands.

To that extent, I consider this to be a very serious breach of my privileges here. As I said before, I support the minister's agreement to these amendments and I would have appreciated it

À ce que je sache, quand quelqu'un remporte une victoire politique, il ne se plaint jamais. Je suis heureuse que la raison, le sens commun et la sagesse aient prévalu et que certaines personnes aient reconnu que ces dispositions étaient très discutables et très contestables, pour ne pas dire embarrassantes, et qu'elles avaient grandement besoin d'être modifiées. Je me réjouis aussi de voir que, après plusieurs semaines d'efforts, la ministre a finalement admis que quelque chose n'allait pas et qu'elle était prête à accepter des changements, plus particulièrement le retrait de ces articles du projet de loi C-37.

Cependant, cela dit, je crois qu'une «irrégularité», et ce n'est peut-être pas le mot qui convient, un événement moins que parlementaire s'est produit et devrait, selon moi, être signalé aux membres de ce comité. Quant à moi, je trouve très frustrant que certains juges et autres parties intéressées seront mis au courant du retrait de ces dispositions ou d'amendements qui pourraient y être apportés, et ce bien avant que le Sénat ou toute activité officielle, procédurale ou parlementaire s'en charge.

Comme je l'ai déjà dit, ce n'est pas la première fois qu'une telle situation se présente à un comité auquel je siège. Par exemple, l'année dernière, avant que notre comité entreprenne l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-41, certaines personnes du ministère de la Justice ou qui vous voulez avaient déjà divulgué certains renseignements.

Je veux bien me faire comprendre afin que personne ne laisse entendre le moindre que je m'oppose à la liberté de presse en laquelle je crois fermement. Ce qui me laisse perplexe, c'est que cette information a été mise à la disposition des juges intéressés et qu'il y a à l'heure actuelle des ententes en matière de séparation et quelque autre entente conclue, qui sont basées sur l'information que certaines personnes ont obtenue. Je trouve cela très suspect.

Il me semble que, si nous accomplissons judicieusement notre travail, ce que nous avons fait, le processus parlementaire officiel ne devrait pas être entravé par la diffusion inutile, inopportune ou inappropriée d'information à des personnes intéressées. Cette question est habituellement soulevée assez publiquement lorsque le ministre des Finances prépare un budget.

Je soulève ce point en tant que question de privilège. Je crois qu'une irrégularité a été commise, qu'il y a eu un manquement et qu'il est en fait malheureux que de l'information soit diffusée avant que les sénateurs soient mis au courant ou avant qu'un sénateur propose une motion à ce comité portant pour ainsi dire retrait de ces dispositions.

En outre, il m'est arrivé fréquemment, en comité et à la Chambre, de soulever la question des contacts constants, permanents, persistants et insistants entre certaines personnes, peu importe de qui il peut s'agir, du ministère de la Justice et certains juges de ce pays. Je trouve tout à fait inquiétant et peu utile que cette information soit divulguée à certaines parties avant de m'être transmise.

Je considère qu'il s'agit d'une grave atteinte à mon privilège. Je le répète, je suis d'accord avec la ministre qui appuie ces amendements et j'aurais apprécié que les sénateurs aient l'honneur

had senators had the honour and the privilege of hearing this first, before the information was released into certain secretive circles.

Other persons may wish to speak to this point of privilege.

**The Chairman:** Before I open up the floor to discussion, Senator Cools, I should point out that this committee does not have the power to rule on a matter of privilege. If the committee so wishes, it must be reported to the Senate for decision.

I should also point out to you that, historically, the manner of proceeding in this committee has been to allow all members of the committee to know what was coming down the pike.

I think Senator Beaudoin will bear me out on this. I know that a similar situation happened when he was chair of this committee and I was sitting in as a member. This has been the custom of this committee, and I think we should proceed on those same grounds.

**Senator Cools:** That is not my question. My question is not on what you did yesterday. I accepted what you did yesterday. The question of privilege, the breach that I perceive, is the fact that other persons in this land, namely certain judges, are in possession of what we were to do as senators prior to any senator making statements about this in this committee and prior to senators having an opportunity to move motions to that effect. That is my concern, and I think it would behoove this committee to try to discover who has been making this information available to the judges of this land.

I am pleased that there has been progress made regarding these clauses but, frankly, I think we should have a chance to vote on it, or at least let the system move ahead.

**The Chairman:** We are about to have a chance to vote on it.

**Senator Joyal:** Following the statement made by Senator Cools, and since yesterday I was the member of the committee who notified my colleagues of my intention to move some amendments, I would like to bring a point of clarification. I would like to make a formal statement that I never, directly or indirectly, consulted any member of the bench, at any level, to get their opinion or reaction on my intention to move forward with any amendments and I never asked anyone in my office to do so.

I would like that point to be very clear on the record. If Senator Cools' statements happen to be true, it is certainly not because I was in any way part of an initiative that would have made my intentions known by any judge in this land.

**The Chairman:** I would further add — if I may, Senator Cools — that I want it made absolutely clear that any amendments that may be proposed today are not being proposed by the Minister of Justice. They are the Liberal senators' amendments.

**Senator Cools:** I accept that and I approve. I would like to be clear here. It was never my intention to question Senator's integrity in any form or fashion. I have known him for a long time. He is a man of outstanding character.

et le privilège d'être mis au courant avant que l'information soit diffusée dans certains cercles secrets.

Quelqu'un d'autre a peut-être quelque chose à dire au sujet de cette question de privilège.

**La présidente:** Avant de céder la parole à d'autres sénateurs, sénatrice Cools, je dois vous dire que ce comité n'est pas autorisé à se prononcer sur des questions de privilège. S'il veut le faire, il doit faire rapport au Sénat afin qu'il prenne une décision.

Je dois aussi vous dire que ce comité a toujours eu comme principe de permettre à tous ses membres de savoir ce qui va se passer.

Je crois que le sénateur Beaudoin confirmera ce qui suit. Je sais qu'une situation similaire s'est présentée lorsqu'il présidait ce comité et que j'y siégeais comme membre. Telle a été la pratique à ce comité et je crois que nous devrions poursuivre dans la même veine.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Ce n'est pas ce qui me préoccupe. Je m'interroge au sujet de ce que nous avons fait hier. J'ai accepté ce que vous avez fait hier. La question de privilège, l'infraction que je perçois, a à voir avec le fait que d'autres personnes dans ce pays, à savoir certains juges, ont été mises au courant de ce que nous nous apprêtions à faire en tant que sénateurs avant qu'un sénateur fasse une déclaration à ce sujet à ce comité et avant que les sénateurs aient l'occasion de proposer des motions à cet effet. C'est à ce sujet que je m'interroge et je crois qu'il incombe à ce comité d'essayer de déterminer qui a diffusé cette information aux juges de ce pays.

Je suis heureuse que des progrès aient été faits en ce qui concerne ces articles mais, en toute franchise, je crois que nous devrions avoir la chance de voter sur la question ou du moins de laisser le système suivre son cours.

**La présidente:** Nous sommes sur le point de voter sur ces motions.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Pour faire suite à la déclaration du sénateur Cools et comme c'est moi qui ai informé hier mes collègues de mon intention de présenter certains amendements, j'aimerais éclaircir un point. J'aimerais dire officiellement que je n'ai jamais, directement ou indirectement, consulté un juge de quelque niveau que ce soit pour savoir ce qu'il pensait de mon intention de proposer des amendements. Je n'ai jamais non plus demandé à personne de mon bureau de le faire.

J'aimerais que ma déclaration soit consignée au compte rendu. Si les déclarations du sénateur Cools devaient s'avérer juste, ce n'est assurément pas parce que j'ai participé de quelque manière à une initiative qui aurait permis de révéler mes intentions à un juge de ce pays.

**La présidente:** J'ajouterais — si vous le permettez, sénateur — que je tiens à ce qu'il soit absolument clair qu'aucun des amendements qui seront proposés aujourd'hui n'émane du ministre de la Justice. Ils sont présentés par les sénateurs libéraux.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Je l'accepte et j'approuve. J'aimerais me faire bien comprendre. Mon intention n'a jamais été de remettre en question l'intégrité du sénateur d'aucune façon que ce soit. Je le connais depuis longtemps. C'est un homme remarquable.

The information that I was referring to is obviously being exchanged between certain individuals at the Department of Justice and other persons across this land. I do not believe that members of this committee divulged the information. Let me be clear, so that no one thinks I was questioning that point.

Madam Chair, you have said that you cannot rule on a question of privilege. I know the rules concerning this well. However, this committee can resolve to take some action to investigate the matter in order to discover how this sort of information has been received by certain people. Perhaps the minister could come here to explain or perhaps we could recall the departmental officials to explain. I believe there is something here that commands attention.

**The Chairman:** Thank you, Senator Cools. However, for this committee to proceed in such a manner, we would need an order to do so from the Senate.

**Senator Cools:** In that case, since I cannot move a motion on this committee to that effect, I would urge the chairman or a member of this committee to put forward a motion asking the Senate to study the matter.

**Senator Grafstein:** Since I am a voting member of the committee, perhaps I could suggest to Senator Cools that a question of privilege, first and foremost, must arise and be stated at the first possible moment. In other words, if somebody's privileges are impinged, the rules state that the senator whose privileges one believes are impinged or interfered with must raise the issue. I assume that is why Senator Cools has raised it here.

Having said that, since Senator Cools believes that this is a matter of her privileges being encroached upon — and, ultimately, it might affect others — the appropriate way to deal with this matter that she is contesting is for the committee to take note of it. I assume we have already done so because it is noted on the record. If the senator wishes to pursue it, she should do so before the full chamber at the appropriate time, which would be today. I have not looked at the questions myself, but I am always sensitive to the privileges of senators. I assume that is the appropriate practice, but I look to Senator Beaudoin and others who may be more familiar with the rules. I am having difficulty with Senator Cools' position that a privilege has been breached because she is a non-voting member of the committee. I am not sure how the privilege is breached. Unless I am told otherwise, I conclude that this is a matter for the full chamber.

I would ask Senator Beaudoin for his comments and then we can move on.

**Senator Beaudoin:** If a person wishes to raise a point of privilege, then he or she must be a member of the committee. If no member of the committee wishes to do so, then that is the end of it. Of course, the matter may be raised in the Senate. However, if no voting member of this committee wishes to raise the point, then I do not see how we can deal with it.

**Senator Cools:** That is rubbish!

Les renseignements dont je parlais ont manifestement été échangés entre des gens du ministère de la Justice et d'autres personnes dans tout le pays. Je ne crois pas que les membres de ce comité ont divulgué les renseignements. Je tiens à ce que ce soit clair, parce que je ne veux pas qu'on pense que c'est ce que je remettais en question.

Madame la présidente, vous avez dit que vous ne pouvez pas vous prononcer sur une question de privilège. Je connais très bien les règles à ce sujet. Quoi qu'il en soit, le comité peut décider d'examiner la question pour découvrir comment certaines personnes ont pu être en possession de ce genre de renseignements. Peut-être que le ministre pourrait venir nous l'expliquer, ou que des fonctionnaires du ministère pourraient revenir nous rencontrer pour le faire. À mon avis, des mesures s'imposent.

**La présidente:** Merci, sénateur. Cependant, le comité doit, pour procéder ainsi, en recevoir l'ordre du Sénat.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Dans ce cas, puisque je ne peux pas présenter de motion en ce sens, j'exhorte la présidente ou un membre du comité à proposer qu'on demande au Sénat d'étudier la question.

**Le sénateur Grafstein:** À titre de membre votant de ce comité, je pourrais peut-être signaler au sénateur Cools qu'une question de privilège doit d'abord et avant tout être soulevée et énoncée à la première occasion possible. Autrement dit, si les privilèges de quelqu'un sont lésés, la règle veut que ce soit le sénateur dont les privilèges auraient été lésés ou restreints qui soulève la question. Je suppose que c'est pourquoi le sénateur Cools nous a fait part du problème ici.

Cela dit, étant donné que le sénateur Cools a des raisons de croire que cette question porte atteinte à ses privilèges — et pourrait bien porter préjudice à d'autres personnes —, la manière appropriée pour le comité de traiter le problème qu'elle soulève est d'en prendre note. Je présume que nous l'avons déjà fait, puisque c'est inscrit au compte rendu. Si le sénateur tient à approfondir la question, elle devrait le faire devant l'ensemble des sénateurs au moment opportun, soit aujourd'hui même. Je ne me suis pas penché là-dessus, mais je suis toujours sensible aux privilèges des sénateurs. Je présume que c'est ainsi que se font les choses, mais je me fie au sénateur Beaudoin et à d'autres, qui connaissent peut-être mieux les règles que moi. J'ai quelque difficulté à comprendre le point de vue du sénateur Cools selon lequel un privilège a été enfreint parce qu'elle n'est pas un membre votant du comité. Je ne vois pas très bien en quoi cela porte atteinte à ses privilèges. À moins d'avis contraire, j'en conclus que cette question relève de l'ensemble des sénateurs.

J'inviterais le sénateur Beaudoin à faire des commentaires, puis nous pourrions poursuivre.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Pour soulever une question de privilège, il faut être membre du comité. Si aucun membre du comité ne veut le faire, c'est fini. Bien sûr, la question peut être soulevée au Sénat. Cependant, si aucun membre votant du comité ne veut soulever la question, je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions en traiter.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Foutaise!

**The Chairman:** No. Order!

**Senator Nolin:** We do not accept "rubbish." If we are to decide on this, I want to hear all the evidence or I do not want to discuss it. I do not think we have the mandate to discuss it. It is your privilege to raise this matter in the chamber and to table all the evidence you have. You will have to produce something. You are accusing a lot of people without mentioning names and I do not wish to be part of that. It is your right to do so in the chamber, but do not do it here.

**Senator Cools:** I would like to respond to that.

**Senator Beaudoin:** One cannot call an explanation of our rules "rubbish."

**Senator Nolin:** No, you cannot.

**The Chairman:** Order. I agree with Senator Beaudoin's comments. I would hope that the senator would retract the word "rubbish."

**Senator Cools:** The word "rubbish" was an aside. It was not intended to be a formal statement.

**Senator Balfour:** Earlier you insisted on being on the record.

**Senator Cools:** Perhaps I should repeat that it was never my intention, in any way, to impugn the integrity of any individual member of this committee. If my use of a particular word as an aside was inappropriate, I will apologize. That is not a problem. Magnanimity comes very easily to me.

In response to the substance of what was said, I should like to say that the rule of "earliest opportunity" does not apply here. It is only applied when the Senate Speaker's role is being invoked in what we call a *prima facie* case in the chamber. It is only invoked in that instance and then, *prima facie*, that response is whether or not the Speaker of the Senate chooses to give priority over all other debate. This subject matter is becoming increasingly not only arcane but also unknown to the majority of senators.

The fact of the matter is that Senate privileges are not "my" privileges. Senators hold them collectively. It is my understanding that it is our duty to uphold the rules at all times. Those rules provide that senators must request information in a certain way. One of those ways, honourable senators, is to introduce a motion in the house. One cannot simply demand information.

What I am introducing here is a sense of discussion —

**The Chairman:** Senator Cools, I have the chair!

**Senator Cools:** You certainly do.

**The Chairman:** I believe that this subject has been explored in great depth. At this point, we will proceed to clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37.

It has been moved by Senator Moore that the committee complete clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-37. Is it agreed?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

**La présidente:** Non. À l'ordre!

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Nous n'acceptons pas ici les termes comme «foutaise». Si nous devons prendre une décision à ce sujet, je tiens à entendre tous les faits, sinon je ne veux plus en entendre parler. Je ne crois pas que nous sommes mandatés pour discuter de ça. Vous avez le droit de soulever cette question au Sénat et de présenter toutes les preuves que vous avez. Il vous faudra en produire. Vous accusez des tas de gens sans donner de nom et je ne tiens pas à être mêlé à ça. Vous avez droit d'en parler au Sénat, mais pas ici.

**Le sénateur Cools:** J'aimerais répondre à ça.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Personne ne peut qualifier de «foutaise» une explication de nos règlements.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Non, personne.

**La présidente:** À l'ordre. Je suis d'accord avec le sénateur Beaudoin. J'espère que le sénateur voudra bien retirer le mot «foutaise».

**Le sénateur Cools:** C'était un aparté. Ça ne se voulait pas une déclaration officielle.

**Le sénateur Balfour:** Vous avez pourtant insisté plus tôt pour que votre intervention soit consignée au compte rendu.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Je devrais peut-être répéter que je n'ai jamais eu la moindre intention de mettre en doute l'intégrité d'aucun membre de ce comité. Si l'expression que j'ai utilisée en aparté n'était pas convenable, je m'en excuse. Ce n'est pas là qu'est le problème. Je sais me montrer magnanime.

Pour en revenir à ce qui a été dit, j'aimerais souligner que la règle de la «première occasion» ne s'applique pas ici. Elle ne s'applique que lorsque le Président du Sénat doit déterminer si la question paraît fondée à première vue. Ce n'est que dans ce cas que cette règle peut être invoquée et le Président peut, à première vue, décider de donner ou non la priorité à cette question sur toutes les autres. Cette règle devient de plus en plus obscure et même ignorée pour la majorité des sénateurs.

Le fait est que les privilèges du Sénat ne sont pas uniquement les miens. Ils sont ceux de tous les sénateurs. D'après moi, nous avons le devoir d'observer les règles tout le temps. Ces règles prévoient que les sénateurs doivent suivre une certaine procédure pour obtenir des renseignements. Ils peuvent notamment les obtenir par voie de motion au Sénat. On ne peut pas tout simplement les exiger.

Ce que je suggère ici est une discussion...

**Le président:** Sénateur, c'est moi qui occupe le fauteuil!

**Le sénateur Cools:** Ça ne fait pas de doute.

**La présidente:** Il me semble que cette question a été amplement approfondie. Nous allons maintenant passer à l'étude détaillée du projet de loi C-37.

Le sénateur Moore propose que le comité procède à l'étude article par article du projet de loi C-37. Êtes-vous d'accord?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Shall clause 1 carry? At this point, I should point out that the normal procedure, if we want to delete a clause, is to vote "No, it shall not carry."

**Senator Beaudoin:** Yes, when the clause is called.

**The Chairman:** The clause is now called. Shall clause 1 carry?

**Senator Beaudoin:** No.

**Senator Nolin:** No.

**The Chairman:** I declare the motion negatived.

**Senator Cools:** Usually when we move clause by clause, there is opportunity for discussion first.

**The Chairman:** Senator Cools, there was no offer for discussion on this one and the motion has been negatived.

Shall clause 2 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed? Carried.

Shall clause 3 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed? Carried.

**Senator Cools:** I was under the impression that when we move a clause we do it formally by motion. It takes more than to say, "Shall this carry? Carried." It seems to me that an individual moved it. I move that.

**The Chairman:** It has been moved by Senator Moore that we should go to clause-by-clause consideration of the bill, and that is what we are doing.

**Senator Cools:** I think the proper way to proceed is for Senator Moore to say, "I move that this clause carry" when we get to each clause. It should then be seconded. Otherwise, the bill is not properly voted on.

**The Chairman:** This is the format that we have traditionally been following in the committee.

**Senator Beaudoin:** When we have an omnibus motion, such as that moved by Senator Moore, we do not repeat ourselves 25 times.

**Senator Nolin:** It implies we are moving each and every clause.

**Senator Beaudoin:** That is right. It is up to the chair to call each clause separately but not each motion separately.

**The Chairman:** Precisely, and that is what I am doing.

We have now carried clause 3.

Shall clause 4 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Shall clause 5 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Est-ce que l'article 1 est adopté? Il convient de souligner que, selon la procédure, si nous voulons supprimer un article il faut voter «non, il n'est pas adopté».

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Oui, lorsqu'il est mis aux voix.

**La présidente:** L'article est maintenant mis aux voix. Est-ce que l'article 1 est adopté?

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Non.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Non.

**La présidente:** Je déclare la motion rejetée.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Normalement, quand on fait une étude article par article, on peut d'abord discuter.

**La présidente:** Sénateur, personne n'a proposé de discuter de cet article, et la motion a été rejetée.

Est-ce que l'article 2 est adopté?

**Des voix:** Oui.

**La présidente:** Qui est contre? Adopté.

Est-ce que l'article 3 est adopté?

**Des voix:** Oui.

**La présidente:** Qui est contre? Adopté.

**Le sénateur Cools:** J'avais l'impression que, pour proposer un article, il fallait le faire formellement au moyen d'une motion. Ça devrait être plus que «est-ce que c'est adopté? Adopté». Il me semble que quelqu'un doit le proposer. C'est ce que je voudrais.

**La présidente:** Le sénateur Moore a proposé que nous fassions l'étude article par article du projet de loi, et c'est ce que nous faisons.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Je crois que pour faire les choses comme il se doit, le sénateur Moore devrait dire «je propose l'adoption de cet article» pour chaque article. Quelqu'un doit ensuite appuyer sa proposition. Autrement, le vote sur le projet de loi n'est pas fait selon les règles.

**La présidente:** Notre comité a toujours procédé de cette façon.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Lorsqu'une motion générale, comme celle du sénateur Moore, est présentée nous ne nous répétons pas 25 fois de suite.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Ça sous-entend que nous proposons chacun des articles.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** C'est exact. Il incombe à la présidente de mettre chaque article aux voix, mais pas chaque motion.

**La présidente:** Précisément, et c'est ce que je fais.

Nous avons donc adopté l'article 3.

Est-ce que l'article 4 est adopté?

**Des voix:** Oui.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Est-ce que l'article 5 est adopté?

**Des voix:** Oui.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Shall clause 6 carry?

**Senator Joyal:** Honourable senators, on clause 6, I move the following amendment. Members of the committee have copies in English in French.

That Bill C-37 be amended, in clause 6,

(a) on page 3, by adding the following after line 7:

“(1.1) In conducting its inquiry, the commission shall consider

(a) the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, and the overall economic and current financial position of the federal government;

(b) the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence;

(c) the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary; and

(d) any other objective measure that the Commission considers relevant.”; and

(b) on page 4, by replacing line 14 with the following:

“a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.”

[Translation]

In French, “Que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié,

a) à la page 3, par adjonction, après la ligne 9, de ce qui suit:

«(1.1) La commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;

b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;

c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;

d) tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.”;

[English]

Of course, the rest of the article follows.

**Senator Nolin:** I have a subamendment. I do not have it in writing because I thought it would be included in the amendment just read. In the French version, section 26, or clause 6 of the bill, paragraph 1 —

[Translation]

The French version contains a reference to “juges fédéraux” in line 2, whereas the English version makes no mention whatsoever of federal judges. Federal judges do not exist in the legislation. The only reference is to judges. In my subamendment, I propose that the reference to “juges fédéraux” in clause 6, paragraph 1,

Est-ce que l'article 6 est adopté?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Honorables sénateurs, à propos de l'article 6, j'ai un amendement à proposer. Les membres du comité ont reçu copie en anglais et en français de l'amendement.

Que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié, à l'article 6,

a) à la page 3, par adjonction, après la ligne 9, de ce qui suit:

«(1.1) La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;

b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;

c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;

d) tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.»;

b) à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13, de ce qui suit:

«(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au.»

[Français]

En français, que l'article 6 soit modifié:

a) à la page 3, par adjonction, après la ligne 9, de ce qui suit:

«(1.1) La commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

a) l'état de l'économie au Canada, y compris le coût de la vie ainsi que la situation économique et financière globale du gouvernement;

b) le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire;

c) le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature;

d) tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.»;

[Traduction]

Bien entendu, le reste de l'article reste tel quel.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** J'aimerais proposer un sous-amendement. Je ne l'ai pas par écrit, parce que je croyais qu'il ferait partie de l'amendement qui vient d'être lu. Dans la version française, à l'article 26, ou à l'article 6 du projet de loi, au paragraphe 1...

[Français]

Dans la version française, on fait référence aux juges fédéraux à la deuxième ligne alors que dans la version anglaise, il n'y a aucune mention des juges fédéraux. Dans la loi, les juges fédéraux n'existent pas. Il existe des juges, point. Mon sous-amendement est de rayer du projet de loi C-37, article 6,



line 2 of the French version of Bill C-37 be deleted. Unfortunately, I do not have this subamendment in writing.

[English]

**Senator Beaudoin:** I support that.

**The Chairman:** We are discussing this, Senator Cools, and I will give you an opportunity to speak.

**Senator Joyal:** I have no objection to including the proposed subamendment to the amendment which I have just read. Senator Nolin is right, there is no such qualification of judges in the English version of the bill. If we maintain "juges fédéraux," it could lead to confusion that we are dealing only with members of the Federal Court and not the other courts. That is certainly not the intention of the bill. We are dealing with the salary of all the judges appointed by the federal government, not only the Federal Court judges, but the Superior Court judges, the Court of Appeal judges, and so forth. The point raised by Senator Nolin is appropriate. It will not change the scope of the bill.

**Senator Nolin:** If we are on the discussion part of our consideration, in English, you have the word "Judicial" in the name of the commission. That word is not used in the French version.

**Senator Grafstein:** What word do they use in French?

**Senator Nolin:** In the name of the commission, there is no word like "judiciaire."

**Senator Joyal:** It is "Commission d'examen de la rémunération".

**Senator Nolin:** All of our judges are federal, first.

**Senator Joyal:** There is no doubt that if we maintain "juges fédéraux" in the French version, it could lead to some confusion in the interpretation of the mandate of the commission.

**Senator Beaudoin:** There is another reason. Both texts are equal according to law and the Constitution, and I think that is a major reason to eliminate the redundant word. We are talking about judges appointed by federal authority, but the expression "juges fédéraux" is not the best translation.

**The Chairman:** Our clerk is writing madly here. Senator Cools?

**Senator Cools:** I would submit to this committee, in particular to Senator Joyal and to the Liberal senators here, that this amendment has not received substantial and sufficient discussion in the Liberal Senate caucus. I would ask Senator Joyal if he would impose a limitation on himself, difficult as it would be, and that is to consider submitting this proposed amendment to our caucus and then —

**Senator Beaudoin:** On a point of order.

**Senator Cools:** I have not finished my remarks, but that is quite all right.

**Senator Beaudoin:** We are sitting in committee. What is going on in your caucus or in our caucus is immaterial.

clause 6, paragraphe 1, à la deuxième ligne, les mots «des juges fédéraux» uniquement dans la version française. Malheureusement, je ne l'ai pas par écrit.

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** J'appuie cette proposition.

**Le président:** Nous allons en discuter, sénateur Cools, et vous pourrez prendre la parole.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je ne vois pas d'objection à incorporer le sous-amendement proposé à l'amendement que je viens de lire. Le sénateur Nolin a raison, la version anglaise de la loi ne qualifie pas les juges. Si nous conservons l'expression «juges fédéraux», ça pourrait prêter à confusion et donner à penser que nous ne parlons que des membres du tribunal fédéral et pas de ceux des autres tribunaux. Ce n'est certainement pas l'intention du projet de loi. Nous traitons des salaires de tous les juges désignés par le gouvernement fédéral, pas seulement de ceux des juges fédéraux, mais des juges du tribunal supérieur, de la Cour d'appel, et cetera. L'intervention du sénateur Nolin est donc pertinente. Ça ne changera pas la portée du projet de loi.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Puisque nous discutons de ça, en anglais, il y a le terme «judicial» dans le titre de la commission. Il n'y a rien de tel dans la version française du titre.

**Le sénateur Grafstein:** Quel est le terme utilisé en français?

**Le sénateur Nolin:** On n'emploie pas, dans le titre de la commission, le mot «judiciaire».

**Le sénateur Joyal:** C'est la Commission d'examen de la rémunération.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Tous les juges sont fédéraux, en premier lieu.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Il n'y a pas de doute que si nous conservons les mots «juges fédéraux» dans la version française, ça pourrait porter à confusion dans l'interprétation du mandat de la commission.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Il y a une autre raison. En vertu de la loi et de la Constitution, les deux textes sont égaux, et je crois que c'est une raison suffisante pour éliminer les mots inutiles. Nous parlons des juges désignés par le pouvoir fédéral, mais l'expression «juges fédéraux» n'est pas la meilleure traduction qui soit.

**La présidente:** Le greffier écrit à toute vitesse. Sénateur Cools?

**Le sénateur Cools:** Je voudrais signaler au comité, en particulier au sénateur Joyal et aux sénateurs libéraux ici présents, que le caucus libéral du Sénat n'a pas eu l'occasion de discuter suffisamment de cet amendement. Je demanderai donc au sénateur Joyal de freiner son élan, aussi difficile que ça puisse être, et d'envisager de soumettre l'amendement qu'il propose à notre caucus, et puis...

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Comme rappel au Règlement.

**Le sénateur Cools:** Je n'ai pas fini de parler, mais c'est exactement où je veux en venir.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Nous siégeons à un comité, ce qui se passe dans votre caucus ou dans le nôtre importe peu.

**The Chairman:** I am not accepting that as a point of order, but I am accepting it as a valid point on this.

**Senator Cools:** My statement was cut off midstream. I was asking Senator Joyal to delay by a day or two, prior to proposing his amendment, so that this matter could be properly canvassed by the Liberal Senate caucus. I do not believe that I asked anything that was out of order. It is a very curious situation where the gentlemen across here are raising this as a potential point of order. I think I understand why. That is quite acceptable, because life unfolds as it does. I was making an appeal to Senator Joyal, since it is his amendment.

As I see it, it is not the government senators' amendment, because it has not been placed before us by the government sponsor of the bill. Thus, I must conclude that it is a personal amendment being moved by Senator Joyal. There is a big difference. Our government sponsors usually do certain things. If Senator Joyal wishes to comply with my request, I would submit, Senator Beaudoin, that it is no business of yours. I was putting it to Senator Joyal.

**Senator Beaudoin:** And my business is to point out that we are in committee. This committee does not need to know what is going on in your caucus or in my caucus.

**Senator Cools:** I am trying to ask a member whether he will consider delaying making a motion, and that is usually done at the point in time when that motion is made. I would like to hear Senator Joyal's response.

**The Chairman:** Order. Senator Joyal has heard your request. I do not believe that the caucus of any side of the Senate should be brought into discussions in this committee. It is up to Senator Joyal to decide whether he will agree to postpone these discussions, for whatever reason. Senator Cools, you did not have the floor.

**Senator Joyal:** Madam Chairman, we are now engaged in the process of voting on the proposed legislation clause by clause. I have suggested that we move forward, as that is our agenda for today. If there is any need for further discussion among certain members of this committee, that discussion will proceed outside the sitting this morning.

**The Chairman:** We shall proceed on the suggestions that have been made by Senator Nolin and Senator Joyal that Bill C-37 be amended, in the French version, by deleting, in clause 6 on page 3, line 4, the phrase "des juges fédéraux".

**Senator Fraser:** No, just the word "fédéraux".

**Senator Joyal:** That is right because the Judges Act defines which judges are covered by the Judges Act. Since it is an amendment to the Judges Act, the definition that is applied in that section is already contained in the Judges Act. Therefore, we should not create confusion. I feel that we should maintain the definition currently in the Judges Act. That is probably the most compelling argument in support of Senator Nolin's argument.

**La présidente:** Je n'accepte pas votre intervention comme un rappel au Règlement, mais j'admets que c'est un argument valable.

**Le sénateur Cools:** J'ai été interrompue dans ma lancée. Je demandais au sénateur Joyal de remettre sa proposition d'un jour ou deux afin de permettre au caucus libéral du Sénat de l'examiner de manière appropriée. Je ne pense pas demander l'impossible. Il est très curieux que ces messieurs, en face de moi, interprètent ça comme un éventuel rappel au Règlement. Je crois comprendre pourquoi. Ça se comprend très bien, parce que la vie suit son cours. Je m'adressais au sénateur Joyal, parce qu'il s'agit de son amendement.

Que je sache, cet amendement n'a pas été proposé par les sénateurs du parti ministériel, parce qu'il n'a pas été proposé par le parrain du projet de loi. J'en conclus donc qu'il s'agit d'un amendement que propose personnellement le sénateur Joyal. C'est très différent. Les parrains du parti ministériel procèdent généralement d'une certaine manière. Si le sénateur Joyal veut bien se plier à ma demande, je soutiendrais, sénateur Beaudoin, que ça ne vous regardé pas. C'est au sénateur Joyal que je m'adressais.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Ça me regarde, cependant, de souligner que nous sommes en comité. Ce comité n'a nullement besoin de savoir ce qui se passe dans votre caucus ou dans le mien.

**Le sénateur Cools:** J'essaie de demander à un membre du comité s'il veut bien envisager de reporter le dépôt d'une motion, et ce genre de requête se fait généralement lorsque la motion est présentée. J'aimerais entendre la réponse du sénateur Joyal.

**La présidente:** À l'ordre. Le sénateur Joyal a entendu votre requête. Je ne crois pas que le caucus ou n'importe quel parti représenté au Sénat devrait être mêlé aux discussions de ce comité. Il incombe au sénateur Joyal de décider s'il veut ou non reporter ces discussions, pour une raison ou une autre. Sénateur Cools, je ne vous avais pas donné la parole.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Madame la présidente, nous avons entrepris l'adoption article par article du projet de loi à l'étude. Je suggère que nous poursuivions, puisque c'est l'objet de notre rencontre d'aujourd'hui. Si certains membres du comité veulent continuer de discuter, ils devraient le faire en dehors de la séance de ce matin.

**La présidente:** Nous revenons aux propositions du sénateur Nolin et du sénateur Joyal qui ont demandé d'amender la version française du projet de loi C-37, à l'article 6, de la page 3, ligne 4, en supprimant les mots «des juges fédéraux».

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Non, seulement le mot «fédéraux».

**Le sénateur Joyal:** C'est exact, parce que la Loi sur les juges définit les juges qu'elle vise. Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'une modification de la Loi sur les juges, la définition qui s'applique à cet article figure déjà dans la Loi sur les juges. Par conséquent, nous ne devons pas semer la confusion. Je crois que nous devons nous en tenir à la définition qui figure dans la Loi sur les juges. C'est probablement l'argument qui donne le plus de poids à la proposition du sénateur Nolin.

[Translation]

**Senator Fraser:** Still with respect to the translation, point (d) in the English version refers to "any other objective measure", while the French version refers to "de tout autre facteur". Should the word "objectif" be added to the French version or does the word "facteur" imply objectivity?

[English]

**Senator Joyal:** That is a very important point. Would Senator Fraser care to explain why she raised it?

**Senator Fraser:** I suggest that we insert the word "objectif" after the word "facteur".

**Senator Beaudoin:** Two words or just one?

**Senator Fraser:** Just one.

[Translation]

**Senator Beaudoin:** How would the amendment read then?

**Senator Fraser:** Right now, it reads "tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent". I am proposing that it to be amended to read "tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent".

[English]

**Senator Joyal:** In the English version we say "any other objective measure". There is a qualification in English which does not exist in the French version.

[Translation]

**Senator Nolin:** "Objectif" is used as an adjective rather than as a noun. It would be inserted after the word "facteur".

[English]

**The Chairman:** Before we continue with amending clause 6, perhaps we should decide whether we will vote on the amendment to clause 1, in the French version, to delete the word "fédéraux".

Our researcher has something of interest to say on this.

**Ms Nancy Holmes, Researcher:** I should like to bring it to the attention of senators before they vote, that section 26 of the Judges Act does not use the reference "des juges fédéraux" with regard to establishing the commission.

**Senator Beaudoin:** What did they use?

**Ms Holmes:** They did not. They said:

[Translation]

"Chargé d'examiner si les traitements et autres prestations prévues à la présente loi".

[English]

It continues in the same.

**The Chairman:** So the entire phrase is not there.

[Français]

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Toujours au niveau de la traduction, dans l'amendement d), en anglais on parle de «any other objective measure», et en français, il est écrit: «de tout autre facteur». Est-ce qu'on devrait insérer le mot «objectif» dans la version française ou est-ce que le mot «facteur» est lui-même un mot qui implique l'objectivité?

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Joyal:** C'est certainement très important. Est-ce que le sénateur Fraser veut bien expliquer pourquoi elle a soulevé cette question?

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Je suggère que nous ajoutions le terme «objectif» après le terme «facteur».

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Deux mots ou un seul?

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Seulement un.

[Français]

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Comment cela se lirait-il?

**Le sénateur Fraser:** Présentement, nous avons: «tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent». Je suggère que l'on devrait l'amender pour «tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent».

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Dans la version anglaise, nous disons «any other objective measure». L'anglais comporte donc une qualification qui n'est pas dans la version française.

[Français]

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Le mot «objectif» est utilisé comme adjectif plutôt que comme nom. Alors on ajoute le mot «objectif» après le mot «facteur».

[Traduction]

**La présidente:** Avant de poursuivre avec l'amendement de l'article 6, nous pourrions peut-être décider si nous allons mettre aux voix l'amendement de l'article 1, qui vise à supprimer le terme «fédéraux» dans la version française.

Notre attachée de recherche à quelque chose à dire là-dessus.

**Mme Nancy Holmes, attachée de recherche:** J'aimerais signaler aux sénateurs, avant qu'ils passent au vote, que l'article 26 de la Loi modifiant la Loi sur les juges ne contient pas de référence à «des juges fédéraux», en ce qui a trait à la mise sur pied de la commission.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Que dit-on?

**Mme Holmes:** On n'y fait pas référence. On dit:

[Français]

«Chargé d'examiner si les traitements et autres prestations prévues à la présente loi».

[Traduction]

Et ça continue ainsi.

**La présidente:** Donc, on ne retrouve pas ces mots.

**Senator Nolin:** The act refers to the appointment of commissioners without naming the commission. Now we will have a name for that commission. In the English version of the name we have the word "judicial". In the French version we have "juges fédéraux". I am suggesting that we leave out the word "fédéraux". All our judges are "fédéraux".

**The Chairman:** At this point, I will put the question on the first amendment to clause 6, which is that Bill C-37 be amended, in the French version, by deleting, in clause 6 on page 3, line 4, the word "fédéraux". Will all those in favour of the amendment so indicate.

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Will all those opposed so indicate.

The amendment is carried.

We shall move to the second amendment.

**Senator Grafstein:** May I ask a question of Senator Joyal on the substance of the drafting? I have no difficulty with the principles. I just query the placement of "(a)" as opposed to "(b)". One of the fundamental principles and one of our concerns is the principle of judicial independence. I wondered whether "(b)" should be "(a)" and "(a)" should be "(b)". I raise this in the context that general principles should follow with specifics, as opposed to specific and then general. The key principle here is to sustain the principle of judicial independence.

Having said that, I then look at the wording of "(b)". While I think I understand the principle, to which I do not object, I wonder whether we could redraft it slightly. Just to illustrate my point, instead of using the phrase, "the role of financial security of the judiciary in ensuring judicial independence", I would suggest we start with, "to ensure judicial independence, the role of financial security of the judiciary." I would make that the first principle that describes what we are doing here. We are really trying to establish an objective standard for judicial independence, yet political accountability. Those are the two principles.

I am not suggesting that we make that change. I am only asking Senator Joyal, who has looked at this longer than I have, to tell me if that meets with his view. If it does not, I will not move it as an amendment.

**Senator Joyal:** Madam Chair, we all know that one of the fundamental principles is, of course, the independence of the judiciary from the legislative and the executive. Those principles are at the root of our parliamentary and constitutional system. To maintain the separation of the three powers, there are elements that the independence of the judiciary should be asserting. One of them, of course, is security of tenure. The second one is financial security. It is important that those elements be stated when we are dealing with compensation of the judiciary.

I personally have no opposition to the suggestion put forward by Senator Grafstein, as such. However, since we are addressing only one aspect of the independence of the judicial system, which is financial security — we are not dealing with security of tenure in this bill — I suggest that, in bringing forward the importance of

**Le sénateur Nolin:** La loi fait référence à la nomination des commissaires sans nommer la commission. Cette commission aura un nom. Dans son nom en anglais, on retrouve le mot «judicial». Dans son nom en français, il est question des «juges fédéraux». Je propose qu'on enlève le mot «fédéraux». Tous nos juges sont «fédéraux».

**La présidente:** Je vais maintenant mettre aux voix le premier amendement de l'article 6 du projet de loi qui propose que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié, dans sa version française, par suppression, à la ligne 4, du mot «fédéraux». Que tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement se manifestent.

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Que tous ceux qui sont contre se manifestent.

L'amendement est adopté.

Nous passons au deuxième amendement.

**Le sénateur Grafstein:** Puis-je poser une question au sénateur Joyal sur la façon dont l'amendement a été rédigé? Je ne mets pas en question les principes de l'amendement. Je m'interroge seulement sur l'ordre des alinéas a) et b). Un des principes fondamentaux qui nous préoccupent est celui de l'indépendance judiciaire. Je me demande si l'on ne devrait pas inverser l'ordre des alinéas b) et a), étant donné que les principes généraux doivent être énoncés avant les particularités et non l'inverse. Ce qui compte ici, c'est de confirmer le principe de l'indépendance judiciaire.

Cela dit, je me demande si on ne pourrait pas modifier légèrement la formulation de l'alinéa b) même si j'en comprends le principe et que je ne m'y oppose pas. Au lieu d'écrire «le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire», je proposerais d'inverser l'ordre des mots pour commencer par «dans la préservation de l'indépendance judiciaire, le rôle de la sécurité financière des juges». J'aimerais qu'on énonce en premier le principe que nous voulons assurer. Ce que nous voulons vraiment faire ici c'est établir un critère objectif d'indépendance judiciaire, sans négliger la responsabilité politique. Ce sont les deux principes à garantir.

Je ne suis pas en train de proposer ce changement. Je veux simplement demander au sénateur Joyal, qui a étudié la question plus à fond que moi, si mon point de vue concorde avec le sien. S'il ne concorde pas, je ne proposerai pas l'amendement.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Madame la présidente, nous savons tous que l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire par rapport au pouvoir législatif et au pouvoir exécutif est un principe fondamental. Ce principe est à la base de notre régime parlementaire et constitutionnel. Pour assurer la séparation des trois pouvoirs, il y a des éléments que l'indépendance judiciaire doit affirmer, dont bien sûr la sécurité du mandat. Il y a aussi la sécurité financière. Il est important de mentionner ces éléments quand on parle de la rémunération des juges.

Je n'ai personnellement rien contre la proposition faite par le sénateur Grafstein. Cependant, comme il n'est question ici que d'un aspect de l'indépendance du système judiciaire, à savoir la sécurité financière — étant donné qu'il n'est pas question de la sécurité du mandat dans ce projet de loi — je pense qu'en

the financial security to the commission, as it is an essential element of their work, we not deal with the overall elements of the independence of the judiciary.

That, of course, involves security of tenure and so on. That is why it was phrased that way. Otherwise, we would need to enumerate the three elements that have been traditionally considered as the guarantees of judicial independence.

This is the best way we could find to state the principles which you just stated yourself and which are, in fact, at the root of any work of the commission. The commission works within the context of the independence of the judicial system and, in that context, it has a specific role to ensure that financial security is confirmed through the recommendation and the study that it makes. It gives the overall context in which the commission must work to prevent the discussion of the questions which were raised in the Supreme Court of Canada in the *P.E.I. Reference* case, which is: How do you define "financial security" versus "judicial independence"?

Of course, it brings forward the overall capacity of the commission to maintain a balance between that principle and the other prevailing economic conditions and so forth. In other words, there is not only the economic set of elements. There are also sets of elements which deal with the very structure of the independence of the judicial system, which, for instance, do not exist in compensation boards for the public service. The public service is not separated from the administration of the government, but the judicial system is totally separated from the administration of the government. It is important to state that principle when we are formally establishing a commission that has the responsibility to define how the element of financial security will be guaranteed in that context. That is why it is stated that way. I agree there are two ways to state the overall objective of the work of the commission, but I feel that the way it is stated now meets Senator Grafstein's preoccupation.

**Senator Balfour:** I do not wish to quibble over words with Senator Grafstein, but if I had been drafting the text, I think I would have stated "the necessity for" or "the need for" rather than "the role of", because that is what we are talking about. In order to have judicial independence, it is necessary that judges have financial security. We are not talking about a role; we are talking about a need.

**The Chairman:** I must say this clause has been the subject of a great deal of debate.

**Senator Balfour:** And I was not present for that.

**Senator Joyal:** I agree with Senator Balfour and Senator Grafstein. I should say, in a candid way, that the dictionary is full of words. That is the magic of language. Certainly we can state an objective and use a certain number of words to describe it without changing the very nature of what we want to say. My honourable colleagues will understand that I tried to draft a text which would meet the very point I was making in my remarks, that is, to be sure that this text is in conformity with our constitutional tradition

soulignant à la commission l'importance de la sécurité financière des juges dans l'exécution de leur travail, nous n'avons pas à traiter de tous les éléments qui assurent l'indépendance judiciaire.

Parmi ces éléments, on retrouve la sécurité du mandat évidemment. C'est pourquoi l'amendement a été formulé de cette façon. Autrement, il faudrait énumérer les trois éléments qui sont normalement censés garantir l'indépendance judiciaire.

C'est la meilleure façon que nous avons trouvée pour énoncer les principes dont vous venez de parler vous-même et qui sont à la base de tous les travaux de la commission. La commission fonctionne dans le contexte de l'indépendance du système judiciaire et, dans ce contexte, elle a pour rôle précis de s'assurer que la sécurité financière des juges est confirmée dans les recommandations et les études qu'elle fait. C'est le contexte global dans lequel la commission doit travailler pour empêcher qu'on ait à se poser des questions comme celles qui ont été soulevées à la Cour suprême du Canada dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, à savoir comment définir la «sécurité financière» par rapport à l'«indépendance judiciaire».

Bien sûr, ça suppose que la commission est capable de tenir compte à la fois de ce principe et de l'état de l'économie et le reste. Autrement dit, il n'y a pas seulement les aspects économiques qui entrent en ligne de compte. Il y a aussi des aspects qui ont trait à la structure même du système judiciaire indépendant et qui n'existent pas dans le cas des commissions de rémunération de la fonction publique. Contrairement à la fonction publique, le système judiciaire est complètement distinct de l'administration gouvernementale. Il est important d'énoncer ce principe quand nous créons officiellement une commission qui est chargée de définir comment la sécurité financière des juges sera garantie dans ce contexte. C'est pourquoi on a formulé ainsi la disposition. Je conviens qu'il y a deux façons de formuler l'objectif général du mandat de la commission, mais j'estime que celle qui a été utilisée répond à la préoccupation du sénateur Grafstein.

**Le sénateur Balfour:** Ce n'est pas que je veuille pinailler sur le choix des mots avec le sénateur Grafstein, mais si j'avais rédigé ce texte, j'aurais employé les mots «nécessité» ou «besoin» plutôt que «rôle», parce que c'est ce dont nous parlons. Pour assurer l'indépendance judiciaire, il est nécessaire que les juges aient une sécurité financière. Nous ne parlons pas d'un rôle, mais d'un besoin.

**La présidente:** Je dois dire que cette disposition a fait l'objet d'un long débat.

**Le sénateur Balfour:** Auquel je n'ai pas assisté.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je suis d'accord avec le sénateur Balfour et le sénateur Grafstein. Je dois dire, bien honnêtement, qu'il y a plein de mots dans le dictionnaire. C'est la magie de la langue. Il est certain qu'on peut formuler un objectif de différentes façons sans changer l'essence même de ce que nous voulons dire. Mes collègues comprendront que j'ai essayé de rédiger un texte qui respecte ce que j'ai souligné, c'est-à-dire qui soit conforme à la tradition et aux obligations de notre Constitution sur la séparation

and our constitutional obligations of separation of power. I was conscious of choosing the terms to be sure that they were acceptable in the context of our legal tradition.

At this point, while I know that those of us who are lawyers or who have discussed legal concepts can express principles in various ways, I would be tempted to maintain this one as it stands, taking into account the research and discussion I had with the legal adviser on the selection of these words.

I understand your point. It is part of the overall essential of judicial independence that we want to maintain through the capacity of the commission to ensure that judges have financial security.

**Senator Beaudoin:** I think we have discussed this *ad nauseam*, because it is only one point out of three in the *Valenti* case. I am ready to accept this as it is.

**The Chairman:** May I ask your opinions on point "(d)", Senator Joyal and others?

**Senator Joyal:** I would like to hear the opinion of my colleagues before I make my comments on that, Madam Chairman.

**The Chairman:** We are referring to the change suggested by Senator Fraser in the French version of "1.1(d)", that the word "objectif" be added after the word "facteur".

**Senator Beaudoin:** I have a problem with that. Look at this.

[Translation]

The French version reads "La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants", namely (a), (b), (c) and (d), "tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent."

[English]

I think if we change any version, it should be the English version which states that the commission shall consider. There is no mention of the objective or the measure. It states, shall consider "(a), (b), (c), (d)" and any other objective measure. It has been translated as "tout autre facteur".

[Translation]

When you say "tout autre facteur", this implies objectivity.

**Senator Joyal:** No, not necessarily.

[English]

**Senator Beaudoin:** A factor is something that exists. It exists or it does not exist.

**Senator Grafstein:** That point is well taken. In the *P.E.I. Reference* case, one of the overlapping issues was the need for objective criteria. "Criteria" is better than "objective measures". I can bring a criterion to bear. I can say that I think everyone who has a certain colour of hair should be treated in a certain way. That, to my mind, is an arbitrary criterion. On the other hand, if I say judges who are disabled should be treated in a certain way, then I move from the arbitrary to the general. I think that "objectif" means those objective, non-arbitrary factors. We do not want the commission to say, "By the way, this was our

des pouvoirs. Je me suis employé à choisir des mots qui allaient être acceptables sur le plan juridique.

Même si je sais que ceux d'entre nous qui sont avocats ou discutent de concepts juridiques peuvent exprimer des principes de différentes façons, je serais tenté de défendre la formulation que j'ai choisie compte tenu des recherches que j'ai faites et des discussions que j'ai eues avec un conseiller juridique sur le choix des mots.

Je comprends votre point de vue. Ça fait partie du principe général de l'indépendance de la magistrature que nous voulons maintenir en permettant à la commission de s'assurer que les juges ont une sécurité financière.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Je pense que nous avons discuté de cela *ad nauseam* parce que c'est seulement un des trois points traités dans l'affaire *Valenti*. Je suis prêt à accepter la disposition telle quelle.

**La présidente:** Puis-je vous demander votre avis sur l'alinéa d), sénateur Joyal et d'autres?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** J'aimerais d'abord entendre l'opinion de mes collègues avant de donner la mienne, madame la présidente.

**La présidente:** Je parle de la modification proposée par le sénateur Fraser à la version française de l'alinéa 1.1d) pour faire ajouter le mot «objectif» après le mot «facteur».

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** J'y vois un problème. Regardez bien.

[Français]

«La Commission fait son examen en tenant compte des facteurs suivants, a), b), c) et à d), tout autre facteur qu'elle considère pertinent.»

[Traduction]

À mon avis, si on change l'une ou l'autre version, ce devrait être la version anglaise parce qu'il n'y est pas question de l'objectif ou de la mesure que la commission doit examiner. On dit que la commission examine a), b), c) et d), toute autre mesure objective. On a traduit ce passage par «tout autre facteur».

[Français]

Si vous dites tout autre facteur, le facteur est toujours objectif.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Non, pas nécessairement.

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Un facteur est quelque chose qui existe ou qui n'existe pas.

**Le sénateur Grafstein:** On en prend note. Dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, il est question de la nécessité d'avoir des critères objectifs. Le mot «critères» vaut mieux que les mots «objective measures» utilisés en anglais. Je peux établir un critère à prendre en considération. Je peux dire que tous ceux qui ont les cheveux d'une certaine couleur doivent être traités d'une certaine façon. D'après moi, c'est un critère arbitraire. En revanche, si je dis que les juges qui ont un handicap devraient être traités d'une certaine façon, je passe de l'arbitraire au général. Je pense que le mot

thought.” If they have a thought, it must be a generally accepted criterion. It is almost like the notion of generally accepted accounting principles.

**The Chairman:** Before we go further, it may be of interest to you to note that, in the *P.E.I. Reference* case, they must make recommendations on judges' remuneration by reference to objective criteria. This is where the reference comes from.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Objective criteria is much better. I think we should change it to that expression.

**Senator Grafstein:** How would that be translated in French?

**The Chairman:** Senator Nolin has the floor.

**Senator Nolin:** Of course, we can change the word “measure” to “criteria”, but the intent of Senator Fraser's amendment was to add —

[Translation]

— if you look at the three first factors or criteria listed, clearly, they are all objective. There is no need to qualify them. However, in subparagraph 4, because they are no longer defined, these factors need to be qualified. The commission has the flexibility to choose on its own those measures or criteria that it deems necessary. These criteria should be objective. It is quite appropriate to insert the word “objective”, but only in subparagraph 4.

[English]

**Senator Beaudoin:** In the *P.E.I. Reference* case, they referred to objective criteria. That decision is also available in French. What does it say in French?

**The Chairman:** We do not have the French version of the *P.E.I. Reference* case here. We will try to get it off the Internet.

**Senator Joyal:** To continue on the point raised by Senator Nolin, I would remind you that the concept came from the *P.E.I. Reference* case. In my opinion, it was important. The basis of this amendment is that the mandate of the commission be circumscribed. The court clearly mentioned it had one element in mind when it stated that objective. In other words, it did not want to leave the commission with an open-ended mandate to make recommendations that could not be measured by objective criteria. That is my interpretation of the decision, and that is what I think we understand here.

When I was drafting the amendment, I thought it important that the word “objective” be maintained. It qualifies the various elements that the commission would take into consideration in making recommendations. I thought it was necessary to add a certain number of examples of criteria, such as the need to attract outstanding candidates to the judiciary. That idea came from the Scott commission. Honourable senators will remember that when Mr. Scott was here, he testified in that regard.

«objectif» qualifie les facteurs non arbitraires. Nous ne voulons pas que la commission exprime un avis sans y avoir vraiment réfléchi. L'avis qu'elle exprime doit être appuyé sur un critère généralement reconnu. C'est un peu comme les principes comptables généralement admis.

**La présidente:** Avant de poursuivre, il peut être intéressant de noter que, selon le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, la commission doit formuler des recommandations sur la rémunération des juges en s'appuyant sur des critères objectifs. C'est de là que viennent ces mots.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Les mots «objectives criteria» valent beaucoup mieux. Je pense que nous devrions les employer à la place.

**Le sénateur Grafstein:** Comment les traduirait-on en français?

**La présidente:** La parole est au sénateur Nolin.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Évidemment, nous pourrions changer le mot «measure» par «criteria», mais le changement proposé par le sénateur Fraser visait à ajouter...

[Français]

... en français, le mot objectif. Si vous regardez l'énumération des trois premiers facteurs ou critères, ils sont de toute évidence objectifs. On n'a pas besoin de les qualifier à ce moment. Mais au quatrième alinéa, il faut absolument le préciser parce qu'ils ne sont plus définis à ce moment. On laisse la Commission libre de choisir elle-même les facteurs ou critères qu'elle jugera nécessaire afin de l'influencer. On veut bien que ces critères soient objectifs. Il est à propos d'ajouter le mot objectif uniquement au quatrième sous-alinéa.

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, il est question de critères objectifs. La décision a été traduite. Que dit-on en français?

**La présidente:** Nous n'avons pas la version française du renvoi ici. Nous essayerons de nous la procurer sur Internet.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Pour revenir à ce que disait le sénateur Nolin, j'aimerais vous rappeler que ce concept vient du *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*. À mon avis, c'est important. L'amendement vise à circonscrire le mandat de la commission. La cour a bien indiqué l'intention qu'elle avait en énonçant cet objectif. Autrement dit, elle ne voulait pas que la commission puisse formuler des recommandations qui ne pourraient pas s'appuyer sur des critères objectifs. C'est ainsi que j'interprète la décision et c'est aussi ce que nous en pensons ici, je crois.

Quand j'ai rédigé l'amendement, j'ai jugé qu'il était important de conserver le mot «objectif». Il qualifie les divers éléments que la commission examinerait pour formuler ses recommandations. J'ai cru bon d'énoncer certains critères, comme le besoin de recruter les meilleurs candidats pour la magistrature. J'ai tiré cet exemple de ce qu'a produit la commission Scott. Mes collègues se rappelleront que M. Scott a parlé en ce sens quand il est venu témoigner devant nous.

As well, the prevailing economic conditions in Canada, including the cost of living, must be taken into account. It is mentioned in the *P.E.I. Reference* decision as an objective criterion. The overall economic and current financial position of the federal government is also an objective criterion.

If we are to allow the commission the capacity to do its work, then it must be able to consider other criteria, but in an objective manner. In other words, it must consider criteria that are justified, ones that are measured on objective grounds. That is why the word "objective" is so important.

I certainly support the suggestion of Senator Fraser in that regard; the word "criteria" is part of the sense of that amendment.

**The Chairman:** It is in the French version of the P.E.I. decision as well.

**Senator Joyal:** We agree that we must ensure that the English and French versions are as similar as possible.

**The Chairman:** We cannot change the wording after we have passed it. Therefore, we should have the exact wording before us before we vote.

We can come back to it later. We will leave the staff to worry about it.

We will move on to part "(b)" of clause 6, on page 4. Do you have a further amendment, Senator Joyal?

**Senator Joyal:** Yes, Madam Chairman. It is essentially a matter of clarification.

I move that Bill C-37 be amended at paragraph "(b)", on page 4, by replacing line 14 with the following:

"a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it."

The French amendment would read:

[Translation]

Paragraphe:

b) à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13, de ce qui suit:

"(7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au".

...within six months of receiving it. The six-month period remains in effect. We are talking here about the commission's report. This provision can be somewhat confusing, as it is not clear if we are talking about the commission's report or about Parliament's report.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Does the French version make no mention of this six-month period?

**Senator Joyal:** Yes, the text continues on line 14.

**Senator Beaudoin:** And that is where mention is made of the six-month period?

Il faut également tenir compte de l'état de l'économie au Canada, et notamment du coût de la vie. Dans la décision rendue dans le *Renvoi relatif aux juges de la Cour provinciale de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard*, cet aspect est considéré comme un critère objectif. La situation économique et financière du gouvernement fédéral est aussi un critère objectif.

Pour pouvoir remplir son mandat, la commission doit pouvoir étudier d'autres critères, mais de façon objective. Autrement dit, elle doit examiner des critères qui sont justifiés, des critères qui peuvent être évalués sur une base objective. Voilà pourquoi le mot «objectif» est si important.

J'approuve tout à fait la proposition du sénateur Fraser à ce sujet; le mot «criteria» donne en partie son sens à cet amendement.

**La présidente:** Il est aussi employé dans la version française de la décision sur le renvoi de l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Nous convenons qu'il faut nous assurer que les versions anglaise et française se ressemblent le plus possible.

**La présidente:** Nous ne pouvons pas changer le libellé après l'avoir adopté. Nous devons donc avoir le libellé exact avant de nous prononcer.

Nous pouvons y revenir plus tard. Nous laisserons le soin au personnel de s'en occuper.

Nous passons à la partie b) de l'article 6, à la page 4. Avez-vous un autre amendement, sénateur Joyal?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Oui, madame la présidente. Il s'agit simplement d'un éclaircissement.

Je propose que le projet de loi C-37 soit modifié, à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 14 de la version anglaise de ce qui suit:

«a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.»

Voici le libellé de l'amendement en français:

[Français]

Paragraphe:

b) à la page 4, par substitution à la ligne 13, de ce qui suit:

« (7) Le ministre donne suite au rapport de la Commission au »

... plus tard six mois après l'avoir reçu. On maintient la période de six mois. C'est le rapport de la commission dont on parle. L'article peut porter à confusion si c'est le rapport de la commission ou le rapport du Parlement.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** C'est parce qu'en français, on ne parle pas du six mois?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Oui, il y a un six mois. On continue avec le texte de la ligne 14.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Et là, il y a le six mois?



**Senator Joyal:** Precisely. The only thing added to the French version is "de la Commission" because it is not clear which report is being referred to. It is purely a technicality.

[English]

I think we all understand the point.

**The Chairman:** At this point, rather than voting on part "(b)," we will go back to part "(a)" because we now have the wording.

Because there are changes to both the English and French versions, we will have to vote on both versions. We will start with the English version. Senator Joyal, will you restate the amendment?

**Senator Joyal:** The amendment to paragraph "(d)" states:

"any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.";

**The Chairman:** Shall the English version of clause 6, as further amended, carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Rather than reading the entire clause, it has been moved by Senator Joyal that paragraph "(d)" read:

[Translation]

Tout autre critère objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Perfect.

[English]

**Senator Nolin:** In the introduction of "1.1" we have the word "facteur". We must change that to "critère". I want to ensure that we are talking about the same thing.

**Senator Joyal:** Personally, I would prefer "facteur" in both paragraph "1.1" and in subparagraph "(d)".

**Senator Nolin:** My point is to use the same wording in both places.

**Senator Beaudoin:** But what will we use?

**Senator Joyal:** We will use the word "facteur".

[Translation]

**Senator Joyal:** "Facteur."

**Senator Nolin:** The correct word is "facteur."

**Senator Beaudoin:** However, in point *d*), we would use "critère objectif"?

**Senator Joyal:** No, we would use "facteur" to maintain agreement with paragraph 1.1.

**Senator Beaudoin:** And what do we do with the English version?

[English]

**The Chairman:** What Senator Joyal is moving is to change his amendment to read, in part "(d)":

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Oui, exactement. Ce qu'on ajoute tout simplement dans la version française c'est «de la Commission» parce qu'on ne sait pas de quel rapport on parle. C'est purement une technicalité.

[Traduction]

Je crois que nous comprenons tous le point.

**La présidente:** Maintenant, plutôt que de voter à l'égard de la partie «b)», nous allons revenir à la partie «a)» vu que nous avons le libellé

Vu qu'il y a des changements et à la version anglaise et à la version française, il nous faudra voter sur les deux versions. Nous commençons par la version anglaise. Sénateur Joyal, auriez-vous l'obligeance de reformuler l'amendement?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** L'amendement proposé au paragraphe «d)» stipule:

«any other objective criteria that the Commission considers relevant.»;

**La présidente:** La version anglaise de l'article 6 modifié est-elle adoptée?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Adoptée.

Plutôt que de lire l'article au complet, il est proposé par le sénateur Joyal que l'alinéa *d*) se lise comme suit:

[Français]

Tout autre critère objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** C'est parfait.

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Dans l'introduction de «1.1», nous avons le mot «facteurs». Nous devons le remplacer par «critères». Je veux être sûr que nous parlons de la même chose.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Personnellement, je préférerais «facteurs» tant au paragraphe «1.1» qu'à l'alinéa «d)».

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Ce que je veux, c'est qu'on utilise le même mot aux deux endroits.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Mais lequel utiliserons-nous?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Nous utiliserons le mot «facteurs».

[Français]

**Le sénateur Joyal:** «facteur».

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Le vrai mot est «facteur ».

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Mais dans *d*) ce serait «critère objectif»?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Non, «facteur», parce qu'on maintient la concordance avec le paragraphe (1.1).

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Et en anglais, qu'est-ce qu'on fait?

[Traduction]

**La présidente:** Ce que propose le sénateur Joyal, c'est de modifier son amendement pour que l'alinéa «d)» se lise comme suit:

[Translation]

Tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

[English]

All in favour?

**Senator Beaudoin:** If we leave the word "criteria" in, it is included in "facteur".

**Senator Joyal:** I totally agree with Senator Beaudoin that in the definition "criteria" is part of "facteur". To ensure that the concordance is maintained, we should include the word "facteur". One includes the other.

**The Chairman:** All those in favour of the amendment?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed?

Carried.

That clause 6 be further amended by substituting at line 14:

"a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it."

I am informed that the French works as well.

All those in favour of the amendment?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 6, as amended, carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 7 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 8 carry? All those in favour?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** I declare clause 8 carried.

Shall clause 9 carry? All those in favour?

**Hon. Senators:** No.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed?

I declare clause 9 negatived.

Shall clause 10 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** No.

**The Chairman:** I declare clause 10 negatived.

Shall clause 11 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** No.

**The Chairman:** I declare clause 11 negatived.

[Français]

Tout autre facteur objectif qu'elle considère pertinent.

[Traduction]

Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Le mot «facteur» traduit bien le mot «critère».

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec le sénateur Beaudoin. Pour assurer la concordance, nous devrions utiliser le mot «facteur», l'un incluant l'autre.

**La présidente:** Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Tous ceux qui sont contre.

Adopté.

Que l'article 6 soit de nouveau modifié par substitution à la ligne 14 du texte anglais par ce qui suit:

«a report of the Commission within six months after receiving it.»

On m'informe que ça va aussi pour le texte français.

Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement.

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Quels sont ceux qui sont contre?

Adopté.

L'article 6 modifié est-il adopté?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Tous ceux qui sont contre?

Adopté.

L'article 7 est-il adopté?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Tous ceux qui sont contre.

Adopté.

L'article 8 est-il adopté? Tous ceux qui sont pour?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** L'article 8 est adopté.

L'article 9 est-il adopté? Tous ceux qui sont pour?

**Des voix:** Non.

**La présidente:** Tous ceux qui sont contre.

L'article 9 est rejeté.

L'article 10 est-il adopté?

**Des voix:** Non.

**La présidente:** L'article 10 est rejeté.

L'article 11 est-il adopté?

**Des voix:** Non.

**La présidente:** L'article 11 est rejeté.

There are no changes to clauses 12 to 20. Shall we consider them en masse?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**Senator Beaudoin:** I wish to confirm one thing. Clause 12 refers to amending section 47. It mentions the word "enfant".

[Translation]

I trust it is not related to the question of the surviving spouse.

**Senator Nolin:** No, it has to do with the question of children.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Shall this clause carry?

[English]

**Senator Beaudoin:** My concerns have been addressed. I wanted to be sure.

**The Chairman:** Shall clauses 12 to 20 carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 21 carry?

**Senator Joyal:** Madam Chairman, taking into account that we have amended the previous clauses of the bill, I would like to move an amendment to ensure that we are consistent with the previous clauses of the bill. I would like to move that Bill C-37 be amended in clause 21, on page 13, by replacing lines 1 to 3 with the following:

"21. Sections 2, 3, 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or"

[Translation]

In French, the amendment would read as follows:

Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié, par substitution, aux lignes 3 à 5, page 13, de ce qui suit:

"21. Les articles 2, 3, 7, et 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date".

And it goes on to say on line 6 "à la date fixée par décret".

**Senator Nolin:** The coming-into-force date is determined by an order of the Governor in Council. A question just occurred to me. I did not put any questions to the department's witnesses when they testified before the committee. Since the coming into force of these amendments affects remuneration, does this clause not put some power in the hands of the executive? Could this not be perceived as the executive branch exercising some control over remuneration? Why would the bill not come into force on the day it receives Royal Assent?

**Senator Joyal:** I would not venture to speak on behalf of the justice department or the Minister of Justice, but I do believe that some provisions have been put in place.

[English]

One of the main reasons this provision has been added is that there are elements in the bill which needed further consultation with the various levels of the judiciary. In particular, in Ontario,

Aucun changement n'est proposé aux articles 12 à 20. Les membres acceptent-ils de les étudier en bloc?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Je veux confirmer une chose. L'article 12 porte modification de l'article 7. On utilise le mot «enfant».

[Français]

J'espère que ce n'est pas relié au conjoint survivant.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Non, c'est toute la question des enfants.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Adopté?

[Traduction]

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Mes craintes sont apaisées. Je voulais être sûr.

**La présidente:** Les articles 12 à 20 sont-ils adoptés?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Tous ceux qui sont contre.

Adopté.

L'article 21 est-il adopté?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Madame la présidente, étant donné que nous avons modifié ces articles du projet de loi, j'aimerais proposer un amendement qui en assurera la conformité avec les dispositions précédentes du projet de loi. J'aimerais proposer que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié par substitution, aux lignes 3 à 5, page 13, de ce qui suit.

«21. Sections 2, 3, 7 and 14 to 20 come into force on a day or»

[Français]

En français, l'amendement se lirait:

Que le projet de loi C-37, à l'article 21, soit modifié, par substitution, aux lignes 3 à 5, page 13, de ce qui suit:

« 21. Les articles 2, 3, 7, 14 à 20 entrent en vigueur à la date».

Et le texte français se poursuit. C'est à la date fixée par décret, à la fin de la ligne six.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Ce sera un décret du pouvoir exécutif. La question me vient à l'instant et je n'ai pas posé de questions aux témoins du ministère lorsqu'ils sont venus témoigner. Comme la mise en vigueur de ces amendements inclut la rémunération, est-ce qu'il n'y a pas, dans cet article de mise en vigueur, un pouvoir entre les mains du pouvoir exécutif? Cela ne pourrait-il pas être perçu comme un contrôle de la rémunération? Pourquoi le projet de loi ne viendrait-il pas en vigueur carrément au moment de sa sanction?

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Je pense qu'il y a des dispositions, enfin, je ne veux pas risquer de parler au nom du ministère de la Justice ou du ministre de la Justice, certainement pas.

[Traduction]

Cette disposition a été ajoutée en grande partie parce que le projet de loi comporte des éléments qui nécessitaient une consultation plus poussée avec divers paliers de l'appareil

there are discussions about the establishment of the new judges of the family court, and so forth. That is why there are elements that require further discussion with other parties and the necessity of clause 21.

Normally legislation comes into force on the day of its Royal Assent. However, because of the particular elements in the bill with respect to the provincial court, the coming into effect of the bill is fixed by an order of the Governor in Council.

**Senator Beaudoin:** Having regard to the complexity of the statute, I do not think it detracts from the independence of the judiciary. I understand your point because if the executive branch chooses to delay, the judges may interpret that as going against the independence of the judges." However, in my opinion, this is purely technical, and I would not worry about it.

**Senator Nolin:** My concern relates to clause 5. As I see it, clause 5 is not included in here. Therefore, I can backtrack on my earlier comments. Clause 5 is the remuneration clause.

**Senator Joyal:** However, it is not included.

[Translation]

The amendments pertain to clauses 2,3,7, 14 and 20.

**Senator Nolin:** I withdraw my comments in that case.

[English]

**The Chairman:** If I may clarify, these technical amendments are being put in because, in conjunction with Ontario's Bill 79, which would rename certain courts of Ontario, clauses 2, 3 and 7 and the transitional provisions of Bill C-37 would make corresponding amendments to various pieces of legislation, including the Judges Act.

**Senator Nolin:** I would ask members of this committee to forget my previous comments. The Constitution gives that power to Parliament, not to the executive branch of the government.

**Senator Beaudoin:** It is the power of the purse.

**Senator Joyal:** It is important that we know which parts of the bill are subject to a decree of the Governor in Council, taking into account the principle of the separation of power, which we discussed this morning. We must be clear that what we are doing is in strict conformity with the separation of power.

**The Chairman:** The question then is on the amendment to clause 21. All those in favour of the amendment?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** All those opposed?

Carried.

Shall clause 21, as amended, carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Shall the title carry?

judiciaire. Plus particulièrement, en Ontario, il est question de l'installation des nouveaux juges du tribunal de la famille, et cetera. C'est la raison pour laquelle il s'y trouve des éléments qui nécessitent une discussion plus poussée avec d'autres parties et l'ajout de l'article 21.

D'habitude la loi entre en vigueur au moment de la sanction royale. Cependant, étant donné les éléments particuliers du projet de loi en ce qui concerne la cour provinciale, l'entrée en vigueur est fixée par décret.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** Étant donné la complexité de la loi, je ne crois pas qu'elle s'éloigne de l'indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire. Je comprends votre point étant donné que si le pouvoir exécutif choisit de reporter l'entrée en vigueur, les juges pourraient interpréter cela comme allant à l'encontre de leur indépendance. Cependant il s'agit selon moi d'une modification purement technique et je ne m'inquiéterais pas.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Je m'interroge au sujet de l'article 5. De la façon dont je vois les choses, l'article 5 n'est pas inclus ici. Par conséquent, je peux retirer ce que j'ai dit. L'article 5 est celui où il est question du calcul du traitement.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Cependant, il n'est pas inclus.

[Français]

Ce sont les article 2, 3, 7,14 et 20.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Je retire mes commentaires.

[Traduction]

**La présidente:** Si je peux éclairer votre lanterne, ces amendements techniques sont présentés parce que, conjointement avec le projet de loi 79 de l'Ontario, qui renommerait certains tribunaux de l'Ontario, les articles 2, 3 et 7 de même que les dispositions transitoires du projet de loi C-37 apporteraient des modifications qui s'imposent à diverses mesures législatives, y compris la Loi sur les juges.

**Le sénateur Nolin:** Je demande aux membres du comité d'oublier ce que j'ai dit. La Constitution donne ce pouvoir au Parlement et non à l'exécutif.

**Le sénateur Beaudoin:** C'est le pouvoir du Trésor public.

**Le sénateur Joyal:** Il est important que nous sachions quelles sont les parties du projet de loi qui sont assujetties à un décret, en tenant compte du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs dont nous avons discuté ce matin. Nous devons nous assurer de respecter la séparation des pouvoirs.

**La présidente:** La mise aux voix porte sur l'amendement proposé à l'article 21. Tous ceux qui sont en faveur de l'amendement?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Quels sont ceux qui s'y opposent?

Adopté.

L'article 21 modifié est-il adopté?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Le titre est-il adopté?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Shall the bill, as amended, carry?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Is it agreed that the clauses of the bill be renumbered appropriately?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** Carried.

Shall I report the bill, as amended, to the Senate?

**Hon. Senators:** Agreed.

**The Chairman:** That completes our agenda for today, honourable senators.

The committee adjourned.

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Le projet de loi modifié est-il adopté?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Plaît-il aux membres du comité que les articles du projet de loi soient renumérotés correctement?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Adopté.

Dois-je faire rapport du projet de loi modifié au Sénat?

**Des voix:** D'accord.

**La présidente:** Honorables sénateurs, nous avons épuisé notre ordre du jour.

La séance est levée.

# Compensation Review of Federally Appointed Judges

Department of Justice regarding the 2020 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission

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26 March 2021

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## A. Purpose of Report

1. I am president and actuary with JDM Actuarial Expert Services Inc. I regularly provide actuarial consulting services as well as actuarial expert testimony. I am a fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and of the Society of Actuaries. I received my Actuarial Fellowship in 1980 and have provided pension, benefits and actuarial consulting services for approximately 43 years. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Appendix 1.
2. I understand and acknowledge that as an expert, I have a duty to provide evidence in this proceeding as follows:
  - a. to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
  - b. to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within my area of expertise; and
  - c. to provide such additional assistance as the 2020 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission (the “**Quadrennial Commission**”) may reasonably require.
3. I acknowledge that the duty referred to above prevails over any obligation that I may owe to any party by whom or on whose behalf I am engaged.
4. This report has been prepared for the Department of Justice of the Government of Canada.
5. The purpose of this report is to:
  - a. review and provide my opinion on data provided by Canada Revenue Agency about self-employed earnings of lawyers in Canada;
  - b. provide comments about issues to consider regarding the total compensation (earnings, benefits, pension and any other remuneration) of self-employed lawyers, deputy ministers and similar positions of the Government of Canada and federally appointed judges;
  - c. provide cost estimates of the judicial annuity that provides a lifetime pension to federally appointed judges upon their retirement as well as providing a pension in the event of permanent disability; and
  - d. provide comments and my opinion about future changes in the Industrial Aggregate Index.
6. The intended users of this report are the Department of Justice, the Quadrennial Commission, and the various parties appearing before the Commission. The report should not be provided to anyone who is not an intended user except as may be required by law. The findings herein should not be relied upon by any party other than an intended user.

## **B. Executive Summary**

7. This report takes a look at the income and total compensation of various jobs with the goal of assisting the Department of Justice prepare their submission to the Quadrennial Commission and also assist the Quadrennial Commission in their review of compensation for federally appointed judges.
8. In this report,
  - a. I determine the value of the Judicial Annuity that is available to federally appointed judges upon retirement from the bench;
  - b. I review recent compensation for self-employed lawyers, deputy ministers and government appointments to senior roles in government agencies;
  - c. I establish a total compensation for each of these positions so that compensation can be viewed on an “apples to apples” basis; and
  - d. I present the results of my analyses along with comments on a number of compensation issues related to these positions, but I make no recommendations.
9. There are many ways to compensate someone for performing work. It starts with salary or wages. Adding to that is commissions, overtime, vacation, bonuses (also referred to as performance pay, at-risk pay, etc.), health and welfare benefits, pension plan, stock options, etc. The sum of all these forms of compensation is referred to as total compensation.
10. Not every job comes with the same components of compensation and even when they do, each of the components are likely worth different amounts. To provide a fair basis for any comparisons, I determine a total compensation for each of the jobs referenced herein. Total compensation allows us to compare like with like.
11. Two jobs may have different salaries, but the total compensation may be the similar. Two jobs may have similar salaries, but the total compensation may be very different. If we compare two jobs on the basis of salary only, it devalues potentially large differences in other aspects of compensation.
12. The *Judges Act* sets out a number of judicial positions and annual salaries, including prothonotaries, puisne judges, and judges of the Supreme Court. I understand that the salary for each of these positions can be expressed as a percentage adjustment to the salary of a puisne judge. In this report, I refer to the salary of a puisne judge as the **Base Judicial Salary**. For the year beginning 1 April 2020, the salary for puisne judges is \$338,800. The salary for a prothonotary is currently set at 80% of the Base Judicial

Salary, which is \$271,000 beginning 1 April 2020. Similar calculations can be performed for other positions.

13. Base Judicial Salary is not appropriate for comparison with other jobs. For a fair comparison, we need to use total compensation. In this report, I have focussed on the total compensation for puisne judges. But, for federally appointed judges, the value of their pension varies based on their age at appointment and therefore their total compensation will vary based on their age at appointment. To simplify matters and to provide a reasonable basis for any comparisons of compensation, I calculate an average amount of total compensation for puisne judges that reflects the age distribution of all judges when appointed. I refer to that as **Base Judicial Total Compensation**. To determine the total compensation of the other judicial positions, one can apply the same percentage as we would apply to the Base Judicial Salary to obtain the base salary of that other position<sup>1</sup>.
14. In this report, I review the salaries of the federally appointed judges and of deputy ministers and calculate their total compensation. I was also provided with the net income amounts for self-employed lawyers in Canada between 2015 and 2019 by the Canada Revenue Agency. I have reviewed it and present summaries of that data from various perspectives. The net income of the self-employed lawyers is their total compensation<sup>2</sup>.
15. The goal is to provide a series of total compensation amounts with a fair relationship to each other. Those amounts are set out in Tables 280, 281 and 282.

### **Increase in Base Judicial Salary as of 1 April 2021**

16. Base Judicial Salary is \$338,800 for the year 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021. Under the *Judges Act*, and subject to any adjustments recommended by the Quadrennial Commission, it will be adjusted effective 1 April 2021 by changes in the Industrial

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<sup>1</sup> The result of using the same percentage as one would apply to Base Judicial Salary will actually result in a small understatement of the total compensation of prothonotaries and a small overstatement of total compensation for all other judicial positions. Those over and understatements are each less than \$1,000 and are not material for the purposes of this report.

<sup>2</sup> Normally, the cost of health and welfare benefits form part of total compensation. Self-employed lawyers can provide health and welfare benefits for themselves as part of their business expenses that are paid out of gross income prior to the calculation of net-income. Health and welfare benefits also would normally form part of both judicial and deputy minister total compensation. To avoid having to make hundreds of adjustments to the income amounts herein for each of lawyers, judges and deputy ministers, I have chosen to simply ignore it since its value is not materially different between these positions.

Aggregate, a data series maintained by Statistics Canada that measures changes in the average earnings of Canadians.

17. I have estimated that increase will be 6.74%, raising the Base Judicial Salary to \$361,600 effective 1 April 2021.

***Effect on Base Judicial Total Compensation<sup>3</sup>***

18. I determined that on average, the Base Judicial Total Compensation for 2019 to 2020 (based on the \$329,900 Base Judicial Salary effective April 2019) is \$496,000. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$496,000 in 2019, I estimate that would be about the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
19. I determined that on average, the Base Judicial Total Compensation for 2020 to 2021 (based on the \$338,800 Base Judicial Salary) is \$509,400. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$509,400 in 2020, I estimate that would be about the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
20. I also determined that on average, the Base Judicial Total Compensation for 2021 to 2022 (based on the \$361,600 I estimated above) will be \$543,800. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$543,800 in 2021, I estimate that would be about the 89<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

***Effect on Total Compensation of Prothonotaries***

21. For April 2019 to March 2020, the base salary of a prothonotary was \$263,900, from April 2020 to March 2021 it is \$271,000 and I estimate beginning April 2021 it will be \$289,200 (80% of the Base Judicial Salary).
22. I determined that the total compensation of a prothonotary for 2019 to 2020 (based on 80% of the Base Judicial Total Compensation and adjusting for a \$600 understatement (see footnote 1)) is \$397,300. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$397,300 in 2019, I estimate that would be about the 82<sup>nd</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
23. I determined that the total compensation of a prothonotary for 2020 to 2021 (using the same basis as for 2019-2020) is \$408,100. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$408,100 in 2020, I estimate that would be about the 82<sup>nd</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

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<sup>3</sup> Details of these calculations are at paragraphs 153 and following.

24. I also determined that the total compensation of a prothonotary for 2021 to 2022 (using the same basis as for 2019-2020) is estimated to be \$435,500. If a self-employed lawyer had a net income of \$435,500 in 2021, I estimate that would be about the 86<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

## **C. Introduction**

25. I was retained by the Department of Justice to prepare a report to assist the Quadrennial Commission in their review of judicial compensation.
26. In preparing this report, I have assumed that the most appropriate perspective is to look at total compensation and the individual components that comprise total compensation.
27. As with past reports for prior Quadrennial Commissions, I have reviewed data regarding net income for self-employed lawyers to provide one comparator for compensation. I also have reviewed compensation of senior deputy ministers within the Government of Canada and appointments to senior government agencies as another objective factor.
28. I have approached the report in the following order:
  - a. General comments and opinions on compensation topics.
  - b. Review of the current situation for federal judges with respect to salary, the Judicial Annuity, disability income and health and welfare benefits.
  - c. Review of compensation for lawyers in private practice with respect to net income, retirement savings, disability and health and welfare benefits.
  - d. Review of compensation for senior deputy ministers with respect to the same components.
  - e. Relationship of current judicial compensation to that of lawyers and deputy ministers.
29. In this report, where I refer to a lawyer, it should be taken as meaning a self-employed lawyer unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
30. In this report, where I refer to a judge, it should be taken as meaning a federally appointed judge. There are no exceptions.

## D. Comments and Opinions on Relevant Compensation Topics

### Total Compensation vs Cash Compensation

31. There are many ways that a person can be compensated for work. In almost all situations, compensation starts with salary, base pay, hourly wage rate or some similar measure (herein referred to as “salary”). An individual may also be entitled to other forms of compensation<sup>4</sup>, such as bonuses, commissions, performance incentives, stock options, benefits, retirement savings, health club membership, etc.
32. When comparing compensation between jobs, it is rare that looking only at cash compensation provides a true picture of any differences.
33. Total compensation is a measure that looks at all forms of pay, including cash compensation, and determines a total value. In comparing the compensation between two organisations, total compensation provides a more accurate result. For example, Acme Company might provide their employees with a full suite of health and welfare benefits as well as a generous pension plan. Boden Corporation might prefer to forego the health, welfare and pension plans and instead pay salaries that are about 25% larger. An employee at Acme who discovers the higher salaries at Boden may be led to change employers – at least until finding out about the difference in the other forms of compensation. Presumably they would only change employers if they determine that the total compensation from Acme is less than the total compensation from Boden.
34. Comparing two jobs on the basis of salary only is to devalue potentially large differences in other aspects of compensation.

### Retirement Savings

35. One component of compensation is retirement income accumulation. While many Canadians<sup>5</sup> enjoy an employer-sponsored retirement plan, most Canadians are left to

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<sup>4</sup> Some of these other forms of compensation may also be paid in cash, but they do not form part of “salary” since there is normally an element of risk, or uncertainty regarding the amount to be received or there is a delay before any amount will be payable.

<sup>5</sup> Obtaining data about membership in an employer-sponsored pension plan is very difficult. Many references are made to the Report on Trusteed Pension Plans published periodically by Statistics Canada. But that report does not include the many pension plans that are not trusteeed. It also ignores the organisations that do not sponsor a registered pension plan but rather provide retirement savings through a group RRSP. Statistics Canada publishes a report on registered pension plan membership (but that also ignores group RRSPs) that shows 37.5% of paid workers are members of a registered pension plan in 2018. [<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200813/t002b-eng.htm>].

look after their personal retirement saving on their own, generally through contributing to a personal Registered Retirement Savings Plan (“RRSP”).

36. There are many different types of retirement plans in Canada. Most retirement plans provided by an employer require part of the annual contribution to be paid by the employees and the balance by the employer. A few plans are funded entirely by the employer with no contribution required from employees<sup>6</sup>. Where there is no retirement plan offered by the employer, the entire cost of retirement savings is borne by the individual employee.
37. For the vast majority, if not all self-employed lawyers, retirement savings are funded entirely out of the individual’s earnings. Under the *Income Tax Act*<sup>7</sup>, self-employed persons are not permitted to sponsor or earn benefits under a registered pension plan leaving the only options an RRSP or non-tax-sheltered savings.
38. For federally appointed judges, the Judicial Annuity provides retirement income with the judges paying 7% of income each year until they are eligible for an unreduced annuity at which time, contributions decrease to 1% of income<sup>8</sup>. Canada is responsible for the balance of the total cost which is paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
39. To properly reflect retirement savings costs for self-employed lawyers and for federally appointed judges, we need to consider their differing opportunities and differing costs for retirement saving.

## Health and Welfare Benefits

40. Most employers provide a selection of health and welfare or group insurance benefits. Typically, these include life insurance, medical and drug benefits and dental benefits.
41. The value of these to an individual depends on how much the benefits are used, usually with respect to prescription drugs and dental.
42. Some employers provide these benefits at no cost to employees, while others may require part of the cost to be paid by employees. Canada pays all costs related to the

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<sup>6</sup> In 2019, 5.7 million Canadians were members of a pension plan requiring employee contributions. 0.7 million Canadians were members of a pension plan where they did not have to contribute. [Statistics Canada data table 11-10-0106-01]

<sup>7</sup> Income Tax Regulations 8503(3)(a)

<sup>8</sup> Judges Act R.S.C., 1985, c. J-1, section 50(2)



health and welfare benefits of judges. Self-employed lawyers will typically pay for these benefits out of their gross income.

## Disability

43. Disability income protection is generally provided through a combination of short-term and long-term disability<sup>9</sup>. In my experience, short-term disability is usually entirely paid by the employer while long-term disability varies – due to income tax implications, usually paid entirely by the employer or entirely by the employee.
44. Self-employed lawyers will typically pay for long-term disability insurance out of their income and will typically self-fund for short-term disability.
45. Short-term disability protection is provided to judges by a continuation of salary. Long-term disability income protection is provided through the Judicial Annuity for a permanent disability and by a continuation of salary for a non-permanent disability.
46. Based on actuarial tables regarding disability claim rates, most people will never claim a disability benefit. In my experience, many people believe it is not an important benefit to have or the cost is too much to be worth having. For those that do have a disability, it is invaluable. As one ages, the chances of having a disability claim increases. At young ages, disability will normally arise from an accident, but as one ages, illnesses such as cancers, cardiovascular and mental health issues become increasingly prevalent in addition to accidents and lead to a greater likelihood of claims.
47. While the incidence rate is small in any single year, it becomes much larger over a number of years and especially as one ages. The actuarial assumptions I used show that 0.02% of judges at age 40 (that's two of every 10,000 judges) are expected to become permanently disabled. That rises to 0.1% by age 52 (10 of every 10,000), to 0.2% by age 60 (20 of every 10,000) and to 1.0% at age 74 (100 of every 10,000).
48. The average annual incidence over all ages is about 0.3% (30 of every 10,000 judges).
49. The Department of Justice provided me with historic data on judges who incurred a permanent disability. From 1985 to 2020, 94 federally appointed judges have become

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<sup>9</sup> Short-term disability usually starts on the first day of absence due to illness or injury or shortly thereafter and continues for anywhere from about three-months to about a year. At the end of that time, long-term disability, if it exists, will commence and normally provide income protection up to recovery or age 65.

permanently disabled. I estimate that the actuarial assumption about disability would result in about the same number of expected permanent disabilities.

50. Both the average and median age of permanent disability was 63 following 11 years of service.
51. For a judge appointed at age 53, there is an 8.8% probability of becoming permanently disabled before age 75. But that 53-year-old would have achieved entitlement to a full retirement annuity at age 68, so there is no additional financial protection from the disability benefit after age 68.
52. For a judge appointed at age 53, there is a 4.3% probability of becoming permanently disabled before age 68.
53. While an annual probability of 0.3% may make the disability benefit sound like it is not worth very much, a probability of 4.3% (1 person out of every 23) becoming permanently disabled over a 15-year period between age 53 and 68 should cause most people to reconsider the value of permanent disability protection.
54. Since 1985, there have been 1,495 judges who have left the bench (retirement, disability or death). 94 of those were due to permanent disability – 6.3% of all judges leaving the bench. That includes judges who became permanently disabled after having qualified for a full retirement annuity and where the disability annuity did not provide any additional financial protection.
55. We can conclude that about 4.3% of judges will become permanently disabled prior to qualifying for a full annuity and 2.0% will become permanently disabled after qualifying for a full annuity.

### **Supernumerary Status**

56. A valuable benefit available to judges is the ability to elect supernumerary status, where the judge is given a reduced workload and continues to receive full compensation. I was informed by the Department of Justice that there is no specific reference, but it is generally accepted that typically, the workload is about 50%.
57. To be eligible for supernumerary status, the judge must have served at least 15 years as a federally appointed judge and have a sum of age plus years of service totalling at least 80, or be at least 70 years old with at least ten years of service as a federally appointed judge. An exception is judges of the Supreme Court who are not eligible for

supernumerary status. Judges may sit as a supernumerary for a maximum of ten years or to age 75, whichever comes first.

58. Judges appointed prior to age 55 who meet the conditions to elect supernumerary status are also eligible to retire on a full unreduced retirement annuity. Judges appointed after age 55 become eligible for supernumerary status prior to their entitlement to a full retirement annuity, but they can grow into a full annuity by continuing in service in either a full-time or supernumerary status. At the time of first eligibility for supernumerary status, the amount of retirement annuity as a percent of Judicial Base Salary is:

**Table 58 – Retirement Annuity at First Eligibility for Supernumerary Status**

Age at Appointment	Retirement Annuity as % of Judicial Base Salary
55 or less	66.7%
56	62.2%
57	57.8%
58	53.3%
59	48.9%
60	44.4%
61	47.6%
62	51.3%
63	55.6%
64	60.6%
65 or more	66.7%
Weighted Average	62.4%

59. Basically, once having met the conditions required for electing supernumerary status, the decision for a judge is to:
- a. Continue to work with a full caseload and receive full compensation;
  - b. Elect supernumerary status and continue to work approximately half-time and receive full compensation; or
  - c. Retire and receive a retirement annuity.
60. The financial benefits of this option for a judge are immediately obvious. But it is also a benefit for Canada. Rather than risk losing an experienced judge to retirement, there is a major incentive for the judge to continue in service, but at a reduced caseload. From the financial perspective, if the judge retired, the Judicial Annuity becomes payable at 2/3<sup>rd</sup>s of full compensation (subject to a reduction in some situations due to retiring

early). By continuing as a supernumerary, the judge receives full compensation – a difference of between 33.3% and 55.6% of the full compensation.

61. For Canada, the average cost of a supernumerary judge is about 38% of the full compensation<sup>10</sup> while the supernumerary judge carries about 50% of a full caseload.
62. As of 1 March 2021, there are 1,206 federally appointed judges in Canada of whom 292 are supernumeraries<sup>11</sup>. That is just under 25% of all judges.
63. I reviewed the statistics of 1,495 judges who left the bench between 1985 and 2020 (see table 267 for additional details). Of those judges,
  - a. 1% of judges did not qualify for supernumerary status prior to age 75;
  - b. 19% retired prior to qualifying for supernumerary status;
  - c. 80% attained eligibility for electing supernumerary status, of whom:
    - i. 8% chose to retire rather than elect supernumerary status; and
    - ii. 72% elected supernumerary status and 90% of them (65% of all judges) so elected within one year of becoming eligible.
64. I estimated the average length of service as a supernumerary during the period 1985 to 2020 was 6.0 years. That lengthened slightly to 6.2 years for the supernumeraries serving between 2000 and 2020. The average age at which a judge elects supernumerary status is 68 with an average of about 18 to 19 years of service.
65. As of the end of 2020, there were 336 judges who had met the eligibility conditions for supernumerary status. 292 had previously elected to serve as supernumeraries (87% of all those eligible) and 44 remained serving full-time (13% of those eligible).
66. In my experience with organisations in the private sector, if an employee is permitted to elect a reduced workload, it is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in pay. But within the private sector, the payment of pensions is normally from a different source<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Or slightly less due to some judges delaying their election beyond their first eligibility or never electing supernumerary status. The 37.6% average cost to Canada is the difference between 100% of Base Judicial Salary and the 62.4% average retirement annuity percent from Table 58.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/judges-juges-eng.aspx>

<sup>12</sup> In the private sector, pensions are paid out of the pension plan, which is an entity separate and apart from the employer. Any benefit to an employer from an employee delaying retirement within the private sector is at best indirect. Private sector employers who do not sponsor a pension plan have no economic ... incentive to pay full-time income for part-time work, since an employee's pension is from the employee's own savings and there is no direct or indirect offset to the compensation paid. For the federally appointed judges, both compensation and the Judicial Annuity are paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

than the employer's payroll, so the economic advantage of paying 100% of compensation for about 50% of work is very different.

67. It is clear that the availability of supernumerary status is valued by judges with the majority of them electing to spend their final years on the bench as a supernumerary.
68. I have looked at ways to calculate a value for this benefit and am not satisfied that any of my approaches is sufficiently robust and impartial between the parties. As a result, in my opinion, the availability of electing supernumerary status has a financial value that is intangible. I have not included any value for this as part of the Base Judicial Total Compensation (see paragraph 104).

### **Industrial Aggregate Increases ("IAI")**

69. The *Judges Act* sets out how federally appointed judges' salaries are determined each year. Increases are effective as of 1 April in each calendar year. An adjustment factor is calculated based on the year over year change in the Industrial Aggregate, a data series maintained by Statistics Canada<sup>13</sup>. The factor is based on the most recently available data as of the first day of the period for which the salary amount is determined.
70. The Industrial Aggregate measures the number of working Canadians and their average weekly earnings. There are some types of jobs, like farming, fishing and military that are excluded. Earnings are tracked and the Industrial Aggregate is updated monthly. The Industrial Aggregate can be considered as similar to the Consumer Price Index except the Consumer Price Index tracks prices of items that are typically purchased by Canadian consumers whereas the Industrial Aggregate tracks the number of workers in Canada and their earnings<sup>14</sup>.
71. In this report, when referring to the data series, I use the term Industrial Aggregate. Judges' salaries are adjusted annually by the percent change in the Industrial Aggregate value. I will refer to percent changes in the Industrial Aggregate as "IAI".
72. Based on Statistics Canada's publication schedule, there is usually a two-month lag between workers' pay dates and the publication of the Industrial Aggregate. For example, the Industrial Aggregate data that is published in February reports on workers and wages as of the previous December. Based on the data available as of

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<sup>13</sup> I have assumed that the data series referenced is the one identified by Statistics Canada as "Average weekly earnings by industry, monthly, unadjusted for seasonality", series 14-10-0203-01 and specifically, the sub-series "Industrial Aggregate excluding unclassified businesses".

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

early March 2021 (data for December 2020) and my assumption about how the calculation is to be done<sup>15</sup>, I have determined the increase in judges' salaries will likely be 6.74% in 2021.

73. In the past fifteen years, the increase in Base Judicial Salary due to changes in the IAI has varied from 0.40% to 3.60% with an average of 2.42%. The average increase over the past five years (2015 to 2020) was 1.90%.
74. What has given rise to this large increase expected in 2021? Covid-19.
75. Business in Canada was largely shut down in March 2020 and many workers were laid off. The loss of jobs and of income was first reflected in the Industrial Aggregate reported for April 2020. The IAI increased by 5.7% from March to April.
76. The vast majority of workers who lost their jobs and income were from the lower paying jobs – work that could not be performed from home and work that is impacted by lockdowns, such as retail some of the service industry and manufacturing<sup>16</sup>. For those with higher paying jobs, their employment status was mainly unaffected by the closure of business as many of those jobs could be performed from home.
77. If a lower-paid worker suffers a large reduction in income but remains employed, the Industrial Aggregate will decrease. But if a lower-paid worker loses their job, they disappear from the calculation of the average and the Industrial Aggregate will increase<sup>17</sup>. With Covid-19, that increase in the Industrial Aggregate happened suddenly as about 2.9 million workers lost their jobs or were laid off in the second half of March and early April 2020<sup>18</sup>.
78. In particular, the increase in IAI during 2020 was not because of workers receiving large wage increases, it was primarily because of workers losing their income.

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<sup>15</sup> The average of the Industrial Aggregate as reported by Statistics Canada in each of the 12-months immediately prior to the date of the increase, divided by the average in each of the 12-months immediately prior to the first averaging period above.

<sup>16</sup> Statistics Canada, Infographic "COVID-19 and the Labour Market in May 2019. Publication 11-627-m/11-627-m2020038. [<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-627-m/11-627-m2020038-eng.htm>]

<sup>17</sup> Consider four numbers – 8, 10, 12 and 14. The average is 11. If the 8 is reduced to 4, the average reduces to 10. But if the 8 is simply removed (as would happen with a lay-off or job loss), the average increases to 12.

<sup>18</sup> Change in total number of workers in Canada between February and May, Statistics Canada Table 14-10-0201-01, Employment by industry, monthly, unadjusted for seasonality.

## **How Does 2.9 Million Workers Getting Laid-off Cause Average Income to Increase?**

Suppose that in February there are 2.9 million workers earning between \$13 and \$30 per hour with an average of \$19.00 per hour. They work an average of 1,800 hours per year. That's an average annual income of \$34,200 ( $\$19.00 \times 1,800$ ). These 2.9 million workers do not know it, but they are about to lose their jobs.

In addition, there are 13.5 million workers that make between \$13 per hour and several million dollars per year\*. The average weekly income of those 13.5 million workers is \$1,135, or just under \$60,000 per annum.

Very roughly, that is the make-up of Canadian workers.

The average weekly income of all the 16.4 million workers is \$1,051, or \$54,700 per annum. That average income lies between the \$34,200 annual amount for the 2.9 million workers and the \$60,000 for the 13.5 million workers – as we would expect from averages.

Based on these assumptions, the Industrial Aggregate for February would be 1,051 – the average weekly income of the 16.4 million workers.

What happens when those 2.9 million workers get laid off in March and April? Their data simply disappears from the calculation. Instead of calculating the average income of 16.4 million workers, we calculate the average income of the remaining 13.5 million workers. Their incomes have not changed – there were no wage increases in March and April.

In May, the 13.5 million workers are still making an average weekly income of \$1,135 – the same as in the second paragraph above. That is the total for all workers in May. So, the Industrial Aggregate for May is 1,135 - the average weekly income of the 13.5 million remaining workers.

Between February and May, the Industrial Aggregate has increased from 1,051 to 1,135. That's an increase of 8.0% - all because 2.9 million Canadians got laid-off from work.

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\* This group includes some workers that make between \$13 and \$30 per hour, but they are not at risk for losing their job when Covid-19 hits.

## **Estimated increase without the Covid-19 Effect**

79. If we had not experienced Covid-19 and assuming 2020 would have been similar to the average year with respect to wages of all Canadians, it is likely that the Industrial Aggregate would have increased but just not as much. In this section, I estimate what that increase would have been by looking at the budget plans for wage increases of employers across Canada.
80. A number of employee benefits and compensation consulting firms conduct compensation surveys to gather information on corporate budget plans for compensation increases in the following year.

81. Morneau Shepell<sup>19</sup> reported a budgeted average salary increase of 1.9% for 2021. If those expected to receive no increase are excluded, the average increase is budgeted as 2.5% for 2021. However, they report that 46% of survey respondents remained undecided at the time of responding to the survey. They also reported that in 2020, base salaries increased by 1.6% on average. If those whose salaries were frozen are excluded, the average increase in 2020 was 2.6%. Morneau Shepell's survey results showed that 36% of organisations froze salaries in 2020 compared with only 2% that had budgeted for a freeze. I assume that most, if not all of those changes were a response to Covid-19.
82. Normandin Beaudry<sup>20</sup> report an average budgeted salary increase for 2021 of 2.6%, excluding organisations that plan to freeze salaries. When those organisations that plan to freeze salaries are included, the average increase was lower by between 0.1% for organisations that have experienced little negative effect to a positive effect from Covi-19 to 0.5% lower for organisations with a negative effect from Covid-19.
83. Mercer<sup>21</sup> report that 2021 budgets average 2.3% for total salary increases. If the 13% of organisations that plan to have no salary increase are excluded, the average increase is budgeted to be 2.4% for 2021, compared with 2.6% for 2020.
84. Based on the various surveys of budgeted salary increases for 2021, it appears that the average will be between 2.0% and 2.5%. The survey results indicated a similar average was budgeted for 2020 increases prior to changes resulting from Covid-19.
85. In my opinion, based on the results of these three surveys of employer plans for salary adjustments, had there not been an employment disruption from Covid-19, the increase in the IAI for the 2021 judicial salary increase would likely have been between 2.0% and 2.5% with a similar increase in the IAI for 2022 increases.

### Effect on IAI Increases in Future Years

86. In February 2020, there were 16.4 million workers included in the Industrial Aggregate earnings average. Three months later, there were 13.5 million workers, a decrease of

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<sup>19</sup> "News & Views", Volume 17, Issue 10, October 2020, page 6.

<sup>20</sup> "Update of the 2021 Salary Forecasts", January 2021, [[www.normandin-beaudry.ca/en/update-of-the-2021-salary-forecasts/](http://www.normandin-beaudry.ca/en/update-of-the-2021-salary-forecasts/)]

<sup>21</sup> "Moving Forward With Optimism", 24 November 2020, [[www.imercer.com/ca/articledetail/moving-forward-with-optimism-1](http://www.imercer.com/ca/articledetail/moving-forward-with-optimism-1)]



2.9 million. The loss of 2.9 million jobs resulted in an immediate 8.0% increase in the average industrial wage in Canada<sup>22</sup>.

87. By December 2020, 2.3 million workers had returned to work. The Industrial Aggregate has decreased since May due to their return. The 8.0% increase between February and May had dropped to a 7.0% increase between February and December<sup>23</sup>.
88. If the 550,000 workers who have still not returned to work are mostly at the bottom of the wage continuum, it is likely the Industrial Aggregate will decrease as and if they return to work. If all 550,000 were to return to work in 2021 and if their average earnings are less than \$20 per hour, I estimate the IAI will further decrease by between 0.5% and 1.0%.
89. It is likely that decrease will be offset by wage increases granted to all workers in 2021. In paragraph 85, I estimated the increase to judicial salaries in the absence of Covid-19 would be between 2.0% and 2.5% for the April 2022 changes. Combining that with the effect of 550,000 more laid-off workers returning to work gives a net change in the IAI of between 1.0% and 2.0%. If less than 550,000 of those laid-off workers return to work, I estimate the change in the IAI for April 2022 will lie in the range of 1.0% to 2.5%.
90. In a letter from François Lemire, Director of the Office of the Chief Actuary for Canada to Anna Dekker dated 26 February 2021, Mr. Lemire sets out the Chief Actuary's current estimate for future changes in the IAI. He references the recent increase in Industrial Aggregate was caused by employment losses and that future decreases in the Industrial Aggregate are expected. His assumption for future changes in the IAI would result in increases to Judicial Base Salary of 6.7% in 2021 and 2.1% in 2022<sup>24</sup>. That 2.1% increase for 2022 lies within the range I have estimated, but it is at the upper end of the range. Based on my calculations, it likely assumes few of the remaining laid-off workers will return to work.

## Weighted Averages

91. In the discussions in this report about income and benefits, many of the items vary by age. Sometimes the variance is by age of appointment and sometimes it is by current

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<sup>22</sup> Statistics Canada, Industrial Aggregate Index, Table: 14-10-0203-01.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> He included assumptions for future years of 2.6% in 2023, 2.8% in 2024, 2.9% in 2025 and 3.0% in 2026 and beyond.

age. It can be helpful in those situations to also know the average amount. In addition, amounts may vary by province or by Census Metropolitan Areas.

92. Taking a straight average of the values shown in a table can, in some situations, be misleading. For example, in a high-school class, there were only three different grades on the last test – 50, 70 and 90. The average of those marks is 70. But if we are told that there were ten students with a grade of 50, ten with 70 and one with 90, the weighted average is 61<sup>25</sup>.
93. When we look at incomes that vary by age, we could calculate an average of those amounts – if there are 30 ages involved, we average 30 income amounts. That would give a reasonable answer if the judges or lawyers were evenly distributed across all 30 ages.
94. If we are looking at incomes of 500 people who are distributed across those 30 ages, a more appropriate result is to take an average of the incomes for the 500 people rather than an average of the 30 age groups. We could create a table with the 500 amounts and calculate that average. Or we can achieve the same result by calculating a weighted average. A weighted average is simply a mathematical shortcut to calculating the average for all 500 people<sup>26</sup>.
95. In this report, the weighted average is not an average of the values shown in a table. It is based on taking those values in the table, determining for each of the many individuals the value that applies, and taking an average over all the individuals.
96. Most of the time in this report where I calculate a weighted average, it is an age-based weighted average.
97. For example, in Table 133, the rightmost column (Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions) shows a weighted average of 34.9%. If we take an average of the values shown in the table for each age, we get 42.1% (not shown in Table 133).
  - a. The 42.1% would be reasonable to use if there are an equal number of judges appointed at each age 40 to 69.
  - b. The 34.9% is appropriate to use to reflect the actual historical distribution of judges by age at appointment.

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<sup>25</sup> That weighted average can be verified by writing down all 21 marks – 10 students got 50, ten got 70 and one got 90. The average of those 21 marks is 61. Weighted average is a quicker way to achieve the same result without actually listing all 21 (or in many situations, significantly more) values.

<sup>26</sup> At least, in this example, it is 500 people.

- c. A different result might be appropriate to use if the future age of judicial appointments is expected to change significantly from past ages at appointment.
98. In this report, I have looked at averages based on the age of the judges upon their appointment to the bench as well as the geographic location of the judges just prior to their appointment. To perform those calculations, I was provided with a summary of the age of all appointments as a federal judge from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2015 and from 1 April 2015 to 23 October 2020<sup>27</sup>.
99. In total, there were 598 appointments during that 9.5-year period – 226 from 2011 to 2015 and 372 from 2015 to 2020.
100. I examined the distribution by age during each of the two periods as well as the entire 9.5 years and found there was very little difference.
- a. The average age at appointment was 52.4 between 2011 and 2015 and it was 52.7 between 2015 and 2020. Over the entire period, the average age at appointment was 52.6.
- b. When I calculated the weighted average value for the Judicial Annuity as a percent of compensation (a discussion of the Judicial Annuity begins at paragraph 112), I obtained 37.6%, 38.0% and 37.8% respectively for appointments during 2011 to 2015, 2015 to 2020 and over the entire period 2011 to 2020.
101. In my opinion, those differences are not material for the purposes of this report, and I have therefore only calculated weighted averages based on the distribution of federal judicial appointments over the entire 9.5-year period from 2011 to 2020.

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<sup>27</sup> The Department of Justice provided me with statistics on judicial appointments from April 2011 to October 2020, made available by the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs.

## E. Judicial Total Compensation

102. I understand that there are three main components to federal judicial total compensation<sup>28</sup> – salary, health and welfare benefits (often called group insurance benefits) and the Judicial Annuity, encompassing both permanent disability income protection and retirement income. There may be other items included and I have assumed that they are not material for the purposes of this report.
103. The nature of the judicial annuity is that the value varies significantly based on the age at appointment of a judge. Consequently, the total compensation for a federal judge will also differ among judges based on their age at appointment.

### Salary

104. The salary for a federally appointed judge in 2020 was \$338,800<sup>29</sup>. For ease of reference, I refer to the base salary (\$338,800 for 2020 to 2021) as the **Base Judicial Salary**. I will refer to the total compensation for a judge who receives the Base Judicial Salary as the **Base Judicial Total Compensation**<sup>30</sup>.
105. For this report, I will focus on the Base Judicial Salary and will ignore the effect of any supplemental amounts based on differing positions and geography.
106. Assuming that the increase in the IAI will be 6.74% in April 2021, the Base Judicial Salary will be increased to \$361,600 as of 1 April 2021 – an increase of \$22,800.

### Retirement Savings

107. One component of compensation is retirement income accumulation. While many Canadians enjoy an employer-sponsored retirement plan, most Canadians are left to look after their personal retirement saving on their own, generally through contributing to a personal Registered Retirement Savings Plan (“RRSP”).

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<sup>28</sup> “Guide for Candidates”, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, [[www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html](http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html)]

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. In addition, there are supplemental amounts chief justices, associate chief justices, justices of certain courts and northern allowances.

<sup>30</sup> As discussed later (Paragraphs 141 to 142), the total compensation for judges varies by their age at appointment. I determine an average amount that reflects the age profile of judges upon appointment and use that – so Base Judicial Total Compensation refers to the average total compensation of all judges based on their ages at appointment.

108. There are many different types of retirement plans in Canada. Most retirement plans provided by an employer require part of the annual contribution to be paid by the employees and the balance by the employer. A few plans are funded entirely by the employer with no contribution required from employees. Where there is no retirement plan offered by the employer, the entire cost of retirement savings is borne by the individual employee.
109. For the vast majority, if not all, self-employed lawyers, retirement savings are funded entirely out of the individual's net income.
110. For federally appointed judges, the Judicial Annuity provides retirement income with the judges paying 7% of income each year until they are eligible for an unreduced annuity at which time, contributions decrease to 1% of income. Canada is responsible for the balance of the total cost.
111. To properly reflect retirement savings costs for self-employed lawyers and for federally appointed judges, we need to consider their differing opportunities, differing costs and differing values for retirement saving.

## **The Judicial Annuity**

112. The Judicial Annuity provides excellent retirement benefits to retired judges. It is one of the best retirement plans in Canada.
  - a. A lifetime annuity equal to  $\frac{2}{3}$ <sup>rds</sup> of the final year's earnings provided the judge has met one of three thresholds involving age and judicial service<sup>31</sup>. A reduced lifetime annuity is available upon retirement prior to those thresholds.
  - b. A lifetime annuity equal to  $\frac{2}{3}$ <sup>rds</sup> of the final year's earnings upon permanent disability while serving as a federal judge with no minimum service requirement.
  - c. A surviving spouse income payable following the death of a judge (both before and after retirement) equal to half of the amount payable to the judge.
  - d. Inflation protection based on changes in the Consumer Price Index in each year while the annuity is payable.

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<sup>31</sup> Attained age 75 and served at least ten years; Served at least 15 years and has a total of age plus service of at least 80; Served on the Supreme Court of Canada for a total of at least ten years.

113. In addition to retirement benefits, the Judicial Annuity provides permanent disability income should a judge become permanently disabled<sup>32</sup>. Within the private sector, if disability income protection is provided, it is usually done through long-term disability insurance which covers both temporary and permanent disabilities.
114. So, the Judicial Annuity is a combination of retirement savings and permanent disability income protection.
115. Judges must contribute part of the cost of the Judicial Annuity through payroll deductions equal to 7% of salary in each year until they are eligible to retire without a reduction to the amount of the annuity, following which the contribution is 1% of salary in each year. Canada is responsible for the balance of the total cost.

### Retirement Income Requirements

116. The general rule used by financial planners for retirement income sufficiency has for many decades been 70% of pre-retirement income. For some people, 70% is not sufficient to maintain their lifestyle. For some people, 70% is more than sufficient.<sup>33</sup>
117. If we look at averages, the replacement percent decreases as pre-retirement income increases<sup>34</sup>. For example, a family earning \$30,000 per annum prior to retirement is unlikely to be able to maintain their lifestyle on a 70% (\$21,000) pension. A family earning \$1 million annually is likely to have more than enough to maintain a lifestyle on a 70% (\$700,000) pension. For most families, this is because of savings. The larger the income, generally the larger the amount saved each year. And in most situations, savings are no longer required following retirement.
118. Two other factors that affect retirement income needs are:
- a. whether one owns a home that has become mortgage-free in the last few years;
  - b. the number of children and whether they have become financially independent<sup>35</sup>.
119. Based on my experiences working with people planning for retirement, it is my opinion that a 70% pension is usually appropriate for families with a total income of \$60,000 to

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<sup>32</sup> *Judges Act* (s. 42(1.1)(b))

<sup>33</sup> "Is a 70% retirement replacement income target too high?" by Fred Vettese, *Globe & Mail*, 14 Feb 2018, [[www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/retirement/retire-planning/book-excerpt-retirement-income-for-life-getting-more-without-savingmore/article37971172/](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/retirement/retire-planning/book-excerpt-retirement-income-for-life-getting-more-without-savingmore/article37971172/)]

<sup>34</sup> Based on my working with people preparing for retirement as well as on unpublished research I have done over the past 30 years.

<sup>35</sup> "Retirement Income for Life: Getting More Without Saving More" by Fred Vettese, *Milner & Associates Inc.*, 2 March 2018.

\$75,000. A higher percent is needed for lower income amounts and less for those with higher incomes.

120. Consequently, in my opinion, the vast majority of judges will have more income from the Judicial Annuity than is required to maintain their pre-retirement lifestyle.
121. While a judge may not require all of the income payable from the Judicial Annuity to maintain a lifestyle, the Judicial Annuity still delivers a full value to the judges. It provides them with an ability to support an increase in lifestyle if they should so wish, greater confidence in their financial future, as well as possibilities to provide larger inheritances and greater philanthropic activities.

### **Value of the Judicial Annuity**

122. Within the pension industry, one generally expresses the value of retirement savings as a percent of salary (rather than as total dollars), thereby removing salary level as a factor for cost difference. In paragraph 128 below, I present the total dollar value of the Judicial Annuity for all years of service. For the rest of the report, I express the value of the Judicial Annuity as a percent of Base Judicial Salary.
123. Further, there are a number of ways to look at the value of a retirement pension. The two most common ways are:
  - a. **Annual Value:** the amount of funds required as a contribution in each year of service up to retirement, which can be expressed as either a dollar amount or a percent of earnings; and
  - b. **Total Value:** the total amount of funds required to pay for the total amount of retirement income earned as of the date of retirement.
124. There is no method that results in the same value for each person. At the time of retirement, the total value will vary by age of the judge, spousal status and gender. The annual value will vary by age of the judge, expected retirement age, expected spousal status at retirement, years of service as a judge and gender.
  - a. The younger a judge is when appointed to the bench, the more years there will be for the time value of money to discount the value from the future retirement age to the present, so the lower the annual value of the pension.
  - b. The younger a judge is at retirement, the greater will be the value of their pension since they will be retired for a longer time and receive greater total payments than if they retired at an older age.

- c. If the judge has a spouse<sup>36</sup>, the Judicial Annuity will be worth more than if there is no spouse because the annuity continues following the death of the judge as long as the spouse remains alive.
  - d. The value of a pension for a female is greater than for a male since females' life expectancy is greater than for males.
125. The value of a pension is based upon expectations at retirement as well as expectations prior to retirement (age at retirement, future compensation increases, etc.). While future events both before and after retirement will affect the final cost of a pension, the value is always based on expectations about what will happen in the future. While a 60-year-old retiree is expected to live more years than a 75-year-old retiree, that does not always happen.
126. Unless one is willing to wait for the cost of a Judicial Annuity to reveal itself once all retired judges have died, we must determine the value based on actuarial assumptions – expectations for the future.
127. I have focussed on the value for each year of service as a judge and have calculated the expected or average value each year from appointment to expected retirement based on a set of actuarial assumptions. Those assumptions are summarised in Appendix 4.
- a. The assumptions recognise that judges retire at different ages and following different number of years of service. The probability of retirement for each age and service combination was taken from the Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for Federally Appointed Judges as of 31 March 2019 (the most recent as of the date I made the calculations). Those assumptions were developed by the Chief Actuary based on past experience of when judges have retired.

### **What is Value?**

I buy a 50/50 ticket for \$10.00. With 1,000 tickets sold, the payout will be \$5,000. My chance of winning the \$5,000 is 1 in 1,000. My expected winnings are \$5.00 – the \$5,000 payout multiplied by my chance of winning it.

So, the value of that ticket to me is \$5.00. After the draw is made, that ticket's value changes to either zero or \$5,000. But prior to the draw, it always had a value of \$5.00.

It is the same with pensions. The value is based on our expectations for the future, and that requires actuarial calculations and actuarial assumptions about future events.

The value may change over time as our expectations for the future change. But those changes do not change the past values since the past values were based on expectations at each past period of time.

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<sup>36</sup> And/or children. There is a provision for continuation of the Judicial Annuity to any surviving dependent children. From my calculations, that provision has an immaterial effect on costs.



- b. The retirement assumptions vary from age 55 (where ½ of 1% of judges are assumed to retire) to age 75 (where all judges who are still serving are assumed to retire).
  - c. Based on those assumptions, the average age of retirement varies from age 68 for a judge appointed at 40; to age 72 for a judge appointed at 50; and age 75 for a judge appointed at 60 and above.
  - d. Assumptions are also made for future interest (to recognise the time value of money), future salary increases, gender split of the judges, mortality rates, disability rates and probability of there being a survivor entitled to survivor benefits following the judge's death.
128. The dollar value of the Judicial Annuity is roughly similar regardless of the age at appointment. In the following, I calculated the weighted averages based on the number of judges appointed at each age from 40 to 69 over the past 9.5 years (April 2011 to October 2020)<sup>37</sup>.
- a. The total value for pension and disability benefits ranges from \$1,775,000 to \$2,172,000 for appointment at ages 40 to 65. The differences are mainly due to the time value of money. The weighted average over all ages is \$1,885,000.
  - b. The total amount of contributions by a judge over their entire period of service varies from \$187,000 to \$356,000 for appointment at ages 40 to 65. The differences are mainly due of the length of time in service – the younger one is appointed, the more the total contributions will total. The weighted average over all ages is \$280,000.
  - c. The total value of the pension and disability benefits, net of judges' contributions ranges from \$1,447,000 to \$1,984,000 for appointment at ages 40 to 65. Those differences are mainly due to the time value of money. The weighted average over all ages is \$1,605,000.
129. The average age of retirement, based on the actuarial assumptions, is about 72. All judges are assumed to retire upon turning 75 or prior to that.
130. These total value amounts are not useful for determining total compensation nor are they useful for a comparison with retirement savings of self-employed lawyers and other professionals. For that, I have expressed the value of the Judicial Annuity as a percent of annual Base Judicial Salary – a percent that remains the same for each year of service as a judge.

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<sup>37</sup> This averaging method is discussed further at paragraphs 91 to 101.

131. The value of the retirement income portion of the Judicial Annuity varies from 26.3% of Base Judicial Salary for a judge appointed at age 40 to 78.6% of Base Judicial Salary for a judge appointed at age 70. Assuming the judges' contributions are all utilised to fund the retirement income benefit, the value of the pension net of contributions ranges from 20.6% for a judge appointed at age 40 to 71.6% for a judge appointed at age 70.
132. The value of the disability income portion of the Judicial Annuity varies from 2.3% of earnings for a judge appointed at age 40 to 9.4% of earnings for a judge appointed at age 70. That assumes that no portion of the judge's contribution is used for disability income protection.
133. Table 133 sets out the annual value for the retirement income and permanent disability income based on each age at appointment from 40 to 70. Note that these percentages are an average over an entire career. As an example, for a judge appointed at age 50, the value net of judges' contributions for the pension and disability benefits would be 30.3% of Base Judicial Salary each year from appointment to retirement. The average cost to the judge would be 5.41% of Base Judicial Salary each year, which represents an average of the years with a 7% and a 1% contribution rate.

***Table 133 – Value of Judicial Annuity by Age at Appointment – percent of Base Judicial Salary***

Age at Appointment	Pension Value	Judges' Contributions	Pension Value Net of Judges' Contributions	Disability Value	Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions
40	30.63%	5.48%	25.15%	2.75%	27.90%
41	31.31%	5.37%	25.94%	2.86%	28.80%
42	30.80%	5.41%	25.39%	3.03%	28.42%
43	30.55%	5.26%	25.29%	3.20%	28.48%
44	30.36%	5.32%	25.04%	3.37%	28.41%
45	30.40%	5.18%	25.22%	3.55%	28.77%
46	30.97%	5.27%	25.70%	3.71%	29.40%
47	32.06%	5.17%	26.89%	3.85%	30.74%
48	32.94%	5.28%	27.66%	4.01%	31.67%
49	33.98%	5.16%	28.82%	4.18%	33.00%
50	34.73%	5.27%	29.46%	4.37%	33.83%
51	35.45%	5.39%	30.07%	4.58%	34.64%
52	36.12%	5.50%	30.62%	4.79%	35.42%
53	36.78%	5.63%	31.15%	5.02%	36.17%
54	37.43%	5.75%	31.68%	5.26%	36.94%
55	38.23%	5.90%	32.34%	5.51%	37.85%
56	39.10%	6.05%	33.05%	5.77%	38.82%
57	40.29%	6.23%	34.06%	6.04%	40.11%
58	41.96%	6.44%	35.52%	6.33%	41.84%

<b>Age at Appointment</b>	<b>Pension Value</b>	<b>Judges' Contributions</b>	<b>Pension Value Net of Judges' Contributions</b>	<b>Disability Value</b>	<b>Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions</b>
59	44.01%	6.69%	37.32%	6.61%	43.93%
60	46.87%	7.00%	39.87%	6.93%	46.80%
61	50.58%	7.00%	43.58%	7.22%	50.80%
62	54.89%	7.00%	47.89%	7.50%	55.39%
63	59.95%	7.00%	52.95%	7.76%	60.70%
64	65.95%	7.00%	58.95%	8.01%	66.96%
65	73.20%	7.00%	66.20%	8.26%	74.45%
66	73.87%	7.00%	66.87%	8.49%	75.37%
67	74.57%	7.00%	67.57%	8.73%	76.30%
68	75.28%	7.00%	68.28%	8.97%	77.25%
69	76.02%	7.00%	69.02%	9.23%	78.25%
<b>Weighted Average</b>	<b>38.52%</b>	<b>5.78%</b>	<b>32.74%</b>	<b>5.10%</b>	<b>37.84%</b>

134. By looking at the ages of judicial appointments, we can calculate an age-weighted average overall value of the Judicial Annuity for all federally appointed judges. Net of judges' contributions, that is 37.8% of Base Judicial Salary.

### Cost to a Lawyer to Replicate the Judicial Annuity

135. The value of the Judicial Annuity shown above is prior to considering the effects of income taxes. While the judge must contribute towards the cost of the Judicial Annuity, that contribution is tax deductible and the actual value is somewhat less than the actual contribution.
136. After retirement, the entire benefit paid by the Judicial Annuity is taxable in each year as it is paid.
137. For a self-employed lawyer to replicate the benefit of the Judicial Annuity (i.e., 66.7% of the lawyer's income) takes a combination of RRSP contributions and contributions to an investment plan. The tax impact on an RRSP is similar to the tax impact on the Judicial Annuity. But the effect of taxes on an investment plan are very different. Contributions are made with after-tax dollars; any investment income is immediately taxable and withdrawals from the plan are tax-free.
138. I have performed calculations of the total amount of income prior to taxes that a self-employed lawyer would need to use in order to replicate the pension benefits from the Judicial Annuity using a combination of RRSP and investment plan. In doing so, I recognised the differing income tax treatment for the different types of saving, the age

at appointment to the judiciary and the average age of retirement of federal judges of age 72.

### Total Value of the Judicial Annuity to a Self-Employed Lawyer

139. The value of the Judicial Annuity shown in Table 133 is prior to recognising that the income tax treatment afforded the Judicial Annuity is not available to individual Canadians, including the self-employed lawyers. Therefore, the value of the Judicial Annuity shown in Table 133 underestimates the actual value to the lawyer.
140. The cost to replicate the pension from the Judicial Annuity ranges from about 8% more for appointment at age 40 compared with the value of the Judicial Annuity to 18% more for appointment at age 65 compared with the value of the Judicial Annuity<sup>38</sup>.
141. Table 141 shows the value of the Judicial Annuity based on age at appointment including the additional costs required to replicate the Judicial pension by a self-employed lawyer. This table builds on the results presented in Table 133 above.

***Table 141 – Total Value of the Judicial Annuity to a Self-Employed Lawyer***

Age at Appointment	Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions	Additional Cost to Replicate Judicial Annuity	Total Value of Judicial Annuity
40	27.90%	11.80%	39.70%
41	28.80%	12.60%	41.40%
42	28.42%	11.40%	39.82%
43	28.48%	11.30%	39.78%
44	28.41%	10.50%	38.91%
45	28.77%	10.70%	39.47%
46	29.40%	10.50%	39.90%
47	30.74%	10.80%	41.54%
48	31.67%	10.80%	42.47%
49	33.00%	11.70%	44.70%
50	33.83%	11.50%	45.33%
51	34.64%	11.20%	45.84%
52	35.42%	11.60%	47.02%
53	36.17%	11.20%	47.37%
54	36.94%	10.90%	47.84%
55	37.85%	11.30%	49.15%
56	38.82%	11.00%	49.82%
57	40.11%	10.90%	51.01%
58	41.84%	11.70%	53.54%

<sup>38</sup> The extra value varies up and down with age, but generally shows a gradually increasing pattern. The up and down fluctuations are mainly caused by changes in the assumed retirement age that starts at age 72 for appointments at age 40 and increases to retirement at age 75 for appointments at age 60 and above.

Age at Appointment	Total Value of Pension and Disability Net of Judges' Contributions	Additional Cost to Replicate Judicial Annuity	Total Value of Judicial Annuity
59	43.93%	11.90%	55.83%
60	46.80%	12.40%	59.20%
61	50.80%	13.40%	64.20%
62	55.39%	14.50%	69.89%
63	60.70%	15.80%	76.50%
64	66.96%	17.40%	84.36%
65	74.45%	19.20%	93.65%
66	75.37%	18.70%	94.07%
67	76.30%	18.30%	94.60%
68	77.25%	17.90%	95.15%
69	78.25%	17.50%	95.75%
<b>Weighted Average</b>	<b>37.84%</b>	<b>11.67%</b>	<b>49.51%</b>

142. By looking at the ages of judicial appointments, we can calculate an age-weighted average value of the Judicial Annuity for all federally appointed judges including the effects of income tax. Net of judges' contributions, that is 49.51% of salary<sup>39</sup>. A self-employed lawyer would, on average, need to save 49.51% more of their net income than a judge in order to provide savings sufficient to provide the 2/3<sup>rd</sup>s of earnings payable under the Judicial Annuity.

## Health & Welfare Benefits

143. Judges receive health and welfare benefits similar to those provided to federal government employees<sup>40</sup>. The cost to the government for that is the total of the claims actually submitted and approved by the individual and their family members plus a small amount to cover claims adjudication and administrative expenses of the insurance company.

144. Self-employed lawyers may also have health and welfare benefits which may be more or less generous than those provided for the judges. The cost of these benefits can be deducted as a business expense in many situations and would therefore normally be paid prior to the determination of net income.

<sup>39</sup> That 49.51% applies to all salary amounts. The dollar value is different between people with different salaries, but the percent is the same. That is similar to the benefit payable from the Judicial Annuity. The full amount is 66.7% of a judge's salary – which produces a different dollar amount between judges with different salaries, but the percent is the same.

<sup>40</sup> "Guide for Candidates", Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, [www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html]

145. While there may be some, or even many, self-employed lawyers who do not buy health and welfare benefits for themselves, I assume that those with net incomes above the median do have these benefits and that the cost is roughly similar as for a judge.
146. The cost of benefits typically forms part of total compensation. Since the costs are likely a wash in most situations, I have chosen to ignore it for purposes of this report.

### **Canada Pension Plan Contributions**

147. There are at least two benefits with a different cost impact between self-employed lawyers and federally appointed judges: part of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) contributions and retirement savings. Retirement savings are addressed above in paragraphs 135 to 142.
148. CPP contributions in 2021 total 10.9% of earnings between \$3,500 and \$61,600. Half is paid by the employee and half by the employer. For self-employed Canadians, the entire amount is paid by the self-employed person. For a person earning over \$61,600 in 2021, the employee portion is \$3,166 and the self-employed total contribution is \$6,333. Those contributions are made out of net income. A judge therefore has \$3,166 less in CPP contributions than the self-employed lawyer.
149. To properly reflect this difference in the CPP contributions, we could either reduce each of the net income amounts of self-employed lawyers shown in the tables in this report by the \$3,166 difference or we could include the \$3,166 as a benefit available to the judges as part of total compensation. In my opinion, it is easier to include this benefit as a part of the judges' total compensation since that involves adjusting only one amount.

### **Base Judicial Total Compensation**

150. The Base Judicial Total Compensation is equal to the Base Judicial Salary plus an amount for Canada Pension Plan contributions plus the value for the Judicial Annuity plus the value of any other items or perquisites. I have assumed that the value of any other items or perquisites is not material and I have assigned a zero value to them for purposes of this report.
151. For a judge appointed at age 40, the Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2020 is \$338,800 plus 39.7% (from table 141) for the Judicial Annuity plus \$3,166 for CPP

contributions giving a total of \$476,500<sup>41</sup>. For a judge appointed at age 69, the Base Judicial Total Compensation is \$666,400. Table 151 shows the Base Judicial Total Compensation by age for each year 2019 to 2021. Note that the 2021 amounts are based on my estimate assuming an increase to Base Judicial Salary for 2021 of 6.74% (paragraph 106). The age-weighted average is based on the actual ages of the judges appointed during the period 1 April 2011 to 23 October 2020.

**Table 151 – Base Judicial Total Compensation by Age at Appointment – 2019, 2020 and 2021**

Age at Appointment	April 2019 to March 2020	April 2020 to March 2021	Estimated Effective April 2021
40	464,000	476,500	508,300
41	469,600	482,200	514,500
42	464,400	476,900	508,700
43	464,300	476,800	508,600
44	461,400	473,800	505,500
45	463,300	475,700	507,500
46	464,700	477,200	509,100
47	470,100	482,700	515,000
48	473,200	485,900	518,300
49	480,500	493,400	526,400
50	482,600	495,600	528,700
51	484,300	497,300	530,500
52	488,200	501,300	534,800
53	489,300	502,500	536,100
54	490,900	504,000	537,800
55	495,200	508,500	542,500
56	497,400	510,800	544,900
57	501,300	514,800	549,200
58	509,700	523,400	558,400
59	517,200	531,100	566,600
60	528,400	542,500	578,800
61	544,900	559,500	596,900
62	563,600	578,700	617,500
63	585,500	601,200	641,400
64	611,400	627,800	669,800
65	642,000	659,300	703,400
66	643,400	660,700	704,900
67	645,100	662,500	706,800
68	647,000	664,300	708,800
69	648,900	666,400	711,000
<b>Weighted Average</b>	<b>\$496,000</b>	<b>\$509,400</b>	<b>\$543,800</b>

<sup>41</sup> In this report, I round compensation amounts to the nearest \$100.

***Effect on Base Judicial Total Compensation***

152. The Base Judicial Total Compensation shown in Table 151 is comprised of three items – Base Judicial Salary which is the same at each age, the value of the Judicial Annuity which varies by age at appointment and the portion of the judge’s Canada Pension Plan contributions paid by Canada which is the same at each age. To determine a single value representative of all judges, I have calculated the “weighted average for age at appointment” of Base Judicial Total Compensation effective April 2019 to be \$496,000.
153. The similar age-weighted average Base Judicial Total Compensation effective April 2020 is \$509,400.
154. If the 2021 Base Judicial Salary increases as I estimated (paragraph 106) to 361,600, the age-weighted average Base Judicial Total Compensation effective April 2021 will be \$543,800.
155. I have estimated at which percentile of net income for self-employed lawyers in all regions of Canada these judicial compensation amounts fall<sup>42</sup>. I took the 2019 net-income amounts for all self-employed lawyers in all regions of Canada and adjusted them to 2020 and to 2021 using an increase based on the average annual increases between 2015 to 2019. Those average increase percentages were determined separately for each of the percentile ranges<sup>43</sup>.
156. I estimate that the average Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2019 of \$496,000 is approximately at the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile of the self-employed lawyers in 2019<sup>44</sup>.
157. I estimate that the average Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2020 of \$509,400 is approximately at the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile of the self-employed lawyers in 2020<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>42</sup> The net incomes for self-employed lawyers in Canada are discussed in Section F and detailed tables of net-income are found in Section H.

<sup>43</sup> That produced an annual increase in the self-employed lawyers’ net income for 2020 and again for 2021 by percentile of:

65-70 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	1.39%
70-75 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	1.21%
75-80 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	1.09%
80-85 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	0.80%
85-90 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	1.07%
90-95 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	1.21%
95-100 <sup>th</sup> percentile:	1.72%

<sup>44</sup> If the self-employed lawyer’s with net income below \$60,000 are excluded, this is the 84<sup>th</sup> percentile of the approximately 70% of all self-employed lawyers who have net incomes greater than \$60,000.

<sup>45</sup> If the self-employed lawyer’s with net income below \$60,000 are excluded, this is the 84<sup>th</sup> percentile of the approximately 70% of all self-employed lawyers who have net incomes greater than \$60,000.



158. I estimate that the average Base Judicial Total Compensation in 2021 of \$543,800 will be approximately at the 89<sup>th</sup> percentile of the self-employed lawyers in 2021<sup>46</sup>.

***Effect on Total Compensation of Prothonotaries***

159. For April 2019 to March 2020, the base salary of a prothonotary was \$263,900, from April 2020 to March 2021 it is \$271,000 and I estimate beginning April 2021 it will be \$289,200 (80% of the Base Judicial Salary).

160. Using the same adjustments to obtain total compensation as used for puisne judges<sup>47</sup>, I determined the total compensation of a prothonotary.

161. The 2019 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$397,300. That is about the 84<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

162. The 2020 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$408,100. That is about the 84<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

163. The 2021 average total compensation of a prothonotary is estimated to be \$435,500. That is about the 86<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

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<sup>46</sup> If the self-employed lawyer's with net income below \$60,000 are excluded, this is the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile of the approximately 70% of all self-employed lawyers who have net incomes greater than \$60,000.

<sup>47</sup> Take the base salary, add the value of the Judicial Annuity (based on the average value of 49.51%) and add the value of the government paying half of the Canada Pension plan contribution. This implicitly assumes that prothonotaries have a similar age profile at appointment as do the federally appointed judges.

## F. Self-Employed Lawyers

164. About 2/3rds of the federal judicial appointees (2011 to 2020) are lawyers from private practice. That includes the self-employed lawyers as well as lawyers practicing in a corporation including professional corporations. Judges are also appointed from lawyers who are employed by organisations within the broader public sector. Canada Revenue Agency provided anonymous net income data for self-employed lawyers but was not able to provide sufficiently reliable employment information for lawyers working for a corporation or within the broader public sector. Consequently, I have utilised only self-employed lawyers as an income comparator.

165. A self-employed lawyer must cover all business expenses out of the gross income. The amount left over, or net income, is available to provide a personal income, retirement savings, and health and welfare benefits.

### Self-Employed Lawyers' Income

166. Canada Revenue Agency provided a data file of the net earnings of self-employed lawyers in Canada. I have analysed those and set out various analyses in section A.

167. Similar data has been provided and included in reports prepared for prior Quadrennial Commissions. I have provided results using similar analyses as was done in prior years. There is an issue with those analyses that I discuss later (see the call-out box on page 46). However, data that would have permitted me to address the issue was not available.

168. Compensation comparisons are a normal part of compensation reviews and are used mainly to determine how an organisation's total compensation amounts compare with similar organisations. It is normal to select other organisations that are in the same industry and similar sized organisations that compete for people with the same skills.

169. Once the data has been collected, one must determine what points in the range of salaries you want to utilise. If the evaluation is for employees with average skills and

### Percentiles

Percentiles help us easily rank a range of numbers, like compensation. When dealing with compensation, the 40th percentile refers to the compensation amount where 40% of all lawyers earn less and the rest (60%) earn more. The 75th percentile is the amount where 75% of lawyers earn less and the balance (25%) earn more.

The 50th percentile is also referred to as the median. Note that the median and the average are not the same. They are sometimes close in value, but they can also be very different – indicating the underlying data is skewed.

Consider the numbers 2, 3, 8, 15, 27. The average is 11. The median is 8 – the value that is in the middle – in this case where there are 2 values below it and two values above it.

average performance, the focus would be on the average or the median compensation from the study. To pay an average performing employee compensation measured at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile would be overpaying and could lead to wage inflation within that job sector. If the evaluation is for high performing employees, the focus would likely be on compensation at the 70<sup>th</sup> to 80<sup>th</sup> percentile – or even higher if the individual is a star performer. To pay average compensation to a high performing employee could lead to them quitting or a cessation of performing well.

170. In this section, I will focus on the compensation of self-employed lawyers<sup>48</sup>. Specifically, I use the net income of self-employed lawyers. Net income is equal to the total income from all services provided less business expenses, such as compensation for employees, office expenses, etc. Net income is basically the total compensation available to the self-employed lawyer.
171. There is a wide range of net income among lawyers and an individual lawyer’s net income could fluctuate greatly from year to year. For example, in 2019 the average income reported by Canada Revenue Agency in metropolitan areas ranged from \$7,530 to \$1,037,000 (\$8,800 to \$1,223,000 in Toronto)<sup>49</sup>. What the data does not show is whether and by how much an individual lawyer’s income fluctuates.

### ***Salary Exclusion***

172. Within the compensation industry, median is frequently used – but that depends on the type of candidate one wants to attract. This process may not completely translate to the relationship of lawyers and judges’ compensation because income is not a perfect indicator of suitability for a judicial position.
173. Some of the data provided to prior Quadrennial Commissions has been based on income amounts that excluded net incomes below a threshold of \$60,000 or \$80,000. Excluding lower salaries is a very unusual method that results in distorted results. I am unable to determine a valid and appropriate reason for such an exclusion.

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<sup>48</sup> It would be better to also include compensation of lawyers who are employed by an organisation, but Canada Revenue Agency advised there are practical issues with being able to extract that data and ensure the accuracy of it.

<sup>49</sup> Canada Revenue Agency use a modified percentile method of reporting net earnings. The lowest earnings reported (referred to as the “1<sup>st</sup> decile mean”) is described as the average of the net income for lawyers who fall between the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile and 10<sup>th</sup> percentile. For clarity, there is no information provided on the bottom 5 percent of incomes, although those incomes are utilised in calculating some of the numbers.

The highest earnings reported (referred to as the “10<sup>th</sup> decile mean”) is the average of the net income for the top 5% of lawyers – that is the average of incomes from the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile to the 100<sup>th</sup> percentile.

174. For example, by excluding those with a net income less than \$60,000 for the 2019 data, one excludes about 34% of the self-employed lawyers in British Columbia, 30% in Alberta, 29.5% in Ontario, 39% in Quebec, and 29% in Atlantic Canada. There were not enough lawyers in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the three Territories to preserve confidentiality, and Canada Revenue Agency therefore suppressed almost all data. As a result, the effect of an income exclusion could not be determined for those five jurisdictions.
175. If we assume that income is one indicator of suitability for a federal judicial appointment, those percentages suggest that only 30% of the self-employed lawyers in Alberta, Ontario and Atlantic Canada are unsuitable while almost 40% of those in Quebec are unsuitable.
176. Based on my past experience of working with large amounts of data, it is my opinion that there are likely no or very few regional differences in the percentage of lawyers that possess specific qualities. That implies there are no or few regional differences in the percentage of lawyers that possess the specific qualities desired for a federal judicial appointment.
177. Normally, when looking at compensation data, we look at data in the range of where one wants to attract employees. In most industries, one looks for candidates from a similar position in other organisations. If you want to have a staff of average performers, you would tend to look to the median income. If you want above average performers, you will tend to look to the 60<sup>th</sup> to 70<sup>th</sup> percentiles. If you want outstanding performers, you will tend to look to the 70<sup>th</sup> and higher percentiles.
178. By excluding incomes below a threshold, the income amounts at each of the percentiles is simply increased while the number of people (or data points) is decreased. The median income becomes the income for above-average performers. The 75<sup>th</sup> percentile becomes the income for very outstanding performers.
179. Even if there is a valid reason to exclude low earnings, doing so leaves a perception that the exclusion is artificial and was done in order to obtain a pre-conceived result. If we know that we need to focus primarily on incomes of the top 25% of all lawyers in order to attract quality candidates, we look to the income statistics of those at the 75<sup>th</sup> and higher percentiles.
180. To exclude those with net incomes below \$60,000 and then determine the percentiles results in inflating the incomes at each percentile. The top 25% of those earning more than \$60,000 may be the top 20% of all lawyers (an even smaller percent in Quebec). To actually include the top 25% of all lawyers, we would need to adjust our sights to look

at roughly the top 30% (lower percent in Quebec) of all lawyers earning more than \$60,000. That becomes a communication challenge when trying to explain to others why the top 25% of all lawyers includes those in the top 30%.

181. Since we can obtain the same end result without excluding any income, one needs to ask why an income exclusion was used. Say we end up selecting the income amount at the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile of the lawyers earning more than \$60,000. That same result could be obtained by selecting the income amount at (approximately) the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile of all lawyers (no income exclusion).
182. If we exclude any data due to the amount of income, the results become inconsistent between geographic areas. If we make no exclusions, the data is consistent.
183. The report of the fifth Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission (the “**2015 Quadrennial Commission**”) submitted 30 June 2016 addressed the issue of excluding salaries. They summarised the position of the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association (the “**Association**”) and the Canadian Judicial Council (the “**Council**”) by stating “*their rationale was that those who earn below a certain threshold are not suitable candidates for the judiciary: low income reflects a lack of success or time commitment incommensurate with the demands of a judicial appointment.*”
184. There are many reasons why an individual lawyer may have a low income, including issues around competence and commitment as suggested by the Association and Council. But there are also reasons, such as personal passions, practice areas and location, that could result in low income without implying unsuitability for a judicial appointment<sup>50</sup>.
185. I also note that due to the variabilities of net income, it is likely that many lawyers will fluctuate between net incomes that are above and below a low-income threshold.
186. If we accept the position of the Association and Council that it is reasonable to exclude low net incomes from the compensation comparators, we should also consider an exclusion of high net incomes. In many situations, high income more likely implies business success (as opposed to legal acumen), a willingness to hustle to obtain clients and a focus on financial rewards rather than implying qualities commensurate with a judicial appointment. Excluding low net-income as well as high net-income does not

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<sup>50</sup> “Guide for Candidates”, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs. In describing the assessment process and considerations, there is no mention made of the salary of an applicant. Reference is made to “professional competence and experience, personal characteristics, and potential impediments to appointment.”

mean that those lawyers are necessarily unsuitable for appointment, but rather that the likelihood of their having suitable characteristics is less than for the non-excluded lawyers.

187. If it is appropriate to exclude those with lower compensation, it is my opinion that there should also be a high-compensation exclusion. I suggest that excluding lawyers with net compensation above about \$650,000 would be appropriate<sup>51</sup> – but only if there is also a low-compensation exclusion. I suggest that excluding net compensation below \$60,000 would be appropriate – but only if there is also a high-compensation exclusion. (In my opinion there should be no income exclusion at either the top or bottom of the income range. But if there is to be an income exclusion, it should be at both the top and bottom.)
188. Unfortunately, the format of the data from the Canada Revenue Agency does not permit an *accurate* calculation of the effect of including a high-income exclusion but it does permit an *estimated* calculation. I have estimated the effect of using both a low and high-income exclusion in Table 188.

**Table 188 - Percentile Levels for Compensation with Various Exclusions**

Age Range	Compensation Excluded	65-70 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> percentile
35 - 69	None	203,280	274,950	413,900	937,480
	Below \$60,000	277,970	363,080	525,260	1,085,320
	Below \$80,000	302,780	394,430	560,130	1,132,330
	Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000	241,000	297,000	384,000	559,000
35 - 46	None	217,340	273,400	376,690	741,350
	Below \$60,000	266,490	326,230	448,060	824,300
	Below \$80,000	282,960	346,420	472,330	851,820
	Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000	247,000	295,000	378,000	570,000

<sup>51</sup> I selected \$650,000 after examining the percentiles for net income. For the Other Regions (all of Canada except the 10 largest census metropolitan areas or CMAs), all the percentile points are less than \$650,000. That does not mean there is no one earning over \$650,000 outside the 10 CMAs, but that if there are such people, they are most likely less than 2.5% of all lawyers outside those 10 CMAs.

For the largest CMAs other than Calgary and Toronto, the income situation is similar to Other Regions except that there could be between 2.5% and 7.5% of all lawyers who earn more than \$650,000. For Calgary and Toronto, this would result in excluding about 10% to 15% of all lawyers in those cities.

Other thresholds could be equally valid. At income levels over \$650,000, the amount of income between percentiles gets wider and wider. There is less and less congestion around a specific income amount as the amount of net income increases. For example, if the exclusion was set at \$750,000, it would have a small impact on the number of lawyers excluded compared with the \$650,000 I have used.

Age Range	Compensation Excluded	65-70 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> percentile
47 - 54	None	261,160	367,380	578,250	1,189,810
	Below \$60,000	346,400	477,690	691,970	1,322,200
	Below \$80,000	378,350	518,960	727,040	1,368,460
	Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000	273,000	335,000	445,000	606,000
55 - 69	None	166,900	237,100	375,100	925,020
	Below \$60,000	257,870	346,740	507,170	1,124,970
	Below \$80,000	287,580	383,760	546,940	1,185,670
	Below \$60,000 & Above \$650,000	220,000	278,000	357,000	545,000

189. By excluding only compensation at the low end, all percentile amounts are increased significantly. By excluding compensation at both the upper and lower end, the income amounts are increased at percentiles up to 80<sup>th</sup> (with the exception of ages 47 to 54) and the income amounts decrease at percentiles above the 80<sup>th</sup>.
190. When looking for comparators (whether for compensation or for other items), excluding any data is only appropriate if there are some obvious outliers that will distort the results if they are included. Given the large amount of data provided by Canada Revenue Agency, the effect of including an outlier with extremely large or small income would be immaterial for the purposes of this report.
191. If there is one lawyer in the data with a net income of \$25 million, I have estimated there would be no change to any of the percentile amounts (except the 100<sup>th</sup>) and the 2019 average net income of all lawyers would be increased by \$1,600. Because the sample size is smaller, the effect on the average net income for lawyers aged 47 to 54 would be about \$7,600 increase if the outlier lawyer was aged between 47 and 54 – an amount that is unlikely to affect the results of the income relationships in this report<sup>52</sup>.
192. While the 2015 Quadrennial Commission neither endorsed nor rejected the method of salary exclusions, they did find that there was no basis to apply an \$80,000 threshold for such an exclusion.
193. In my opinion, excluding any compensation amounts distorts the results and creates a perception of possible manipulation.

<sup>52</sup> For the other age groups, the dollar effect would be less.

194. In the submission of the Association and Council, to the 2015 Quadrennial Commission, they utilised the average earnings of self-employed lawyers based on the ages between 44 and 56. That is the age range at which the majority of judges are appointed. But there have been judges appointed at ages below 44 and above 56. To exclude them from the analysis amounts to age exclusion – similar to earnings exclusion.
195. If we look at the net earnings data for self-employed lawyers (Table 256a), we can see that the ages with the lowest earnings are 35 to 43 and 56 to 69<sup>53</sup>.
196. Calculating an average income amount by looking only at ages 44 to 56 is the same as excluding lawyers with low earnings – it is similar to a belief that younger and older lawyers are irrelevant for the purposes of reviewing judicial compensation.
197. It is true that relatively fewer lawyers (30% of appointments between 2011 and 2020) are appointed at ages outside the range 44 to 56 compared to those who are within that range (70% of appointments between 2011 and 2020). One way to reflect the smaller number of judges appointed at younger and older ages is to calculate a weighted average that is based on the relative number of judges appointed at each age. Because the younger and older appointees are relatively fewer, including them in the weighted average has a smaller effect on the average than those aged 44 to 56. But including them recognises that they exist and do get appointed.
198. Unless it can be shown that the data includes only a few outliers that will distort the results, there is no valid reason to exclude any data when calculating an average for a group.
199. For example, we can compare the net incomes of all self-employed lawyers as provided by the Canada Revenue Agency (ages 35 to 69) with the net incomes of self-employed lawyers aged 44 to 56 and with the average net incomes of all lawyers weighted to reflect the distribution of ages at appointment. For this I use the 2019 net income amounts for all lawyers in all regions of Canada.

***Table 209 – Effect of Age Exclusion – 2019 Net Earnings***

Ages	65-70 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> percentile	Average
35 - 69	203,280	274,950	413,900	937,480	224,140
Age weighted	230,840	321,080	499,160	1,065,810	259,270
44 - 56	251,630	349,530	539,060	1,124,160	277,930

<sup>53</sup> However, for regions other than the top ten CMAs, income remains high through to age 59 and then drops off at ages 60 to 69.



200. Table 209 shows the effect of excluding the younger and older ages at appointment – at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, the net income of all lawyers in 2019 was \$270,000, but by excluding the younger and older lawyers, it is boosted to \$340,000 – an increase of 26%.
201. Instead of using the average net income of all self-employed lawyers, we could calculate a weighted average that reflects the age distribution of judges at their appointment. This method gives greater weight to the incomes at ages where more judges are appointed and less weight to the ages where fewer judges get appointed. The net income in 2019 weighted by age at appointment was \$320,000 (79<sup>th</sup> percentile), but by excluding the younger and older lawyers, it is boosted to \$350,000 (81<sup>st</sup> percentile) – an increase of 9%.
202. For the balance of the body of this report, I will look at net income amounts with no exclusions – either for age or income. For the sake of completeness, the data included in Section H does include compensation exclusions of incomes below both \$60,000 and \$80,000. Because of the significant amount of work required to add an exclusion at the high end of incomes, I have not made any calculations with a high-income exclusion other than those shown in Table 188.

### *Self-Employed Lawyers' Income Comparators*

203. Table 205 shows the percentile net income amounts by age groupings and by calendar year 2015 to 2019. Ages 35 to 69 covers all of the lawyers within the data from Canada Revenue Agency. The next three age groups (35–46, 47–54, 55–69) follow the lawyers as they move through their careers. The last grouping (44 to 56) was used by the Association and Council in past years to be representative of the ages at which most new judicial appointments are made.
204. Net income fluctuates up and down from year to year, but generally with an upward trend.
205. In general, compensation increases with age and peaks somewhere between ages 47 and 54. Compensation then declines as lawyers approach retirement.

**Table 205 - Changes in Net Income 2015 to 2019 by Ages - no income exclusion**

Age Range	Year	65-70 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> percentile	Average
35 - 69	2015	188,590	260,000	259,720	394,710	868,420	210,390
	2016	188,790	250,000	252,540	370,480	806,250	201,940
	2017	192,820	260,000	259,620	385,070	825,440	206,950
	2018	197,340	270,000	273,550	416,440	929,160	221,020
	2019	203,280	270,000	274,950	413,900	937,480	224,140
35 - 46	2015	199,590	260,000	260,040	372,080	753,810	200,820
	2016	199,540	250,000	250,610	346,710	699,260	194,010
	2017	202,370	250,000	256,040	354,510	668,130	193,600
	2018	208,230	270,000	270,960	380,770	752,980	205,720
	2019	217,340	270,000	273,400	376,690	741,350	209,220
47 - 54	2015	224,110	320,000	319,240	481,370	1,000,220	247,980
	2016	221,050	300,000	306,640	444,560	941,220	236,950
	2017	232,330	320,000	325,200	482,460	998,450	251,610
	2018	249,040	350,000	353,020	562,010	1,152,910	279,780
	2019	261,160	360,000	367,380	578,250	1,189,810	292,580
55 - 69	2015	165,860	230,000	232,730	363,930	861,390	197,360
	2016	166,300	230,000	228,990	346,100	796,820	189,210
	2017	167,590	230,000	233,430	356,020	828,010	193,390
	2018	167,290	240,000	239,340	377,660	909,990	202,520
	2019	166,900	240,000	237,100	375,100	925,020	203,360
44 - 56	2015	227,440	320,000	320,770	477,460	997,070	249,820
	2016	223,540	300,000	306,030	443,370	941,030	238,960
	2017	232,750	320,000	319,270	471,910	955,380	246,560
	2018	244,640	340,000	343,940	537,310	1,094,120	269,580
	2019	251,630	340,000	349,530	394,710	868,420	210,390

### How can percentiles mislead us?

1. It is important to note that these percentile numbers do not necessarily reflect the income levels of individual lawyers over a period of years. As a simplified example of this, consider a group of 100 lawyers. Each lawyer in the group normally has net income of \$200,000 give or take \$20,000 each year. Some lawyers are down, and some are up each year. The median net income is \$200,000, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile is \$216,000 and the 100<sup>th</sup> percentile is \$220,000.
2. However, in each year, five of those lawyers have a windfall year with a net income of \$400,000. No lawyer has more than one windfall year in each decade. The statistics will still show a median income of about \$200,000 and a 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of about \$216,000, but the 100<sup>th</sup> percentile is \$400,000.
3. Each year, the statistics will show the same result. The statistics will, at first glance, suggest that there are a few lawyers who have a net income of \$400,000 consistently in each year with the rest having income between \$180,000 and \$220,000. And yet based on the scenario I laid out, there is no one who regularly makes more than \$220,000.
4. In this example, if we focus on the \$400,000 data point for a decision about individual incomes of high achievers, we will be led astray. Even if we focus on the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile and use the \$216,000 net income amount, we will miss the approximately one year in ten with a huge income increase. That one year in ten amount would raise the *average annual net income* for the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile group from \$216,000 to \$236,000.
5. What we do not know from the data provided by Canada Revenue Agency is how much variability there is in year-to-year incomes of individuals nor the frequency and effect of any windfall years. With the large sample size used by Canada Revenue Agency, it is unlikely that the data would be as misleading as the above example, but there could be issues hidden within the data that we are not able to identify. For example, if we rank lawyers based on average net income over five or ten years, are the decile breaks lower, higher or approximately the same? How many lawyers have windfall years; how often does that occur and what is the effect on the income statistics?
6. In my opinion, if this issue affects the self-employed lawyers' income amounts, it will primarily do so at the upper and lower percentiles. It is possible that the income amounts at the upper percentiles may be significantly overstated and the amounts at the lower percentiles understated.
7. For that reason, I requested data on a sample set of individuals showing their net income over a ten-year period on an individual basis – either as a dollar amount or as a percentage of their 2010 income. The goal was to understand how income fluctuates and how it can affect the percentile rankings of all self-employed lawyers. Canada Revenue Agency advised they are unable to ensure confidentiality of individuals if data was provided in that format and consequently, they are not permitted to release that information.

206. The net-income data was provided based on a number of age groupings. That allows us to look at how net income changes as one ages and presumably gains experience and reputation.
207. Overall, self-employed lawyers have seen their income increase roughly in line with the IAI over the four-year period 2015 to 2019 (the most recent data available from Canada Revenue Agency). This is based on data for lawyers aged 35 to 69 in all areas of Canada without any income exclusion.

***Table 207 - Increase in Net Income of Self-Employed Lawyers - 2015 to 2019***

Grouping	Total Increase over 4-Years	Average Annual Increase
45 to 50 <sup>th</sup> percentile	6.6%	1.6%
55 to 60 <sup>th</sup> percentile	8.2%	2.0%
65 to 70 <sup>th</sup> percentile	7.8%	1.9%
75 to 80 <sup>th</sup> percentile	5.9%	1.4%
85 to 90 <sup>th</sup> percentile	4.9%	1.2%
95 to 100 <sup>th</sup> percentile	8.0%	1.9%
Average net income	6.5%	1.6%
Average of 65 to 100 <sup>th</sup> percentile	6.9%	1.7%
IAI Change	7.0%	1.7%

208. While some of the net income brackets experienced increases in the 2015 to 2019 period greater than the IAI and other brackets less than the IAI, the average over all net income levels (6.5%) as well as the average over the 65<sup>th</sup> to 100<sup>th</sup> percentiles (6.9%)<sup>54</sup> were similar to the four-year total IAI increase (7.0%).
209. In my opinion, over the most recent four-year period for which we have data (2015 to 2019), the increase in the IAI has been approximately the same as the increase in net income of self-employed lawyers.
210. Based on that, we can state that the relationship between self-employed lawyers' net income and Base Judicial Total Compensation of judges has remained unchanged.
211. While we do not know how much self-employed lawyers net incomes changed in 2020, in my opinion, it is highly unlikely that they increased as much as the IAI. Therefore, I

<sup>54</sup> The average increase for the 75<sup>th</sup> to 100<sup>th</sup> percentile was slightly lower at 6.8% over the four-year period 2015 to 2019, giving an average of 1.66% per year.

conclude that the Base Judicial Salary will likely increase more in April 2021 than will self-employed lawyers' net income.

## **Self-Employed Lawyers and Retirement Savings**

212. For self-employed Canadians, saving for retirement involves making contributions to an RRSP and once the maximum contribution is reached, contributing to a non-registered investment account. RRSPs have income tax advantages that make them more efficient for retirement savings than other options.
213. It is important to recognise that the Judicial Annuity provides a retirement income that exceeds the maximum tax-assisted pension permitted under the *Income Tax Act* for the private sector. The same retirement income savings are available within the private sector, but the majority of that amount must be funded without the tax-sheltering of registered pension plans and RRSPs. Consequently, the cost of having equivalent savings is higher than the value of the Judicial Annuity.
214. If a Canadian wants to enjoy a retirement lifestyle more expensive than can be provided out of government benefits (CPP and Old Age Security), they will need to save. I have assumed that all judges and all self-employed lawyers with incomes above the median want more income than provided by government benefits. The Judicial Annuity serves that purpose for judges and so they most likely do not need to save any additional monies for retirement beyond their contributions towards the Judicial Annuity. Any savings for retirement by a self-employed lawyer will come out of net income because the *Income Tax Act* does not permit the self-employed to have a retirement savings plan where contributions are permitted as a business expense.
215. Table 141 shows the value of replicating the Judicial Annuity for a self-employed lawyer. To maintain consistency in any review of income relationships<sup>55</sup>, we can either reduce the self-employed lawyers' net income by the required amount for retirement saving and compare that to the Base Judicial Salary, or we can use the total amount of the self-employed net income and compare that with the Base Judicial Total Compensation which includes the value of the Judicial Annuity is fully reflected. Either basis is comparing like with like. I have chosen the latter as it involves fewer calculations.

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<sup>55</sup> That is, to ensure we are looking at "apples and apples" and have not included any oranges in the review.

## **G. Deputy Ministers Within the Federal Government**

216. Past Quadrennial Commissions have reviewed the compensation of deputy ministers in relation to the compensation of federally appointed judges.
217. Like judges, deputy ministers receive both health and welfare benefits and pension benefits in addition to their salary. They both are required to make contributions towards the pension. CPP contributions are the same – the government pays half and the employee pays the other half. There are two significant differences – performance pay and the value of the pension<sup>56</sup>.
218. Deputy ministers are eligible for performance pay in addition to their base salary. That has been reflected in the tables in this section.
219. The pension arrangements for deputy ministers differs from that for federally appointed judges. To obtain a similar pension income, a deputy minister needs to work within the public service for about 35 years and to contribute to the Public Service Superannuation Plan for those years. That likely includes many years of service prior to being appointed as a deputy minister.
220. The contribution rates are slightly greater than the 7% of base compensation for the judges – 9.83% on the first \$61,600 of income and 12.26% on the balance<sup>57</sup>. For a deputy minister earning \$300,000 per annum, that is a contribution of about 11.75% of base compensation, or about 4.75% more than a judge is required to contribute.
221. I estimate that the annual value of the pension for a deputy minister, net of contributions, is roughly 17.0% of a deputy minister's base compensation<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>56</sup> There is also a difference in contributions to the pension plan, but that will be included as part of the pension plan difference.

<sup>57</sup> Lower contribution rates apply to those hired after 2012, but the provisions of the pension are less generous for retirement prior to age 65.

<sup>58</sup> A Deputy Minister requires about 35 years of federal government service to earn a pension equivalent to a judicial pension. The average tenure of a judge, based on the assumptions used in the valuation of the judicial annuity, is 20.7 years. The average value of the judicial annuity for appointments between ages 40 and 65 is 36.7% of base compensation. Adjusting that 36.7% for the differences in tenure and then subtracting 4.75% to reflect the higher contributions required of a deputy minister results in an estimated value for a deputy minister's pension of 17.0% of compensation. A small additional adjustment should be made to reflect the differences in income tax treatment between the pension plan and retirement savings available to self-employed lawyers. I have ignored that adjustment.

222. To be able to make a valid and fair comparison of earnings, we need to use the total compensation of a deputy minister. In particular, there is a large difference between the value of a judge's pension and the value of a deputy minister's pension. To calculate the total compensation of a deputy minister so that the relationship with Base Judicial Total Compensation is a fair and proper one, we should gross-up the deputy ministerial compensation by 17.0%.

### Deputy Minister Compensation

223. I was provided with a history of compensation for deputy ministers. There are four levels of deputy minister – DM-1, DM-2, DM-3, and DM-4.

224. The compensation information set out the salary range for each year (April to March), the average base compensation and average amount of at-risk pay. I was also provided with the maximum amount that could be payable as at-risk pay, expressed as a percentage of base compensation. The amount of at-risk pay varies by individual and is awarded at year-end based on the individual's performance.

### Block Comparator

225. The 2015 Quadrennial Commission discussed<sup>59</sup> using compensation of deputy ministers at the DM-3 level, and their year-over-year increases as a reference for judicial compensation (the "**Block Comparator**"). The Block Comparator in each year is the mid-point of the DM-3 base salary range plus half of the total at-risk pay<sup>60</sup>.

226. The 2015 Quadrennial Commission commented on a proposal from the Association and Council that the Block Comparator be changed to equal the total average compensation of DM-3s<sup>61</sup>. The number of DM-3s is small and average compensation can vary considerably based on the composition of the deputy ministers. They concluded that using average pay of DM-3s would not "provide a consistent reflection of year over year changes in compensation." I agree.

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<sup>59</sup> "Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada" by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 30 June 2016, paragraphs 45-56.

<sup>60</sup> Total at-risk pay is the maximum amount that a deputy minister can earn based upon performance. The amount of at-risk pay actually paid will vary from year to year and from person to person.

<sup>61</sup> "Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada" by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 30 June 2016, paragraph 49 - 51.

227. The Block Comparator is based on only two of the components of total compensation – salary and at-risk pay (see paragraphs 31 to 34). It ignores the pension plan and other forms of compensation available to deputy ministers. In essence, it assumes the value of a deputy minister’s pension plan is equivalent to the value of the Judicial Annuity. Consequently, in my opinion, the Block Comparator should be used with care and recognition should be made either directly or indirectly to the large difference in value of the two pension plans.
228. In this section, I first review the total compensation of deputy ministers and of senior government agency appointments over the past five years and then I calculate the Block Comparator.

### Total Compensation for Deputy Ministers.

229. The amount of at-risk pay shown in the tables below is the average amount paid to all deputy ministers at each level and is likely different by individual. The at-risk pay for the year beginning 2020 was not available as of the date of this report and so I have estimated it to be the same percentage of mid-point salary as in 2019 (shown in red). The total compensation includes the value of the pension net of contributions (paragraph 221).
230. I note the salary ranges have not changed in the last four years, but the deputy ministers’ base compensation has increased, likely as a result of their progressing through the salary grids. With the possible exception of DM-4<sup>62</sup>, base compensation is nearing the top-end of the salary range and it is likely that at least some of the deputy ministers have not received an increase in compensation in the past few years.

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<sup>62</sup> The possible exception of DM-4 is because there is not enough data disclosed to be able to make a finding on this issue.



**Table 230a – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-1**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	195,500 - 229,900	212,700	225,288	38,323	263,611	308,306
2016	200,000 - 235,200	217,600	227,721	39,412	267,133	312,425
2017	202,500 - 238,200	220,350	230,810	38,876	269,686	315,411
2018	202,500 - 238,200	220,350	233,556	37,404	270,960	316,901
2019	202,500 - 238,200	220,350	234,956	39,187	274,143	320,624
2020	202,500 - 238,200	220,350	236,754	39,487	276,241	323,078

**Table 230b – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-2**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	224,700 - 264,300	244,500	259,432	52,945	312,377	365,341
2016	229,800 - 270,300	250,050	261,816	46,723	308,539	360,852
2017	232,700 - 273,700	253,200	265,894	53,937	319,831	374,058
2018	232,700 - 273,700	253,200	265,791	55,318	321,109	375,553
2019	232,700 - 273,700	253,200	266,944	63,881	330,825	386,916
2020	232,700 - 273,700	253,200	270,682	64,776	335,458	392,334

**Table 230c – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-3**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	251,600 - 296,000	273,800	291,950	65,875	357,825	418,494
2016	257,300 - 302,700	280,000	298,200	62,578	360,778	421,948
2017	260,600 - 306,500	283,550	298,900	64,110	363,010	424,558
2018	260,600 - 306,500	283,550	298,143	67,371	365,514	427,487
2019	260,600 - 306,500	283,550	303,545	79,909	383,454	448,469
2020	260,600 - 306,500	283,550	304,450	80,147	384,597	449,806

**Table 230d – Compensation for Deputy Ministers at level DM-4**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay*	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	281,700 - 331,300	306,500	323,849	106,870	430,719	503,748
2016	288,000 - 338,800	313,400	331,140	109,276	440,416	515,088
2017	291,700 - 343,100	317,400	335,366	110,671	446,037	521,662
2018	291,700 - 343,100	317,400	335,366	110,671	446,037	521,662
2019	291,700 - 343,100	317,400	335,366	110,671	446,037	521,662
2020	291,700 - 343,100	317,400	335,366	110,671	446,037	521,662

\* The average basic compensation and the at-risk pay was not provided for DM-4 due to the small number of incumbents and confidentiality issues. The amounts shown in Table 230d are estimated by me. I calculated the average ratio of the average basic compensation to the mid-point salary for DM-1, DM-2 and DM-3 over the period 2015 to 2019. I assumed that average would apply at DM-4 (shown in red). I examined the at-risk pay as a percent of average basic compensation for DM-1, DM-2 and DM-3 and assumed the actual amount paid at DM-4 would have been 33% (shown in red). Consequently, the total compensation for DM-4 is based on assumptions that I made and does not necessarily reflect the actual amounts.

## Government Agency Appointments Compensation

231. I was provided with compensation information for positions within government agencies and similar organisations with a job classification of GC-09, GC-10, GCQ-09 and GCQ- 10. In each of these classifications, there are between 1 and 5 individuals and for confidentiality purposes, average salary was not provided. I note that as with the DM compensation grids, these grids have been frozen since 2017. It is therefore likely that the incumbents are close to if not at the upper end of their grid as with the deputy ministers. I have therefore assumed that the average basic compensation in each year 2015 to 2020 for GC and GCQ positions is the same as I assumed for DM-4 positions -- 105.5% of the mid-point salary in each year (shown in red).
232. The specifics of the pension plan available to each of these positions may vary from the Public Sector Pension Plan. I have assumed that any variance is not material and have applied the same value for the pension as I used for deputy ministers – 17.0%
233. I was informed by the Department of Justice that these two GC positions are eligible for at-risk pay, but the GCQ positions are not eligible.

**Table 233a – Compensation for Government Appointments at GC-09**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay*	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	229,500 – 269,900	249,700	263,834	61,737	325,571	380,772
2016	234,700 – 276,100	255,400	269,857	63,146	333,003	389,464
2017	237,700 – 279,600	258,650	273,291	63,950	337,241	394,420
2018	237,700 – 279,600	258,650	273,291	63,950	337,241	394,420
2019	237,700 – 279,600	258,650	273,291	63,950	337,241	394,420
2020	237,700 – 279,600	258,650	273,291	63,950	337,241	394,420

\* Average at-risk pay was assumed to be a consistent 23.4% of average basic compensation each year.

**Table 233b – Compensation for Government Appointments at GC-10**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay*	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	263,700 - 310,200	286,950	303,192	86,107	389,299	455,305
2016	269,800 - 317,300	293,550	310,166	88,087	398,253	465,777
2017	273,200 - 321,300	297,250	314,075	89,197	403,273	471,648
2018	273,200 - 321,300	297,250	314,075	89,197	403,273	471,648
2019	273,200 - 321,300	297,250	314,075	89,197	403,273	471,648
2020	273,200 - 321,300	297,250	314,075	89,197	403,273	471,648

\* Average at-risk pay was assumed to be a consistent 28.4% of average basic compensation each year.

**Table 233c – Compensation for Government Appointments at GCQ-09**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	269,300 - 316,800	293,050	309,638	-	309,638	362,137
2016	275,400 - 324,000	299,700	316,664	-	316,664	370,355
2017	278,900 - 328,100	303,500	320,679	-	320,679	375,050
2018	278,900 - 328,100	303,500	320,679	-	320,679	375,050
2019	278,900 - 328,100	303,500	320,679	-	320,679	375,050
2020	278,900 - 328,100	303,500	320,679	-	320,679	375,050

**Table 233d – Compensation for Government Appointments at GCQ-10**

Year Beginning 1 April	Salary Range	Mid-Point Salary	Average Basic Compensation	At-Risk Pay	Cash Compensation	Total Compensation
2015	317,600 - 373,600	345,600	365,162	-	365,162	427,076
2016	324,800 - 382,100	353,450	373,457	-	373,457	436,776
2017	328,900 - 386,900	357,900	378,158	-	378,158	442,275
2018	328,900 - 386,900	357,900	378,158	-	378,158	442,275
2019	328,900 - 386,900	357,900	378,158	-	378,158	442,275
2020	328,900 - 386,900	357,900	378,158	-	378,158	442,275

234. I determined that the Base Judicial Total Compensation beginning April 2020 is \$509,400 (paragraph 153). That is 113% of the Total Compensation of a DM-3 and 98% of the estimated Total Compensation of a DM-4.

235. I determined that the Base Judicial Total Compensation beginning April 2021 will be approximately \$543,800 (paragraph 154). Assuming there are no increases effective April 2021 for deputy ministers, that is 121% of the Total Compensation of a DM-3 and 104% of the estimated Total Compensation of a DM-4.

## The Block Comparator

236. In this section, I determine the amount of the Block Comparator (see paragraphs 225 to 228) for 2015 to 2020 in relation to the Base Judicial Salary.

**Table 236 – Block Comparator and Base Judicial Salary**

Year Beginning 1 April	Mid-point of Salary range for DM-3	50% of At-Risk Pay	Block Comparator	Base Judicial Salary	Percent of Block Comparator
2015	273,800	45,180	318,980	308,600	96.7%
2016	280,000	46,200	326,200	314,100	96.3%
2017	283,550	46,790	330,340	315,300	95.4%
2018	283,550	46,790	330,340	321,600	97.4%
2019	283,550	46,790	330,340	329,900	99.9%
2020	283,550	46,790	330,340	338,800	102.6%

237. In 2016 and 2017, the Block Comparator increased more than did Base Judicial Salary – 3.6% over the two years compared with IAI increases of 2.2% over the same two years. That is the smallest increase in the IAI over any two-year period since the IAI was introduced in 2005 as the automatic driver of judicial salary increases.
238. DM-3 salary ranges were frozen for 2018, and no increases have been given to DM-3s since April 2017 other than for progression through the salary range. Since 2017, the Base Judicial Salary has increased a total of 7.5% with no increase to the Block Comparator.
239. As discussed in paragraph 227, the Block Comparator ignores the unequal value of the pension arrangements for judges and deputy ministers. The value of the Judicial Annuity is about 32.5% more as a percent of salary than the value of the deputy minister’s pension. One way to address that is to adjust the Block Comparator to reflect the value of a deputy minister’s pension and the portion of the CPP contributions paid by the government<sup>63</sup> – which gives a comparator equivalent to the expected total compensation of a DM-3. That gives a like-for-like relationship between the Block Comparator and Base Judicial Total Compensation.

***Table 239 – Adjusted Block Comparator and Base Judicial Total Compensation***

<b>Year Beginning 1 April</b>	<b>Block Comparator</b>	<b>Adjusted Block Comparator*</b>	<b>Base Judicial Total Compensation</b>	<b>Percent of Adjusted Block Comparator</b>
2015	318,980	375,543	463,867	123.5%
2016	326,200	384,052	472,154	122.9%
2017	330,340	388,913	473,968	121.9%
2018	330,340	388,943	483,417	124.3%
2019	330,340	389,098	495,981	127.5%
2020	330,340	389,247	509,437	130.9%

\* Block Comparator plus value of DM Pension and CPP Value

<sup>63</sup> The amount of the CPP contributions paid by the government varies from year to year as the total CPP contribution amount changes. The Adjusted Block Comparator shown here reflects that changing value - \$2,480 in 2015 increasing annually to \$2,898 in 2020. (The 2021 amount, which is used elsewhere in this report for the 2021 Base Judicial Total Compensation is \$3,166).

## Deputy Minister Tenure

240. I was provided with details of past deputy ministers setting out their positions, initial appointment as a deputy minister and the date they left the ranks of deputy minister. From that, I calculated the time served as a deputy minister and the average tenure of deputy ministers. The data included 107 people whose term ended at either a DM-3 or DM-4 level. Two of those were acting deputy minister and had a term of less than one month, and I have excluded them. That leaves 105 with terms of more than one month.
241. The tenures for deputy ministers who were DM-3 or DM-4 at the end of their service ranged from five months to 20.7 years. The average tenure of those 105 deputy ministers was 8.75 years.
242. The average tenure of these deputy ministers is significantly shorter than the average expected tenure of a judge. Based on the assumptions used in valuing the Judicial Annuity, the average tenure of a federally appointed judge is 20.3 years – over twice the length of a deputy minister who reached a DM-3 or DM-4 level.
243. In my opinion, there are three possible reasons for this differential in tenure.
- a. Deputy ministers retire much earlier than judges. Under the Public Service Superannuation Act, most government employees retire at or prior to age 65. For long-term employees, there is little or no incentive to remain working beyond age 65. Based on the assumptions used in valuing the Judicial Annuity, the average expected retirement age for judges is about age 72. Retirement could account for between 7 and 12-years differential in tenure.
  - b. Deputy ministers serve at the pleasure of the government and could be terminated at any time. The job security of a deputy minister may not be as high as it is with judges.
  - c. Deputy ministers may be subject to more stress and/or different stressors and may be unable to function at the high level demanded of their position for as long as a judge.
244. I am not able to offer an opinion as to whether and to what extent this differential in tenure should or could be reflected in any relationship between total compensation of deputy ministers and Judicial Total Compensation.

## H. Data Tables Utilised in the Report

245. As was done for prior Quadrennial Commissions, Canada Revenue Agency provided a number of files with data on the past net income of self-employed lawyers in Canada. The data provided was already grouped by age brackets, census metropolitan areas (“**CMAs**”) and provinces. If there are not enough lawyers within a grouping to preserve confidentiality, then no income amount was provided.

### Number of Self-Employed Lawyers

246. The total number of self-employed lawyers for whom net income data was provided decreased from 2015 to 2020. This continued the trend seen in prior years. I obtained the number of self-employed lawyers for the 2010 to 2014 period from the Report on the Earnings of Self-Employed Lawyers for the Department of Justice Canada in Preparation for the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission by Mr. Haripaul Pannu, dated 25 February 2016.

***Table 246 – Total Number of Self-Employed Lawyers – 2010 to 2019<sup>64</sup>***

Year	Number of Self-Employed Lawyers
2010	22,110
2011	19,310
2012	19,190
2013	19,360
2014	18,550
2015	18,740
2016	18,330
2017	17,270
2018	17,640
2019	15,510
Average	18,600

247. The most likely reason for this decrease in numbers is a gradual process of self-employed lawyers converting their practice to a professional corporation. The number

<sup>64</sup> These are the total number of self-employed lawyers in Canada for whom Canada Revenue Agency provided data in each year. Only lawyers between ages 35 and 69 were included. There were some within that age range that were excluded for data reasons.

of self-employed lawyers could also be affected by a shift in the age of such lawyers – reducing the numbers between 35 and 69. In my opinion, that is likely to have a much smaller effect than the conversion of practices.

248. Canada Revenue Agency advise that they are not able to provide accurate income amounts from a professional corporation. The reporting of income from the provision of legal services is not separated from other types of income provided on income tax returns and so any information could be misleading. That is much less likely to happen with net income from the self-employed.

## Data Presentation

249. There are many ways the data can be presented and reviewed. In the tables that follow in this section, I have presented the data in several ways that in my opinion provide differing ways to consider the relationships. With the exception of the first three groups of tables (Tables 253a to 255c), I have only shown the 65<sup>th</sup> and higher percentile ranges along with the median income and 75<sup>th</sup> percentile.

250. Definitions:

- a. **Median:** the net income amount where half of all lawyers make less and half make more.
- b. **Average or Mean:** the income amount that is the average of all the net incomes for all lawyers in the group. If the average is greater than the median, it indicates that the net incomes are skewed towards the high end – that is, there are some lawyers with very high net incomes relative to the entire group.
- c. **Percentile:** A system of ranking data from the smallest to the largest. For income ranking, the 65<sup>th</sup> percentile is the amount where 65% of all self-employed lawyers make less and 35% make more. Refer also to the call-out box on page 37.
- d. **Percentile range:** In the data from Canada Revenue Agency, the actual percentiles were not provided, but instead the average income amount for the five percentiles below the indicated percentile was given. For example, the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile is the average of the net incomes for all lawyers with incomes between the 70<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles. The 100<sup>th</sup> percentile is the average of the net incomes of the top five percent of self-employed lawyers. Where I refer to the percentile data provided by Canada Revenue Agency, I show the range, such as 70-75<sup>th</sup> percentile. We can estimate with sufficiently high accuracy the actual single-point percentile



represented by a range of percentiles is the mid-point. For example, the range 70-75<sup>th</sup> percentile is the 72.5<sup>th</sup> percentile<sup>65</sup>.

- e. **All Ages:** The data provided includes self-employed lawyers aged 35 to 69. So a reference to “All Ages” should be considered as ages 35 to 69.
- f. **CMAs:** The lawyers were grouped within the ten largest Census Metropolitan Areas (**CMAs**) – in order of decreasing size, Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Québec City and combined into one group for confidentiality purposes, Hamilton and the Kitchener, Cambridge, Waterloo areas). All other regions of Canada were combined and are referenced as “**Other Regions**”).

- 251. Canada Revenue Agency rounded all income amounts to the nearest \$10 with the exception of the median and the 75<sup>th</sup> percentiles which were rounded to the nearest \$10,000. The data contains a couple of apparent anomalies that are the result of the different rounding<sup>66</sup>. In my opinion, those anomalies are not material for the purposes of this report, and I have not drawn attention to them elsewhere.
- 252. While it is my opinion that income exclusions should have no place in a compensation comparison, I have included tables based on an income exclusion since that data was provided by Canada Revenue Agency and may have been utilised by prior Quadrennial Commissions in their deliberations.

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<sup>65</sup> This works well up to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile. From the 75<sup>th</sup> to 90<sup>th</sup> percentile, it gives a result that is approximately equal to the correct value and above the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile, it will give a result that is low.

<sup>66</sup> For example, the 70-75<sup>th</sup> percentile is slightly greater than the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile. If rounding were done consistently, the 70-75<sup>th</sup> percentile should never be larger than the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile.

## Net Incomes for All Regions and All Ages 2015 to 2019

253. The following three tables present information for all of the self-employed lawyers in Canada over the period 2015 to 2019 based on (a) no income exclusion and (b) excluding those with net incomes less than \$60,000 and (c) excluding those with net incomes less than \$80,000.

**Table 253a - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - No Income Exclusion**  
**All Regions, All Ages**

Percentiles	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	5-Year Average
0 to 5	3,840	4,030	3,930	3,180	3,430	3,682
5 to 10	12,220	12,740	13,060	11,190	11,310	12,104
10 to 15	21,430	22,040	22,360	19,620	20,240	21,138
15 to 20	30,910	31,810	32,210	28,840	29,890	30,732
20 to 25	41,420	42,950	43,240	39,380	41,320	41,662
25 to 30	52,970	54,990	54,600	51,540	53,610	53,542
30 to 35	65,450	67,250	67,480	64,500	67,470	66,430
35 to 40	78,470	80,390	81,660	77,910	81,930	80,072
40 to 45	92,540	95,160	96,230	93,270	98,200	95,080
45 to 50	109,020	111,770	112,800	111,320	116,600	112,302
50 to 55	127,490	129,900	131,920	131,780	138,140	131,846
55 to 60	149,680	150,040	154,280	155,250	161,680	154,186
60 to 65	173,830	174,810	178,680	182,280	188,710	179,662
65 to 70	203,340	202,790	207,020	212,410	217,890	208,690
70 to 75	237,500	232,500	239,140	250,210	252,250	242,320
75 to 80	281,940	272,580	280,070	296,910	297,680	285,836
80 to 85	347,750	329,830	339,630	363,280	361,970	348,492
85 to 90	441,670	411,080	430,450	469,590	465,890	443,736
90 to 95	601,490	552,270	573,980	646,740	638,900	602,676
95 to 100	1,135,630	1,060,510	1,076,910	1,211,900	1,236,440	1,144,278
Average	210,390	201,940	206,950	221,020	224,140	212,888
Median	118,000	121,000	122,000	121,000	127,000	121,800
Number of lawyers	18,740	18,330	17,270	17,640	15,510	17,498

**Table 253b - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$60,000 Income Exclusion  
All Regions, All Ages**

<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>5-Year Average</b>
0 to 5	64,490	64,210	64,840	64,460	64,810	64,562
5 to 10	73,340	73,250	74,690	73,500	74,750	73,906
10 to 15	82,840	82,820	84,660	83,410	85,220	83,790
15 to 20	92,650	93,190	94,950	94,480	96,700	94,394
20 to 25	103,930	104,480	106,040	106,680	109,290	106,084
25 to 30	116,150	116,860	118,570	120,430	123,020	119,006
30 to 35	129,500	129,650	132,200	135,030	138,700	133,016
35 to 40	145,150	143,640	148,110	151,350	154,880	148,626
40 to 45	160,860	158,940	164,040	169,150	172,870	165,172
45 to 50	179,030	177,630	182,010	188,860	192,250	183,956
50 to 55	199,640	197,340	201,770	209,770	212,830	204,270
55 to 60	222,330	217,470	223,650	233,970	234,560	226,396
60 to 65	248,150	239,630	247,170	263,610	261,840	252,080
65 to 70	280,110	268,590	276,450	296,290	294,120	283,112
70 to 75	322,690	305,530	315,480	338,910	334,190	323,360
75 to 80	377,950	352,680	364,990	397,160	391,910	376,938
80 to 85	447,570	413,650	434,570	478,490	469,850	448,826
85 to 90	549,570	501,250	525,930	595,310	580,560	550,524
90 to 95	720,860	661,050	678,440	769,300	761,630	718,256
95 to 100	1,287,530	1,200,970	1,219,710	1,379,180	1,409,020	1,299,282
Average	290,180	275,090	282,880	307,400	308,090	292,728
Median	190,000	187,000	191,000	199,000	202,000	193,800
Number of lawyers	13,050	12,920	12,120	12,210	10,890	12,238

**Table 253c - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$80,000 Income Exclusion  
All Regions, All Ages**

<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>5-Year Average</b>
0 to 5	84,150	84,550	84,410	84,400	85,080	84,518
5 to 10	92,940	93,770	93,610	94,370	95,340	94,006
10 to 15	103,000	103,830	103,340	105,070	106,450	104,338
15 to 20	113,800	114,750	114,380	117,380	118,470	115,756
20 to 25	125,170	125,980	126,020	129,860	131,870	127,780
25 to 30	138,600	138,110	139,590	144,030	146,410	141,348
30 to 35	152,690	150,850	153,840	159,080	161,220	155,536
35 to 40	167,100	165,830	168,570	175,740	178,230	171,094
40 to 45	184,400	183,100	185,100	193,860	195,530	188,398
45 to 50	202,800	200,630	203,130	212,490	214,330	206,676
50 to 55	223,320	218,590	222,800	234,540	233,770	226,604
55 to 60	246,240	238,130	243,620	260,900	257,710	249,320
60 to 65	273,660	263,290	268,370	289,490	286,160	276,194
65 to 70	309,150	293,940	301,360	324,730	319,400	309,716
70 to 75	354,260	333,090	340,370	370,630	362,950	352,260
75 to 80	409,500	380,500	394,460	433,320	425,920	408,740
80 to 85	481,180	442,890	463,140	517,080	503,700	481,598
85 to 90	586,710	534,810	555,870	632,940	616,560	585,378
90 to 95	759,660	698,490	711,950	808,830	799,860	755,758
95 to 100	1,339,640	1,250,110	1,265,050	1,434,530	1,465,470	1,350,960
Average	317,340	300,760	306,880	336,060	335,100	319,228
Median	213,000	210,000	213,000	222,000	223,000	216,200
Number of lawyers	11,610	11,480	10,900	10,900	9,780	10,934

## Net Incomes for 10 Largest CMAs and All Ages 2015 to 2019

254. The following three tables present information for all of the self-employed lawyers in the ten largest CMAs over the period 2015 to 2019 based on (a) no income exclusion and (b) excluding those with net incomes less than \$60,000 and (c) excluding those with net incomes less than \$80,000.

**Table 254a - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - No Income Exclusion  
10 CMAs, All Ages**

Percentiles	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	5-Year Average
0 to 5	3,980	4,360	4,150	3,460	3,600	3,910
5 to 10	12,590	13,130	13,290	11,500	11,470	12,396
10 to 15	21,840	22,380	22,510	20,120	20,610	21,492
15 to 20	31,970	32,450	32,630	29,750	30,810	31,522
20 to 25	43,680	44,670	44,650	41,090	42,950	43,408
25 to 30	56,280	57,600	57,400	54,620	56,570	56,494
30 to 35	70,640	71,430	72,410	68,870	71,930	71,056
35 to 40	86,360	87,230	88,490	84,570	88,420	87,014
40 to 45	103,510	104,440	105,300	102,620	107,120	104,598
45 to 50	123,190	124,340	124,640	124,670	129,350	125,238
50 to 55	147,060	146,190	148,650	149,890	154,510	149,260
55 to 60	173,140	171,800	175,040	178,640	182,800	176,284
60 to 65	203,280	200,700	203,460	208,390	213,070	205,780
65 to 70	235,530	229,130	235,280	244,040	245,780	237,952
70 to 75	277,460	265,370	271,890	287,270	286,950	277,788
75 to 80	334,550	314,510	321,420	344,490	340,720	331,138
80 to 85	408,670	377,810	392,840	428,370	422,340	406,006
85 to 90	510,360	467,620	491,440	547,900	536,150	510,694
90 to 95	683,910	624,550	643,270	726,560	719,340	679,526
95 to 100	1,227,470	1,162,550	1,176,690	1,324,130	1,355,050	1,249,178
Average	237,740	226,080	231,240	248,990	250,930	238,996
Median	134,000	135,000	136,000	137,000	142,000	136,800
Number of lawyers	13,990	13,670	12,920	13,070	11,590	13,048

**Table 254b - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$60,000 Income Exclusion  
10 CMAs, All Ages**

<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>5-Year Average</b>
0 to 5	65,140	64,890	65,420	65,120	65,420	65,198
5 to 10	76,160	75,200	76,850	75,620	76,630	76,092
10 to 15	87,290	86,810	88,300	87,140	88,620	87,632
15 to 20	99,290	98,680	99,960	99,690	101,640	99,852
20 to 25	112,590	112,130	113,130	114,480	116,150	113,696
25 to 30	127,220	126,810	127,390	131,290	133,180	129,178
30 to 35	144,610	142,460	144,760	149,230	150,960	146,404
35 to 40	162,450	159,380	163,340	169,080	170,560	164,962
40 to 45	182,940	179,340	182,550	190,170	191,390	185,278
45 to 50	204,060	200,310	203,230	211,130	213,420	206,430
50 to 55	226,700	220,350	225,710	235,820	235,740	228,864
55 to 60	252,760	242,240	249,560	265,030	262,620	254,442
60 to 65	285,670	270,780	277,630	297,010	293,400	284,898
65 to 70	326,590	305,900	313,160	338,150	331,830	323,126
70 to 75	376,010	347,980	357,740	392,110	382,610	371,290
75 to 80	434,150	398,070	417,640	462,080	450,660	432,520
80 to 85	510,040	465,900	489,900	551,050	535,310	510,440
85 to 90	622,110	563,990	587,570	666,400	653,460	618,706
90 to 95	798,420	733,520	749,260	848,150	840,370	793,944
95 to 100	1,374,410	1,305,520	1,319,900	1,493,240	1,531,710	1,404,956
Average	323,390	304,970	312,560	342,050	341,210	324,836
Median	215,000	210,000	214,000	222,000	224,000	217,000
Number of lawyers	9,940	9,780	9,240	9,220	8,270	9,290

**Table 254c - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$80,000 Income Exclusion  
10 CMAs, All Ages**

<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>5-Year Average</b>
0 to 5	84,950	85,450	85,210	85,130	85,750	85,298
5 to 10	95,410	96,010	95,580	96,290	97,210	96,100
10 to 15	107,210	107,690	106,960	108,990	110,150	108,200
15 to 20	119,780	120,680	119,350	123,480	124,280	121,514
20 to 25	134,290	134,530	133,410	139,240	140,400	136,374
25 to 30	150,610	148,770	149,990	156,160	156,840	152,474
30 to 35	166,840	165,160	167,040	174,790	175,340	169,834
35 to 40	186,250	183,660	184,580	193,820	194,160	188,494
40 to 45	205,170	202,530	203,580	212,870	214,440	207,718
45 to 50	225,800	220,620	224,120	235,450	234,640	228,126
50 to 55	248,940	240,040	245,490	261,760	258,580	250,962
55 to 60	277,520	265,310	269,810	290,050	285,970	277,732
60 to 65	313,080	295,090	300,450	324,810	318,590	310,404
65 to 70	354,660	331,360	336,350	369,190	359,090	350,130
70 to 75	403,940	372,990	385,200	426,360	415,340	400,766
75 to 80	462,740	425,170	445,030	495,970	481,910	462,164
80 to 85	540,900	493,470	516,000	586,270	568,320	540,992
85 to 90	654,040	595,850	614,140	699,480	687,600	650,222
90 to 95	832,140	767,580	779,960	884,220	874,980	827,776
95 to 100	1,417,040	1,350,040	1,360,020	1,543,880	1,585,160	1,451,228
Average	349,010	330,100	336,110	370,310	368,300	350,766
Median	237,000	229,000	234,000	248,000	245,000	238,600
Number of lawyers	9,030	8,840	8,420	8,360	7,520	8,434

## Net Incomes for Other Regions and All Ages 2015 to 2019

255. The following three tables present information for all of the self-employed lawyers in the Other Regions over the period 2015 to 2019 based on (a) no income exclusion and (b) excluding those with net incomes less than \$60,000 and (c) excluding those with net incomes less than \$80,000.

**Table 255a - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - No Income Exclusion  
Other Regions, All Ages**

Percentiles	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	5-Year Average
0 to 5	3,430	3,220	3,420	2,520	2,960	3,110
5 to 10	11,260	11,590	12,310	10,210	10,890	11,252
10 to 15	20,300	21,040	21,990	18,490	19,300	20,224
15 to 20	28,610	30,310	31,240	26,610	27,560	28,866
20 to 25	36,750	39,300	40,280	35,710	37,630	37,934
25 to 30	45,760	49,190	49,200	45,190	47,280	47,324
30 to 35	55,510	58,860	58,020	55,590	58,150	57,226
35 to 40	65,460	68,690	68,350	65,880	69,260	67,528
40 to 45	73,900	78,200	79,000	76,250	80,490	77,568
45 to 50	83,750	88,610	89,550	87,660	93,480	88,610
50 to 55	94,580	101,280	101,970	101,330	107,300	101,292
55 to 60	107,830	114,460	116,410	116,740	122,610	115,610
60 to 65	122,090	127,610	131,980	130,980	139,980	130,528
65 to 70	138,630	142,770	148,980	149,460	158,370	147,642
70 to 75	156,030	160,510	165,840	169,730	180,100	166,442
75 to 80	176,810	184,270	189,370	196,430	204,730	190,322
80 to 85	205,820	211,320	218,370	230,770	233,760	220,008
85 to 90	247,030	249,630	255,290	279,580	281,290	262,564
90 to 95	307,710	315,350	330,230	351,270	356,890	332,290
95 to 100	618,060	570,470	584,420	666,910	669,730	621,918
Average	129,890	131,280	134,750	140,830	145,030	136,356
Median	89,000	95,000	96,000	95,000	100,000	95,000
Number of lawyers	4,750	4,670	4,350	4,560	3,920	4,450



**Table 255b - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$60,000 Income Exclusion  
Other Regions, All Ages**

<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>5-Year Average</b>
0 to 5	63,200	62,850	63,620	63,300	63,440	63,282
5 to 10	69,340	69,630	70,520	69,340	70,920	69,950
10 to 15	74,400	76,010	77,720	76,570	78,360	76,612
15 to 20	81,030	82,390	84,510	83,570	86,330	83,566
20 to 25	87,690	89,750	91,980	92,250	95,610	91,456
25 to 30	94,870	98,400	100,370	101,200	104,810	99,930
30 to 35	103,390	107,020	109,220	111,250	114,690	109,114
35 to 40	112,680	115,990	119,460	121,170	124,660	118,792
40 to 45	121,930	124,530	129,340	129,860	136,500	128,432
45 to 50	132,100	134,150	141,270	142,360	149,100	139,796
50 to 55	144,110	144,910	152,140	154,670	161,200	151,406
55 to 60	154,860	156,360	162,940	168,080	175,830	163,614
60 to 65	167,770	171,250	177,310	183,620	191,920	178,374
65 to 70	182,870	187,620	193,830	204,010	208,840	195,434
70 to 75	202,260	205,550	213,780	226,190	227,110	214,978
75 to 80	227,960	227,410	234,540	255,660	253,810	239,876
80 to 85	256,690	256,390	263,480	290,830	290,650	271,608
85 to 90	293,730	297,840	315,000	337,100	336,320	315,998
90 to 95	370,110	374,940	389,120	415,460	425,040	394,934
95 to 100	736,060	653,170	670,050	786,080	777,010	724,474
Average	183,790	181,720	187,920	200,540	203,600	191,514
Median	138,000	140,000	147,000	148,000	155,000	145,600
Number of lawyers	3,100	3,130	2,890	2,990	2,620	2,946

**Table 255c - Comparison of Net Incomes by Year - \$80,000 Income Exclusion  
Other Regions, All Ages**

<b>Percentiles</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>5-Year Average</b>
0 to 5	82,740	82,770	83,070	82,880	83,530	82,998
5 to 10	88,370	88,870	88,790	90,160	91,330	89,504
10 to 15	94,310	96,210	96,330	97,790	99,060	96,740
15 to 20	101,120	103,380	103,140	105,490	107,220	104,070
20 to 25	108,810	110,920	111,220	114,820	116,060	112,366
25 to 30	116,690	118,330	120,180	122,570	124,500	120,454
30 to 35	124,310	125,500	128,440	129,990	134,540	128,556
35 to 40	133,130	133,720	138,720	140,850	145,530	138,390
40 to 45	143,220	142,670	148,360	151,100	155,850	148,240
45 to 50	152,140	152,130	157,220	162,190	166,970	158,130
50 to 55	162,190	162,820	167,270	174,130	180,960	169,474
55 to 60	173,780	176,920	180,780	188,740	194,480	182,940
60 to 65	187,060	190,330	194,990	206,430	209,450	197,652
65 to 70	204,260	205,820	212,240	225,440	224,750	214,502
70 to 75	225,520	223,820	229,610	249,880	246,550	235,076
75 to 80	249,350	246,910	251,090	279,840	275,810	260,600
80 to 85	276,070	276,820	286,090	311,940	309,740	292,132
85 to 90	318,180	320,560	336,150	359,630	359,540	338,812
90 to 95	398,830	400,830	411,790	443,450	450,250	421,030
95 to 100	794,510	690,940	707,280	835,310	820,840	769,776
Average	206,650	202,510	207,490	223,540	224,770	212,992
Median	157,000	157,000	162,000	168,000	173,000	163,400
Number of lawyers	2,580	2,640	2,480	2,540	2,260	2,500

## Comparison of Net Incomes by Age

256. The Canada Revenue Agency provided net income amounts by age groupings for each year 2015 to 2019. To reduce the amount of data included herein, I show only the data for 2019. I have examined the other years and while the income progressions differ somewhat, they do follow the same pattern of increasing as one ages from 35 to about 50 and then gradually falling off by age 69.

**Table 256a – Comparison of Net incomes by Age groups – No Income Exclusion**  
**All Regions, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Region	Age Group	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
All Regions	35-43	208,380	256,860	339,970	640,680	190,900	141,000	250,000
	44-47	264,630	359,800	535,130	1,002,360	272,460	170,000	350,000
	48-51	258,170	363,270	559,510	1,168,540	286,850	160,000	360,000
	52-55	239,300	339,380	559,350	1,189,660	281,210	150,000	330,000
	56-59	210,780	289,900	445,210	1,038,000	242,700	130,000	290,000
	60-63	171,990	247,220	398,210	1,009,360	218,020	110,000	240,000
	64-69	131,560	188,760	295,930	755,020	161,790	78,000	190,000
10 CMAs	35-43	221,580	275,000	369,650	678,010	202,720	150,000	270,000
	44-47	293,770	407,660	590,050	1,062,810	296,460	190,000	410,000
	48-51	289,090	412,470	634,840	1,264,470	314,340	180,000	410,000
	52-55	283,310	418,740	662,890	1,320,390	321,410	160,000	410,000
	56-59	235,050	327,230	507,670	1,157,850	268,900	150,000	330,000
	60-63	203,440	299,360	482,540	1,153,310	252,110	120,000	300,000
	64-69	154,880	227,660	360,390	875,660	189,320	90,000	230,000
Other Regions	35-43	167,680	203,670	250,430	430,100	146,700	120,000	200,000
	44-47	187,270	232,980	298,420	595,000	175,360	100,000	200,000
	48-51	196,350	241,780	339,220	609,780	183,420	100,000	200,000
	52-55	166,440	211,730	276,850	484,150	153,790	120,000	210,000
	56-59	166,270	214,640	295,530	609,150	168,840	110,000	210,000
	60-63	134,540	169,130	239,590	546,550	140,110	90,000	170,000
	64-69	97,950	135,850	191,870	434,180	106,420	60,000	140,000

**Table 256b – Comparison of Net incomes by Age groups – \$60,000 Income Exclusion  
All Regions, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Region	Age Group	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
<b>All</b>								
Regions	35-43	251,840	303,480	398,130	712,020	250,070	200,000	300,000
	44-47	333,330	448,700	624,040	1,090,460	345,110	240,000	440,000
	48-51	348,520	469,330	678,260	1,302,950	376,150	240,000	460,000
	52-55	323,740	458,250	684,310	1,333,400	368,940	220,000	460,000
	56-59	284,780	380,520	551,690	1,193,460	324,070	200,000	370,000
	60-63	261,200	357,710	532,770	1,206,150	311,090	180,000	350,000
	64-69	227,870	301,440	438,220	971,590	263,480	160,000	300,000
<b>10</b>								
CMAAs	35-43	269,770	325,590	434,510	747,220	265,390	214,000	330,000
	44-47	377,040	494,340	676,540	1,148,990	373,390	260,000	490,000
	48-51	394,140	544,000	754,190	1,402,120	413,780	270,000	550,000
	52-55	395,950	557,970	779,770	1,478,550	422,380	270,000	560,000
	56-59	318,310	435,400	617,870	1,325,870	358,450	220,000	440,000
	60-63	312,940	430,330	629,800	1,360,090	357,060	210,000	430,000
	64-69	264,190	354,620	503,740	1,102,720	299,350	180,000	350,000
<b>Other</b>								
Regions	35-43	202,450	231,440	280,210	481,050	191,640	160,000	230,000
	44-47	227,320	271,850	345,640	669,730	225,830	200,000	300,000
	48-51	232,110	298,840	377,920	670,640	235,890	200,000	300,000
	52-55	208,220	250,730	310,800	538,780	198,440	200,000	300,000
	56-59	214,020	266,620	354,460	696,870	224,310	200,000	300,000
	60-63	179,640	221,870	316,790	663,270	200,610	100,000	200,000
	64-69	168,060	205,360	275,050	576,320	180,710	130,000	210,000

**Table 256c – Comparison of Net incomes by Age groups – \$80,000 Income Exclusion  
All Regions, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Region	Age Group	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
<b>All</b>								
Regions	35-43	267,010	318,240	417,890	734,260	268,450	216,000	320,000
	44-47	365,390	480,720	656,920	1,123,710	374,050	260,000	480,000
	48-51	374,990	505,600	710,310	1,342,990	403,670	260,000	500,000
	52-55	356,590	502,780	722,850	1,385,150	400,090	250,000	500,000
	56-59	308,330	411,540	581,910	1,241,820	349,240	220,000	410,000
	60-63	294,500	395,270	580,200	1,270,650	341,900	200,000	390,000
	64-69	257,690	340,710	477,980	1,041,950	295,810	190,000	340,000
<b>10</b>								
CMA's	35-43	284,520	342,810	455,510	769,020	284,410	230,000	340,000
	44-47	412,200	530,050	710,020	1,183,550	405,190	290,000	520,000
	48-51	425,880	575,130	787,780	1,437,210	441,610	290,000	580,000
	52-55	432,470	596,110	809,230	1,527,530	450,240	290,000	590,000
	56-59	345,930	466,670	649,600	1,373,770	385,420	240,000	470,000
	60-63	346,730	468,660	672,530	1,419,940	388,180	240,000	470,000
	64-69	296,060	392,330	539,430	1,166,350	330,180	220,000	390,000
<b>Other</b>								
Regions	35-43	212,960	242,300	290,820	499,630	206,320	180,000	240,000
	44-47	239,980	283,320	364,250	687,700	242,570	200,000	300,000
	48-51	252,790	322,160	395,260	700,190	256,520	200,000	300,000
	52-55	227,430	274,360	330,940	571,060	223,280	200,000	300,000
	56-59	232,700	282,060	374,380	721,050	242,070	200,000	300,000
	60-63	198,730	250,010	341,820	705,500	223,780	200,000	200,000
	64-69	191,870	229,560	317,510	628,050	208,430	160,000	230,000

## Comparison of Net Incomes by Census Metropolitan Area

257. The Canada Revenue Agency provided net income amounts by CMA for each year 2015 to 2019. To reduce the amount of data included herein, I show only the data for 2019. I have examined the other years and while the income relationships differ somewhat, they do follow roughly the same pattern of increasing and decreasing from year to year.

**Table 257a – Comparison of Net incomes by CMAs – No Income Exclusion  
All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Region	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Toronto	287,980	414,060	642,550	1,598,410	295,880	161,000	370,000
Montréal	212,690	296,760	495,970	1,151,030	215,740	105,000	270,000
Vancouver	241,780	330,440	499,540	1,187,490	235,040	150,000	300,000
Calgary	247,240	322,370	461,610	1,082,320	222,990	140,000	300,000
Edmonton	234,560	283,000	409,920	673,030	199,600	200,000	300,000
Ottawa	253,360	341,760	497,080	1,470,080	256,370	160,000	310,000
Winnipeg	169,980	223,110	312,870	682,620	157,220	100,000	200,000
Québec City	210,180	256,410	345,490	895,680	190,350	140,000	240,000
Hamilton & KCW	203,850	260,460	370,970	831,940	184,350	120,000	240,000
10 CMAs	245,780	340,720	536,150	1,355,050	250,930	142,000	310,000
Other Regions	158,370	204,730	281,290	669,730	145,030	100,000	190,000
<b>All Regions</b>	<b>217,890</b>	<b>297,680</b>	<b>465,890</b>	<b>1,236,440</b>	<b>224,140</b>	<b>127,000</b>	<b>270,000</b>

**Table 257b – Comparison of Net incomes by CMAs – \$60,000 Income Exclusion**  
**All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Region	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Toronto	386,860	526,360	762,040	1,777,320	390,700	246,000	490,000
Montréal	314,520	440,800	663,490	1,292,520	321,860	220,000	400,000
Vancouver	325,230	417,240	602,820	1,331,230	319,690	220,000	390,000
Calgary	321,580	416,350	559,950	1,286,800	310,460	200,000	400,000
Edmonton	268,790	325,520	452,410	701,910	246,030	200,000	300,000
Ottawa	324,220	427,610	583,020	1,729,730	339,030	220,000	400,000
Winnipeg	210,280	266,790	366,640	744,360	201,870	100,000	200,000
Québec City	247,490	289,760	410,680	1,023,980	245,650	200,000	300,000
Hamilton & KCW	257,470	333,130	475,860	895,040	253,470	200,000	300,000
10 CMAs	331,830	450,660	653,460	1,531,710	341,210	224,000	410,000
Other Regions	208,840	253,810	336,320	777,010	203,600	155,000	240,000
<b>All Regions</b>	<b>294,120</b>	<b>391,910</b>	<b>580,560</b>	<b>1,409,020</b>	<b>308,090</b>	<b>202,000</b>	<b>360,000</b>

**Table 257c – Comparison of Net incomes by CMAs – \$80,000 Income Exclusion**  
**All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Region	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Toronto	420,170	558,050	792,620	1,827,930	418,200	274,000	520,000
Montréal	352,150	482,860	705,010	1,333,450	354,040	240,000	450,000
Vancouver	343,970	446,740	635,080	1,386,440	344,130	240,000	410,000
Calgary	344,710	435,140	575,370	1,327,500	334,600	300,000	400,000
Edmonton	274,430	339,880	461,480	710,200	257,380	200,000	300,000
Ottawa	349,150	450,810	607,830	1,802,000	363,550	240,000	420,000
Winnipeg	241,010	289,840	389,130	780,880	230,520	200,000	300,000
Québec City	258,600	303,880	431,600	1,053,030	262,940	200,000	300,000
Hamilton & KCW	277,120	345,740	506,570	922,020	271,200	200,000	300,000
10 CMAs	359,090	481,910	687,600	1,585,160	368,300	245,000	450,000
Other Regions	224,750	275,810	359,540	820,840	224,770	173,000	260,000
<b>All Regions</b>	<b>319,400</b>	<b>425,920</b>	<b>616,560</b>	<b>1,465,470</b>	<b>335,100</b>	<b>223,000</b>	<b>390,000</b>

## Comparison of Net Incomes by Province

258. Canada Revenue Agency provided net income amounts by provinces and territories for each year 2015 to 2019. However, for Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the three territories, almost all of the data was suppressed due to confidentiality issues. To reduce the amount of data included herein, I show only the data for 2019. I have examined the other years and while the income relationships differ somewhat, they do follow roughly the same pattern of increasing and decreasing from year to year with the exception of Alberta. I have included a table that shows the data for all years for Alberta.

**Table 258a – Comparison of Net incomes by Province – No Income Exclusion**  
**All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Province	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median -	
						50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
British Columbia	197,350	263,420	398,080	1,066,110	196,510	110,000	240,000
Alberta	228,580	294,690	423,230	881,860	203,780	140,000	270,000
Saskatchewan & Manitoba	-	-	-	-	153,400	100,000	200,000
Ontario	243,100	343,290	543,390	1,439,770	258,490	145,000	310,000
Quebec	183,720	261,800	408,050	1,063,760	191,520	98,000	240,000
Atlantic	200,840	250,910	318,690	576,320	165,560	130,000	230,000
Territories	-	-	-	-	158,470	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>217,890</b>	<b>297,680</b>	<b>465,890</b>	<b>1,236,440</b>	<b>224,140</b>	<b>127,000</b>	<b>270,000</b>

**Table 258b – Comparison of Net incomes by Province – \$60,000 Income Exclusion**  
**All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Province	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median -	
						50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
British Columbia	264,740	344,170	512,710	1,212,740	275,030	190,000	320,000
Alberta	286,990	362,810	484,060	981,540	270,680	210,000	330,000
Saskatchewan & Manitoba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ontario	327,970	448,440	657,420	1,624,030	343,920	216,000	410,000
Quebec	277,650	363,490	563,630	1,211,520	285,940	188,000	330,000
Atlantic	243,160	289,180	354,550	625,080	215,320	190,000	280,000
Territories	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>294,120</b>	<b>391,910</b>	<b>580,560</b>	<b>1,409,020</b>	<b>308,090</b>	<b>202,000</b>	<b>360,000</b>



**Table 258c – Comparison of Net incomes by Province – \$80,000 Income Exclusion**  
**All Ages, Calendar Year 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Province	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
British Columbia	292,650	372,930	551,920	1,271,970	301,980	210,000	350,000
Alberta	300,620	384,150	500,940	1,001,810	287,690	220,000	350,000
Saskatchewan & Manitoba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ontario	353,540	479,700	692,290	1,680,050	370,580	237,000	440,000
Quebec	301,650	405,790	610,040	1,255,650	316,350	218,000	370,000
Atlantic Territories	258,160	300,930	372,380	639,230	233,210	200,000	290,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>319,400</b>	<b>425,920</b>	<b>616,560</b>	<b>1,465,470</b>	<b>335,100</b>	<b>223,000</b>	<b>390,000</b>

259. Since the year-to-year net income amounts for Alberta fluctuated significantly and differently from the other provinces, but only at the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile and above, I have included the data for Alberta and for all other provinces in the two tables below. In 2016, the net incomes for those at the 60<sup>th</sup> percentile and above in Alberta decreased by between 14% and 40% from the 2015 amounts. For all other provinces, there was a small increase except in Ontario where there was a small decrease.

**Table 259a – Comparison of Net Incomes for Alberta – No Income Exclusion**  
**All Ages, Calendar Years 2015 to 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

Alberta	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
2015	238,730	305,980	461,760	1,102,930	225,070	150,000	290,000
2016	203,470	257,790	349,200	661,860	174,450	130,000	240,000
2017	212,380	280,590	392,680	806,000	190,350	130,000	260,000
2018	212,050	288,450	409,680	848,470	192,190	120,000	270,000
2019	228,580	294,690	423,230	881,860	203,780	140,000	270,000

**Table 259b – Comparison of Net Incomes for All Provinces ex Alberta – No Income Exclusion  
All Ages, Calendar Years 2015 to 2019, 65-70<sup>th</sup> Percentile and Above**

All Provinces Other than Alberta	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
2015	206,377	291,957	451,270	1,126,649	218,592	123,154	270,000
2016	205,616	281,502	426,991	1,071,436	212,661	126,289	270,000
2017	210,700	288,770	442,319	1,086,044	217,182	129,037	270,000
2018	216,479	308,198	487,353	1,228,391	232,464	127,494	285,000
2019	219,706	307,591	479,232	1,253,421	235,702	131,819	290,000

## Recent Appointments to Federal Judiciary

260. The Department of Justice provided me with a summary of the number of appointments to the federal judiciary. The data covered the period 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2015 and from 1 April 2015 to 23 October 2020. In total, that data covers about 9.5 years of appointments.
261. The first such table is age at appointment. The average age of appointment was 52.4 from 2011 to 2015; 52.7 from 2015 to 2020 and 52.6 from 2011 to 2020. The median age at appointment was 52, 53 and 52 respectively.
262. There was a total of 598 appointments during the 9.5-year period.

**Table 262 - Age at Appointment to Federal Judiciary 2011 to 2020**

Age	Number Appointed			Percent Appointed		
	1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015	1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020	1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020	Percentage 2011-2015	Percentage 2015-2020	Percentage 2011-2020
35	-	-	-	-	-	-
36	-	-	-	-	-	-
37	1	-	1	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%
38	-	-	-	-	-	-
39	-	-	-	-	-	-
40	1	2	3	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%
41	1	4	5	0.4%	1.1%	0.8%
42	2	2	4	0.9%	0.5%	0.7%
43	5	8	13	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%
44	11	8	19	4.9%	2.2%	3.2%
45	10	16	26	4.4%	4.3%	4.3%
46	10	20	30	4.4%	5.4%	5.0%
47	15	17	32	6.6%	4.6%	5.4%
48	10	16	26	4.4%	4.3%	4.3%
49	15	21	36	6.6%	5.6%	6.0%
50	9	20	29	4.0%	5.4%	4.8%
51	12	30	42	5.3%	8.1%	7.0%
52	18	18	36	8.0%	4.8%	6.0%
53	12	27	39	5.3%	7.3%	6.5%
54	8	24	32	3.5%	6.5%	5.4%
55	13	24	37	5.8%	6.5%	6.2%
56	14	23	37	6.2%	6.2%	6.2%
57	9	15	24	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%
58	9	17	26	4.0%	4.6%	4.3%
59	11	9	20	4.9%	2.4%	3.3%
60	7	16	23	3.1%	4.3%	3.8%
61	7	9	16	3.1%	2.4%	2.7%
62	3	5	8	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
63	3	7	10	1.3%	1.9%	1.7%
64	5	3	8	2.2%	0.8%	1.3%
65	3	5	8	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
66	1	2	3	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%
67	1	3	4	0.4%	0.8%	0.7%
68	-	1	1	-	0.3%	0.2%
69	-	-	-	-	-	-
70	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

263. We can summarise the age at appointment data into the age categories that were used by Canada Revenue Agency in compiling the net-income data.

***Table 263a - Age at Appointment to Federal Judiciary 2011 to 2020 – 4-Year Bands<sup>67</sup>***

<b>Age Bracket</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015</b>	<b>1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>Percentage 2011-2020</b>
35-44	10	16	26	4.3%
44-47	46	61	107	17.9%
48-51	46	87	133	22.2%
52-55	51	93	144	24.1%
56-59	43	64	107	17.9%
60-63	20	37	57	9.5%
64+	10	14	24	4.0%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

***Table 263b - Age at Appointment to Federal Judiciary 2011 to 2020 – Broad Bands***

<b>Age Bracket</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015</b>	<b>1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>Percentage 2011-2020</b>
35-46	41	60	101	16.9%
47-54	99	173	272	45.5%
55-69	86	139	225	37.6%
44-56	157	264	421	70.4%
35-69	226	372	598	100.0%

264. I also received details on the number of appointments by CMA over the same 9.5 years. This data showed the total number of appointments in each CMA as well as the number of appointments from private practice in each CMA.

<sup>67</sup> Note that the first age band (35 to 44) is actually nine years. The balance are four years each.

**Table 264a – Number of Appointments by CMA – 2011 to 2020**

<b>CMA</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015</b>	<b>1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>Percentage 2011-2020</b>
Calgary	8	20	28	4.7%
Edmonton	9	26	35	5.9%
Hamilton	6	5	11	1.8%
Kitchener/Cambridge/ Waterloo	0	5	5	0.8%
Montréal	29	43	72	12.0%
Ottawa -Gatineau	13	27	40	6.7%
Québec	12	15	27	4.5%
Toronto	32	60	92	15.4%
Vancouver	20	40	60	10.0%
Winnipeg	8	11	19	3.2%
Other Regions	89	120	209	34.9%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Table 264b – Number of Appointments from Private Practice by CMA – 2011 to 2020**

<b>CMA</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015</b>	<b>1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020</b>	<b>Percentage 2011-2020</b>
Calgary	5	13	18	4.7%
Edmonton	6	14	20	5.3%
Hamilton	5	2	7	1.8%
Kitchener/Cambridge/ Waterloo	0	4	4	1.1%
Montréal	22	29	51	13.5%
Ottawa -Gatineau	4	10	14	3.7%
Québec	10	11	21	5.5%
Toronto	17	39	56	14.8%
Vancouver	14	26	40	10.6%
Winnipeg	6	8	14	3.7%
Other Regions	56	78	134	35.3%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>145</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

265. I was provided with a distribution of the judicial appointments over the same 9.5 years by province and territory.

**Table 265 – Number of Appointments by CMA – 2011 to 2020**

Province	1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015	1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020	1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020	Percentage 2011-2020
Alberta	17	47	64	10.7%
British Columbia	24	47	71	11.9%
Manitoba	10	13	23	3.8%
New Brunswick	5	12	17	2.8%
Newfoundland & Labrador	7	10	17	2.8%
Northwest Territories	2	0	2	0.3%
Nova Scotia	11	17	28	4.7%
Nunavut	2	3	5	0.8%
Ontario	94	134	228	38.1%
Prince Edward Island	1	4	5	0.8%
Québec	41	68	109	18.2%
Saskatchewan	12	15	27	4.5%
Yukon	0	2	2	0.3%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

266. The number of appointments by gender was also provided.

**Table 266 – Number of Appointments by Gender – 2011 to 2020**

Gender	1 Apr 2011 to 30 Mar 2015	1 Apr 2015 to 23 Oct 2020	1 Apr 2011 to 23 Oct 2020	Percentage 2011-2015	Percentage 2015-2020	Percentage 2011-2020
Female	76	204	280	33.6%	54.8%	46.8%
Male	150	168	372	66.4%	45.2%	53.2%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>598</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

## Election of Supernumerary Status

267. I was provided the following data for the number of judges electing supernumerary status between 1985 and 2020.

**Table 267 – Election of Supernumerary Status – 1985 to 2020**

Years from Eligibility to Supernumerary Election	Years of Supernumerary Service										Total Number	Percent of All Judges	Percent of All Elections
	Less than 1	1 to 1.9	2 to 2.9	3 to 3.9	4 to 4.9	5 to 6.9	7 to 10	Never Elected					
Never Qualified Prior to 75	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	1.1%	0.0%
Did Not Elect Supernumerary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	121	8.1%	0.0%
Retired Before Qualifying	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	282	18.9%	0.0%
Within 1 Year of First Eligibility	33	63	74	81	183	177	353	-	-	-	964	64.5%	89.7%
1 to < 2 Years After First Eligible	2	3	3	7	3	4	18	-	-	-	40	2.7%	3.7%
2 to < 3 Years After First Eligible	1	-	6	2	1	7	10	-	-	-	27	1.8%	2.5%
3 to < 4 Years After First Eligible	-	3	1	2	1	6	1	-	-	-	14	0.9%	1.3%
4 to < 5 Years After First Eligible	2	1	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	8	0.5%	0.7%
5 to < 7 Years After First Eligible	-	3	2	1	8	1	1	-	-	-	16	1.1%	1.5%
7 to < 10 Years After First Eligible	2	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	0.3%	0.5%
10 or More Years After First Eligible	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.1%	0.1%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>383</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>1,495</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,495</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

## I. Summary of Compensation Amounts

268. In this section, I summarise the compensation amounts for federally appointed judges, self-employed lawyers and deputy ministers (including government appointments to GC and GCQ senior positions) for 2015 to the most recent year data is available.
269. The first set of tables shows the base salary<sup>68</sup> for these positions. Note that these numbers should not be compared between tables as that would be an “apples and Oranges” comparison. The second set of tables shows the total compensation<sup>69</sup> for these positions

### Summary of Base Salaries

270. Table 270 shows the Base Judicial Salary for selected judicial offices. There are other offices not shown here that receive a supplement in addition to the amounts shown in this table. The amounts shown for the year beginning April 2021 are calculated by me based on my estimate of the increase in the Industrial Aggregate.

**Table 270 - Base Judicial Salary - 2015 to 2021**

Year beginning 1 April	Supreme Court of Canada				
	Chief Justice	Puisne Justices	Other Chief Justices	Puisne Justices	Protho- notaries
2015	\$ 396,800	\$ 367,300	\$ 338,400	\$ 308,600	\$ 234,500
2016	403,900	373,900	344,400	314,100	251,200
2017	405,400	375,300	345,700	315,300	252,200
2018	413,500	382,800	352,600	321,600	257,200
2019	424,200	392,700	361,700	329,900	263,900
2020	435,600	403,300	371,400	338,800	271,000
2021	464,900	430,400	396,400	361,600	289,200

271. Table 271 shows the net incomes of self-employed lawyers at the 70<sup>th</sup> percentile and above based on all ages (34 to 69) and all regions of Canada.

<sup>68</sup> Base Judicial Salary, net income and base salary respectively for judges, self-employed lawyers and deputy ministers and senior government appointees.

<sup>69</sup> Base Judicial Total Compensation, net income and total compensation respectively for judges, self-employed lawyers and deputy ministers and senior government appointees.



**Table 271 – Net Income of Self-Employed Lawyers – 2015 to 2019**

Calendar Year	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> percentile
2015	\$ 188,590	\$ 259,720	\$ 394,710	\$ 868,420	\$ 210,390	\$ 118,000	\$ 260,000
2016	188,790	252,540	370,480	806,250	201,940	121,000	250,000
2017	192,820	259,620	385,070	825,440	206,950	122,000	260,000
2018	197,340	273,550	416,440	929,160	221,020	121,000	270,000
2019	203,280	274,950	413,900	937,480	224,140	127,000	270,000

272. Table 272 shows the average base salary plus average at-risk pay for deputy ministers and government appointees to senior positions at GC and GCQ classifications<sup>70</sup>.

**Table 272 – Base Salary and At-Risk Pay for DM, GC and GCQ positions: 2015 - 2020**

Beginning 1 April	DM-1	DM-2	DM-3	DM-4	GC-09	GC-10	GCQ-09	GCQ-10
2015	\$263,611	\$312,377	\$357,825	\$430,719	\$325,571	\$389,299	\$309,638	\$365,162
2016	267,133	308,539	360,778	440,416	333,003	398,253	316,664	373,457
2017	269,686	319,831	363,010	446,037	337,241	403,273	320,679	378,158
2018	270,960	321,109	365,514	446,037	337,241	403,273	320,679	378,158
2019	274,143	330,825	383,454	446,037	337,241	403,273	320,679	378,158
2020	276,241	335,458	384,597	446,037	337,241	403,273	320,679	378,158

273. Past Quadrennial Commissions have been provided with the percentile comparisons of Base Judicial Salary with the net earnings of self-employed lawyers. As discussed above (paragraphs 31 to 34), in my opinion this is a misleading and inappropriate comparison.

**Base Judicial Salary**

274. The 2019 Base Judicial Salary of \$329,900 is about the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

275. The 2020 Base Judicial Salary of \$338,800 is about the 80<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

<sup>70</sup> For DM-4, GC-09 and GC-10 positions, the amounts were estimated by me as described in the footnotes to Tables 231 and 234a.

276. The 2021 Base Judicial Salary of \$361,600 is about the 82<sup>nd</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

***Base Salary of Prothonotaries***

277. The 2019 base salary of a prothonotary of \$263,900 is about the 74<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

278. The 2020 base salary of a prothonotary of \$271,000 is about the 74<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

279. The 2021 estimated base salary of a prothonotary of \$289,200 is about the 76<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

**Summary of Total Compensation**

280. Table 280 shows the Base Judicial Total Compensation for selected judicial offices. There are other offices not shown here that receive a supplement in addition to the amounts shown in this table. The amounts shown for the year beginning April 2021 are calculated by me based on my estimate of the increase in the Industrial Aggregate.

***Table 280 - Base Judicial Total Compensation - 2015 to 2021***

Year Beginning 1 April	Supreme Court of Canada				
	Chief Justice	Puisne Justices	Other Chief Justices	Puisne Justices	Prothonotaries
2015	\$ 595,700	\$ 551,600	\$ 508,400	\$ 463,900	\$ 353,100
2016	606,400	561,600	517,500	472,200	378,100
2017	608,700	563,700	519,400	474,000	379,600
2018	620,800	574,900	529,800	483,400	387,100
2019	637,000	589,900	543,500	496,000	397,300
2020	654,200	605,900	558,200	509,400	408,100
2021	698,200	646,700	595,800	543,800	435,500

281. Table 281 shows the net incomes of self-employed lawyers at the 70<sup>th</sup> percentile and above based on all ages (34 to 69) and all regions of Canada<sup>71</sup>.

<sup>71</sup> This is the same as Table 271 since there is no difference between the concept of a base salary and total compensation for a self-employed lawyer.

**Table 281 – Net Income of Self-Employed Lawyers – 2015 to 2019**

Calendar Year	65-70 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75-80 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	85-90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	95-100 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Average	Median - 50 <sup>th</sup> percentile	75th percentile
2015	\$ 188,590	\$ 259,720	\$ 394,710	\$ 868,420	\$ 210,390	\$ 118,000	\$ 260,000
2016	188,790	252,540	370,480	806,250	201,940	121,000	250,000
2017	192,820	259,620	385,070	825,440	206,950	122,000	260,000
2018	197,340	273,550	416,440	929,160	221,020	121,000	270,000
2019	203,280	274,950	413,900	937,480	224,140	127,000	270,000

282. Table 282 shows the total compensation including at-risk pay for deputy ministers and government appointees to senior positions at GC and GCQ classifications<sup>72</sup>.

**Table 282 – Total Compensation for DM, GC and GCQ positions: 2015 - 2020**

Beginning 1 April	DM-1	DM-2	DM-3	DM-4	GC-09	GC-10	GCQ-09	GCQ-10
2015	\$308,306	\$365,341	\$418,494	\$503,748	\$380,772	\$455,305	\$362,137	\$427,076
2016	312,425	360,852	421,948	515,088	389,464	465,777	370,355	436,776
2017	315,411	374,058	424,558	521,662	394,420	471,648	375,050	442,275
2018	316,901	375,553	427,487	521,662	394,420	471,648	375,050	442,275
2019	320,624	386,916	448,469	521,662	394,420	471,648	375,050	442,275
2020	323,078	392,334	449,806	521,662	394,420	471,648	375,050	442,275

**Base Judicial Total Compensation and Self-Employed Lawyers Net Income**

283. The 2019 Base Judicial Total Compensation (the \$496,000 shown in Table 280 for Puisne Judges) is at about the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers.

284. The 2020 Base Judicial Total Compensation (the \$509,400 shown in Table 280 for Puisne Judges) is at about the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers based on my estimation of the increase in self-employed lawyers net income for 2020<sup>73</sup>.

285. The 2021 Base Judicial Total Compensation (the \$543,800 shown in Table 280 for Puisne Judges) is at about the 89<sup>th</sup> percentile of self-employed lawyers based on my estimation of the increase in self-employed lawyers net income for 2021<sup>74</sup>.

<sup>72</sup> For DM-4, GC-09 and GC-10 positions, the amounts were estimated by me as described in the footnotes to Tables 230d and 233a and b.

<sup>73</sup> To estimate the net income of self-employed lawyers in 2020, I projected their 2019 net income together with an increase based on the average annual increases from 2015 to 2019.

<sup>74</sup> To estimate the net income of self-employed lawyers in 2021, I projected their 2019 net income together with two years of increase based on the average annual increases from 2015 to 2019.

***Total Compensation of Prothonotaries***

286. The 2019 base salary of a prothonotary was \$263,900, beginning April 2020 it is \$271,000 and I estimate beginning April 2021 it will be \$289,200 (80% of the Base Judicial Salary).
287. Using the same adjustments to obtain total compensation as used for puisne judges<sup>75</sup>, I determined the total compensation of a prothonotary.
288. The 2019 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$397,300 (Table 280). That is about the 84<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
289. The 2020 average total compensation of a prothonotary is \$408,100 (Table 280). That is about the 84<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.
290. The 2021 average total compensation of a prothonotary is estimated to be \$435,500. (Table 280). That is about the 86<sup>th</sup> percentile for all self-employed lawyers in Canada.

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
<sup>75</sup> Take the base salary, add the value of the Judicial Annuity (based on the average value of 49.51%) and add the value of the government paying half of the Canada Pension plan contribution. This implicitly assumes that prothonotaries have a similar age profile at appointment as do the federally appointed judges.

## J. Certification

291. I hereby certify that:

- a. in my opinion, the data used is sufficient and reliable for the purposes of the report;
- b. in my opinion, the actuarial methods employed are appropriate for the purposes of this report;
- c. in my opinion, the assumptions used are, in aggregate, appropriate for the purposes of the work;
- d. the calculations were prepared in accordance with the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Standards of Practice;
- e. there are no subsequent events other than those discussed in this report that I am aware of that would have an impact on the results presented herein; and
- f. this report has been prepared and my opinions given in accordance with accepted actuarial practice in Canada.

JDM ACTUARIAL EXPERT SERVICES INC.



Peter Gorham

Fellow, Canadian Institute of Actuaries  
Fellow, Society of Actuaries

26 March 2021

Date

## Appendix 1 Curriculum Vitae of Peter Gorham, F.S.A, F.C.I.A.

Position & Responsibilities	<p>Peter is the President and Actuary of JDM Actuarial Expert Services Inc. (JDM Actuarial). He provides pension and actuarial consulting advice, expert testimony, retirement planning and governance services.</p>
Areas of Specialization	<p>Peter has provided expert advice and testimony to the legal profession since 1987. His experience includes determining:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• certification of criminal rates of interest,</li><li>• lost benefits for wrongful dismissal,</li><li>• the present value of future income and future care costs,</li><li>• valuation of life estates,</li><li>• present value of future trust plan benefits and present value of past funds under various possible investment scenarios,</li><li>• present value of future contingent events.</li></ul> <p>In the past, Peter has also provided expert evidence for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• family law pension valuations.</li></ul> <p>He has provided expert testimony to the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Court of Queen’s Bench of Manitoba, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, La Cour Supérieure du Québec, the Ontario Unified Family Court, the High Court of Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, the Supreme Court of Bermuda, Ontario Employment Standards Tribunal, Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Tribunal, Canada Human Rights Tribunal and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Disciplinary Tribunal.</p> <p>Within the pension and actuarial consulting practice, Peter’s main areas of expertise include the design, financing, administration and governance of pension and benefit plans. His strengths lie in providing innovative and workable solutions that address a client’s needs. He is effective in communicating actuarial concepts in simple and understandable terms.</p> <p>Peter is an experienced public speaker and an author of numerous articles related to pensions and benefits.</p>
Background	<p>Peter is an actuary, receiving his fellowship in 1980. He attended the University of Toronto, graduating with a B.Sc. in Actuarial and Computer Sciences. Prior to founding JDM Actuarial in 2011, Peter spent 13 years as a partner at Morneau Shepell, and prior to that, 20 years with Aon Consulting, (formerly MLH + A inc), serving clients in the area of pension and employee benefits.</p>
Professional & Other Affiliations	<p>Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Fellow of the Society of Actuaries Faculty, Humber College PPAC program Past-President, Rotary Club of Whitby Sunrise</p>

## Appendix 2 Documents Utilised

292. The following documents and data were provided to me for use in preparing this report:
- a. “Report on the Earnings of Self-Employed Lawyers for the Department of Justice Canada in Preparation for the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission”, by Haripaul Pannu, 25 February 2016
  - b. “Report on the Value of the Judicial Annuity” prepare for Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP 29 March 2016 by Dean Newell;
  - c. Letter from Nick Leswick, Assistant Deputy Minister, Economic and Fiscal Policy Branch, Department of Finance to Christopher Rugar dated 9 December 2020 summarising the prevailing economic conditions in Canada;
  - d. Letter from Francois Lemire, Director, Office of the Chief Actuary, to Anna Dekker dated 2 November 2020 setting out estimates for future increases in federally appointed judges’ salaries;
  - e. Letter from Francois Lemire, Director, Office of the Chief Actuary, to Anna Dekker date 26 February 2021 setting out updated estimates for future increases in federally appointed judges’ salaries;
  - f. A series of 96 excel data files prepared by Canada Revenue Agency with data regarding net incomes of self-employed lawyers in Canada;
  - g. An excel file “2011-2020 Appointment Profile Extract for PG.xlsx” providing summary details (location, type of practice) of judicial appointments made from 1 April 2011 to 23 October 2020;
  - h. An excel file “Appointment Profiles For Peter Gorham Dec 7 2020.xlsx” providing a summary analysis (age, location, type of practice) of judicial appointments made from 1 April 2011 to 23 October 2020;
  - i. A document “27 - Quad Comm 2020 - DM Average Salary Mid-Point and Counts.doc” from the Department of Justice setting out current and historic salary levels of deputy ministers;
  - j. A document “22 - Quad Comm 2020 - DM Distribution of At-Risk Pay.doc” from the Department of Justice setting out current and historic at-risk pay of deputy ministers;

- k. A document “28 - Quad Comm 2020 - GC and GCQ Income Information.doc” from the Department of Justice setting out current and historic salary information and at-risk pay for the most senior positions in government agencies;
  - l. A spreadsheet “26 - Quad Comm 2020 - DM Tenure.xlsx” setting out the positions held by individuals over their career at deputy minister level together with the dates served.
293. The following documents and data were obtained by me and were utilised in the preparation of this report:
- a. “Judges Act”, as amended to 12 April 2019;
  - b. “Guide for Candidates”, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, downloaded from the internet 2 February 2021 [[www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html](http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/appointments-nominations/guideCandidates-eng.html)]
  - c. Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for the Federally Appointed Judges as at 31 March 2019;
  - d. Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for the Federally Appointed Judges as at 31 March 2016;
  - e. Submission of the Government of Canada to the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 29 February 2016;
  - f. Submission of the Canadian Superior Courts Judges Association and the Canadian Judicial Council to the 2015 Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 29 February 2016;
  - g. Letter to Louise Meagher from Haripaul Pannu and Dean Newell dated 26 May 2016 identifying the differences in their respective reports regarding the value of the Judicial annuity;
  - h. Letter to Louise Meagher from Haripaul Pannu and Dean Newell dated 15 June 2016 providing a supplement to their 26 May 2016 letter;
  - i. “Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada” by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 30 June 2016;
  - j. “Response of The Government of Canada to the Report of the 2015 Judicial Compensation and benefits Commission”, 30 November 2016;



- k. "Report and Recommendations Submitted to the Minister of Justice of Canada pursuant to section 26(4) of the Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1" by the Judicial Compensation and Benefits Commission, 28 October 2019;
- l. Historic data for the Industrial Aggregate Index downloaded from Statistics Canada (Table 14-10-0222-01) showing for each month from December 2001 to November 2020 the number of working Canadians included in the index along with their average weekly earnings.

## Appendix 3 Summary of Judicial Annuity Benefits

Full Benefit	66.7% of final year salary
Eligibility for Full Benefit	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Age 75 with at least 10 years of service.</li> <li>2. At least 15 years of service with the sum of age plus service equalling 80 or more.</li> <li>3. At least 10 years of service while a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada.</li> <li>4. Permanent disability.</li> </ol>
Eligibility for a reduced benefit	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Age 75</li> <li>2. Age 55 with at least 10 years of service</li> </ol>
Reduced benefit amount	<p>At age 75 with less than 10 years of service, the reduced benefit is pro rata to service. e.g. with 7 years of service, the reduced benefit is 70% of the Full Benefit.</p> <p>For ages 60 to 74, where age plus service is less than 80, the reduced benefit is pro rata to service. e.g. with 10 years of service at age 60, the sum of age and service is 70. It will take 5 more years of service to reach a total of 80 (at age 65 with 15 years of service). the reduced benefit is 10/15<sup>ths</sup>, or 66.7% of the Full Benefit.</p> <p>For ages under 60 with age plus service less than 80, the reduced benefit is pro rata as in the previous paragraph plus an additional 5% reduction for each year prior to age 60.</p>
Indexing	The benefit payable is adjusted each year based on the changes in the Consumer Price Index as of 30 September.
Survivor benefit	If the judge's spouse at the time of retirement is alive following the judge's death, a surviving spouse benefit equal to 50% of the amount payable to the judge will continue for the surviving spouse's lifetime.
Refund of contributions	If both the judge and spouse should die prior to receiving a total benefit at least equal to the judge's contributions plus interest, the difference is paid as a lump sum.
Death before retirement	<p>A lump sum equal to 16.7% of earnings; plus</p> <p>A survivor annuity equal to 33.3% of final year salary is payable to a surviving spouse; plus</p> <p>A survivor annuity equal to 6.7% of final year salary is paid to each dependent child (maximum of 4) which amount is doubled if there is no surviving spouse.</p>
Termination	A refund of contributions plus interest.
Contributions	The judge makes contributions each year prior to becoming eligible for a Full Benefit equal to 7% of salary and thereafter, 1% of salary.
Interest	Interest is credited on judges' contributions at the same rate that is paid on income tax refunds.

## Appendix 4 Actuarial Assumptions Utilised

The actuarial assumptions I utilised for determining a value of the Judicial Annuity are the same as used in the Actuarial Report on the Pension Plan for the Federally Appointed Judges as at 31 March 2019 (the “**Actuarial Report**”), except where indicated otherwise.

Valuation Date	1 January 2021
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### Economic Assumptions (Expectations for the Future)

Interest Rate	4.50%
Inflation Rate	2.00%
Real Salary Increase	1.00%
Indexing of annuity after retirement	2.00%
Interest on Contributions	4.50%

### Demographic Assumptions

Gender	41% of judges are assumed to be female and 59% male.
Appointment to Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice	4 appointments annually
Appointment to Supreme Court	0.4 appointments annually
Retirement	Varies by age and service. The rates used in the Actuarial Report assume the probability of retirement increases after 14 complete years of service. At that point, many of the judges will be 12-months from earnings a full pension and I have assumed they will most likely work that additional year unless in poor health. I therefore utilised the same rates as set out in the Actuarial Report, but based on one additional year of service.

#### Sample Rates of Retirement

Age Last Birthday	Completed Years of Service						
	0 to 9	10 to 14	15	16	17	20	25+
Under 55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
55	-	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	15.0%
60	-	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	13.0%	2.0%
65	-	0.5%	6.0%	3.0%	3.0%	5.0%	6.0%
70	-	0.5%	12.0%	4.0%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%
75	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Permanent Disability	Varies by age.
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#### Sample Rates of Disability

Age Last Birthday	Male	Female
40	0.2	0.4
50	0.7	1.0
60	2.0	3.1
70	6.4	10.1

Termination	Judges are assumed to leave the bench without qualifying for an annuity with a probability of 3% in their first year of service, 2% in the second year and 1% per annum for years 3 to 9. After reaching 10 years of service, all departures from the bench are treated as a retirement, disability or death.
Death	Ignored prior to retirement. Based on the mortality assumptions after retirement
Mortality	Canadian Pensioner Mortality Table for public sector workers with allowance or future mortality improvements based on the CPM-B projection factors. An adjustment for the size of the retirement income was made -- for males, 74% of those rates were used and for females, 92%.
Surviving Spouse	<p>The probability of having a surviving spouse at death as well as the number of surviving children and their assumed age was taken from the 2016 Actuarial Report (Table 23) as that report contained more detail about this assumption. The 2019 Actuarial report stated the assumptions were the same as in 2016.</p> <p>For males, the probability of having a surviving spouse is 98% at age 60 decreasing to 74% at 80 and to 17% at 100.</p> <p>For females, the probability of having a surviving spouse is 83% at age 60 decreasing to 35% at 80 and to 2% at 100.</p> <p>Spouses are assumed to be of the opposite gender from the judge with the male spouse being about 3 years older (spousal age differences vary by age of the judge)</p>

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March 23, 2021

Our File: 474119

Civil Litigation Section  
Department of Justice  
50 O'Connor Street, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor  
Ottawa, ON K1A 0H8

Attention of Mr. Kirk G. Shannon

Dear Sirs/Mesdames:

**Re: Judicial Compensation in Canada**

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**INTRODUCTION**

1. Columbia Pacific Consulting Ltd. was retained by the Department of Justice to comment on the following matters:
  - (a) How does the salary of a federally appointed judge in Canada compare with that of other high-level professionals in Canada?
  - (b) How does the salary of a federally appointed judge in Canada compare to that of judges in other jurisdictions?
2. This report contains three sections:
  - (a) Part A (pages 2 to 5) reviews the compensation structure that applies to federally appointed judges in Canada.
  - (b) Part B (pages 5 to 9) compares salaries of federally appointed judges in Canada to those of other high-level professionals in Canada.
  - (c) Part C (pages 10 to 12) compares salaries of federally appointed judges in Canada to those of judges in other jurisdictions.

## A. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION IN CANADA

3. Federally appointed judges in Canada receive compensation in the form of salary, judicial annuity, and other benefits. [1]

### Judicial Salary

4. Table 1 (page 3) shows salaries applicable to Canada's federally appointed judiciary from April 1, 2011 to present.<sup>1</sup> [2, 3, 4] Salaries of April 1, 2011 were as follows:
  - (a) \$361,300 for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada;
  - (b) \$334,500 for other Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada;
  - (c) \$308,200 for Chief Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces;
  - (d) \$281,100 for other Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces; and,
  - (e) \$194,000 for Federal Court Prothonotaries.
5. Salaries for federally appointed judges are indexed to the growth rate of average wages and salaries, as measured by the Industrial Aggregate Index, up to a maximum increase of 7% for any one year and rounded down to the nearest \$100.<sup>2</sup>
6. Salaries of April 1, 2021 are projected to be as follows:
  - (a) \$464,700 for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada;
  - (b) \$430,300 for other Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada;

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<sup>1</sup>The period since April 1, 2011 corresponds roughly to the periods of the two most recent Quadrennial Commissions. The Fourth Commission was announced in December 2011 and lasted four years ending August 31, 2015. The Fifth Commission was announced in December 2015 and lasted four years ending September 30, 2019.

<sup>2</sup>Salaries for Federal Court Prothonotaries are set as a percentage of the salary of federally appointed judges. This percentage had been 69% prior to April 1, 2011, but then was increased to 76% effective April 1, 2011 and to 80% effective April 1, 2016. Because of the increase in this percentage over time, the salaries for Federal Court Prothonotaries have risen more rapidly than the salaries of federally appointed judges.

**Table 1**  
**Salaries for Federally Appointed Judges and Prothonotaries**

	Supreme Court of Canada		Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Court Martial Appeal Court, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces		Federal Court Prothonotaries
	Chief Justice	Justice	Chief Justice	Justice	
April 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012 (+ 3.6%)	\$361,300	\$334,500	\$308,200	\$281,100	\$194,000
April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2013 (+ 2.5%)	\$370,300	\$342,800	\$315,900	\$288,100	\$218,900
April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014 (+ 2.6%)	\$379,900	\$351,700	\$324,100	\$295,500	\$224,500
April 1, 2014 to March 31, 2015 (+ 1.8%)	\$386,700	\$358,000	\$329,900	\$300,800	\$228,600
April 1, 2015 to March 31, 2016 (+ 2.6%)	\$396,700	\$367,300	\$338,400	\$308,600	\$234,500
April 1, 2016 to March 31, 2017 (+ 1.8%)	\$403,800	\$373,900	\$344,400	\$314,100	\$251,200
April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 (+ 0.4%)	\$405,400	\$375,300	\$345,700	\$315,300	\$252,200
April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019 (+ 2.0%)	\$413,500	\$382,800	\$352,600	\$321,600	\$257,200
April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020 (+ 2.6%)	\$424,200	\$392,700	\$361,700	\$329,900	\$263,900
April 1, 2020 to March 31, 2021 (+ 2.7%)	\$435,600	\$403,300	\$371,400	\$338,800	\$271,000
April 1, 2021 to March 31, 2022 (+ 6.7%) <sup>3</sup>	\$464,700	\$430,300	\$396,200	\$361,400	\$289,100

<sup>3</sup> Values for April 1, 2021 are forecasts and may be subject to revision.

- (c) \$396,200 for Chief Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Court Martial Appeal Court,<sup>4</sup> Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces;
  - (d) \$361,400 for other Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces; and,
  - (e) \$289,100 for Federal Court Prothonotaries.
7. Over the ten-year period from April 1, 2011 to April 1, 2021, the salaries of Canada's federally appointed judiciary, excluding Federal Court Prothonotaries, will have increased by 28.6%. This works out to an average increase of 2.5% per year.<sup>5</sup>

## Judicial Annuity

8. Retiring judges become entitled to an annuity as set out in the Judges Act:

*"42 (1) A judge shall be paid an annuity equal to two thirds of the salary annexed to the office held by the judge at the time of his or her resignation, removal or attaining the age of retirement, as the case may be, if the judge*

*"(a) has continued in judicial office for at least 15 years, has a combined age and number of years in judicial office that is not less than 80 and resigns from office;*

*"(b) has attained the age of retirement and has held judicial office for at least 10 years; or*

*"(c) has continued in judicial office on the Supreme Court of Canada for at least 10 years and resigns from office."*

## Other Benefits

9. Judges receive extended health and dental coverage under the Public Service Health Care Plan and the Public Service Dental Care Plan while holding office and during retirement. Other benefits provided to judges include life insurance, dependents' life insurance, and accidental death and dismemberment insurance.

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<sup>4</sup> The Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court was added to this group on April 1, 2016. Prior to April 1, 2016, the Chief Justice of the Court Martial Appeal Court had been paid as a Federal Court judge.

<sup>5</sup> Over the same ten years, salaries for Federal Court Prothonotaries will have increased by about 49.0%. This works out to an average increase of 4.1% per year.



## **Advancement of Judicial Salaries Compared to those of the DM-3 Group**

10. Judicial salaries have increased more rapidly than the salaries of deputy ministers in the DM-3 group.
11. During the nine-year period from April 1, 2011 to April 1, 2020, the base salaries of deputy ministers in the DM-3 group increased by 8.9% [5]. This works out to an average increase in base salary of less than 1.0% per year.<sup>6</sup> In addition to base salary, deputy ministers in the DM-3 group receive “at-risk pay” (variable compensation) in an amount of up to 33% of base salary. Overall salaries the DM-3 group (including “at-risk” pay) have risen, on average, from \$288,709 as of March 31, 2015 to \$303,545 as of March 31, 2020. This represents a 5.1% increase over five years, which works out to an average of about 1.0% per year over the five-year period from March 31, 2015 to March 31, 2020.
12. From paragraph 7, the salaries of Canada’s federally appointed judges will have increased by about 2.5% per year over the ten years from April 1, 2011 to April 1, 2021. This rate changed over time, and for the five-year period ending March 31, 2020, judicial salaries increased by 9.7%. This works out to an average of 1.9% per year.

## **B. SALARIES OF OTHER HIGH-LEVEL PROFESSIONALS IN CANADA**

13. This section considers the salaries of other high-level professionals in Canada.
14. We first consider the earnings of Canadian law school deans and the top salary bands for Canadian public sector lawyers. Earnings for these groups may be of interest, insofar as they represent alternative career paths for judicial candidates. We also examine the earnings of Canadian physicians. While a career in medicine would not represent an alternative path for most judicial candidates, earnings in medicine offers another perspective on the levels earned by other high-level professionals in Canada.

### **Earnings of Canadian Law School Deans**

15. Table 2 (page 6) shows salaries (excluding expenses) for law school deans for 2018 onward.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> As of April 1, 2011, base salaries applicable to the DM-3 group were in the range of \$239,200 to \$281,400. Since April 1, 2017, the range has remained frozen at \$260,600 to \$306,500.

<sup>7</sup> The sources for the salaries in Table 2 are identified at pages 13 to 15 as items [6] to [22].

**Table 2**  
**Salaries for Canadian Law School Deans**

	2018 Calendar Year		2019 Calendar Year	
	Name	Salary	Name	Salary
University of Toronto	Edward Iacobucci	\$357,715	Edward Iacobucci	\$364,911
McGill University*	Robert Leckey	\$240,000		
University of British Columbia*	Catherine Dauvergne	\$344,577	Catherine Dauvergne	\$348,365
University of Montréal*	Jean-Francois Gaudreault-Desbiens	\$221,070		
University of Ottawa				
- Common Law Section	Adam Dodek	\$216,565	Adam Dodek	\$224,331
- Civil Law Section	Céline Levesque	\$218,552	Céline Lévesque (to end of June 2019)	\$225,523
			Marie-Eve Sylvestre (from July 2019)	\$201,490
York University	Lorne Sossin (to end of April 2018)	\$309,915	Mary Condon	\$292,051
	Mary Condon (from May 2018)	\$240,503		
Queen's University	William Flanagan	\$293,808	William Flanagan (to end of June 2019)	\$291,371
			Mark Walters (from July 2019)	\$130,000
University of Alberta	Paul Paton	\$357,627	Paul Paton (to end of June 2019)	\$345,161
			David Percy (from July 2019)	\$326,072
Western University	Erika Chamberlain	\$232,500	Erika Chamberlain	\$259,493
University of Calgary	Ian Holloway	\$326,017	Ian Holloway	\$326,017
University of Windsor	Christopher Waters	\$238,464	Christopher Waters	\$248,460
University of Victoria*	Jeremy Webber (to end of June 2018)	\$201,036	Susan Breau	\$226,504
	Susan Breau (from July 2018)	\$163,407		
Dalhousie University*	Camille Cameron	\$280,288	Camille Cameron	\$282,525
Laval University*	Anne-Marie Laflamme	\$174,541		
University of Quebec*	Monique Brodeur	\$174,024		
University of Sherbrooke*	Sébastien Lebel-Grenier	\$172,751		
University of Manitoba			Johnathan Black-Branch	\$318,505
University of Saskatchewan	Martin Phillipson	\$249,675		
Thompson Rivers University**	Bradford Morse	\$203,393		

Notes:

\*Reported salary for fiscal year (year-end March 31 of following year).

\*\*Reported salary for 2017/2018 fiscal year.

16. Most salaries for Canadian law school deans are lower than judicial salaries. The salaries for Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces were \$321,600 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019, and were \$329,900 from April 1, 2019 to March 31, 2020.

### **Top Salary Bands for Canadian Public Sector Lawyers**

17. Examples of the top salary bands for public sector lawyers in Canada are as follows:

- (a) For lawyers with the federal government, the highest classification is LP-05. As of May 10, 2021, rates of pay for LP-05 are **\$181,624 to \$222,210**. Any performance pay would be additional. [23]
- (b) For lawyers with the Province of Ontario, the highest classification is Crown Counsel 4. As of December 2019, rates of pay for this classification were **\$176,568 to \$231,920**. Any performance pay would be additional. [24]
- (c) For lawyers with the Province of British Columbia, the highest classification is Level 4. As of April 1, 2020, the top end of the pay scale for Level 4 was **\$233,779**. [25]
- (d) For lawyers with the Province of Manitoba, the highest classification is Supervising Legal Counsel. From September 29, 2018 to March 29, 2019, the top pay step for this classification was **\$157,395**. [26]
- (e) For lawyers with the Province of Nova Scotia, the highest classification is Senior Crown Counsel. For Senior Crown Counsel with 17 years or more relevant experience, the top rate of pay for 2021 is **\$161,962**. [27]
- (f) For lawyers with the Province of New Brunswick, the highest classification would be a Lawyer 2 at Pay Step 26. As of July 1, 2020, the annual rate of pay for this position was **\$140,088**. [28]

18. Salaries for public sector lawyers are generally lower than the judicial salaries shown in Table 1 (page 3).

## Earnings of Physicians in Canada

19. Canada's physicians work in a single payer system with their payments tracked by the provinces and made available by the Canadian Institute for Health Information. Estimates of overhead costs are available from the Canadian Medical Association.
20. Table 3 (page 9) estimates annual earnings for physicians in Canada by specialty. Average clinical amounts paid were obtained from the Canadian Institute for Health Information's National Physician Database. [29, 30] Values are shown by specialty. To estimate earnings, revenues are reduced by the overhead percentages from the Canadian Medical Association's 2017 Workforce Survey. [31]
21. Family doctors comprised the largest group of physicians. For fiscal 2019, Canada had 36,659 family doctors, and their average earnings are estimated in Table 3 to have been **\$204,348**.
22. The earnings of specialist physicians varied by medical or surgical field. For example, Canada had 2,054 general surgery specialists in fiscal 2019, and their average earnings are estimated in Table 3 to have been **\$358,594**.
23. The salaries for Justices of the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, Tax Court of Canada, Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories, and Appeal Courts of the Provinces were \$315,300 from April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018 and were \$321,600 from April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019. While physicians in some specialties had earnings that exceeded judicial salaries, physicians in other specialties earned less.

## Economic Effects of COVID-19

24. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has negatively affected the labour market with uneven effects across sectors. For example, while Canada's total unemployment rate increased from 5.7% in February 2020 to 9.4% in January 2021, the unemployment rate in Canada's Accommodation and Food Services industry increased from 5.6% to 18.7% over the same period. [32]
25. The Government of Canada's Fall Economic Statement shows that \$382.4 billion had been spent as of November 13, 2020 on direct measures to fight COVID-19 and support people. This includes \$322.3 billion spent by the federal government and an additional \$60.1 billion spent by provincial and territorial governments. The federal debt before accounting for any planned stimulus spending was projected to increase from 31.2% for Fiscal 2020 to 50.7% for Fiscal 2021. The above deficits do not consider impacts relating to the federal government's plans to spend an additional sum of up to \$100 billion in stimulus spending over three years. [33]

**Table 3**  
**Estimated Earnings per Physician by Specialty, Canada**

	April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018				April 1, 2018 to March 31, 2019			
	Count of physicians	Mean clinical amount paid	Over-head	Estimated Earnings	Count of physicians	Mean clinical amount paid	Over-head	Estimated Earnings
Family medicine	35,919	\$280,231	27%	<b>\$204,568</b>	36,659	\$279,929	27%	<b>\$204,348</b>
Medical specialists								
Internal medicine	9,574	\$403,475	21%	<b>\$318,745</b>	9,916	\$407,171	21%	<b>\$321,665</b>
Cardiology	1,365	\$600,413	23%	<b>\$462,318</b>	1,396	\$610,793	23%	<b>\$470,311</b>
Gastroenterology	687	\$541,682	25%	<b>\$406,262</b>	716	\$551,900	25%	<b>\$413,925</b>
Neurology	998	\$309,700	24%	<b>\$235,372</b>	1,032	\$316,133	24%	<b>\$240,261</b>
Psychiatry	4,809	\$277,523	19%	<b>\$224,794</b>	4,799	\$281,614	19%	<b>\$228,107</b>
Pediatrics	3,114	\$297,832	24%	<b>\$226,352</b>	3,209	\$296,010	24%	<b>\$224,968</b>
Dermatology	558	\$383,410	35%	<b>\$249,216</b>	571	\$384,815	35%	<b>\$250,130</b>
Physical medicine	423	\$285,969	19%	<b>\$231,635</b>	438	\$289,497	19%	<b>\$234,493</b>
Anesthesia	3,195	\$430,744	13%	<b>\$374,747</b>	3,249	\$436,983	13%	<b>\$380,175</b>
Surgical specialists								
General surgery	2,027	\$451,766	23%	<b>\$347,860</b>	2,054	\$465,707	23%	<b>\$358,594</b>
Thoracic/cardiovascular surgery	415	\$599,196	28%	<b>\$429,024</b>	417	\$587,585	28%	<b>\$420,711</b>
Urology	666	\$479,976	25%	<b>\$359,982</b>	666	\$499,668	25%	<b>\$374,751</b>
Orthopedic surgery	1,478	\$427,130	23%	<b>\$328,890</b>	1,506	\$438,037	23%	<b>\$337,288</b>
Plastic surgery	523	\$384,140	31%	<b>\$265,057</b>	531	\$394,176	31%	<b>\$271,981</b>
Neurosurgery	293	\$529,651	28%	<b>\$379,230</b>	276	\$557,925	28%	<b>\$399,474</b>
Ophthalmology	1,183	\$766,367	40%	<b>\$459,820</b>	1,191	\$791,466	40%	<b>\$474,880</b>
Otolaryngology	728	\$441,765	32%	<b>\$300,400</b>	736	\$443,596	32%	<b>\$301,645</b>
Obstetrics/gynecology	2,117	\$390,939	30%	<b>\$273,658</b>	2,127	\$392,115	30%	<b>\$274,481</b>

## C. JUDICIAL REMUNERATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

26. Since judicial systems differ between countries, it is difficult to directly compare salaries of judges across different countries. Unlike Canada, where all superior court judges across the country are paid the same at both the trial and appellate levels, other countries set judicial salaries that differ by region and by court hierarchy.
27. Salaries as of 2020 for judges in Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States are considered below.<sup>8</sup>

### *Australia*

28. In Australia, salaries of federally appointed judges are recommended by the Government of Australia Remuneration Tribunal (Judicial and Related Offices – Remuneration and Allowances). Determinations from the Tribunal must then be approved by the House of Parliament. [36]
29. Salaries for federal judges, as of July 1, 2020, range from \$394,980 AUD for Federal Circuit Court Judges to \$468,020 AUD for Federal Court and Family Court Judges. As these salaries are in Australian dollars, currency conversion is necessary before comparing them to Canadian salaries. [37]
30. Using a nominal exchange rate of {\$1.00 AUD = \$0.9247 CAD}, the salary of Australian Federal Circuit Court Judges converts to \$365,238 CAD, and the salary of Australian Family and Federal Court Judges converts to \$432,778 CAD.
31. Costs of living are lower in Canada than in Australia. Because the above estimates do not account for these cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada.
32. Purchasing power parity exchange rates are adjustments that account not only for the rate of currency exchange but also for cost-of-living differences.
33. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 AUD = \$0.8197 CAD}, the salary of Australian Federal Circuit Court Judges is worth **\$323,772 CAD**, and the salary of Australian Family and Federal Court Judges is worth **\$383,644 CAD**. The salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800) falls within this range.

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<sup>8</sup> Nominal exchange rates in this section represent average values indicated by the Bank of Canada for 2020. [34] Purchasing Power Exchange rates are from OECD Data Reports for the year 2020. [35]

## *New Zealand*


34. In New Zealand, the Remuneration Authority of New Zealand sets the salaries of federally appointed judges. [38] Salaries for federal judges as of October 1, 2020 range from \$471,100 NZD for Judges of the High Court to \$493,500 NZD for Judges of the Court of Appeal. [39]
35. Using a nominal exchange rate of {\$1.00 NZD = \$0.8712 CAD}, the salary of Judges of the High Court converts to \$410,422 CAD, and the salary of Judges of the Court of Appeal converts to \$429,937 CAD.
36. Because the above estimates do not account for cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada, where costs of living are lower. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 NZD = \$0.8211 CAD}, the salary of Judges of the High Court is worth **\$386,824 CAD**, and the salary of Judges of the Court of Appeal is worth **\$405,217 CAD**. These adjusted salaries exceed the salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800).

## *United Kingdom*

37. In the United Kingdom, judges are appointed by the prime minister with the selection of candidates for judicial office determined by an independent Judicial Appointments Commission. The salaries of judges in the United Kingdom are determined through recommendation of the Senior Salaries Review Body. [40]
38. As of April 1, 2020, salaries were £219,396 for Group 3 Judges (which include Inner House Judges of the Court of Session for Scotland, Justices of Appeal, and Justices of Appeal for Northern Ireland), and £192,679 for Group 4 Judges (which include Puisne Judges of the High Court, Vice-Chancellor of the County Palatine of Lancaster, Puisne Judge of the High Court for Northern Ireland, and Outer House Judges of the Court of Session for Scotland). [41, 42]
39. Using a nominal exchange rate of {£1.00 = \$1.7199 CAD}, the salary of Group 3 Judges converts to \$377,339 CAD, and the salary of Group 4 Judges converts to \$331,389 CAD.
40. As the above estimates do not account for cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada, where costs of living are lower. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate {£1.00 = \$1.6727 CAD}, the salary of Group 3 Judges is worth **\$366,982 CAD**, and the salary of Group 4 Judges is worth **\$322,292 CAD**. The salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800) falls within this range.

## *United States*

41. Federal judges in the United States are nominated by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. [43] For 2020, salaries were \$216,400 USD for District Judges and \$229,500 USD for Circuit Judges. [44]
42. Using a nominal exchange rate of {\$1.00 USD = \$1.3415 CAD}, the salary of District Judges converts to \$290,301 CAD, and the salary of Circuit Judges converts to \$307,874 CAD.
43. As the above estimates do not account for cost-of-living differences, they will overstate the income needed to enjoy the same living standard in Canada, where costs of living are lower. Using a purchasing power parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 USD = \$1.1981 CAD}, the salary of District Judges is worth **\$259,266 CAD**, and the salary of Circuit Judges is worth **\$274,961 CAD**. These adjusted salaries are much lower than the salary in Canada for Superior Trial Courts of the Provinces and Territories (\$338,800).
44. The Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court for 2020 is \$277,700 USD. Using a purchasing parity exchange rate of {\$1.00 USD = \$1.1981 CAD}, this would be worth **\$332,709 CAD**. The salary of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada (\$435,600 CDN) exceeds this level by about 31%.



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APPENDIX B – QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE



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## MARK E. SZEKELY

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### EDUCATION:

Bachelor of Science (Economics), University of Victoria (1993)  
Master of Arts (Economics), University of Western Ontario (1994)

### PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

Board of Directors, Association of Professional Economists of BC  
Member, National Association of Forensic Economics

### SPECIALIZATION AREAS:

Labour economics, natural resources and the environment, socio-economic analysis and major project assessment.

### PROFESSIONAL HISTORY:

#### 1998-Present: Economist/Partner, Columbia Pacific Consulting Ltd.

Economic assessments relating to litigation matters involving personal injury and fatality. More than 1,500 assignments completed including earnings projections by education level and occupation, cost of future care valuations, pension loss calculations; financial support projections; statistical household services projections, and gross-up estimates for income taxes and investment management fees. Also completed socio-economic impact studies for various major investment projects. Partner since June 2018.

Qualified as an expert witness in the British Columbia Supreme Court.

#### 1996-1998: Economic Consultant, Vancouver

Preparation of study outlines, drafts and final reports for government and private sector clients. Projects include labour markets, forestry modeling, and community development.

1995: Research Analyst, BC Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum

Contract position involving data analysis and stakeholder consultations for the BC Greenhouse Gas Action Plan.

1994-1996: Research Analyst, G.E. Bridges & Associates

Socio-economic analysis and financial modeling for projects dealing with natural resources and the environment.

1993-1994: Research Assistant, University of Western Ontario

Research Assistant to Dr. Jonas Fisher. Studies effects of monetary shocks to US and Canadian economies.





## SALARIES - APRIL 1, 2019

Revision rate            2.60%

	<b>New (current)</b>		<b>Previous</b>	
	Annual salary	monthly salary	Annual salary	monthly salary

### Supreme Court of Canada

Chief Justice	<b>\$424,200.00</b>	<b>\$35,350.00</b>	\$413,500.00	\$34,458.33
Justice	<b>\$392,700.00</b>	<b>\$32,725.00</b>	\$382,800.00	\$31,900.00

### Federal Court & Tax Court

Chief Justice	<b>\$361,700.00</b>	<b>\$30,141.66</b>	\$352,600.00	\$29,383.33
Allowance	<b>\$2,000.00</b>	<b>\$166.67</b>	\$2,000.00	\$166.67
Associate Chief Justice	<b>\$361,700.00</b>	<b>\$30,141.66</b>	\$352,600.00	\$29,383.33
Allowance	<b>\$2,000.00</b>	<b>\$166.67</b>	\$2,000.00	\$166.67
Justice	<b>\$329,900.00</b>	<b>\$27,491.66</b>	\$321,600.00	\$26,800.00
Allowance	<b>\$2,000.00</b>	<b>\$166.67</b>	\$2,000.00	\$166.67
Prothonotaries	<b>\$263,900.00</b>	<b>\$21,991.66</b>	\$257,200.00	\$21,433.33

P/J	
80%	\$263,900
80%	\$263,900 rounded down
	\$0

### Superior, Supreme, Q.B

Chief Justice	<b>\$361,700.00</b>	<b>\$30,141.66</b>	\$352,600.00	\$29,383.33
Associate Chief Justice	<b>\$361,700.00</b>	<b>\$30,141.66</b>	\$352,600.00	\$29,383.33
Justice	<b>\$329,900.00</b>	<b>\$27,491.66</b>	\$321,600.00	\$26,800.00

### Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Labrador

Chief Justice	<b>\$361,700.00</b>	<b>\$30,141.66</b>	\$352,600.00	\$29,383.33
Allowance	<b>\$12,000.00</b>	<b>\$1,000.00</b>	\$12,000.00	\$1,000.00
Justice	<b>\$329,900.00</b>	<b>\$27,491.66</b>	\$321,600.00	\$26,800.00
Allowance	<b>\$12,000.00</b>	<b>\$1,000.00</b>	\$12,000.00	\$1,000.00





**Anonymized Data Re: Appointment, Supernumerary Status and Retirement  
for Retirements from 1933 to 30Sep20**

(All dates have been anonymized in order to protect the identities of the individuals involved)

<b>ID</b>	<b>First Appointment</b>	<b>Eligible to Retire</b>	<b>Eligible to Elect</b>	<b>Elected</b>	<b>Retirement</b>	<b>Retirement Reason</b>	<b>Age at Retirement</b>
1	11-Apr-1983	26-Feb-1999	9-Oct-1999	8-Oct-2000	5-Nov-2003	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.1
2	8-Sep-2012	18-Sep-2027	18-Sep-2027				
3	11-Mar-1999	11-Mar-2014	11-Mar-2014		23-Jul-2009	Early Retirement	63.3
4	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019			
5	6-Jun-2015	1-Dec-2030	1-Dec-2030				
6	7-Mar-1993	15-Jul-2008	15-Jul-2008	15-Jul-2008	9-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE	68.4
7	9-Nov-1973	9-Nov-1988	9-Nov-1988	10-Apr-1989	30-Dec-1995	COMPULSORY	75.0
8	30-Jan-2010	29-Jun-2023	30-Jan-2020	30-Jan-2020			
9	3-Nov-1995	3-Nov-2010	3-Nov-2010	3-Nov-2010	1-Jan-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
10	23-Dec-2006	23-Dec-2021	23-Dec-2021		1-Jan-2017	Early Retirement	64.0
11	18-Jan-2003	18-Jan-2018	18-Jan-2018	18-Jan-2018			
12	29-Sep-2018	27-Sep-2036	27-Sep-2036				
13	18-Dec-1948	23-Jul-1967	23-Jul-1967		3-Feb-1976	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.5
14	24-Sep-2016	15-Oct-2031	15-Oct-2031				
15	25-Dec-1971	27-Dec-1987	27-Dec-1987	9-Feb-1988	10-Apr-1993	ELECTIVE	70.3
16	21-Mar-2015	24-Jun-2033	24-Jun-2033				
17	16-Jun-1974	16-Jun-1989	14-Apr-1986	23-Oct-1987	14-Apr-1991	COMPULSORY	75.0
18	11-Jun-2011	11-Jun-2026	22-Sep-2025				
19	4-May-1986	4-May-2001	4-May-2001	4-May-2001	11-Jul-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
20	21-Feb-1976	21-Feb-1991	21-Feb-1991	21-Feb-1991	10-Mar-1997	ELECTIVE	74.3
21	2-Nov-1975	6-Apr-1992	6-Apr-1992	6-Apr-1992	7-Apr-2002	COMPULSORY	75.0
22	24-Jul-2019	24-Jul-2034	2-Dec-2032				
23	31-May-1969	30-May-1984	29-Nov-1981		10-Apr-1986	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.4
24	9-Nov-1983	24-Aug-2006	24-Aug-2006		23-Jun-1984	RESIGNATION (RPC)	42.8
25	29-Jan-2000	19-Jun-2016	19-Jun-2016	14-Dec-2016			
26	22-Dec-1965	22-Dec-1980	22-Dec-1980	22-Dec-1980	29-Jul-1987	COMPULSORY	75.0
27	6-Jan-2019	6-Jan-2034	6-Jan-2034				
28	4-Jan-1996	17-Apr-2012	17-Apr-2012	17-Apr-2012	10-Apr-2015	ELECTIVE	66.7
29	17-Jul-2007	21-Jan-2018	17-Jul-2017	17-Jul-2017	21-Jan-2018	COMPULSORY	75.0
30	19-Jul-2014	19-Jul-2029	17-Jan-2029				
31	24-Oct-1981	4-Jul-1992	4-Jul-1992	4-Jul-1992	4-Jul-1997	COMPULSORY	75.0
32	31-Mar-1979	16-Dec-1998	16-Dec-1998	16-Dec-1998	11-Apr-2001	ELECTIVE	67.3
33	28-Aug-2020	27-Apr-2039	27-Apr-2039				
34	29-Apr-1972	29-Jun-1988	29-Jun-1988		24-Dec-1986	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.5
35	8-Mar-1991	28-May-2005	8-Mar-2001	8-Mar-2001	28-May-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
36	29-Mar-1970	29-Mar-1985	29-Mar-1985		29-Mar-1975	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	57.8
37	12-Jan-1986	12-Jan-2001	12-Jan-2001	12-Jan-2001	29-Nov-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
38	12-Feb-2000	12-Feb-2015	9-Jan-2013		5-Jan-2008	DISABILITY	65.0
39	17-Dec-1988	16-Nov-2007	16-Nov-2007	28-Nov-2007	11-Jul-2012	ELECTIVE	65.7
40	14-Oct-1953	9-Jan-1970	9-Jan-1970		30-Oct-1975	ELECTIVE	70.8
41	21-Mar-2018	28-Mar-2035	28-Mar-2035				
42	29-Aug-2019	29-Aug-2034	29-Aug-2034				
43	12-Jun-1952	2-May-1960	12-Jun-1962		3-May-1965	COMPULSORY	75.0
44	18-Jul-1975	14-Feb-1992	14-Feb-1992	14-Feb-1992	14-Feb-2002	COMPULSORY	75.0
45	31-Aug-1972	9-May-1996	9-May-1996	9-May-1996	10-May-2006	COMPULSORY	75.0
46	22-Feb-1969	29-Dec-1986	29-Dec-1986	11-Apr-1989	11-Apr-1995	ELECTIVE	73.3
47	21-Jan-1984	21-Jan-1999	21-Jan-1999	21-Jan-1999	3-Jul-2004	DEATH (RPC)	71.9
48	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	26-Sep-2023		11-Apr-2019	Early Retirement	63.4
49	31-Mar-1985	17-Jun-2000	3-Sep-2000	3-Sep-2000	1-Apr-2009	ELECTIVE	73.6
50	11-Apr-1946	11-Apr-1961	3-Jun-1957		10-Dec-1961	ELECTIVE	74.5
51	9-Feb-1995	28-Jan-2011	28-Jan-2011	28-Jan-2011	25-Mar-2018	ELECTIVE	71.2
52	9-Feb-1995	9-Feb-2010	29-Jun-2006	10-Jul-2006	15-Aug-2007	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.1
53	8-Oct-1989	8-Oct-2004			9-Dec-2013	ELECTIVE	74.8
54	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	27-Sep-2030				
55	28-Sep-2000	26-Dec-2017	26-Dec-2017	26-Dec-2017			
56	11-Dec-1988	13-Jul-2004	13-Feb-2005	13-Feb-2005	25-Dec-2006	ELECTIVE	66.9
57	14-Sep-2001	14-May-2019	14-May-2019	14-May-2019			
58	11-Jun-2008	11-Jun-2023	17-Jul-2019	17-Jul-2019			
59	27-Mar-2014	18-Feb-2028	26-Mar-2024				
60	22-Nov-1935	22-Nov-1950	22-Nov-1950		2-Jan-1953	DISABILITY	70.6
61	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	27-Mar-2029				
62	4-Jan-1969	4-Jan-1984	21-Mar-1979	12-Apr-1979	20-Mar-1984	COMPULSORY	75.0
63	1-Jul-1984	22-Nov-2004	24-Mar-2007	14-Apr-2008	15-Apr-2018	COMPULSORY	73.0
64	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	8-Jan-2026				
65	26-Jan-1967	4-Jun-1984	4-Jun-1984	4-Jun-1984	12-Jun-1988	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.0
66	21-May-1999	21-May-2014	19-Dec-2011	19-Dec-2011	19-Dec-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
67	1-Jul-1972	16-Aug-1988	16-Aug-1988	16-Aug-1988	24-Apr-1989	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.7
68	26-Apr-2015	20-Nov-2031	20-Nov-2031				
69	26-May-1973	25-May-1988	7-Feb-1987	8-Feb-1987	7-Feb-1992	COMPULSORY	75.0
70	3-Feb-2007	3-Feb-2022	26-Jan-2020	26-Jan-2020			
71	29-Mar-1987	29-Mar-2002	29-Mar-2002	29-Mar-2002	10-Dec-2002	ELECTIVE	66.5
72	19-Oct-1991	19-Oct-2006	19-Oct-2006	9-Nov-2006	23-Aug-2014	COMPULSORY	75.0
73	12-Jun-2020	9-Feb-2036	9-Feb-2036				
74	27-Apr-1977	26-Feb-1999	5-Sep-2003	5-Sep-2003	13-Jul-2005	ELECTIVE	66.9
75	5-Aug-1978	4-Nov-1995	4-Nov-1995	8-Nov-1995	4-Nov-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
76	8-Nov-1992	11-May-2014	11-May-2014	11-Apr-2019			
77	7-Nov-2008	1-Apr-2024	1-Apr-2024				
78	9-Nov-1973	9-Nov-1988	9-Nov-1988	10-Nov-1988	1-Jun-1996	COMPULSORY	75.0
79	21-May-1993	9-Aug-2009	9-Aug-2009	9-Sep-2014	27-Oct-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0

80	26-Sep-2003	26-Sep-2018	15-Jun-2018		9-Dec-2014 Early Retirement	66.5
81	16-Jun-1943	16-Jun-1958	16-Jun-1958		16-Jun-1963 DISABILITY	71.0
82	23-Aug-1980	23-Aug-1995	23-Aug-1995		8-Jun-1982 RESIGNATION (RPC)	56.4
83	11-Jun-2011	11-Jun-2026	3-Sep-2024			
84	4-May-1956	19-Jul-1970	19-Jul-1970		22-May-1973 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	72.8
85	1-Aug-1968	25-Aug-1989	25-Aug-1989	25-Aug-1989	25-Aug-1999 COMPULSORY	75.0
86	27-Jul-1945	27-Jul-1960	27-Jul-1960		29-Nov-1962 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.8
87	9-May-1970	24-Jul-1996	24-Jul-1996		15-Feb-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	43.6
88	30-Sep-1978	11-May-1997	11-May-1997	11-May-1997	11-May-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
89	19-May-1973	5-Oct-1993	5-Oct-1993	5-Oct-1993	5-Oct-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
90	23-Nov-1956	8-Jul-1976	8-Jul-1976	8-Jul-1976	8-Jul-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
91	8-Sep-1994	19-Feb-2013	19-Feb-2013	19-Feb-2013	1-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE	67.6
92	5-Jan-2002	5-Jan-2017	5-Jan-2017	8-Jan-2017		
93	30-Mar-1975	11-Apr-1993	11-Apr-1993	16-Apr-1993	29-Nov-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.6
94	1-Feb-1996	5-May-2015	5-May-2015		8-Aug-2015 ELECTIVE	61.0
95	22-Jun-2005	22-Jun-2020	5-Mar-2020		12-Jul-2018 Early Retirement	68.4
96	29-Dec-1994	29-Dec-2009	9-Nov-2005	9-Nov-2005	27-Dec-2007 DISABILITY	72.1
97	7-Aug-2009	1-Jul-2022	7-Aug-2019	9-Aug-2019		
98	11-Dec-2020	13-Jul-2039	13-Jul-2039			
99	25-Jan-2019	25-Jan-2034	25-Jan-2034			
100	23-Sep-1964	27-Sep-1985	27-Sep-1985	8-Jan-1987	27-Sep-1995 COMPULSORY	75.0
101	21-May-2010	21-May-2025	21-Jun-2024			
102	27-Apr-1958	27-Apr-1973	27-Apr-1973		14-Mar-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	59.8
103	21-Mar-2003	7-Apr-2021	7-Apr-2021		13-Jul-2019 Early Retirement	60.2
104	26-Feb-1998	21-Mar-2014	21-Mar-2014	21-Mar-2014		
105	8-Mar-2008	9-Mar-2023	9-Mar-2023			
106	27-Oct-1988	27-Oct-2003	14-Aug-2003		27-Nov-2002 DISABILITY	69.3
107	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015		
108	26-Dec-2004	26-Dec-2019	26-Dec-2019		25-Nov-2017 DISABILITY	66.9
109	14-May-2011	16-Aug-2025	14-May-2021			
110	9-Jul-1983	24-Apr-2005	24-Apr-2005		9-Oct-2019 ELECTIVE	72.7
111	11-Jun-2008	11-Jun-2023	11-Jun-2023			
112	3-Nov-1988	31-May-2006	24-Mar-2007	9-Jun-2007	8-Nov-2010 ELECTIVE	66.9
113	7-Feb-1947	7-Feb-1962	7-Feb-1962		23-Oct-1966 ELECTIVE	74.0
114	22-Mar-2008	23-Mar-2023	23-Mar-2023			
115	20-Jul-1978	20-Jul-1993	20-Jul-1993	20-Jul-1993	10-Apr-2000 ELECTIVE	72.1
116	23-Oct-1975	26-Feb-1999	11-Jan-2000	11-Jan-2000	21-Sep-2009 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.7
117	6-Jun-1981	5-Jun-1996	5-Jun-1996		9-Oct-1998 ELECTIVE	69.6
118	29-Jan-1970	14-Jan-1994	14-Jan-1994	14-Jan-1994	10-Dec-1994 ELECTIVE	65.9
119	25-Dec-2003	27-Mar-2021	27-Mar-2021			
120	11-Aug-2017	16-Jul-2033	16-Jul-2033			
121	19-May-1985	18-May-2000	18-Aug-1996	18-Aug-1996	18-Aug-2001 COMPULSORY	75.0
122	6-Mar-1980	7-Mar-1995	15-Jun-1994		8-Oct-1991 DISABILITY	67.3
123	28-Apr-2005	27-Apr-2020	27-Apr-2020	27-Apr-2020		
124	9-Sep-1964	1-Dec-1977	1-Dec-1977	9-Aug-1982	1-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY	75.0
125	27-Jun-2010	30-Mar-2026	30-Mar-2026			
126	21-Jan-1999	29-Apr-2014	29-Apr-2014		23-Jul-2014 ELECTIVE	65.0
127	18-Apr-1999	18-Apr-2014	18-Apr-2014	18-Apr-2014		
128	28-Aug-1971	28-Aug-1986	28-Aug-1986		13-May-1978 DISABILITY	59.2
129	29-Sep-1984	1-Apr-1996	1-Apr-1996	1-Apr-1996	2-Apr-2001 COMPULSORY	75.0
130	9-Jun-1961	3-Dec-1979	3-Dec-1979		3-Dec-1989 COMPULSORY	75.0
131	8-Oct-2015	8-Oct-2030	8-Oct-2030			
132	21-Jan-1964	21-Jan-1979	21-Jan-1979	9-Jan-1986	21-Sep-1988 COMPULSORY	75.0
133	2-Oct-2011	13-Feb-2020			13-Feb-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
134	25-Jan-1951	25-Jan-1966	20-Oct-1964		29-May-1952 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	57.6
135	9-Sep-1999	23-Mar-2012	9-Sep-2009		7-Dec-2001 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.7
136	22-Aug-2009	12-Feb-2018			12-Feb-2018 COMPULSORY	75.0
137	12-Jul-2018	12-Jul-2033	12-Jul-2033			
138	3-Feb-2007	28-Sep-2018	3-Feb-2017		9-Sep-2017 Early Retirement	73.9
139	11-Apr-1953	17-Oct-1977	17-Oct-1977	10-Apr-1980	17-Oct-1987 COMPULSORY	75.0
140	14-Nov-2010	24-Nov-2031	24-Nov-2031			
141	7-Mar-1993	21-Mar-2013	21-Mar-2013	11-Apr-2019		
142	19-May-1973	14-Dec-1986	19-May-1983		10-Apr-1979 RESIGNATION (RPC)	67.3
143	17-Dec-1988	17-Dec-2003	17-Dec-2003	17-Dec-2003	9-Oct-2008 ELECTIVE	71.4
144	24-Oct-2002	21-Dec-2012	24-Oct-2012		21-Dec-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
145	5-May-1973	15-Feb-1992	15-Feb-1992	15-Feb-1992	15-Feb-2002 COMPULSORY	75.0
146	8-May-1966	8-May-1981	8-May-1981	8-May-1981	10-Apr-1986 ELECTIVE	74.1
147	9-Jan-1960	9-Jan-1975	8-Nov-1971	28-Oct-1975	8-Nov-1976 COMPULSORY	75.0
148	13-Sep-2002	21-Feb-2020	21-Feb-2020	21-Feb-2020		
149	29-Mar-1961	28-Mar-1976	7-Apr-1971		6-Apr-1976 COMPULSORY	75.0
150	9-Jul-1977	26-Feb-1999	7-Oct-2000	10-Dec-2001	7-Oct-2010 COMPULSORY	75.0
151	7-Dec-2005	10-Apr-2021	10-Apr-2021			
152	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	27-Sep-2030			
153	15-Feb-2019	15-Feb-2034	31-May-2032			
154	12-Jan-1990	19-Jul-2005	23-Jan-2006	23-Jan-2006	9-Aug-2006 ELECTIVE	65.5
155	17-Oct-1984	13-Jan-2000	8-Apr-2000	29-May-2005	11-Jul-2009 ELECTIVE	74.3
156	2-Oct-1992	2-Oct-2007			9-Dec-2015 ELECTIVE	74.7
157	30-May-2008	23-Mar-2025	23-Mar-2025			
158	27-Jan-2017	25-Feb-2034	25-Feb-2034			
159	27-Jan-2017	30-Jul-2032	30-Jul-2032			
160	5-Sep-2015	5-Sep-2030	5-Sep-2030			
161	8-Jul-1999	27-Jul-2015	27-Jul-2015	27-Jul-2015		
162	8-Feb-1964	9-Jan-1990	9-Jan-1990	20-Feb-1992	9-Jan-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
163	21-Sep-2014	21-Sep-2029	23-Oct-2024			

164	3-Aug-2013	3-Aug-2028	3-Aug-2028						
165	1-Apr-1992	12-Apr-2011	12-Apr-2011	12-Apr-2011	9-Dec-2014	ELECTIVE			64.6
166	12-Apr-1985	11-Apr-2000	16-Feb-2000	16-Feb-2000	16-Feb-2005	COMPULSORY			75.0
167	2-May-2009	9-Oct-2027	9-Oct-2027						
168	22-Oct-2017	22-Oct-2032	22-Oct-2032						
169	30-Jun-1991	19-Nov-2004	30-Jun-2001	30-Jun-2001	19-Nov-2004	COMPULSORY			75.0
170	26-Mar-1983	19-Nov-2001	15-Jul-2005	15-Jul-2005	10-Apr-2013	ELECTIVE			72.7
171	21-Mar-1996	2-Apr-2013	2-Apr-2013	13-Jun-2014	5-Dec-2015	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			65.6
172	19-Oct-1991	12-Aug-2010	12-Aug-2010	18-Aug-2010	18-Aug-2020	COMPULSORY			71.2
173	24-Oct-1976	24-Oct-1991	24-Oct-1991		1-Nov-1978	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			53.2
174	8-Mar-2008	9-Mar-2023	9-Mar-2023						
175	25-Sep-1976	25-Sep-1991	15-Apr-1987	16-Apr-1987	14-Apr-1992	COMPULSORY			75.0
176	13-Mar-1986	13-Mar-2001	13-Mar-2001	13-Mar-2001	9-Jan-2007	ELECTIVE			74.6
177	18-Feb-1977	18-Feb-1992	18-Feb-1992	18-Feb-1992	15-Oct-1998	COMPULSORY			75.0
178	4-Aug-1966	4-Aug-1981	21-Jun-1977	21-Jun-1977	10-Apr-1982	ELECTIVE			74.8
179	9-Jul-1977	13-Dec-1996	13-Dec-1996	13-Dec-1996	13-Dec-2006	COMPULSORY			75.0
180	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	1-May-2024						
181	24-Sep-2016	24-Sep-2031	24-Sep-2031						
182	29-Mar-1997	28-Mar-2012	28-Mar-2012	28-Mar-2012	2-Sep-2019	COMPULSORY			75.0
183	9-Feb-2019	21-Mar-2035	21-Mar-2035						
184	9-May-2007	9-May-2022	9-May-2022						
185	30-Mar-1974	30-Mar-1989	18-Jun-1986		7-Nov-1981	DISABILITY			65.4
186	9-May-2020	10-May-2035	10-May-2035						
187	31-Dec-1983	13-Jun-2005	24-Mar-2007		23-Aug-2010	ELECTIVE			63.7
188	8-Jan-2021	12-Aug-2040	12-Aug-2040						
189	10-Jul-1993	10-Jul-2008	18-Jul-2005	18-Jul-2005	18-Jul-2010	COMPULSORY			75.0
190	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2035	28-Aug-2035						
191	1-Oct-1998	1-Oct-2013	1-Oct-2013		1-Oct-2013	ELECTIVE			68.2
192	31-Jul-1994	31-Jul-2009	31-Jul-2009	31-Jul-2009	11-Nov-2018	COMPULSORY			75.0
193	26-Aug-1973	30-Jun-1992	30-Jun-1992	30-Jun-1992	13-Sep-2000	ELECTIVE			73.2
194	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	5-Jan-2030						
195	8-Sep-2012	20-Sep-2027	20-Sep-2027						
196	12-Jan-2013	19-Sep-2022							
197	26-Jun-1997	10-Mar-2014	10-Mar-2014	10-Mar-2014					
198	13-Jul-1985	13-Jul-2000	12-Jan-2000	12-Jan-2000	10-Apr-2004	ELECTIVE			74.2
199	21-Jun-1974	1-Mar-1993	1-Mar-1993	1-Mar-1993	12-Jan-1999	ELECTIVE			70.9
200	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2030	22-Jul-2030						
201	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	7-Nov-2023						
202	18-Feb-1972	11-Jun-1996	11-Jun-1996		11-Jun-2006	COMPULSORY			75.0
203	9-Aug-1934	2-Dec-1964	2-Dec-1964		2-Dec-1964	ELECTIVE			65.0
204	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	24-Sep-2031						
205	30-Aug-1975	15-May-1994			17-May-1987	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			58.0
206	2-Jul-2005	2-Jul-2020	2-Jul-2020		11-Mar-2019	Early Retirement			67.3
207	10-Jul-1993	10-Jul-2008	4-Sep-2005	9-Sep-2005	9-Dec-2008	ELECTIVE			73.3
208	21-Dec-1950	9-Jan-1967	9-Jan-1967	17-Dec-1975	9-Jan-1977	COMPULSORY			75.0
209	18-Jul-2019	18-Jul-2034	1-Sep-2029						
210	11-Apr-1974	11-Apr-1989			9-Jan-1978	RESIGNATION (RPC)			60.6
211	9-May-1997	31-Mar-2013	31-Mar-2013	31-Mar-2013	8-Jan-2014	ELECTIVE			64.9
212	29-May-1971	13-Sep-1997	13-Sep-1997	13-Sep-1997	13-Sep-2007	COMPULSORY			75.0
213	7-Nov-2008	27-May-2023	7-Nov-2018	7-Nov-2018					
214	24-Dec-1989	24-Dec-2004	12-Oct-2003	25-May-2008	12-Oct-2008	COMPULSORY			75.0
215	1-Apr-1992	25-Jan-2011	25-Jan-2011						
216	9-Sep-1938	9-Sep-1953	9-Sep-1953		19-Feb-1963	COMPULSORY			75.0
217	16-Aug-1942	16-Aug-1957	16-Aug-1957		8-Feb-1964	ELECTIVE			72.1
218	8-Sep-2012	8-Sep-2027	15-Nov-2022						
219	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	27-Sep-2030						
220	21-May-1999	21-May-2014	28-Feb-2014	28-Feb-2014	28-Feb-2019	COMPULSORY			75.0
221	24-Jun-1978	26-Feb-1999	19-Sep-2001		9-Jan-2005	ELECTIVE			68.3
222	12-Feb-1998	31-Aug-2013	31-Aug-2013	8-Jan-2014					
223	18-Aug-1946	25-Nov-1966	25-Nov-1966		25-Nov-1976	COMPULSORY			75.0
224	7-Feb-2002	7-Feb-2017	7-Feb-2017	7-Feb-2017					
225	21-Jun-1969	25-Dec-1987	25-Dec-1987	25-Dec-1987	25-Dec-1997	COMPULSORY			75.0
226	9-Nov-1978	9-Nov-1993	9-Nov-1993	30-Nov-1996	19-Jan-1999	COMPULSORY			75.0
227	10-May-2014	1-Dec-2031	1-Dec-2031						
228	5-Nov-1981	5-Nov-1996	5-Nov-1996	5-Nov-1996	29-Dec-2005	COMPULSORY			75.0
229	31-Jul-1943	15-Oct-1960	15-Oct-1960		15-Oct-1970	COMPULSORY			75.0
230	9-May-2007	12-Mar-2023	12-Mar-2023						
231	19-Jun-1985	25-Jan-1996	25-Jan-1996	25-Jan-1996	9-Jun-2000	ELECTIVE			74.4
232	1-Oct-1998	1-Oct-2013	1-Oct-2013		16-Dec-2012	Early Retirement			66.7
233	24-Sep-1961	9-Jul-1978	9-Jul-1978	10-Jul-1978	9-Dec-1983	ELECTIVE			70.4
234	5-Jan-2002	16-Oct-2019	16-Oct-2019		9-Dec-2017	Early Retirement			60.4
235	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	6-Oct-2029						
236	26-Aug-1973	26-Aug-1988	23-Sep-1986	24-Sep-1986	27-Apr-1991	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			74.6
237	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034						
238	18-Oct-1980	7-Dec-1991	7-Dec-1991	7-Dec-1991	9-Dec-1994	ELECTIVE			73.0
239	7-Mar-1981	15-Jun-2003	24-Mar-2007	10-Dec-2007	10-Dec-2017	COMPULSORY			72.2
240	12-Jul-2020	12-Jul-2035	7-Oct-2033						
241	27-Mar-1988	15-Oct-2007	2-May-2012		14-Feb-2005	DEATH (RPC)			57.8
242	1-Jul-1950	1-Jul-1965	1-Jul-1965		17-Aug-1961	DISABILITY			65.0
243	31-Oct-1981	31-Oct-1996	11-Feb-1992	11-Feb-1992	11-Feb-1997	COMPULSORY			75.0
244	30-May-1996	31-May-2011	31-May-2011	31-May-2011	21-Feb-2019	ELECTIVE			74.0
245	19-Oct-1963	13-Jun-1978	19-Oct-1973	19-Oct-1975	13-Jun-1978	COMPULSORY			75.0
246	10-Dec-1975	10-Dec-1990	10-Dec-1990	10-Dec-1990	19-Jan-1998	COMPULSORY			75.0
247	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	11-Apr-2010	ELECTIVE			70.3

248	1-Feb-1997	13-May-2013	13-May-2013		9-Jan-2010 DISABILITY	60.4
249	11-Aug-2018	11-Aug-2033	11-Aug-2033			
250	7-Mar-1984	8-Mar-1999	25-Dec-1997	25-Dec-1997	11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE	71.3
251	31-Dec-1983	31-Dec-1998	31-Dec-1998		7-Sep-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.4
252	21-Jul-1990	21-Jul-2005	21-Jul-2005	21-Jul-2005	17-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
253	2-Apr-1998	24-Jul-2016	24-Jul-2016	9-Oct-2016		
254	30-Jul-2005	2-Nov-2020	2-Nov-2020	2-Nov-2020		
255	26-Jun-1997	17-Aug-2014	17-Aug-2014	10-Apr-2016		
256	20-Jun-1992	20-Aug-2007	20-Aug-2007	18-Oct-2007	8-Nov-2015 ELECTIVE	73.1
257	5-Oct-2002	5-Oct-2017	5-Oct-2017	5-Oct-2017		
258	8-Apr-1948	2-Jan-1958	9-Apr-1958		7-Oct-1953 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.8
259	3-Nov-1988	15-May-2008	15-May-2008	11-Apr-2017		
260	7-May-1994	2-May-2012	2-May-2012		9-Mar-2009 Early Retirement	58.9
261	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	7-Dec-2033			
262	17-Mar-1965	3-Jun-1986	3-Jun-1986	3-Jun-1986	3-Jun-1994 ELECTIVE	73.0
263	24-Jul-1957	13-Jun-1973	13-Jun-1973		10-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE	65.8
264	2-Mar-2006	2-Mar-2021	2-Mar-2021			
265	27-Mar-2014	11-Mar-2031	11-Mar-2031			
266	27-Oct-1988	20-Sep-2006	20-Sep-2006		9-Jun-1998 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	56.7
267	11-Oct-1980	30-Oct-1994	11-Oct-1990		3-Jan-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.2
268	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034			
269	18-Jan-1972	19-Aug-1981			19-Aug-1981 COMPULSORY	75.0
270	24-Apr-1966	24-Apr-1981	24-Apr-1981	25-Apr-1981	24-Oct-1982 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.9
271	5-Aug-2007	3-Feb-2024	3-Feb-2024			
272	9-Jan-2014	23-Nov-2031	23-Nov-2031			
273	30-Nov-1985	13-Mar-2003	23-Jun-2005		16-Jul-2003 ELECTIVE	63.1
274	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	27-Sep-2024			
275	8-Jul-1999	8-Jul-2014	8-Jul-2014		18-Aug-2005 DISABILITY	56.7
276	29-Mar-2018	29-Mar-2033	29-Mar-2033			
277	19-Aug-2017	19-Aug-2032	19-Aug-2032			
278	9-Jun-2012	24-Jun-2029	24-Jun-2029			
279	19-Jan-1992	28-Nov-2008	8-Oct-2010		24-Jul-1997 RESIGNATION (RPC)	51.8
280	23-Jan-1959	23-Jan-1974	8-Nov-1971	9-May-1973	8-Nov-1976 COMPULSORY	75.0
281	6-May-1972	16-Mar-1989	16-Mar-1989	9-Sep-1990	16-Mar-1999 COMPULSORY	75.0
282	21-Mar-2003	21-Mar-2018	21-Mar-2018	21-Mar-2018	10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE	70.7
283	2-Nov-1969	2-Nov-1984	21-Nov-1983	21-Nov-1983	21-Nov-1988 COMPULSORY	75.0
284	14-Jun-2014	14-Jun-2029	14-Jun-2029			
285	5-Sep-1985	16-Jul-2000	16-Jul-2000		16-Jul-2000 ELECTIVE	70.0
286	10-Jun-1965	17-Oct-1970	10-Jun-1975		17-Oct-1975 COMPULSORY	75.0
287	5-Jul-1962	5-Jul-1977	5-Jul-1977		3-Nov-1984 COMPULSORY	75.0
288	16-May-2015	8-Feb-2031	8-Feb-2031			
289	8-Mar-1975	6-Feb-1997	6-Feb-1997	29-Sep-2004	6-Feb-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
290	15-Feb-1968	21-Dec-1991	21-Dec-1991	21-Dec-1991	8-Jan-1995 ELECTIVE	68.0
291	23-Mar-1985	10-Jul-1995	23-Mar-1995	23-Mar-1995	10-Jul-1995 COMPULSORY	75.0
292	5-Jan-2002	3-May-2018	3-May-2018			
293	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015		16-Jun-2005 DISABILITY	59.1
294	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	8-Mar-2012	8-Mar-2012	9-Mar-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
295	23-Jun-1965	23-Jun-1980	20-Jun-1980	20-Jun-1980	9-Dec-1982 ELECTIVE	72.5
296	21-Aug-1992	21-Aug-2007	21-Aug-2007	21-Aug-2007	10-Apr-2015 ELECTIVE	74.6
297	5-Oct-2002	5-Oct-2017	13-May-2017		8-Jan-2016 Early Retirement	68.7
298	19-Sep-1981	19-Sep-1996	19-Sep-1996		4-Nov-1990 DISABILITY	63.6
299	26-May-1996	5-Dec-2013	5-Dec-2013	10-Dec-2014		
300	15-Oct-2015	16-Sep-2032	16-Sep-2032			
301	27-Feb-2005	17-May-2021	17-May-2021			
302	19-Jan-1992	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007	9-Jan-2010 ELECTIVE	69.8
303	9-Jan-2014	9-Jan-2029	9-Jan-2029			
304	14-Sep-2018	14-Sep-2033	3-Oct-2029			
305	9-Feb-1967	9-Feb-1982	9-Feb-1982		4-Apr-1982 ELECTIVE	65.3
306	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-May-2003	14-May-2003	13-May-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
307	24-Sep-2016	26-Apr-2036	26-Apr-2036			
308	30-Nov-1985	1-Jan-2001	2-Feb-2001	11-Apr-2001	10-Dec-2002 ELECTIVE	66.9
309	23-Nov-1995	13-May-2014	13-May-2014	13-May-2014	9-Oct-2019 ELECTIVE	66.9
310	10-Jul-1993	6-Mar-2011	6-Mar-2011		10-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE	65.1
311	4-Jul-1979	4-Jul-1994	4-Jul-1994		30-Sep-1989 DISABILITY	61.0
312	24-Jul-2019	24-Jul-2034	24-Jul-2034			
313	11-Jan-1996	27-Jan-2012	27-Jan-2012	13-Feb-2013	23-Sep-2015 DEATH (RPC)	67.6
314	7-Dec-2018	10-Mar-2034	10-Mar-2034			
315	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	14-Jun-2023			
316	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	27-Sep-2024			
317	7-Oct-1984	12-Dec-2001	16-Feb-2004		9-Feb-2002 Early Retirement	63.0
318	18-Apr-1998	17-Apr-2008			29-Jan-2012 ELECTIVE	72.5
319	10-Mar-1979	11-Mar-1999	11-Mar-1999		24-Mar-1995 DISABILITY	61.0
320	4-Jan-1969	2-Apr-1990	2-Apr-1990	2-Apr-1990	1-Apr-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
321	4-Nov-2000	1-Mar-2013	4-Nov-2010	11-Apr-2011	1-Mar-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
322	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	8-Dec-2018	8-Dec-2018		
323	12-Jun-2020	12-Jun-2035	12-Jun-2035			
324	1-Oct-1998	20-Apr-2015	20-Apr-2015		20-Mar-2013 Early Retirement	61.4
325	10-Dec-1976	10-Dec-1991	10-Dec-1991	10-Dec-1991	8-Feb-1994 ELECTIVE	71.6
326	27-Mar-1982	11-Sep-1996	26-Mar-1992	10-Dec-1992	11-Sep-1996 COMPULSORY	75.0
327	8-Jun-1961	5-Apr-1968	8-Jun-1971		6-Apr-1973 COMPULSORY	75.0
328	9-Jun-1962	30-Aug-1977	30-Aug-1977		25-Jan-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	53.4
329	23-Nov-2017	12-Apr-2033	12-Apr-2033			
330	21-Aug-1992	23-Mar-2009	23-Mar-2009	23-Mar-2009	10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE	67.5
331	19-Jan-1992	1-Nov-2012	1-Nov-2012	11-Apr-2019		



332	25-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2022	25-Mar-2022						
333	6-Apr-1952	10-Dec-1974	10-Dec-1974	16-Oct-1976	7-Apr-1982	ELECTIVE			72.3
334	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	1-May-2024						
335	20-Aug-1959	20-Aug-1974	20-Aug-1974		18-Mar-1980	COMPULSORY			75.0
336	27-Mar-1968	12-Sep-1990	12-Sep-1990	12-Sep-1990	24-Jul-1991	ELECTIVE			65.9
337	21-Jul-1990	21-Jul-2005	21-Jul-2005		22-Apr-2002	Early Retirement			62.7
338	29-Jan-1954	18-Dec-1970	18-Dec-1970		13-Nov-1972	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			66.9
339	21-Mar-2010	21-Mar-2025	21-Mar-2025						
340	26-Nov-1965	6-Mar-1981	6-Mar-1981	11-Mar-1981	6-Mar-1991	COMPULSORY			75.0
341	21-Jan-1982	22-Mar-2000	21-May-2003	21-May-2003	11-May-2013	ELECTIVE			75.0
342	30-Mar-1974	30-Mar-1989	30-Mar-1989	24-Apr-1992	2-May-1996	COMPULSORY			75.0
343	29-Sep-1984	29-Sep-1999	29-Sep-1999	29-Sep-1999	15-Aug-2007	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			74.9
344	2-Jan-1982	26-Feb-1999	19-Nov-1999	19-Nov-1999	19-Nov-2009	COMPULSORY			75.0
345	30-Nov-1985	30-Nov-2000	30-Nov-2000	9-Jan-2007	15-Feb-2008	COMPULSORY			75.0
346	27-Feb-2004	27-Feb-2019	16-Sep-2017	24-Sep-2017					
347	15-Jan-1998	15-Jan-2013	15-Jan-2013	15-Jan-2013	9-Dec-2018	ELECTIVE			73.4
348	14-Aug-1992	18-Oct-2012	18-Oct-2012	18-Oct-2012					
349	12-May-1951	18-Jul-1971	18-Jul-1971		18-Jul-1981	COMPULSORY			75.0
350	8-May-1966	24-Jul-1982	24-Jul-1982	23-Jun-1983	24-Jul-1992	COMPULSORY			75.0
351	7-May-1977	6-May-1992	6-May-1992	6-May-1992	9-Mar-1996	ELECTIVE			73.7
352	7-Oct-1984	7-Oct-1999	7-Oct-1999		22-Apr-1998	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			66.9
353	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	6-Jun-2019	6-Jun-2019					
354	18-Jan-1957	3-Jun-1975	3-Jun-1975		16-Sep-1967	OTHER			57.3
355	26-Mar-2003	9-Oct-2021	9-Oct-2021		9-Aug-2020	Early Retirement			60.3
356	12-May-1993	11-May-2008	19-Dec-2003	19-Dec-2003	19-Dec-2008	COMPULSORY			75.0
357	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	18-Apr-2011	20-Apr-2011	11-May-2013	DISABILITY			72.1
358	22-Sep-2018	22-Sep-2033	19-Oct-2032						
359	9-Jun-1995	8-Jan-2008			9-Oct-2008	ELECTIVE			61.1
360	24-Sep-2016	12-Dec-2031	12-Dec-2031						
361	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2029	30-Nov-2027						
362	2-Dec-1964	21-Feb-1980	21-Feb-1980	21-Feb-1980	10-Apr-1984	DISABILITY			69.1
363	28-Apr-2018	30-Sep-2034	30-Sep-2034						
364	6-Mar-1966	6-Mar-1981	23-Nov-1976	23-Nov-1976	23-Nov-1981	COMPULSORY			75.0
365	27-May-1990	25-Sep-2008	25-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2008	8-Sep-2015	ELECTIVE			68.6
366	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	29-Apr-2021						
367	10-Dec-1975	10-Dec-1990			10-Mar-1989	DISABILITY			64.0
368	14-Jun-1969	7-Jan-1986	7-Jan-1986	7-Jan-1986	8-Jan-1993	ELECTIVE			72.0
369	21-Oct-1972	30-Mar-1995	30-Mar-1995		7-Apr-1995	ELECTIVE			65.0
370	21-Mar-2010	3-Apr-2024	20-Mar-2020	15-Apr-2020					
371	19-Jul-2014	19-Jul-2029	19-Jul-2029						
372	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007	10-Apr-2008	31-Aug-2013	COMPULSORY			75.0
373	27-Jun-1940	8-Jun-1957	8-Jun-1957		11-Apr-1966	ELECTIVE			73.8
374	15-Feb-1958	15-Feb-1973	15-Feb-1973		15-Feb-1973	ELECTIVE			68.0
375	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	31-May-2023						
376	21-Jan-1978	21-Jan-1993	21-Jan-1993	17-Jul-1993	25-Jul-1997	ELECTIVE			71.8
377	9-Feb-1995	4-Feb-2012	4-Feb-2012	4-Feb-2012	11-Jul-2013	ELECTIVE			64.4
378	26-Oct-1983	4-May-1993	26-Oct-1993		9-Dec-1990	DISABILITY			67.6
379	17-Aug-1995	17-Aug-2010	17-Aug-2010	17-Aug-2010	17-Jul-2019	COMPULSORY			75.0
380	14-Sep-2013	14-Sep-2028	28-Jul-2027						
381	26-Jun-1982	26-Jun-1997	6-Oct-1995		4-Dec-1993	DISABILITY			68.2
382	27-Sep-2015	13-Jul-2031	13-Jul-2031						
383	5-May-2002	18-Nov-2018	18-Nov-2018	10-Dec-2018					
384	24-Sep-1993	18-Sep-2010	11-Sep-2012		22-Apr-1999	RESIGNATION (RPC)			51.6
385	19-May-1956	20-Mar-1970	20-Mar-1970		27-Jun-1969	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			69.3
386	21-Sep-1961	21-Jun-1969	21-Sep-1971		21-Jun-1974	COMPULSORY			75.0
387	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	25-May-2021		21-Jul-2019	DISABILITY			68.2
388	5-Aug-2007	5-Oct-2027	5-Oct-2027						
389	5-Sep-2015	5-Sep-2030	5-Sep-2030						
390	8-Jul-2007	8-Jul-2022	8-Jul-2022						
391	8-Oct-1999	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2014	10-Apr-2019	ELECTIVE			69.9
392	14-May-2011	27-Apr-2025	14-May-2021						
393	5-Sep-2015	4-Feb-2025							
394	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	29-Jul-2033						
395	21-Sep-1967	24-Jul-1978	21-Sep-1977		12-May-1969	DISABILITY			65.8
396	19-Jun-1985	19-Jun-2000	19-Jun-2000		24-Jan-2007	COMPULSORY			75.0
397	1-Jul-1978	1-Jul-1993	1-Jul-1993		1-Jun-1991	DISABILITY			64.4
398	18-Aug-1956	18-Aug-1971	1-Nov-1967		1-Nov-1972	COMPULSORY			75.0
399	6-Jun-1981	9-Jul-1989	6-Jun-1991		24-Jul-1986	DISABILITY			67.0
400	18-Jan-1964	18-Dec-1985	18-Dec-1985	19-Dec-1985	18-Dec-1995	COMPULSORY			75.0
401	9-May-2019	15-Dec-2036	15-Dec-2036						
402	9-Feb-2011	9-Feb-2026	31-Dec-2024						
403	23-Oct-1975	23-Oct-1990	23-Oct-1990	9-Aug-1991	6-Nov-1993	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			69.2
404	30-Nov-1985	20-Apr-1999	30-Nov-1995	30-Nov-1995	20-Apr-1999	COMPULSORY			75.0
405	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	3-Apr-2004		12-Jan-2002	Early Retirement			67.8
406	28-Apr-1965	11-Jan-1987	11-Jan-1987		24-Jul-1989	ELECTIVE			67.5
407	5-Jun-2005	4-Jun-2020	11-Oct-2015	11-Oct-2015	11-Oct-2020	COMPULSORY			75.0
408	6-Mar-1980	7-Mar-1995	7-Mar-1995	7-Mar-1995	24-Dec-1997	ELECTIVE			68.7
409	11-Oct-1975	17-Aug-1991	17-Aug-1991	17-Aug-1991	16-May-1999	ELECTIVE			72.7
410	26-Jan-1964	29-Jun-1978	26-Jan-1974		29-Jun-1978	COMPULSORY			75.0
411	9-Feb-2006	9-Feb-2021	13-Mar-2017	10-Apr-2017					
412	7-Dec-2005	7-Dec-2020	7-Dec-2020	9-Dec-2020					
413	16-May-2015	18-Jul-2029	16-May-2025						
414	31-Mar-1984	1-Apr-1999	1-Apr-1999	1-Apr-1999	10-Dec-2002	ELECTIVE			70.3
415	9-Jun-2001	26-Aug-2016	26-Aug-2016						

416	20-Oct-1976	15-Dec-1986	20-Oct-1986		24-Dec-1981 RESIGNATION (RPC)	70.0
417	16-Feb-1997	24-Aug-2015	24-Aug-2015	24-Aug-2015		
418	27-Aug-2003	23-Sep-2020	23-Sep-2020	23-Sep-2020		
419	9-Jan-2010	16-Aug-2021	9-Jan-2020		9-Jan-2020 Early Retirement	73.4
420	27-Sep-1958	6-Mar-1977	17-Jun-1975		9-Feb-1969 RESIGNATION (RPC)	56.9
421	22-Nov-1959	20-Mar-1982	20-Mar-1982		14-Mar-1964 DISABILITY	47.0
422	14-May-2011	25-Nov-2025	14-May-2021			
423	8-Nov-2001	8-Nov-2016	8-Nov-2016		8-Feb-2014 Early Retirement	65.5
424	5-May-1966	5-May-1981	5-May-1981		19-Mar-1991 COMPULSORY	75.0
425	6-Feb-1986	6-Feb-2001	6-Feb-2001	7-Feb-2001	7-May-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
426	2-Jan-1982	26-Feb-1999	18-Mar-2001		10-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE	63.1
427	29-May-1971	13-Oct-1981	29-May-1981		13-Oct-1981 COMPULSORY	75.0
428	19-Dec-1991	15-Apr-2007	15-Apr-2007	11-Apr-2011	10-Aug-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
429	21-Oct-1987	29-Jul-1998	21-Oct-1997		9-Oct-1997 DISABILITY	74.2
430	7-Jan-1978	15-Dec-1995	15-Dec-1995	15-Dec-1995	17-Mar-1999 ELECTIVE	68.3
431	11-Apr-1979	16-Oct-1995	16-Oct-1995	16-Oct-1995	14-Dec-2003 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.2
432	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998		9-Apr-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.7
433	30-May-2008	1-Dec-2023	1-Dec-2023			
434	16-Feb-1963	16-Feb-1978	4-Jul-1977	6-Jul-1977	4-Jul-1982 COMPULSORY	75.0
435	5-Aug-1948	5-Aug-1963	5-Aug-1963		2-Jan-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.7
436	28-Apr-1965	7-Oct-1984	7-Oct-1984		4-Dec-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.2
437	7-Dec-2018	16-Mar-2036	16-Mar-2036			
438	5-Jul-2001	5-Jul-2016	5-Jul-2016			
439	17-Apr-1947	31-Dec-1965	31-Dec-1965		31-Dec-1975 COMPULSORY	75.0
440	7-Oct-1984	25-Mar-2000	10-Sep-2000	10-Sep-2000	9-Apr-2008 ELECTIVE	72.6
441	5-Jul-2001	17-Jul-2017	17-Jul-2017	17-Jul-2017		
442	27-Mar-2014	12-Jun-2030	12-Jun-2030			
443	12-Jul-2018	18-Mar-2035	18-Mar-2035			
444	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	27-Sep-2030			
445	2-Oct-1992	13-Mar-2009	13-Mar-2009		16-Dec-2009 ELECTIVE	64.3
446	19-Jan-1992	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007		12-Sep-1998 DISABILITY	58.2
447	12-Sep-1986	12-Sep-2001	7-Sep-1999		9-Apr-1992 RESIGNATION (RPC)	62.6
448	17-Jun-1961	17-Jun-1976	11-Dec-1972	11-Dec-1972	11-Dec-1977 COMPULSORY	75.0
449	9-Feb-2019	9-Feb-2034	9-Feb-2034			
450	12-Jun-2020	8-Oct-2038	8-Oct-2038			
451	19-Apr-1996	15-Feb-2012	15-Feb-2012	13-Dec-2012		
452	29-Mar-1970	29-Mar-1985	29-Mar-1985	30-Mar-1985	20-Jul-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
453	7-Jan-1954	9-Feb-1967	9-Feb-1967		20-Nov-1960 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.8
454	7-Jan-2012	7-Jan-2027	7-Jan-2027			
455	1-Apr-1978	1-Apr-1993	1-Apr-1993	2-Apr-1993	9-Oct-1998 ELECTIVE	70.7
456	19-Oct-1991	30-May-2007	30-May-2007	30-May-2007	12-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE	70.3
457	21-Sep-1967	18-Oct-1985	18-Oct-1985		19-Feb-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.3
458	5-Feb-1977	5-Feb-1992	5-Feb-1992	5-Feb-1992	9-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE	70.2
459	6-Aug-1995	6-Aug-2010	29-Nov-2008		26-Sep-2001 DISABILITY	62.8
460	30-Sep-2017	30-Sep-2032	30-Sep-2032			
461	14-Nov-2010	23-May-2026	23-May-2026			
462	1-Apr-1996	16-Apr-2011	16-Apr-2011	16-Apr-2011	8-Nov-2018 ELECTIVE	72.5
463	13-Nov-1982	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	11-Apr-2003 ELECTIVE	72.3
464	9-Jan-1967	20-Jun-1983	20-Jun-1983	20-Jun-1983	20-Jun-1993 COMPULSORY	75.0
465	14-Jan-1984	11-Oct-2001	9-Jul-2004	9-Jul-2004	9-Jul-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0
466	8-Jul-2007	8-Jul-2022	23-May-2021			
467	30-Sep-2014	30-Sep-2029	13-Jul-2028			
468	10-Aug-2019	10-Aug-2034	10-Aug-2034			
469	21-Mar-2009	20-Mar-2024	28-Dec-2022			
470	8-Oct-1999	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2014	16-Dec-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0
471	30-Jan-2005	30-Jan-2020	23-Jan-2020	23-Jan-2020		
472	13-Nov-1982	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	2-Nov-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
473	23-Jul-2005	23-Jul-2020	28-Nov-2017	28-Nov-2017	9-Sep-2020 ELECTIVE	72.8
474	30-Jun-1967	7-Jul-1990	7-Jul-1990		25-Aug-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.1
475	9-Jun-1961	28-May-1981	28-May-1981	9-Aug-1981	28-May-1991 COMPULSORY	75.0
476	17-Jul-1971	29-Jun-1993	29-Jun-1993	8-Jan-1994	29-Jun-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
477	7-Mar-1970	17-Mar-1994	17-Mar-1994	17-Mar-1994	10-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE	67.7
478	15-Oct-1983	16-Jan-2000	18-Apr-2001	18-Apr-2001	10-Dec-2007 ELECTIVE	71.6
479	23-Nov-1951	30-Apr-1967	30-Apr-1967		5-Feb-1970 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.8
480	17-Dec-1995	19-Jun-2014	19-Jun-2014		10-Apr-2011 Early Retirement	58.3
481	21-Jul-1990	18-Aug-2006	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2007	8-Aug-2013 ELECTIVE	70.9
482	14-Aug-1992	23-Aug-2004	14-Aug-2002		23-Aug-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
483	10-Jun-1978	30-Apr-1990	30-Apr-1990	10-Nov-1991	30-Apr-1995 COMPULSORY	75.0
484	12-Feb-1983	29-Mar-2000	14-May-2002	14-May-2002	13-May-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
485	25-Dec-2003	25-Dec-2018	25-Dec-2018	25-Dec-2018		
486	7-Jan-1989	25-Feb-2005	14-Apr-2006	14-Apr-2006	23-Feb-2009 ELECTIVE	67.9
487	18-Aug-2007	18-Aug-2022	13-May-2020	13-May-2020		
488	21-Jul-1990	27-May-2009				
489	7-Dec-2001	7-Dec-2016	17-Aug-2014	17-Aug-2014	8-Feb-2018 ELECTIVE	73.5
490	12-Feb-2004	12-Feb-2019	29-Jun-2018	29-Jun-2018		
491	3-Feb-2018	26-Jan-2030	3-Feb-2028			
492	31-Jul-1983	31-Jul-1998	21-Dec-1996		9-Jan-1989 DISABILITY	62.1
493	16-Sep-1999	16-Sep-2014	16-Sep-2014		28-May-2009 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.0
494	8-Jul-2007	9-Sep-2019	8-Jul-2017		9-Sep-2017 Early Retirement	73.0
495	15-Mar-1984	4-May-1998	16-Mar-1994	10-Apr-1994	4-May-1998 COMPULSORY	75.0
496	6-Apr-1996	7-Sep-2015	7-Sep-2015	9-Sep-2015		
497	4-Dec-1966	7-Aug-1989	7-Aug-1989	4-Dec-1989	29-Mar-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.6
498	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-2002	21-Apr-2000	21-Apr-2000	9-Feb-2003 ELECTIVE	72.8
499	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	27-Mar-2029			

500	22-Sep-1965	13-Apr-1979	13-Apr-1979	13-Apr-1979	8-Oct-1983	ELECTIVE	74.5
501	9-Aug-1978	19-May-1996	19-May-1996	19-May-1996	20-May-2006	COMPULSORY	75.0
502	29-Aug-2019	29-Aug-2034	29-Aug-2034				
503	31-Jan-1988	1-Dec-1996			12-Nov-1988	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.9
504	10-Dec-1970	10-Dec-1985	1-Sep-1984		25-Mar-1982	DISABILITY	67.6
505	29-Mar-1987	4-Sep-2001	4-Sep-2001		12-Aug-2000	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.9
506	6-Mar-2010	6-Mar-2025	20-Nov-2021				
507	12-Jul-2018	18-Oct-2034	18-Oct-2034				
508	26-Oct-1983	18-Dec-1996	26-Oct-1993		24-Jun-1989	DISABILITY	67.5
509	4-Jan-2004	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019			
510	30-Jan-2010	30-Jan-2025	30-Jan-2025				
511	9-Oct-2017	9-Oct-2032	9-Oct-2032				
512	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	20-Jun-2029				
513	6-Nov-2009	6-Nov-2024	24-May-2022				
514	30-Mar-1975	26-Feb-1999	16-Jun-2000	9-Jan-2010	16-Jun-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
515	29-Sep-2012	12-Aug-2031	12-Aug-2031				
516	10-Aug-1989	27-Aug-2007	27-Aug-2007	8-Jan-2020	12-Sep-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
517	7-Jun-1969	4-Feb-1995	4-Feb-1995	9-Feb-1995	4-Feb-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
518	5-Sep-1998	5-Sep-2013	29-Aug-2012	29-Aug-2012	9-Dec-2015	ELECTIVE	73.3
519	3-Jul-2019	25-Aug-2030	3-Jul-2029				
520	12-Feb-2004	12-Feb-2019	12-Feb-2019	12-Feb-2019			
521	24-Jan-2002	14-Feb-2018	14-Feb-2018	14-Feb-2018			
522	27-May-1999	27-May-2014	27-May-2014	27-May-2014			
523	7-Mar-1993	15-Sep-2011	15-Sep-2011	15-Sep-2011	10-Mar-2018	ELECTIVE	68.0
524	21-Jan-1982	12-Dec-2002	2-Nov-2008		12-Dec-2002	ELECTIVE	59.1
525	26-Sep-2010	15-Jul-2022	26-Sep-2020	26-Sep-2020			
526	7-Jun-1961	21-May-1974	21-May-1974		6-Jun-1971	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.0
527	15-Feb-2002	15-Feb-2017	15-Feb-2017	15-Feb-2017	10-Dec-2020	ELECTIVE	73.8
528	13-Nov-1982	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	10-Apr-2006	ELECTIVE	74.9
529	10-Jun-1978	2-Sep-1996	2-Sep-1996		11-Jan-1992	DISABILITY	60.4
530	27-Sep-2009	11-Mar-2027	11-Mar-2027				
531	29-Sep-2018	29-Sep-2033	29-Sep-2033				
532	27-Sep-2015	14-Apr-2032	14-Apr-2032				
533	30-Mar-1975	2-Feb-1991			9-Sep-1999	ELECTIVE	73.6
534	14-Sep-2013	8-Jun-2031	8-Jun-2031				
535	9-May-1997	25-Jul-2014	25-Jul-2014	10-Oct-2016			
536	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	21-Feb-2015			
537	12-Aug-1977	2-Oct-1993	2-Oct-1993	20-Feb-1994	8-Jan-1997	ELECTIVE	68.3
538	17-Jul-1991	7-Dec-2009	7-Dec-2009				
539	28-Jan-1999	28-Jan-2014	28-Jan-2014	28-Jan-2014	9-Apr-2020	ELECTIVE	72.0
540	5-Jan-1995	5-Jan-2010	5-Jan-2010	5-Jan-2010	13-Jun-2018	COMPULSORY	75.0
541	8-Oct-1989	4-Nov-2007	4-Nov-2007	4-Nov-2007	11-Apr-2011	ELECTIVE	65.4
542	5-Sep-1981	5-Sep-1996	5-Sep-1996	8-Sep-1996	4-Nov-2004	COMPULSORY	75.0
543	6-Jun-2015	6-Jun-2030	5-Feb-2028				
544	24-Oct-1976	4-Apr-1997	4-Apr-1997	11-Apr-1997	2-Jun-1998	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.2
545	27-Sep-2009	17-May-2027	17-May-2027				
546	23-Dec-2006	23-Dec-2021	23-Dec-2021				
547	11-Apr-1951	11-Apr-1966	11-Apr-1966		9-Aug-1972	ELECTIVE	74.6
548	4-Feb-1988	4-Feb-2003	15-Nov-2002	15-Nov-2002	15-Nov-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
549	7-Mar-1981	26-Feb-1999	6-Apr-1999	6-Apr-1999	15-Dec-2001	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.7
550	5-Jun-2005	5-Feb-2022	5-Feb-2022				
551	13-Oct-1985	21-Sep-2005	24-Mar-2007	30-Aug-2010	30-Aug-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
552	28-Jul-1988	10-Feb-2005	25-Aug-2006	25-Aug-2006	25-Aug-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
553	22-Sep-1956	22-May-1978	22-May-1978	8-Oct-1978	21-May-1988	COMPULSORY	75.0
554	3-Aug-1995	17-Apr-2007	3-Aug-2005	3-Aug-2005	17-Apr-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
555	9-Jan-1967	31-Jan-1977	31-Jan-1977	31-Jan-1977	31-Jan-1982	COMPULSORY	75.0
556	28-Oct-2015	28-Oct-2030	28-Oct-2030				
557	5-Aug-1978	5-Aug-1993	5-Aug-1993	5-Aug-1993	9-Sep-1998	COMPULSORY	75.0
558	28-Jan-2012	28-Jan-2027	28-Jan-2027				
559	11-Jan-1975	11-Jan-1990	23-Jun-1985		10-May-1981	DISABILITY	65.9
560	27-Sep-1998	27-Sep-2013	5-Dec-2010	5-Dec-2010	8-Jan-2014	ELECTIVE	73.1
561	26-Oct-1983	25-Feb-2001	28-Jun-2003	28-Jun-2003	28-Jun-2013	COMPULSORY	75.0
562	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	11-Jun-2001	11-Jun-2001	12-Jan-2005	ELECTIVE	73.6
563	20-Feb-1959	1-May-1967	20-Feb-1969		30-Apr-1972	COMPULSORY	75.0
564	24-Oct-1981	24-Oct-1996	24-Oct-1996	24-Oct-1996	9-Feb-2000	ELECTIVE	72.1
565	22-Oct-1972	27-Dec-1987	27-Dec-1987		23-Oct-1986	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.8
566	27-May-1967	27-May-1982	9-Jan-1981		5-Feb-1977	DISABILITY	66.1
567	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	29-Sep-2032				
568	9-Aug-2001	9-Aug-2016	15-Oct-2015	15-Oct-2015	15-Oct-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
569	24-Mar-2002	27-Jan-2019	27-Jan-2019		20-Dec-2015	DISABILITY	60.0
570	27-Feb-2005	24-Jun-2020	24-Jun-2020				
571	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	23-May-2023				
572	6-Jan-2019	1-Nov-2035	1-Nov-2035				
573	10-Dec-1972	18-Dec-1996	18-Dec-1996		18-Dec-2006	COMPULSORY	75.0
574	10-Jul-1993	10-Jul-2008	31-Dec-2006	1-Jan-2007	31-Dec-2011	COMPULSORY	75.0
575	24-Sep-1993	4-Dec-2013	4-Dec-2013	12-Feb-2014	8-Aug-2018	ELECTIVE	64.5
576	5-Jul-1975	6-Sep-1992	6-Sep-1992	6-Sep-1992	9-Aug-2002	ELECTIVE	74.9
577	21-Sep-1961	23-Feb-1982	23-Feb-1982		23-Feb-1982	ELECTIVE	65.0
578	24-Nov-1960	27-Apr-1983	27-Apr-1983		8-Apr-1979	OTHER	60.9
579	21-Oct-1987	21-Oct-2002	21-Oct-2002	21-Oct-2002	29-Feb-2008	COMPULSORY	75.0
580	31-May-1979	9-Feb-1996	9-Feb-1996	23-May-2001	9-Feb-2006	COMPULSORY	75.0
581	25-Aug-1983	29-Jan-2000	3-Jul-2001	11-Apr-2002	3-Jul-2011	COMPULSORY	75.0
582	18-Apr-1999	18-Apr-2014	18-Apr-2014	18-Apr-2014	9-Dec-2019	ELECTIVE	74.1
583	7-Mar-1993	6-Mar-2008	6-Mar-2008		9-Aug-2006	Early Retirement	65.9

584	19-Oct-1991	9-Nov-2007	9-Nov-2007	9-Nov-2007	9-Feb-2013 ELECTIVE	69.2
585	30-Apr-1977	15-Dec-1989	15-Dec-1989		2-Oct-1986 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.8
586	7-Mar-1993	24-Dec-2006	7-Mar-2003	7-Mar-2003	24-Dec-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
587	19-Mar-2005	24-Jan-2022	24-Jan-2022			
588	17-Oct-1970	24-Feb-1988	24-Feb-1988		1-Sep-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.5
589	17-Dec-1988	19-Sep-1996			19-Sep-1996 COMPULSORY	75.0
590	7-Jan-2012	7-Jan-2027	14-Jan-2025			
591	10-Dec-1954	7-Nov-1970	7-Nov-1970	11-Apr-1974	24-Dec-1977 ELECTIVE	72.1
592	29-Jun-1995	3-Dec-2014	3-Dec-2014	3-Dec-2014		
593	28-Jan-2018	26-May-2034	26-May-2034			
594	14-Mar-2002	14-Mar-2017	14-Mar-2017	14-Mar-2017		
595	17-Aug-2014	17-Aug-2029	4-Feb-2029			
596	10-Aug-2019	10-Aug-2034	10-Aug-2034			
597	13-Jul-1985	13-Jul-2000	13-Jul-2000	13-Jul-2000	11-Sep-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
598	28-Jan-2018	28-Jan-2033	28-Jan-2033			
599	28-Aug-2009	28-Aug-2024	30-Apr-2020			
600	15-Feb-2002	1-Feb-2018	1-Feb-2018	22-Aug-2018		
601	23-Dec-2006	11-Jul-2020	23-Dec-2016	23-Dec-2016	11-Jul-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
602	3-Feb-2007	3-Feb-2022	14-Dec-2019		7-Apr-2010 RESIGNATION (RPC)	60.3
603	2-Oct-1992	2-Oct-2007	2-Oct-2007	2-Oct-2007	11-Apr-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
604	13-Oct-1965	13-Oct-1980	13-Oct-1980	25-Feb-1984	10-Mar-1985 ELECTIVE	69.7
605	8-Oct-1989	8-Oct-2004	27-Feb-2001	27-Feb-2001	27-Feb-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
606	23-Feb-2000	30-Dec-2017	30-Dec-2017			
607	16-Mar-2019	16-Mar-2034	21-Feb-2030			
608	18-Jul-2019	2-Apr-2031	18-Jul-2029			
609	21-Mar-2015	31-May-2030	31-May-2030			
610	18-Sep-1993	2-Nov-2011	2-Nov-2011	2-Nov-2011		
611	9-Jan-1956	2-Jul-1967	2-Jul-1967		9-Jan-1971 ELECTIVE	73.5
612	6-Mar-1976	28-May-1994	28-May-1994	27-Mar-1998	3-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE	70.7
613	8-Oct-1999	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2014	10-Mar-2016 ELECTIVE	70.5
614	14-Apr-1976	15-Apr-1991	15-Apr-1991	15-Apr-1991	9-Sep-1998 ELECTIVE	72.6
615	17-Mar-2000	18-Mar-2015	18-Mar-2015	18-Mar-2015	8-Sep-2016 ELECTIVE	69.6
616	20-Apr-2001	27-May-2016	27-May-2016	27-May-2016	8-Aug-2019 ELECTIVE	68.1
617	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	27-Mar-2029			
618	17-Feb-2018	19-Apr-2034	19-Apr-2034			
619	7-Jan-2012	7-Jan-2027	7-Jan-2027			
620	22-May-1982	25-Mar-1999	26-Jan-2001		9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE	64.0
621	7-May-1994	7-May-2009	7-May-2009	8-May-2009	11-May-2013 ELECTIVE	72.4
622	17-Apr-1950	17-Jun-1969			8-Apr-1979 ELECTIVE	74.8
623	26-Feb-1983	11-Sep-2002	24-Mar-2007	23-Aug-2009	27-Mar-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
624	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	27-Sep-2030			
625	30-Sep-2020	30-Sep-2035	30-Nov-2034			
626	2-Jul-2017	2-Jul-2032	2-Jul-2032			
627	3-Sep-1928	8-Feb-1945	8-Feb-1945		11-Aug-1933 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	53.5
628	18-Feb-1972	18-Feb-1987	18-Feb-1987	18-Feb-1987	14-Jun-1993 COMPULSORY	75.0
629	13-Jul-1995	13-Jul-2010	6-Jun-2007		6-Mar-2003 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.7
630	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	7-Dec-2033			
631	29-Mar-2018	17-May-2035	17-May-2035			
632	5-Feb-2011	5-Feb-2026	30-Aug-2025			
633	10-Jul-1993	30-Jul-2008	19-Aug-2008		24-Jan-2002 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	58.4
634	9-Nov-1995	14-Nov-2015	14-Nov-2015	19-Jul-2017		
635	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	26-Apr-2021			
636	28-Aug-1959	28-Aug-1974	28-Aug-1974		20-Apr-1976 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.6
637	6-Jun-2018	6-Jun-2033	16-Sep-2030			
638	28-Apr-1950	28-Apr-1965	28-Apr-1965		6-Mar-1972 COMPULSORY	75.0
639	23-Mar-1963	1-Feb-1986	1-Feb-1986	1-Feb-1986	11-Apr-1990 ELECTIVE	69.2
640	2-Mar-2007	28-Jan-2023	28-Jan-2023			
641	31-Mar-1979	31-Mar-1994	31-Mar-1994	31-Mar-1994	8-Feb-1997 ELECTIVE	68.0
642	8-Dec-1978	8-Dec-1993	27-Jul-1993	27-Jul-1993	8-Aug-1994 ELECTIVE	71.0
643	15-Feb-2014	15-Feb-2029	20-Jun-2028			
644	7-Jul-1990	9-Oct-2011			15-Nov-2012 ELECTIVE	59.8
645	26-Feb-1998	25-May-2015	25-May-2015	28-Feb-2016		
646	24-Oct-1981	18-May-2000	10-Dec-2003	10-Apr-2004	22-Sep-2007 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.8
647	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	17-Aug-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
648	28-Dec-1963	14-Mar-1979	14-Mar-1979		18-Jan-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.8
649	8-Mar-1991	17-Aug-2010	17-Aug-2010	22-Mar-2015	10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE	70.9
650	15-Mar-1991	15-Mar-2006	8-Apr-2001	8-Apr-2001	8-Apr-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
651	19-Mar-2005	18-Mar-2020	18-Mar-2020	18-Mar-2020		
652	8-Jul-2007	5-Feb-2019	8-Jul-2017	8-Jul-2017	5-Feb-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0
653	9-Oct-1970	27-Jan-1990	27-Jan-1990	27-Jan-1990	9-Aug-1994 ELECTIVE	69.5
654	13-Nov-1982	13-Nov-1992	13-Nov-1992	10-Dec-1992	12-May-1994 COMPULSORY	75.0
655	22-Sep-2018	22-Sep-2033	25-Jan-2029			
656	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	14-Dec-2027			
657	11-Oct-1959	2-Mar-1980	2-Mar-1980	9-Oct-1981	11-Oct-1988 ELECTIVE	73.6
658	3-Aug-1995	3-Aug-2010	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
659	20-Jul-1978	20-Jul-1993	20-Jul-1993	20-Jul-1993	10-Nov-2001 ELECTIVE	74.1
660	20-Jun-1968	26-Mar-1993	26-Mar-1993	26-Mar-1993	29-May-1995 ELECTIVE	67.2
661	31-Mar-1979	26-Feb-1999	29-Jan-2003		11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE	61.2
662	26-Jan-1961	26-Jan-1976	19-Jan-1972		19-Jan-1977 COMPULSORY	75.0
663	15-Mar-1975	15-Mar-1990	22-Jan-1989		26-Mar-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.2
664	8-Oct-1999	8-Oct-2014	22-Oct-2009	22-Oct-2009	22-Oct-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0
665	12-May-1958	26-Oct-1967			26-Oct-1967 COMPULSORY	75.0
666	4-Jan-2004	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019		
667	12-Feb-1998	12-Feb-2013	14-Jun-2011	14-Jun-2011	10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE	71.8

668	11-Dec-1988	11-Dec-2003	16-Aug-2003	16-Aug-2003	10-Dec-2004 ELECTIVE	71.3
669	11-Mar-1999	11-Mar-2014	9-Jun-2013	9-Jun-2013	9-Jun-2018 COMPULSORY	75.0
670	19-Jun-1985	14-Aug-1996	19-Jun-1995	19-Jun-1995	14-Aug-1996 COMPULSORY	75.0
671	26-Feb-1998	26-Feb-2013	26-Dec-2012	8-Nov-2014	26-Dec-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
672	3-Nov-1984	29-Jul-1997	29-Jul-1997	29-Jul-1997	10-Dec-2000 ELECTIVE	73.4
673	19-Oct-1991	27-Dec-2010	27-Dec-2010	11-Apr-2019		
674	2-May-1996	16-May-2013	16-May-2013	16-May-2013		
675	20-Jun-1992	15-Aug-2009				
676	5-Feb-2004	4-Jul-2021	4-Jul-2021			
677	2-Apr-1977	1-Apr-1992	2-Nov-1991	2-Nov-1991	8-Jun-1992 ELECTIVE	70.6
678	9-Mar-2019	9-Mar-2034	6-Mar-2034			
679	6-Mar-2010	6-Mar-2025	6-Mar-2025			
680	28-Jan-1945	19-Feb-1964	19-Feb-1964		10-Jun-1965 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.3
681	1-Jul-1999	23-Jul-2014	23-Jul-2014	23-Jul-2014	9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE	66.7
682	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	27-Feb-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
683	21-Jun-2011	3-Sep-2022	21-Jun-2021			
684	19-Jul-2014	16-Oct-2030	16-Oct-2030			
685	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	21-Jun-2027			
686	8-May-1966	6-Jul-1985	6-Jul-1985		10-May-1981 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.8
687	6-Mar-1980	25-Jul-1995	25-Jul-1995	25-Jul-1995	25-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
688	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	7-Dec-2033			
689	28-Dec-1961	28-Dec-1976	28-Dec-1976	12-Apr-1978	8-Apr-1982 ELECTIVE	74.9
690	1-Jun-2018	14-Mar-2036	14-Mar-2036			
691	8-Jul-1961	13-Nov-1976	13-Nov-1976	7-Feb-1977	13-Nov-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
692	4-Jun-1961	3-Feb-1974	3-Feb-1974		10-Dec-1976 ELECTIVE	72.9
693	6-Jun-1970	5-Mar-1996	5-Mar-1996		9-Mar-1996 ELECTIVE	65.0
694	14-Jan-1984	18-Jun-2004	21-Nov-2009		9-Feb-2002 DISABILITY	57.2
695	11-Feb-1988	26-Jan-2006	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	11-Apr-2017 COMPULSORY	73.3
696	13-Oct-1977	26-Feb-1999	1-Mar-2003	1-Mar-2003	1-Mar-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
697	31-Mar-1979	31-Mar-1994	31-Mar-1994	31-Mar-1994	8-Oct-2002 COMPULSORY	75.0
698	9-Aug-1978	9-Aug-1993	21-Dec-1991	21-Dec-1991	9-Aug-1993 ELECTIVE	71.6
699	10-May-1993	9-May-2008	6-Jan-2004		15-Aug-2000 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.6
700	21-Jul-2017	21-May-2024				
701	27-Mar-1988	16-Sep-2008			9-Oct-2004 Early Retirement	57.4
702	25-Jun-1998	28-Nov-2015	28-Nov-2015	10-Dec-2017		
703	28-Nov-1965	8-May-1979	28-Nov-1975	29-Nov-1975	10-Apr-1979 DISABILITY	74.9
704	27-Jun-2010	27-Jun-2025	28-Jan-2022			
705	13-Jul-1985	11-Feb-2002	12-Sep-2003	12-Sep-2003	12-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
706	3-Aug-1995	25-Sep-2012	25-Sep-2012	9-Dec-2014		
707	3-Feb-2018	3-Feb-2033	3-Feb-2033			
708	19-Jul-2017	8-Oct-2032	8-Oct-2032			
709	17-Jan-2015	17-Jan-2030	17-Jan-2030			
710	17-Oct-1970	17-Oct-1985	17-Oct-1985	17-Oct-1985	9-Feb-1989 ELECTIVE	72.2
711	9-Oct-1999	9-Oct-2014	9-Oct-2014	9-Oct-2014	8-Oct-2016 ELECTIVE	67.8
712	27-Aug-2005	24-Apr-2021	24-Apr-2021		29-Aug-2015 Early Retirement	58.7
713	7-Jun-2000	29-Feb-2016	29-Feb-2016			
714	22-May-1994	26-Aug-2011	26-Aug-2011	26-Aug-2011		
715	17-Jan-2015	30-Sep-2031	30-Sep-2031			
716	23-Mar-2013	2-Jul-2032	2-Jul-2032			
717	7-May-1994	17-Jun-2011	17-Jun-2011		11-Jul-2011 ELECTIVE	63.0
718	9-Jul-1983	9-Jul-1998	9-Jul-1998	10-Jul-1998	9-Aug-2000 ELECTIVE	68.5
719	6-Feb-1982	6-Feb-1997	25-Oct-1995	25-Oct-1995	25-Oct-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
720	16-Jun-1951	9-Aug-1967	9-Aug-1967		6-Nov-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.2
721	12-Apr-1992	13-Apr-2007	11-Nov-2005		9-Feb-2003 Early Retirement	67.2
722	10-Dec-1987	17-Sep-2009	17-Sep-2009	9-Oct-2009	9-Oct-2019 COMPULSORY	68.3
723	30-Sep-2019	30-Sep-2034	30-Sep-2034			
724	27-Mar-1982	27-Mar-1997	27-Mar-1997	27-Mar-1997	9-Aug-1997 ELECTIVE	69.0
725	9-Mar-1995	30-Dec-2010	30-Dec-2010	22-Oct-2011		
726	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	15-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
727	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034			
728	1-Apr-1978	16-Mar-1997	16-Mar-1997	16-Mar-1997	10-Dec-2004 ELECTIVE	72.7
729	10-Dec-1972	30-Sep-1988	30-Sep-1988	15-Dec-1988	30-Sep-1998 COMPULSORY	75.0
730	9-Mar-1995	6-Mar-2011	6-Mar-2011	22-May-2011	10-Apr-2019 ELECTIVE	72.1
731	4-Mar-1999	2-Jul-2015	2-Jul-2015	8-Oct-2016		
732	13-Feb-1965	13-Feb-1980	1-Dec-1977	10-Dec-1977	1-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY	75.0
733	19-Jul-2014	17-Jun-2030	17-Jun-2030			
734	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	1-Jan-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
735	10-Nov-1973	22-Oct-1997	22-Oct-1997	11-Nov-1998	22-Oct-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
736	15-Aug-2004	18-Oct-2021	18-Oct-2021			
737	20-Jun-2020	29-Nov-2035	29-Nov-2035			
738	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034			
739	27-May-1990	18-Aug-2005	8-Nov-2005	8-Nov-2005	9-Feb-2007 ELECTIVE	66.3
740	7-Aug-1982	7-Aug-1997	7-Aug-1997		26-Dec-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.4
741	12-Jan-2013	20-Aug-2029	20-Aug-2029			
742	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034			
743	10-Nov-1973	26-Feb-1999	23-May-2001	23-May-2001	3-Feb-2008 DEATH (RPC)	71.7
744	15-Mar-1984	16-Mar-1999	17-Oct-1997	17-Oct-1997	17-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE	75.0
745	20-Sep-1986	6-Jun-2008	6-Jun-2008	6-Jun-2008	7-Jun-2018 COMPULSORY	68.3
746	9-Jun-1979	9-Jun-1994	9-Jun-1994		9-Oct-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	57.9
747	30-Sep-2019	30-Sep-2034	30-Sep-2034			
748	24-Oct-1976	24-Oct-1991	6-Oct-1989		15-Apr-1980 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.5
749	27-Jan-2017	16-Mar-2030	27-Jan-2027			
750	22-Mar-2008	14-Feb-2024	14-Feb-2024			
751	13-Dec-1981	23-Apr-2000	2-Sep-2003	8-Oct-2003	10-Apr-2012 ELECTIVE	73.6

752	21-Feb-1970	21-Feb-1985	21-Feb-1985	21-Feb-1985	18-Dec-1990	COMPULSORY	75.0
753	8-Oct-1961	8-Nov-1977	8-Nov-1977	9-Nov-1977	8-Nov-1987	COMPULSORY	75.0
754	6-Dec-1963	6-Dec-1978	6-Dec-1978	6-Dec-1978	10-Dec-1981	ELECTIVE	70.2
755	28-Jul-1973	28-Jul-1988	28-Jul-1988	10-Apr-1989	25-Mar-1991	ELECTIVE	71.0
756	14-Dec-1951	28-Oct-1967			28-Oct-1977	COMPULSORY	75.0
757	28-Aug-1964	28-Aug-1979	5-Aug-1978		5-Aug-1983	COMPULSORY	75.0
758	8-Jul-1999	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2015	7-May-2018	ELECTIVE	66.4
759	17-Jan-2015	9-Nov-2030	9-Nov-2030				
760	16-Mar-2019	16-Mar-2034	22-Nov-2030				
761	2-Oct-2011	2-Oct-2026	23-Sep-2024				
762	27-Jan-1962	28-May-1979	28-May-1979	28-May-1979	8-Feb-1988	ELECTIVE	73.7
763	6-Sep-1975	6-Sep-1990	19-Sep-1989	20-Sep-1989	19-Sep-1994	COMPULSORY	75.0
764	17-Jul-1952	17-Jul-1967	29-Jun-1967		9-Mar-1958	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.7
765	27-May-1967	10-Jan-1974	27-May-1977		22-Mar-1969	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.2
766	18-Dec-2009	23-Mar-2025	23-Mar-2025				
767	29-Jun-2001	29-Jun-2016	29-Jun-2016	10-Jul-2016			
768	29-Dec-1979	29-Dec-1994	29-Dec-1994	30-Dec-1994	2-Oct-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
769	19-Jan-1986	2-Aug-2004	24-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2010	ELECTIVE	67.2
770	23-Jul-2005	23-Jul-2020	23-Jul-2020	23-Jul-2020			
771	9-Oct-1978	26-Feb-1999	22-Jul-2000	22-Jul-2000	9-Nov-2006	ELECTIVE	71.3
772	9-Jan-2003	9-Jan-2018	9-Jan-2018				
773	7-Dec-2018	20-Mar-2031	7-Dec-2028				
774	21-Mar-2015	9-May-2030	9-May-2030				
775	1-Sep-1988	1-Sep-2003			4-Mar-1998	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.7
776	17-Dec-1988	9-Dec-2006	24-Mar-2007	25-Apr-2007	9-Nov-2011	ELECTIVE	66.9
777	15-Feb-2003	15-Feb-2018	15-Feb-2018	16-Feb-2018			
778	14-Mar-1985	13-Mar-2000	12-Feb-1998	7-Oct-2001	12-Feb-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
779	9-Jun-2012	9-Jun-2027	12-Jan-2024				
780	9-Feb-1986	20-Feb-2008	20-Feb-2008	10-Dec-2009	10-Dec-2019	COMPULSORY	69.8
781	12-Jan-2013	20-Oct-2028	20-Oct-2028				
782	5-Feb-2004	5-Feb-2019	11-Aug-2016	12-Oct-2016			
783	1-Apr-1992	25-Jan-2010	20-Nov-2012		29-Nov-2002	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	55.0
784	27-Feb-1948	27-Feb-1963	27-Feb-1963		7-Apr-1954	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	58.7
785	7-May-1994	25-Jan-2007	6-May-2004		10-Mar-2001	DISABILITY	69.1
786	8-Sep-2012	11-Feb-2023	8-Sep-2022				
787	9-Jun-1955	9-Jun-1970	9-Jun-1970	31-Mar-1973	7-Apr-1976	ELECTIVE	73.9
788	21-May-2010	21-May-2025	21-May-2025				
789	7-Jan-2018	7-Jan-2033	7-Jan-2033				
790	10-Aug-1974	10-Aug-1989	10-Aug-1989	9-Jan-1991	10-Jul-1993	ELECTIVE	73.6
791	9-Feb-1969	17-Dec-1981	9-Feb-1979	9-Feb-1979	17-Dec-1981	COMPULSORY	75.0
792	23-Feb-2006	23-Feb-2021	23-Feb-2021				
793	25-Jun-1998	25-Jun-2013	25-Jun-2013	9-Jul-2013			
794	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034				
795	12-Aug-1999	12-Aug-2014	12-Aug-2014		13-Feb-2013	Early Retirement	66.7
796	29-Mar-1997	28-Mar-2012	28-Mar-2012	11-May-2014	8-Aug-2014	ELECTIVE	71.5
797	8-Sep-2002	8-Sep-2017	19-Nov-2013		10-Sep-2013	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.8
798	9-Jan-1958	9-Jan-1973			9-Jun-1973	ELECTIVE	74.3
799	18-May-2013	9-May-2025	18-May-2023		23-Oct-2020	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.5
800	2-Oct-1993	27-Mar-2012	19-Sep-2020	11-Apr-2017			
801	20-Aug-1966	20-Aug-1981	15-Dec-1980	15-Dec-1980	15-Dec-1985	COMPULSORY	75.0
802	1-Jan-1931	1-Jan-1946	1-Jan-1946		9-Feb-1956	Appointed for Life	77.4
803	11-Apr-1979	11-Apr-1994	11-Apr-1994		28-Aug-2001	COMPULSORY	75.0
804	22-Aug-2009	18-Aug-2027	18-Aug-2027				
805	2-Feb-1974	2-Feb-1989	2-Feb-1989		7-Aug-1987	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.8
806	17-Aug-1995	12-Feb-2015	12-Feb-2015		12-Feb-2015	ELECTIVE	60.5
807	17-Dec-1988	17-Dec-2003	31-Jul-2002		29-Sep-2001	DISABILITY	69.2
808	26-Sep-2003	26-Sep-2018	26-Sep-2018	26-Sep-2018	10-May-2020	ELECTIVE	70.7
809	22-Aug-2004	27-Oct-2019	27-Oct-2019	27-Oct-2019			
810	25-Sep-1993	18-Jun-2012	18-Jun-2012	11-Apr-2015	10-Dec-2018	ELECTIVE	67.8
811	16-Jun-1973	16-Jun-1988	15-Mar-1987	11-Apr-1987	9-Feb-1992	ELECTIVE	74.9
812	1-Jun-1989	13-Jan-2008	26-Aug-2011		16-Feb-2000	DISABILITY	53.5
813	18-Jul-2019	2-May-2038	2-May-2038				
814	26-Sep-2008	8-Mar-2025	8-Mar-2025				
815	4-May-1975	19-Dec-1992	19-Dec-1992	3-Mar-1994	19-Dec-2002	COMPULSORY	75.0
816	30-Dec-1967	30-Dec-1982	20-Aug-1981	20-Aug-1981	22-Jul-1986	ELECTIVE	74.9
817	2-Mar-2006	26-Apr-2022	26-Apr-2022				
818	27-Jan-2017	11-Dec-2031	27-Jan-2027				
819	15-Feb-2014	7-Jul-2029	7-Jul-2029				
820	21-Jan-1978	21-Jan-1993	29-Jul-1988	29-Jul-1988	29-Jul-1993	COMPULSORY	75.0
821	19-Jul-2014	19-Jul-2029	8-Oct-2026				
822	5-Sep-1976	13-Jun-1995	13-Jun-1995		13-Jun-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
823	15-Mar-1986	15-Mar-2001	22-Apr-2000		10-Jun-1987	RESIGNATION (RPC)	57.1
824	14-Mar-1964	15-Mar-1979	9-Feb-1977	9-Feb-1977	9-Feb-1982	COMPULSORY	75.0
825	12-May-1993	11-May-2008	30-Mar-2004	30-Mar-2004	31-Mar-2009	COMPULSORY	75.0
826	29-Sep-2012	29-Sep-2027	22-Jul-2027				
827	10-Dec-2015	19-Jun-2031	19-Jun-2031				
828	5-Sep-1985	1-Nov-1993			1-Nov-1993	COMPULSORY	75.0
829	13-May-1962	13-May-1977	3-Oct-1975	13-May-1979	3-Oct-1980	COMPULSORY	75.0
830	5-Jun-1982	5-Jun-1997	5-Jun-1997	5-Jun-1997	28-Mar-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
831	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015	17-Dec-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
832	25-May-1985	12-Feb-1996	25-May-1995	25-May-1995	24-Nov-1995	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.8
833	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	31-May-2023				
834	28-Apr-2018	28-Apr-2033	23-Jul-2032				
835	11-Jul-1998	11-Jul-2013	11-Jul-2013	11-Jul-2013			

836	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	27-Sep-2030					
837	9-Jan-1956	7-Aug-1977	7-Aug-1977	27-Mar-1983	7-Aug-1987	COMPULSORY		75.0
838	13-Oct-1994	13-Oct-2009	23-Oct-2004	23-Oct-2004	23-Oct-2009	COMPULSORY		75.0
839	21-Mar-2010	21-Mar-2025	21-Mar-2025					
840	25-Jun-1998	25-Jun-2013	6-Oct-2009	6-Oct-2009	24-Sep-2014	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		75.0
841	19-Jan-1992	2-Oct-2008	2-Oct-2008	8-Aug-2009	8-Aug-2019	COMPULSORY		74.1
842	7-Mar-1996	10-Nov-2013	10-Nov-2013	10-Nov-2013				
843	26-Oct-1983	19-Sep-1999	12-Aug-2000	12-Aug-2000	9-Aug-2009	ELECTIVE		74.0
844	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	8-Jan-2026					
845	1-Oct-1993	7-May-2010	7-May-2010	7-May-2010	9-Feb-2017	ELECTIVE		70.2
846	12-Aug-1999	12-Aug-2014	12-Aug-2014	12-Aug-2014	15-May-2020	COMPULSORY		75.0
847	31-Mar-1984	15-Apr-2000	30-Apr-2001	30-Apr-2001	30-Apr-2011	COMPULSORY		75.0
848	9-Jan-2014	15-Nov-2027	9-Jan-2024					
849	28-Aug-1976	24-Nov-1992	24-Nov-1992	11-Apr-1993	24-Nov-2002	COMPULSORY		75.0
850	6-Apr-2003	24-Aug-2019						
851	20-Mar-1954	20-Mar-1969	20-Mar-1969	9-Dec-1973	26-Jan-1976	COMPULSORY		75.0
852	10-Dec-1972	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-1987	17-Jul-1991	1-May-1995	COMPULSORY		75.0
853	24-Jul-1960	30-Nov-1976	30-Nov-1976		20-Jul-1969	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		57.6
854	8-Mar-1992	14-Jun-2008	14-Jun-2008	14-Jun-2008	14-Jun-2018	COMPULSORY		73.7
855	31-Oct-1981	31-Oct-1996	31-Oct-1996		11-Mar-1999	ELECTIVE		68.2
856	8-Oct-1989	3-Nov-2004	29-Nov-2004		1-Dec-2004	ELECTIVE		65.0
857	13-Aug-1983	4-Mar-2001	24-Sep-2003		24-Sep-2013	COMPULSORY		75.0
858	30-Mar-1975	21-Jan-1991	21-Jan-1991	21-Jan-1991	9-Sep-1999	ELECTIVE		73.6
859	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	17-Oct-2021					
860	2-Oct-2011	2-Oct-2026	2-Oct-2026					
861	25-Sep-1993	25-Sep-2008	25-Sep-2008	25-Sep-2008	22-Jul-2012	ELECTIVE		69.1
862	6-Jun-2015	6-Jun-2030	16-May-2030					
863	12-Jan-2013	12-Jan-2028	2-Jun-2023					
864	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007	23-Aug-2007	10-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE		74.6
865	9-Feb-2019	9-Feb-2034	7-Aug-2030					
866	15-Feb-2014	13-Sep-2031	13-Sep-2031					
867	14-Sep-2013	14-Sep-2028	18-Aug-2027					
868	9-May-1998	17-Jan-2014	17-Jan-2014	9-Oct-2014				
869	11-Apr-1987	25-May-2008	25-May-2008	25-May-2008	24-Dec-2013	ELECTIVE		64.5
870	4-Mar-1967	23-Apr-1988	23-Apr-1988		12-May-1984	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		61.1
871	1-Feb-1963	20-Sep-1992	20-Sep-1992		29-Jan-1981	OTHER		53.4
872	17-Aug-1995	17-Aug-2010	8-May-2008		10-Dec-2011	ELECTIVE		73.6
873	22-Dec-1991	22-Dec-2006	22-Dec-2006	22-Dec-2006	22-Apr-2016	COMPULSORY		75.0
874	26-Oct-1983	30-Aug-2005	30-Aug-2005		10-Apr-1999	OTHER		58.6
875	12-Jun-2020	23-Dec-2035	23-Dec-2035					
876	31-Oct-1981	31-Oct-1996	31-Oct-1996		11-May-1994	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		63.7
877	2-Mar-2006	2-Mar-2021	2-Mar-2021					
878	22-Apr-1943	22-Apr-1958	22-Apr-1958		15-Aug-1964	COMPULSORY		75.0
879	17-Jun-1999	17-Jun-2014	17-Jun-2014	17-Jun-2014	10-Apr-2018	ELECTIVE		69.2
880	7-Jun-2000	1-Nov-2017	1-Nov-2017	10-Dec-2017				
881	24-Sep-2016	24-Sep-2031	6-Sep-2031					
882	23-Jan-1956	8-Jun-1973	8-Jun-1973	3-Oct-1975	9-Apr-1983	ELECTIVE		74.8
883	26-Sep-2010	26-Sep-2025	26-Sep-2025		9-May-2015	DISABILITY		54.8
884	18-Jan-1969	18-Jan-1984	27-Nov-1981	27-Nov-1981	25-Mar-1984	ELECTIVE		72.3
885	25-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2022	25-Mar-2022					
886	31-May-1969	20-Mar-1990	20-Mar-1990		20-Jan-1983	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		57.8
887	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	13-Jul-2021					
888	17-Nov-1982	17-Nov-1997	17-Nov-1997		26-Dec-1985	DISABILITY		55.0
889	5-Sep-2015	8-Mar-2034	8-Mar-2034					
890	11-Aug-1988	12-May-2006	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2017	COMPULSORY		73.1
891	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2030	28-Sep-2030					
892	18-Jul-2019	6-Aug-2034	6-Aug-2034					
893	7-May-1994	23-Sep-2010	23-Sep-2010	8-Oct-2012	18-Jan-2019	ELECTIVE		71.9
894	28-Sep-2000	6-Apr-2018	6-Apr-2018	10-Apr-2018				
895	7-Jan-2018	7-Jan-2033	29-Sep-2031					
896	19-Jun-1974	19-Jun-1989	19-Jun-1989		16-Sep-1978	DISABILITY		56.3
897	14-Nov-2010	24-Apr-2028	24-Apr-2028					
898	22-Mar-2008	23-Mar-2023	27-Feb-2020	27-Feb-2020				
899	8-Jan-2011	12-Mar-2026	12-Mar-2026					
900	22-Oct-2017	26-Sep-2033	26-Sep-2033					
901	1-Jan-1988	1-Jan-2003	1-Jan-2003	1-Jan-2003	2-Mar-2009	COMPULSORY		75.0
902	27-Jan-1962	27-Jan-1977	19-Jun-1973	1-Feb-1976	12-Mar-1977	DISABILITY		73.7
903	22-Mar-2008	23-Mar-2023	7-Nov-2018					
904	12-Jan-1990	31-Jul-2007	31-Jul-2007	31-Jul-2007	31-Jul-2017	COMPULSORY		72.5
905	24-Mar-2002	22-Aug-2019	22-Aug-2019		10-Dec-2017	Early Retirement		60.9
906	25-Jan-2001	12-Jul-2012	25-Jan-2011	25-Jan-2011	12-Jul-2012	COMPULSORY		75.0
907	8-Mar-2009	7-Mar-2024	30-Dec-2021					
908	12-Aug-1999	12-Aug-2014	12-Aug-2014	12-Aug-2014				
909	1-Apr-1972	1-Oct-1985	1-Oct-1985	23-Oct-1987	1-Oct-1990	COMPULSORY		75.0
910	2-Mar-2006	2-Mar-2021	23-Apr-2017	9-Dec-2017				
911	18-Aug-2007	2-Oct-2025	2-Oct-2025					
912	2-Mar-2007	22-Mar-2022	22-Mar-2022					
913	16-Nov-2002	16-Nov-2017	16-Nov-2017	10-Dec-2017				
914	7-Oct-2009	22-Jan-2026	22-Jan-2026					
915	9-Sep-1978	9-Sep-1993	21-Dec-1991	21-Dec-1991	9-Apr-1996	ELECTIVE		74.3
916	24-Oct-2002	24-Oct-2017	24-Oct-2017		22-Feb-2010	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		58.0
917	10-Dec-1949	10-Dec-1964	10-Dec-1964	23-Aug-1972	11-Nov-1973	COMPULSORY		75.0
918	1-Apr-1972	25-Feb-1984	25-Feb-1984		25-Feb-1984	Compulsory(County Court)		70.0
919	9-Jul-1983	8-Aug-2002	6-Sep-2006	10-Apr-2008	10-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE		70.6

920	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	9-Feb-2020 ELECTIVE	70.1
921	15-Aug-2004	15-Aug-2019	15-Aug-2019	15-Aug-2019		
922	11-Mar-1999	11-Mar-2014	3-Oct-2012	8-Oct-2012	3-Oct-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
923	1-Nov-1975	25-Sep-1994	25-Sep-1994	25-Sep-1994	13-Apr-2000 ELECTIVE	70.5
924	14-Sep-2013	14-Sep-2028	21-Jan-2026			
925	20-Jun-2018	17-Nov-2035	17-Nov-2035			
926	18-Jul-2003	18-Jul-2018	18-Jul-2018	18-Jul-2018		
927	7-Dec-2018	22-Nov-2034	22-Nov-2034			
928	24-Jun-1978	24-Jun-1993	24-Jun-1993	24-Jun-1993	9-Feb-1997 ELECTIVE	68.9
929	3-Jul-2019	3-Jul-2034	3-Jul-2034			
930	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	11-Feb-2026			
931	9-Jan-2014	5-Jun-2029	5-Jun-2029			
932	8-Oct-1989	7-Sep-2008	7-Sep-2008		9-Sep-2008 ELECTIVE	61.1
933	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	19-Feb-2006	19-Feb-2006	9-Feb-2008 ELECTIVE	72.0
934	5-Feb-1948	28-Jun-1962	28-Jun-1962		3-Jan-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.5
935	20-Oct-1973	4-Jun-1989	4-Jun-1989	18-Dec-1991	4-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY	75.0
936	20-Jul-1978	20-Jul-1993	20-Jul-1993	20-Jul-1993	10-Aug-2002 ELECTIVE	75.0
937	26-Aug-2017	26-Aug-2032	26-Aug-2032			
938	14-Aug-1992	10-Jul-2009	10-Jul-2009	10-Jul-2009	10-Jul-2019 COMPULSORY	73.1
939	21-Dec-1974	20-Dec-1990	20-Dec-1990	11-Apr-1995	10-Mar-1997 ELECTIVE	71.2
940	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	4-Nov-2025			
941	28-Feb-1980	12-Dec-2000	12-Dec-2000		23-Mar-1997 OTHER	61.3
942	15-Nov-1996	15-Nov-2011	15-Nov-2011	9-Jan-2012	31-Aug-2012 ELECTIVE	68.5
943	12-May-1973	5-Jul-1992			18-Feb-1989 DISABILITY	61.6
944	11-Aug-1988	11-Aug-2003	11-Aug-2003	10-Apr-2004	19-Mar-2010 ELECTIVE	73.9
945	1-Apr-1950	30-Jan-1965	30-Jan-1965		30-Jan-1970 COMPULSORY	75.0
946	8-Oct-1989	8-Oct-2004	15-May-2004		10-Oct-2001 Early Retirement	67.4
947	28-Sep-1996	28-Sep-2011	28-Sep-2011	28-Sep-2011	9-Sep-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
948	27-Jul-2002	27-Jul-2017	23-May-2016	9-Jun-2016	9-Dec-2018 ELECTIVE	72.5
949	5-Jun-2005	23-Feb-2023	23-Feb-2023			
950	3-Mar-1963	3-Mar-1978	3-Mar-1978	3-Mar-1978	13-Nov-1983 COMPULSORY	75.0
951	24-Mar-2012	19-Mar-2029	19-Mar-2029			
952	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	13-Dec-2017	13-Dec-2017		
953	23-Jul-2005	8-Nov-2014			8-Nov-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0
954	15-Dec-1979	15-Dec-1994	16-Oct-1994	16-Oct-1994	10-Mar-1997 ELECTIVE	72.4
955	29-Sep-2018	29-Sep-2033	17-Mar-2030			
956	18-Sep-1993	10-Oct-2011	10-Oct-2011	18-Sep-2012		
957	10-Sep-1975	26-Feb-1999	10-Sep-2000	10-Sep-2000	10-Dec-2007 ELECTIVE	72.2
958	30-May-2008	26-Mar-2025	26-Mar-2025			
959	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-2002	2-Jan-1998	2-Jan-1998	2-Jan-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
960	10-Jan-2010	10-Jan-2025	12-May-2021			
961	23-May-1970	8-Jan-1986	8-Jan-1986	8-Jan-1986	8-Jan-1996 COMPULSORY	75.0
962	30-Jun-1965	30-Jun-1980	30-Jun-1980	10-Dec-1980	15-Jan-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
963	5-Sep-1993	30-Jul-2013	30-Jul-2013	31-Jul-2013	9-Dec-2016 ELECTIVE	63.5
964	28-Sep-2000	4-Jan-2018	4-Jan-2018	4-Jan-2018		
965	1-Nov-1975	1-Nov-1990	20-Sep-1988		6-May-1976 RESIGNATION (RPC)	57.6
966	17-Jul-1976	17-Jul-1991	15-Mar-1989	15-Mar-1989	15-Mar-1994 COMPULSORY	75.0
967	12-Jul-1969	12-Jul-1984	23-May-1982	23-May-1982	23-May-1987 COMPULSORY	75.0
968	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	1-May-2024			
969	13-Oct-1990	4-May-2008	4-May-2008	4-May-2008	10-Apr-2018 ELECTIVE	72.4
970	2-Mar-2007	2-Mar-2022	3-Aug-2020	8-Oct-2020		
971	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	25-Nov-2032			
972	30-Nov-1985	21-Feb-1999	30-Nov-1995	30-Nov-1995	22-Mar-1998 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.1
973	22-Jul-1972	22-Jul-1987	22-Jul-1987	8-Jan-1989	8-Mar-1996 COMPULSORY	75.0
974	24-Feb-1965	30-Mar-1981	30-Mar-1981	30-Mar-1981	9-Feb-1982 ELECTIVE	65.9
975	8-Nov-1992	20-Sep-2009	20-Sep-2009	8-Sep-2012		
976	5-Sep-2015	5-Sep-2030	5-Sep-2030			
977	18-Jul-1981	15-Feb-2012			25-Mar-2018 ELECTIVE	74.3
978	3-Feb-2007	3-Feb-2022	6-Jun-2018	6-Jun-2018		
979	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	29-Sep-2032			
980	30-Mar-1968	21-Aug-1981	21-Aug-1981	9-Sep-1981	21-Aug-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
981	19-Jul-2014	8-May-2030	8-May-2030			
982	13-Oct-2015	13-Oct-2030	13-Oct-2030			
983	25-Aug-2019	25-Feb-2038	25-Feb-2038			
984	2-Mar-1974	10-Apr-1992	10-Apr-1992		10-Sep-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.4
985	31-May-1979	31-May-1994	31-May-1994		31-May-1994 ELECTIVE	69.1
986	16-Sep-2017	16-Sep-2032	16-Sep-2032			
987	16-Feb-1980	16-Feb-1995	16-Feb-1995		28-Sep-1991 DISABILITY	63.2
988	27-Apr-1957	24-Dec-1975	24-Dec-1975		11-Apr-1973 DISABILITY	62.3
989	25-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2022	11-Nov-2020	11-Nov-2020		
990	22-Dec-1973	22-May-1994	22-May-1994	22-May-1994	21-May-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
991	7-Jul-1965	7-Jul-1980	18-Jul-1979	9-Dec-1979	18-Jul-1984 COMPULSORY	75.0
992	9-Feb-1967	9-Feb-1982	9-Feb-1982	11-Apr-1982	13-Nov-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
993	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	10-Apr-2015		
994	20-Nov-2000	20-Nov-2015	9-Dec-2011	10-Dec-2011	20-Nov-2013 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.9
995	8-Oct-1976	8-Oct-1991	8-Oct-1991	8-Oct-1991	8-Nov-1994 ELECTIVE	72.7
996	17-Oct-1981	17-Oct-1996	17-Oct-1996		17-Oct-1996 ELECTIVE	69.9
997	5-Aug-1978	5-Aug-1993	5-Aug-1993		16-Dec-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	59.0
998	25-Dec-1991	20-Aug-2012	20-Aug-2012	31-Jul-2016		
999	25-Jan-1975	25-Jan-1990	25-Jan-1990		9-Feb-1983 DISABILITY	60.4
1000	24-Jan-1981	26-Feb-1999	22-Mar-1999	22-Mar-1999	10-Mar-2008 ELECTIVE	74.0
1001	1-Aug-2010	28-Oct-2028	28-Oct-2028			
1002	6-Nov-2009	11-Jul-2025	11-Jul-2025			
1003	29-Jun-2001	29-Jun-2016	29-Jun-2016	11-Apr-2018		



1004	30-Jan-2010	10-Dec-2029	10-Dec-2029				
1005	12-Jan-2014	12-Jan-2029	12-Jan-2029				
1006	9-Jun-2001	30-Dec-2016	30-Dec-2016	26-Sep-2017			
1007	27-Apr-1974	21-Jan-1990	21-Jan-1990	21-Jan-1990	8-Feb-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		67.0
1008	19-Feb-1944	16-Nov-1967	16-Nov-1967		30-Jan-1948 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		45.2
1009	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	9-Oct-2022				
1010	22-Mar-2003	22-Mar-2018	22-Mar-2018	22-Mar-2018			
1011	27-Jan-2017	26-Oct-2032	26-Oct-2032				
1012	18-Jul-1970	18-Jul-1985	18-Jul-1985	19-Jul-1985	22-Mar-1995 COMPULSORY		75.0
1013	3-Nov-1989	20-Nov-2000	3-Nov-1999		20-Nov-2000 COMPULSORY		75.0
1014	5-May-1973	4-May-1988	4-May-1988	4-May-1988	6-Dec-1993 COMPULSORY		75.0
1015	23-Feb-1962	12-Mar-1973	12-Mar-1973	10-Dec-1976	12-Mar-1978 COMPULSORY		75.0
1016	15-Dec-1988	15-Dec-2003	15-Dec-2003	15-Feb-2006	17-Feb-2012 COMPULSORY		75.0
1017	19-Jun-1982	18-Mar-2004	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE		70.3
1018	1-Nov-2003	1-Nov-2018	8-Aug-2018		6-Nov-2011 DISABILITY		63.2
1019	4-Jan-1964	4-Jan-1979	4-Jan-1979	11-Jun-1984	5-Mar-1987 COMPULSORY		75.0
1020	9-Oct-2020	9-Oct-2035	20-May-2034				
1021	8-Jun-1977	13-Oct-1997	13-Oct-1997	13-Oct-1997	9-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE		70.0
1022	26-Oct-1983	31-Jul-2001	4-May-2004	4-May-2004	9-Apr-2014 ELECTIVE		74.9
1023	7-Jan-2012	7-Jan-2027	3-Aug-2025				
1024	23-Nov-1951	12-Mar-1970	12-Mar-1970	5-Nov-1975	11-Mar-1980 COMPULSORY		75.0
1025	21-May-1998	10-Jun-2017	10-Jun-2017	10-Jun-2017	12-Nov-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		63.4
1026	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	3-Sep-2022				
1027	16-Feb-1974	16-Feb-1989	16-Feb-1989	16-Feb-1989	28-Apr-1998 COMPULSORY		75.0
1028	22-Oct-2017	22-Oct-2032	22-Oct-2032				
1029	7-Aug-2009	11-Jul-2027	11-Jul-2027				
1030	27-Oct-1968	27-Oct-1983	27-Oct-1983	8-Oct-1984	22-Feb-1993 COMPULSORY		75.0
1031	23-Mar-2013	22-Mar-2028	22-Mar-2028				
1032	27-Jun-1968	8-Nov-1990	8-Nov-1990		9-Sep-1980 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		54.8
1033	12-Jan-2013	21-Apr-2030	21-Apr-2030				
1034	9-Feb-1963	26-Aug-1989	26-Aug-1989	26-Aug-1989	26-Aug-1999 COMPULSORY		75.0
1035	21-Aug-2005	19-Feb-2015			19-Feb-2015 COMPULSORY		75.0
1036	16-May-2015	11-Dec-2031	11-Dec-2031				
1037	22-Jul-1999	27-May-2016	27-May-2016	10-Aug-2016			
1038	6-Mar-1980	7-Mar-1995	19-Feb-1993	19-Feb-1993	19-Feb-1998 COMPULSORY		75.0
1039	24-Dec-1989	6-Jun-2011	6-Jun-2011	6-Jun-2011	8-Jan-2018 ELECTIVE		65.1
1040	30-May-1996	15-Jan-2014	2-Sep-2016		24-Jul-2006 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		54.9
1041	14-Jun-2014	19-Dec-2027	14-Jun-2024				
1042	8-Jun-1995	13-Aug-2012	13-Aug-2012	10-Dec-2018			
1043	23-Mar-1941	22-Mar-1956	22-Mar-1956		6-Jan-1964 COMPULSORY		75.0
1044	2-Jul-1993	1-Aug-2011	1-Aug-2011	1-Aug-2011			
1045	3-Jan-2004	26-Feb-2021	26-Feb-2021				
1046	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	30-Nov-2021				
1047	28-Dec-1963	28-Dec-1978	28-Dec-1978		28-Mar-1976 Early Retirement		66.7
1048	20-Aug-1966	5-Sep-1976	20-Aug-1976		5-Sep-1976 COMPULSORY		75.0
1049	26-Sep-2003	26-Sep-2018	26-Sep-2018		9-Aug-2014 DISABILITY		61.9
1050	11-May-1972	12-May-1987	12-May-1987		6-Oct-1982 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		61.2
1051	27-Dec-1936	2-Jan-1962	2-Jan-1962		2-Jan-1972 COMPULSORY		75.0
1052	13-Nov-1982	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	13-Nov-1997	23-Aug-2007 COMPULSORY		75.0
1053	30-Jul-1955	21-Dec-1969	30-Jul-1965		21-Dec-1969 COMPULSORY		75.0
1054	27-Jul-2002	20-Jan-2018	20-Jan-2018	15-Jul-2018			
1055	18-Sep-1993	27-Aug-2015	27-Aug-2015				
1056	9-Aug-1979	27-Jan-1995	27-Jan-1995		25-May-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		63.3
1057	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	18-May-1998 COMPULSORY		75.0
1058	30-Aug-2010	30-Aug-2025	6-Feb-2025				
1059	25-Dec-1965	25-Dec-1980	25-Dec-1980	19-Jul-1982	26-May-1990 COMPULSORY		75.0
1060	24-Jul-1997	12-Jun-2013	12-Jun-2013		24-Nov-2010 Early Retirement		61.6
1061	21-Aug-2020	21-Aug-2035	26-Jul-2034				
1062	27-May-1999	27-May-2014	27-May-2014	27-May-2014	8-Aug-2016 ELECTIVE		70.8
1063	15-Mar-1984	16-Mar-1999	6-Jun-1995	6-Jun-1995	11-Jul-1999 ELECTIVE		74.1
1064	2-Dec-1983	29-Oct-1992			29-Oct-1992 COMPULSORY		75.0
1065	28-Sep-2000	15-Jul-2017	15-Jul-2017	15-Jul-2017			
1066	11-Dec-1988	11-Dec-2003	1-Nov-2002		9-Jul-1997 DISABILITY		64.7
1067	31-Jan-1981	31-Jan-1996	31-Jan-1996	31-Jan-1996	24-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE		72.2
1068	9-Jun-1991	9-Jun-2006	9-Jun-2006	9-Jun-2006	9-Sep-2012 ELECTIVE		71.4
1069	7-Nov-2009	17-Jan-2025	17-Jan-2025				
1070	9-Feb-1995	3-May-2016	3-May-2016	9-Feb-2019			
1071	8-Aug-2015	11-Jun-2030	8-Aug-2025				
1072	22-Oct-2017	7-May-2035	7-May-2035				
1073	16-Oct-1971	26-Feb-1999	20-Feb-2001		11-Apr-2003 ELECTIVE		67.1
1074	10-Dec-1987	7-May-2005	24-Mar-2007	29-Mar-2007	8-Jan-2017 ELECTIVE		74.3
1075	14-Mar-1985	11-Apr-1999	14-Mar-1995		11-Apr-1999 COMPULSORY		75.0
1076	9-Jun-1972	15-Sep-1988	15-Sep-1988	15-Sep-1988	9-Dec-1988 ELECTIVE		65.2
1077	8-Nov-1990	8-Nov-2005	27-Aug-2003	27-Aug-2003	27-Aug-2008 COMPULSORY		75.0
1078	4-Jul-2015	4-Jul-2030	4-Jul-2030				
1079	2-May-2009	21-Nov-2021	2-May-2019	2-May-2019			
1080	22-Mar-2019	22-Mar-2034	22-Mar-2034				
1081	1-Oct-1998	4-Jan-2014	4-Jan-2014		1-Oct-2014 ELECTIVE		65.5
1082	6-Mar-2005	5-Mar-2020	22-Mar-2017	22-Mar-2017			
1083	22-Mar-2008	23-Mar-2023	30-Aug-2021				
1084	5-Feb-2004	14-Jun-2020	14-Jun-2020		6-Feb-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		62.3
1085	23-Nov-2017	23-Nov-2032	25-Sep-2029				
1086	12-Sep-1963	12-Sep-1978	9-Apr-1976		9-Jan-1974 DISABILITY		67.8
1087	15-Feb-2002	27-May-2020	27-May-2020				

1088	19-Jun-1982	26-Feb-1999	10-Jul-1999		10-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE	64.8
1089	8-Feb-1964	15-Apr-1975	15-Apr-1975	10-Jul-1978	24-Mar-1980 ELECTIVE	74.9
1090	21-Mar-2015	13-Nov-2032	13-Nov-2032			
1091	10-Jul-1947	30-Jan-1966			2-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE	73.2
1092	16-Feb-1974	16-Feb-1989	16-Feb-1989	16-Feb-1989	10-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE	68.3
1093	9-Jun-1991	9-Jun-2006	15-Aug-2002	15-Aug-2002	16-Jul-2006 ELECTIVE	73.9
1094	9-Jan-1967	17-Jul-1989	17-Jul-1989		28-Mar-1989 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.7
1095	23-Mar-2013	22-Mar-2028	22-Mar-2028			
1096	10-Sep-2019	10-Sep-2034	10-Sep-2034			
1097	20-Jul-2008	20-Jul-2023	20-Jul-2023			
1098	10-Dec-1964	10-Dec-1979	10-Dec-1979	9-Feb-1980	15-Jan-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.1
1099	30-Dec-1967	4-Jun-1982	30-Dec-1977		13-Aug-1977 DISABILITY	70.2
1100	9-Nov-1974	9-Nov-1989	9-Nov-1989	9-Nov-1989	10-Feb-1991 ELECTIVE	67.4
1101	5-Oct-2006	24-Feb-2026	24-Feb-2026			
1102	8-Oct-1983	20-Oct-1998	20-Oct-1998	23-Oct-1998	20-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
1103	18-Jan-2003	18-Jan-2018	18-Jan-2018		12-Oct-2017 DISABILITY	69.6
1104	13-Oct-1985	13-Oct-2000	17-Aug-1998	17-Aug-1998	11-Mar-2001 ELECTIVE	72.6
1105	9-Jun-1979	26-Feb-1999	21-Sep-2000		11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE	63.6
1106	23-Mar-1985	22-Mar-2000	22-Mar-2000		12-Mar-1986 RESIGNATION (RPC)	51.1
1107	27-Jul-2002	24-Feb-2020	24-Feb-2020	12-Apr-2020		
1108	27-Jan-2017	31-Jul-2030	27-Jan-2027			
1109	22-Aug-2009	8-Oct-2025	8-Oct-2025			
1110	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	29-May-2028			
1111	21-Dec-1950	23-Dec-1970	23-Dec-1970		23-Dec-1980 COMPULSORY	75.0
1112	23-Oct-1975	17-Dec-1995	17-Dec-1995	8-Jan-1996	9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE	69.1
1113	7-Jan-1989	25-Mar-2010			8-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE	60.5
1114	30-Aug-1973	30-Aug-1988	30-Aug-1988	30-Aug-1988	3-Nov-1995 COMPULSORY	75.0
1115	7-Feb-2002	17-Sep-2020	17-Sep-2020			
1116	9-Feb-2019	30-Apr-2034	30-Apr-2034			
1117	11-Mar-1955	11-Mar-1970	11-Mar-1970	1-Sep-1978	1-Mar-1979 COMPULSORY	75.0
1118	12-Jul-1969	12-Jul-1984	1-Jul-1981	10-Mar-1984	1-Jul-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
1119	6-Mar-2005	5-Mar-2020	5-Mar-2020	5-Mar-2020		
1120	11-Aug-2018	16-Oct-2035	16-Oct-2035			
1121	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	27-Mar-2029			
1122	30-Jun-1988	30-Jun-2003	7-Oct-2001	7-Oct-2001	7-Oct-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
1123	16-Mar-2019	16-Mar-2034	16-Mar-2034			
1124	1-Jan-1988	31-Jul-2007	31-Jul-2007	26-Feb-2012	18-Jan-2019 ELECTIVE	71.9
1125	26-Mar-1954	26-Mar-1971	26-Mar-1971		10-Apr-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	58.0
1126	22-Sep-1966	22-Sep-1981	22-Sep-1981		19-Jun-1988 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	72.8
1127	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	27-Sep-2024			
1128	9-Sep-2007	9-Sep-2022	7-May-2022		9-Dec-2018 Early Retirement	66.6
1129	9-Feb-2006	9-Feb-2021	16-Feb-2018	16-Feb-2018		
1130	8-Feb-1969	8-Feb-1984	6-Sep-1979	9-Sep-1979	6-Sep-1984 COMPULSORY	75.0
1131	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	17-Dec-2026			
1132	2-Mar-2007	4-Dec-2025	4-Dec-2025			
1133	22-Aug-2010	30-Apr-2029	30-Apr-2029			
1134	5-Sep-1981	5-Sep-1996	5-Sep-1996	10-Apr-1997	1-Dec-2001 COMPULSORY	75.0
1135	24-Sep-2016	24-Sep-2031	17-Oct-2026			
1136	22-Jul-1999	27-Jul-2015	27-Jul-2015			
1137	2-Jan-1953	3-Sep-1968	3-Sep-1968		9-Jan-1967 DISABILITY	63.4
1138	21-May-1993	18-Jul-2007	21-May-2003		10-Dec-2003 DISABILITY	71.4
1139	16-Sep-1999	16-Dec-2016	16-Dec-2016	9-Dec-2017		
1140	31-Dec-1977	29-Feb-2000	29-Feb-2000		10-Dec-1988 RESIGNATION (RPC)	53.8
1141	27-Jan-1965	11-Sep-1978	11-Sep-1978	8-Oct-1978	11-Sep-1983 COMPULSORY	75.0
1142	10-Jun-2007	26-Sep-2025	26-Sep-2025			
1143	17-Oct-1984	15-Aug-2002	11-Jun-2005		9-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE	62.3
1144	22-Mar-2008	18-Apr-2023	18-Apr-2023			
1145	24-Oct-1981	18-Jan-1999	18-Jan-1999	18-Jan-1999	18-Jan-2009 COMPULSORY	75.0
1146	14-Nov-2010	14-Nov-2025	14-Nov-2025			
1147	14-Sep-2013	9-Dec-2028	9-Dec-2028			
1148	17-Jul-1976	12-Apr-1993	12-Apr-1993	12-Apr-1993	12-Apr-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
1149	2-Jun-1957	4-Jan-1978	4-Jan-1978	18-May-1983	4-Jan-1988 COMPULSORY	75.0
1150	8-Oct-1989	20-Jun-2007	20-Jun-2007	10-Apr-2008	11-Apr-2018 COMPULSORY	73.1
1151	19-Jun-1985	19-Jun-2000	19-Jun-2000	19-Jun-2000	9-Jan-2006 ELECTIVE	74.9
1152	23-Jul-2005	23-Jul-2020	23-Jul-2020	23-Jul-2020		
1153	1-May-1999	6-Mar-2015	6-Mar-2015		8-Jan-2015 Early Retirement	64.0
1154	21-Mar-1970	29-Mar-1993	29-Mar-1993		25-May-1991 DISABILITY	62.2
1155	1-Nov-1975	26-Aug-1998	26-Aug-1998	1-Nov-2000	26-Aug-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
1156	5-Aug-2007	24-Jan-2027	24-Jan-2027			
1157	26-Jun-1982	27-Feb-2002	30-Oct-2006	30-Oct-2006	30-Oct-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
1158	16-Nov-1977	26-Jul-1995	26-Jul-1995	26-Jul-1995	8-Aug-1997 ELECTIVE	67.0
1159	23-Dec-2017	23-Dec-2032	19-Apr-2032			
1160	25-Feb-1987	25-Feb-2002	25-Feb-2002	10-Mar-2002	6-Dec-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
1161	10-Sep-2004	10-Sep-2019	10-Sep-2019	10-Dec-2019		
1162	3-Jun-1986	3-Jun-2001	19-Jul-2000	19-Jul-2000	19-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
1163	12-Feb-1983	2-Dec-2000	21-Sep-2003	22-Mar-2005	21-Sep-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
1164	2-Jan-1982	3-Oct-1999	3-Oct-1999		18-Feb-1982 RESIGNATION (RPC)	47.4
1165	30-Sep-2019	30-Sep-2034	30-Sep-2034			
1166	14-Jun-2014	14-Jun-2029	14-Jun-2029			
1167	9-Jan-1964	9-Jan-1979	9-Jan-1979		15-Feb-1976 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.5
1168	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	26-Sep-2023			
1169	17-Jan-2015	25-Mar-2032	25-Mar-2032			
1170	7-Oct-1998	8-Nov-2013	8-Nov-2013	8-Nov-2013		
1171	11-Apr-1976	12-Apr-1991			14-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE	67.3

1172	9-May-2019	9-May-2034	25-Oct-2030				
1173	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015			
1174	24-Mar-2012	25-Mar-2027	25-Mar-2027				
1175	9-Sep-2020	9-Sep-2035	21-Feb-2033				
1176	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	1-Jan-2011	1-Jan-2011	11-Apr-2011	Early Retirement	70.3
1177	12-Jan-2019	7-Mar-2029	12-Jan-2029				
1178	20-Dec-1947	20-Dec-1962	20-Dec-1962		13-Feb-1965	ELECTIVE	71.0
1179	1-Mar-2019	1-Mar-2034	13-Apr-2029				
1180	12-Jun-2020	27-Sep-2028					
1181	5-Oct-2019	5-Oct-2034	19-Mar-2032				
1182	27-Sep-2009	15-Mar-2027	15-Mar-2027				
1183	23-Mar-2013	26-May-2026	23-Mar-2023				
1184	20-Jul-2008	20-Jul-2023	24-Apr-2021				
1185	27-Jun-1963	27-Jun-1978	27-Jun-1978	9-Jan-1980	1-Jun-1985	COMPULSORY	75.0
1186	9-Nov-1973	9-Nov-1988	9-Nov-1988	9-Nov-1988	27-Oct-1998	COMPULSORY	75.0
1187	23-May-1970	16-Apr-1999	16-Apr-1999		11-Jul-1997	DISABILITY	63.2
1188	2-Jan-2005	2-Jan-2020	2-Jan-2020	2-Jan-2020			
1189	25-Dec-2003	6-Jun-2022	6-Jun-2022				
1190	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	26-Sep-2023				
1191	2-Mar-2007	2-Mar-2022	2-Mar-2022				
1192	5-Sep-2015	5-Sep-2030	2-Jun-2029				
1193	8-Apr-1954	29-Feb-1972	29-Feb-1972	13-Apr-1974	1-Mar-1982	COMPULSORY	75.0
1194	27-Sep-2015	13-Aug-2031	13-Aug-2031				
1195	2-Jan-1958	24-Dec-1960			24-Dec-1965	COMPULSORY	75.0
1196	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	21-Mar-2030				
1197	25-Jun-1998	25-Jun-2013	8-Jul-2012	8-Jul-2012	24-Jan-2016	ELECTIVE	73.5
1198	25-Mar-1972	10-Dec-1997	10-Dec-1997	10-Dec-1997	9-Aug-2003	ELECTIVE	70.7
1199	16-Nov-1977	16-Nov-1992	12-May-1989	9-Jun-1989	9-Dec-1992	ELECTIVE	73.6
1200	26-Apr-1981	25-Apr-1996	25-Apr-1996	25-Apr-1996	10-Apr-2000	ELECTIVE	70.1
1201	11-Aug-2017	13-Jul-2035	13-Jul-2035				
1202	3-Feb-1979	12-Oct-1998	12-Oct-1998	18-Nov-1998	12-Dec-2003	ELECTIVE	70.2
1203	10-Dec-2001	10-Dec-2016	10-Dec-2016	10-Dec-2016			
1204	7-May-1983	7-May-1998	28-Jan-1995		31-Oct-1985	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.8
1205	16-Nov-1977	16-Nov-1992	16-Nov-1992	16-Nov-1992	14-Dec-1994	ELECTIVE	68.7
1206	11-Mar-1955	9-May-1964	11-Mar-1965		21-Nov-1964	DISABILITY	70.5
1207	13-Jan-1974	12-Jul-1993	12-Jul-1993		10-Sep-1984	DEATH (RPC)	56.2
1208	17-Jun-1999	17-Jun-2014	17-Jun-2014				
1209	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	5-Jan-2027				
1210	11-Jan-1996	21-May-2014	21-May-2014	9-Aug-2014			
1211	1-Nov-1975	20-Aug-1993	20-Aug-1993	26-May-1999	20-Aug-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
1212	9-Feb-2019	9-Feb-2034	18-Oct-2032				
1213	28-Jan-2012	28-Jan-2027	24-Oct-2022				
1214	1-Oct-1983	5-Nov-1996	1-Oct-1993	1-Oct-1993	5-Nov-1995	DISABILITY	74.0
1215	13-Nov-1982	11-Apr-1999	7-Sep-2000	7-Sep-2000	7-Sep-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
1216	18-May-2013	9-Dec-2025					
1217	3-Jan-1942	4-Feb-1960	4-Feb-1960		3-Apr-1964	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.2
1218	13-Aug-2005	13-Aug-2020	13-Aug-2020				
1219	12-Jul-2020	3-Nov-2037	3-Nov-2037				
1220	17-Aug-2014	7-Aug-2029	17-Aug-2024				
1221	3-Aug-2013	3-Aug-2028	29-Mar-2028				
1222	12-Apr-1975	12-Aug-1992	12-Aug-1992	12-Aug-1992	10-Dec-1999	ELECTIVE	72.3
1223	27-Jan-2017	17-Feb-2031	27-Jan-2027				
1224	18-Oct-1980	26-Feb-1999	4-Apr-1999	4-Apr-1999	13-Jul-2005	ELECTIVE	71.3
1225	23-Nov-2017	23-Nov-2032	23-Nov-2032				
1226	7-May-1994	19-Oct-2013	19-Oct-2013	19-Oct-2013			
1227	18-Dec-2009	5-Oct-2027	5-Oct-2027				
1228	20-Dec-1975	20-Dec-1990	20-Dec-1990	16-Feb-1992	14-Feb-1996	ELECTIVE	70.4
1229	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	9-Aug-2008	ELECTIVE	69.8
1230	4-Jan-2004	19-May-2023	19-May-2023				
1231	11-Jun-2011	11-Jun-2026	11-Jun-2026				
1232	3-Mar-1963	12-Jan-1982	12-Jan-1982		8-Jan-1977	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.0
1233	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007		9-Oct-2003	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.1
1234	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2035	28-Aug-2035				
1235	23-Dec-2006	20-Mar-2016			20-Mar-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1236	26-May-1985	9-Oct-2000	22-Feb-2001	22-Feb-2001	10-Apr-2009	ELECTIVE	73.1
1237	11-Mar-1999	11-Mar-2014	26-Feb-2014	26-Feb-2014	10-Dec-2018	ELECTIVE	74.8
1238	16-May-2015	17-May-2024					
1239	8-Jul-2007	8-Jul-2022	16-Feb-2018	11-Mar-2018			
1240	28-Jan-2018	23-Nov-2027					
1241	29-Sep-2017	10-Apr-2027					
1242	12-May-1993	26-Aug-2008	26-Aug-2008	26-Aug-2008	14-Feb-2017	ELECTIVE	73.2
1243	25-Mar-1972	15-Dec-1987	15-Dec-1987	15-Dec-1987	15-Dec-1997	COMPULSORY	75.0
1244	21-Nov-2009	21-Nov-2024	21-Nov-2024				
1245	1-Nov-2003	1-Nov-2018	18-Aug-2017	18-Aug-2017	9-Oct-2020	ELECTIVE	73.1
1246	19-Jul-2014	13-Mar-2032	13-Mar-2032				
1247	12-Feb-1998	12-Feb-2013	12-Feb-2013	12-Feb-2013	9-Feb-2019	ELECTIVE	74.7
1248	7-May-1977	14-Jun-1993	14-Jun-1993	14-Jun-1993	14-Jun-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
1249	24-Sep-2016	16-Sep-2031	24-Sep-2026				
1250	29-Apr-1972	15-Mar-1991	15-Mar-1991		15-Mar-2001	COMPULSORY	75.0
1251	12-Jan-2019	17-Dec-2036	17-Dec-2036				
1252	17-Jul-1976	26-Feb-1999	22-Jan-2001		10-Apr-2000	ELECTIVE	64.2
1253	9-Jun-1979	9-Jun-1994	9-Jun-1994	9-Jun-1994	6-Feb-1996	ELECTIVE	67.6
1254	8-Oct-1989	20-Dec-2004	3-Mar-2005	3-Mar-2005	9-Aug-2008	ELECTIVE	68.4
1255	8-Nov-2001	8-Nov-2016	8-Nov-2016		22-Sep-2012	Early Retirement	63.7

1256	26-Sep-2008	27-Oct-2022	26-Sep-2018			11-Jun-2011 DISABILITY	63.6
1257	16-Sep-2017	16-Sep-2032	31-May-2030				
1258	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007			9-Jan-2013 ELECTIVE	71.9
1259	5-May-1940	6-May-1955	6-May-1955			30-Oct-1958 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.7
1260	2-Apr-2007	14-May-2026	14-May-2026				
1261	29-Apr-1964	3-Dec-1988	3-Dec-1988	30-Apr-1994		14-May-1998 ELECTIVE	74.4
1262	3-Feb-2007	3-Feb-2022	3-Feb-2022				
1263	26-Oct-1983	14-Apr-2002	1-Oct-2005	1-Oct-2005		1-Oct-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
1264	29-Dec-1994	18-Mar-2010	18-Mar-2010	9-Aug-2010		10-Apr-2017 ELECTIVE	71.8
1265	13-Jan-2001	11-Nov-2017	11-Nov-2017			5-Oct-2014 DEATH (RPC)	60.1
1266	13-Dec-1992	13-Dec-2007	13-Dec-2007	13-Dec-2007		13-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE	74.4
1267	19-Jul-1985	19-Jul-2000	9-Aug-1998	9-Aug-1998		1-Mar-2002 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.6
1268	22-Aug-2009	22-Aug-2024	5-Mar-2020	10-Mar-2020			
1269	13-Aug-1959	27-Sep-1975				8-Feb-1985 ELECTIVE	74.4
1270	18-Jan-2003	17-Jul-2027				13-Jun-2020 Early Retirement	60.1
1271	27-May-1990	27-May-2005	5-Feb-2003	5-Feb-2003		5-Feb-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
1272	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	17-Feb-1999		17-Dec-2001 ELECTIVE	71.1
1273	9-Jul-1977	11-Sep-1997	11-Sep-1997	11-Sep-1997		9-Jan-2002 Early Retirement	69.3
1274	23-Feb-2002	23-Feb-2017	23-Feb-2017	23-Feb-2017		9-Dec-2017 ELECTIVE	66.8
1275	9-Mar-2018	7-Nov-2034	7-Nov-2034				
1276	25-Feb-1988	25-Feb-2003	18-Dec-2000	18-Dec-2000		18-Dec-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
1277	5-May-2002	5-May-2017	5-May-2017			5-Oct-2012 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.9
1278	24-Sep-2016	15-May-2036	15-May-2036				
1279	10-May-2008	6-Nov-2025	6-Nov-2025				
1280	6-Jun-2015	6-Jun-2030	6-Jun-2030				
1281	25-Jul-1986	27-Sep-2003	28-Nov-2005	28-Nov-2005		28-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
1282	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015		10-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE	71.6
1283	9-Jun-2012	9-Jun-2027	9-Jun-2027				
1284	9-Oct-1963	9-Oct-1978	9-Oct-1978			23-Feb-1976 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.3
1285	30-May-1996	31-May-2011	14-Apr-2007	14-Apr-2007		13-Apr-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
1286	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	1-Jun-2029				
1287	15-Jun-1989	25-Aug-2009	25-Aug-2009	10-Dec-2009		9-Feb-2018 ELECTIVE	68.3
1288	3-Nov-1995	3-Nov-2010	25-Dec-2006	25-Dec-2006		25-Dec-2011 COMPULSORY	75.0
1289	30-Apr-1967	23-Jun-1983				26-May-1989 ELECTIVE	70.9
1290	20-Jul-2008	1-Jun-2025	1-Jun-2025				
1291	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007		22-May-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0
1292	28-Mar-1996	25-Nov-2014	25-Nov-2014				
1293	1-Oct-2005	18-Dec-2027					
1294	10-Jul-1961	3-Jul-1977	3-Jul-1977	9-Oct-1977		5-Apr-1978 ELECTIVE	65.8
1295	25-Jan-1964	6-Feb-1984	6-Feb-1984	6-Feb-1984		6-Feb-1994 COMPULSORY	75.0
1296	25-Sep-1987	10-Jan-2008	10-Jan-2008	9-Sep-2008		9-Sep-2018 COMPULSORY	70.4
1297	1-Oct-2005	22-Nov-2023	22-Nov-2023				
1298	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	22-Jan-2005	22-Jan-2005		11-Apr-2009 ELECTIVE	74.2
1299	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	8-Jan-2026				
1300	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007		5-Mar-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
1301	7-May-1994	7-May-2009	7-Apr-2007	7-Apr-2007		6-Apr-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
1302	10-Apr-2012	11-Apr-2027	10-Jan-2024				
1303	22-Mar-1975	22-Mar-1990	7-Mar-1989	7-Mar-1989		26-Dec-1990 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.8
1304	12-Feb-1954	13-Jun-1977	13-Jun-1977			20-Mar-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.8
1305	7-Mar-1971	12-Sep-1982	7-Mar-1981			18-Jun-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.8
1306	16-Feb-1997	2-Oct-2014	2-Oct-2014	2-Oct-2014			
1307	7-Jan-2012	7-Jan-2027	19-Feb-2023				
1308	27-Dec-1975	27-Dec-1990	27-Dec-1990			9-Sep-1989 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.2
1309	18-May-2013	5-Apr-2029	5-Apr-2029				
1310	20-Jan-1963	1-Aug-1984	1-Aug-1984	1-Aug-1984		20-Jan-1993 ELECTIVE	73.5
1311	1-Jun-1989	26-Oct-2003	1-Jun-1999	10-Dec-1999		26-Oct-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
1312	8-Mar-1992	27-Aug-2000				27-Aug-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
1313	21-Oct-1972	24-Jul-1988	24-Jul-1988	24-Jul-1988		27-Jul-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.0
1314	23-Jul-2005	23-Jul-2020	23-Jul-2020			9-Sep-2017 Early Retirement	63.7
1315	21-Aug-2005	16-Mar-2022	16-Mar-2022				
1316	29-Sep-1984	15-Jun-1999	15-Jun-1999	15-Jun-1999		15-Jun-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
1317	4-Jul-2015	5-Apr-2031	5-Apr-2031				
1318	5-May-2002	13-Apr-2018	13-Apr-2018	9-Sep-2020			
1319	18-Apr-1999	25-Sep-2015	25-Sep-2015	11-Mar-2018			
1320	16-Oct-1986	16-Oct-2001	16-Oct-2001	16-Oct-2001		19-Mar-2010 COMPULSORY	75.0
1321	9-Jan-1965	23-Dec-1978	23-Dec-1978			14-Jul-1973 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.6
1322	11-Dec-1971	19-Oct-1995	19-Oct-1995	19-Oct-1995		21-Apr-1999 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.5
1323	7-Jan-1989	7-Jan-2004	2-Apr-2000	9-Oct-2001		9-Jan-2005 ELECTIVE	74.8
1324	31-Mar-1979	26-Feb-1999	15-Feb-2002	8-Jun-2002		9-Feb-2007 ELECTIVE	70.0
1325	31-Mar-1984	1-Apr-1999	1-Apr-1999	1-Apr-1999		10-May-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
1326	18-Aug-1985	11-Nov-2000	4-Feb-2001			14-Aug-1999 DISABILITY	63.5
1327	11-Dec-1988	11-Dec-2003	28-Jun-1999	9-Sep-2000		28-Jun-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
1328	2-Oct-2011	25-Oct-2026	25-Oct-2026				
1329	11-May-1958	23-Dec-1977	23-Dec-1977	23-Dec-1977		25-Jun-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.5
1330	27-Jan-1962	17-Nov-1972	17-Nov-1972			16-Apr-1965 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.4
1331	3-Feb-2018	14-Sep-2034	14-Sep-2034				
1332	15-May-2020	16-May-2035	16-May-2035				
1333	5-Oct-2019	5-Oct-2034	5-Oct-2034				
1334	13-Oct-1990	13-Oct-2005	25-Jun-2002	25-Jun-2002		25-Jun-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
1335	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2035	28-Aug-2035				
1336	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	10-Jun-2022				
1337	9-Feb-1995	9-Feb-2010	9-Feb-2010	10-Apr-2012		11-Jan-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
1338	7-Dec-2018	19-Oct-2028					
1339	13-Oct-1978	13-Oct-1993	13-Oct-1993			29-Oct-1988 DISABILITY	63.0

1340	8-Jan-2021	23-Jan-2036	23-Jan-2036						
1341	19-Jan-1992	13-Nov-2010	13-Nov-2010	13-Nov-2010	8-Nov-2017	ELECTIVE			68.2
1342	18-Dec-2009	18-Dec-2024	23-Oct-2024						
1343	22-Nov-1935	19-Oct-1953	19-Oct-1953		5-Mar-1958	ELECTIVE			69.4
1344	29-Mar-1981	28-Mar-1996	26-Jul-1993		25-Oct-1987	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			64.2
1345	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	3-Nov-1995	3-Nov-1995	11-Mar-1999	ELECTIVE			73.4
1346	18-Aug-2007	18-Aug-2022	6-Jul-2022						
1347	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	16-Jan-1995	ELECTIVE			69.0
1348	8-Aug-2015	11-Nov-2032	11-Nov-2032						
1349	15-May-1963	7-Apr-1977	7-Apr-1977	11-Apr-1977	7-Apr-1982	COMPULSORY			75.0
1350	29-Dec-1979	29-Dec-1994	29-Dec-1994		4-Apr-1984	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			56.0
1351	11-Jul-1998	11-Jul-2013	11-Jul-2013	11-Jul-2013	9-Apr-2020	ELECTIVE			75.0
1352	28-Jan-1999	28-Jan-2014	28-Jan-2014	28-Jan-2014					
1353	12-Jul-2020	14-Oct-2035	14-Oct-2035						
1354	8-Mar-1969	23-Jun-1984	23-Jun-1984		25-Jul-1975	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			56.1
1355	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	17-Mar-2027						
1356	13-Jul-1995	13-Jul-2010	13-Jul-2010		17-Feb-1997	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			51.8
1357	26-Oct-1983	31-Jul-2006	31-Jul-2006		11-May-1996	RESIGNATION (RPC)			54.8
1358	6-Aug-2020	6-Aug-2035	6-Aug-2035						
1359	8-Nov-1951	25-Nov-1965	8-Nov-1961		27-Jun-1965	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			74.6
1360	9-May-1938	20-Apr-1955	20-Apr-1955		18-Dec-1963	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			73.7
1361	3-Feb-1983	3-Feb-1993	3-Feb-1993	10-Apr-1993	20-Oct-1995	COMPULSORY			75.0
1362	11-Dec-2020	26-Sep-2040	26-Sep-2040						
1363	22-Mar-2019	22-Mar-2034	10-Apr-2031						
1364	13-May-2005	10-Nov-2024	10-Nov-2024						
1365	10-Mar-1965	19-Dec-1981	19-Dec-1981		23-Jul-1973	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			56.6
1366	3-Apr-1974	3-Apr-1989	11-Dec-1988	11-Dec-1988	11-Apr-1991	ELECTIVE			72.3
1367	26-Jun-1997	26-Jun-2012	26-Jun-2012	10-Jul-2012					
1368	18-Sep-1993	11-Feb-2012	11-Feb-2012	12-Jul-2015					
1369	4-May-1986	20-Oct-2002	6-Apr-2004	6-Apr-2004	18-Jul-2012	ELECTIVE			73.3
1370	5-Sep-1993	3-Mar-2015	27-Aug-2026	15-Dec-2016					
1371	21-May-1998	21-May-2013	21-May-2013	21-May-2013	6-Oct-2017	ELECTIVE			74.1
1372	21-Sep-1961	21-Sep-1976	21-Sep-1976	9-Oct-1981	16-Sep-1984	COMPULSORY			75.0
1373	9-Jun-1961	29-Nov-1981	29-Nov-1981	9-Dec-1981	7-Jul-1983	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			66.6
1374	8-Dec-1978	29-Oct-1998	29-Oct-1998		9-Feb-2002	ELECTIVE			68.3
1375	3-Apr-1970	3-Apr-1985	3-Apr-1985		10-Apr-1983	DISABILITY			65.0
1376	7-Dec-2005	2-Jun-2023	2-Jun-2023						
1377	28-Feb-1962	18-Jun-1964			18-Jun-1969	RESIGNATION (RPC)			75.0
1378	23-May-1952	20-Aug-1970	20-Aug-1970		20-Aug-1980	COMPULSORY			75.0
1379	23-Oct-1998	27-Jul-2015	27-Jul-2015	29-Jul-2015					
1380	10-Mar-1984	29-Sep-2000	20-Apr-2002	20-Apr-2002	10-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE			75.0
1381	23-May-1981	7-Feb-2000	23-Oct-2003	23-Oct-2003	10-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE			73.5
1382	13-Sep-1969	5-Apr-1987	5-Apr-1987	11-Apr-1987	5-Apr-1997	COMPULSORY			75.0
1383	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	17-Dec-2029						
1384	9-Nov-1995	9-Nov-2010	9-Nov-2010		2-Feb-2006	DISABILITY			61.9
1385	14-Apr-1965	9-Apr-1976	14-Apr-1975		3-Apr-1969	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			68.0
1386	15-Sep-1988	15-Sep-2003	15-Sep-2003	15-Sep-2003	10-Apr-2004	ELECTIVE			67.2
1387	2-Apr-1977	8-Mar-2003	8-Mar-2003		10-Dec-1996	DISABILITY			58.8
1388	16-May-1996	17-May-2011	19-Mar-2010	19-Mar-2010	17-May-2011	ELECTIVE			71.2
1389	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	23-Oct-2016	ELECTIVE			70.0
1390	15-Feb-2014	15-Feb-2029	15-Feb-2029						
1391	9-Sep-1953	16-Aug-1971	16-Aug-1971	9-Sep-1976	8-Apr-1977	ELECTIVE			70.6
1392	17-Oct-1959	23-Dec-1968			23-Dec-1968	COMPULSORY			75.0
1393	20-Jul-1978	16-Feb-1994	16-Feb-1994	16-Feb-1994	16-Feb-2004	COMPULSORY			75.0
1394	19-Jun-1985	7-May-2000	7-May-2000	7-May-2000	10-Nov-2001	ELECTIVE			71.5
1395	9-Oct-1977	6-Jul-1997	6-Jul-1997	6-Jul-1997	6-Jul-2007	COMPULSORY			75.0
1396	17-Aug-1995	11-Mar-2010	17-Aug-2005	17-Aug-2005	11-Mar-2010	COMPULSORY			75.0
1397	29-Jan-2000	29-Jan-2015	5-Jun-2014	5-Jun-2014	8-Feb-2019	ELECTIVE			74.7
1398	17-Jun-2014	30-Apr-2031	30-Apr-2031						
1399	9-Feb-2019	9-Feb-2034	9-Feb-2034						
1400	22-Apr-2000	23-Apr-2015	23-Apr-2015		23-Apr-2015	ELECTIVE			69.8
1401	25-Feb-1953	22-Jun-1974	22-Jun-1974	25-Oct-1975	8-Apr-1979	ELECTIVE			69.8
1402	29-Jan-1954	29-Jan-1969	29-Jan-1969		16-May-1961	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			59.8
1403	1-Oct-1998	5-Feb-2012	1-Oct-2008	1-Oct-2008	5-Feb-2012	COMPULSORY			75.0
1404	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	31-Oct-2029						
1405	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	21-Mar-2030						
1406	9-May-1970	21-Jun-1992	21-Jun-1992	21-Jun-1992	21-Jun-2002	COMPULSORY			75.0
1407	13-Nov-1982	30-Oct-1992	13-Nov-1992		7-Sep-1986	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			63.9
1408	8-Mar-1969	31-Aug-1992	31-Aug-1992	31-Aug-1992	31-Aug-2002	COMPULSORY			75.0
1409	9-Jan-2014	9-Jan-2029	21-Jul-2027						
1410	11-Dec-1988	23-Mar-2005	2-Jul-2006	2-Jul-2006	2-Jul-2016	COMPULSORY			75.0
1411	12-Jan-2019	12-Jan-2034	12-Jan-2034						
1412	1-Sep-1963	28-Jun-1971			28-Jun-1971	RESIGNATION (RPC)			75.0
1413	2-Jan-2005	25-Nov-2020	25-Nov-2020						
1414	1-Apr-1992	6-Jul-2010	6-Jul-2010	6-Jul-2010	10-Dec-2018	ELECTIVE			70.2
1415	14-Oct-1965	14-Oct-1980	14-Oct-1980	9-Jul-1985	9-Dec-1988	ELECTIVE			74.3
1416	8-May-1966	8-May-1981	8-May-1981	9-Oct-1981	7-Aug-1989	COMPULSORY			75.0
1417	23-Nov-1973	23-Nov-1988	3-Nov-1986		9-Oct-1985	DISABILITY			68.9
1418	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	27-Jan-2032						
1419	10-May-2014	1-Jun-2028	9-May-2024		9-Dec-2019	RESIGNATION (RPC)			66.5
1420	15-Feb-1964	15-Feb-1979	15-Feb-1979	15-Feb-1979	5-Oct-1987	COMPULSORY			75.0
1421	6-Sep-1945	10-Dec-1965	10-Dec-1965	9-Sep-1974	10-Dec-1975	COMPULSORY			75.0
1422	17-Aug-1996	29-Nov-2013	29-Nov-2013	9-Oct-2015	9-Dec-2015	ELECTIVE			64.7
1423	11-Dec-1980	26-Feb-1999	21-May-2000	21-May-2000	14-Dec-2009	ELECTIVE			74.6

1424	30-May-1976	12-Sep-1998	12-Sep-1998	9-Feb-1999	24-Jul-2002	ELECTIVE	68.9
1425	14-Apr-1976	26-Feb-1999	9-Dec-2005	10-Dec-2005	9-Aug-2012	ELECTIVE	71.7
1426	31-Aug-2018	31-Aug-2033	29-Jul-2033				
1427	10-Feb-2013	26-Dec-2030	26-Dec-2030				
1428	13-Sep-2002	5-Nov-2018	5-Nov-2018	5-Nov-2018			
1429	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	24-Jul-2028				
1430	10-May-2008	11-May-2023	16-Jul-2020		15-Aug-2018	Early Retirement	68.1
1431	21-Aug-1982	21-Aug-1997	21-Aug-1997		22-Feb-2006	COMPULSORY	75.0
1432	3-Apr-1991	14-Apr-2007	14-Apr-2007	25-Apr-2007	11-Jul-2014	ELECTIVE	71.2
1433	11-Apr-1987	27-Apr-2004	13-May-2006	9-Jun-2006	12-May-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1434	26-Oct-1983	15-Sep-2003	24-Mar-2007	18-Apr-2007	20-Apr-2015	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.7
1435	19-Jul-2014	31-Aug-2032	31-Aug-2032				
1436	5-Nov-1981	30-May-1996	30-May-1996	30-May-1996	11-Apr-1999	ELECTIVE	72.9
1437	14-May-2011	8-Jul-2027	8-Jul-2027				
1438	11-Dec-1988	9-Nov-2001	11-Dec-1998	11-Dec-1998	9-Nov-2001	COMPULSORY	75.0
1439	9-Aug-1960	19-Jan-1986	19-Jan-1986		11-Mar-1977	DISABILITY	56.1
1440	25-Sep-1987	8-Feb-2004	22-Jun-2005	22-Jun-2005	26-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE	71.8
1441	8-Mar-1969	6-Apr-1988	6-Apr-1988		24-Jun-1985	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.2
1442	28-Jun-2003	28-Jun-2018	28-Jun-2018	10-Jul-2018			
1443	28-Sep-1996	28-Jul-2012	28-Jul-2012	8-Oct-2012			
1444	24-Jan-1981	13-Dec-2000	31-Oct-2005	31-Oct-2005	9-Feb-2007	ELECTIVE	66.3
1445	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	20-Jan-2006	20-Jan-2006	20-Jan-2011	COMPULSORY	75.0
1446	10-May-2014	11-Feb-2031	11-Feb-2031				
1447	9-Jun-1991	10-Jan-2009	10-Jan-2009	10-Jan-2009	8-Aug-2015	ELECTIVE	69.0
1448	29-Mar-1970	16-Oct-1998			16-Apr-2000	ELECTIVE	66.5
1449	19-Jan-1992	16-Apr-2008	16-Apr-2008	16-Apr-2008	26-Sep-2016	ELECTIVE	72.2
1450	16-Sep-2001	24-Oct-2017	24-Oct-2017	11-Apr-2018			
1451	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	8-Sep-2002		8-Sep-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
1452	2-Jul-1993	2-Jul-2008	10-May-2005	10-May-2005	9-Dec-2008	ELECTIVE	73.6
1453	8-Dec-1978	4-Aug-1999	31-Mar-2005	31-Mar-2005	8-Dec-2009	ELECTIVE	69.7
1454	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	8-Nov-2021		30-Jan-2019	DISABILITY	67.2
1455	2-Jan-1970	29-Jul-1991	29-Jul-1991	29-Jul-1991	29-Jul-2001	COMPULSORY	75.0
1456	13-Aug-2005	13-Aug-2020	30-Nov-2019	13-Aug-2020			
1457	29-Mar-1987	23-Oct-2003	18-May-2005		19-Jun-2000	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.1
1458	4-Jul-1979	26-Feb-1999	7-Aug-2000	7-Aug-2000	7-Aug-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
1459	29-Mar-2018	29-Mar-2033	9-May-2032				
1460	17-Aug-2000	25-Sep-2015	25-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2015			
1461	1-Nov-1975	4-Jun-1992	4-Jun-1992	11-Mar-1993	26-Mar-1993	DEATH (RPC)	65.8
1462	3-Sep-1998	21-Mar-2014	21-Mar-2014		8-Oct-2009	Early Retirement	60.0
1463	10-Aug-1944	10-Aug-1959	10-Aug-1959		13-Feb-1968	COMPULSORY	75.0
1464	10-Feb-1965	10-Feb-1980	10-Feb-1980	10-Feb-1980	10-Mar-1982	ELECTIVE	71.8
1465	20-Aug-1962	13-Apr-1977	20-Aug-1972	6-Jun-1976	13-Apr-1977	COMPULSORY	75.0
1466	13-Jan-1963	7-Sep-1987	7-Sep-1987	7-Sep-1987	7-Sep-1997	ELECTIVE	75.0
1467	14-Sep-2001	13-Sep-2018	13-Sep-2018	13-Sep-2018			
1468	5-Aug-2007	27-Nov-2019	5-Aug-2017	27-Nov-2017	27-Nov-2019	COMPULSORY	75.0
1469	20-Jun-2020	22-Apr-2038	22-Apr-2038				
1470	27-Oct-1988	24-Jun-2004	19-Feb-2005	19-Feb-2005	10-Apr-2014	ELECTIVE	74.1
1471	9-Jun-1979	26-Feb-1999	22-Jun-2001	10-Dec-2005	10-Apr-2006	ELECTIVE	69.8
1472	19-Jul-2014	19-Jul-2029	19-Jul-2029				
1473	19-Jan-1992	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007	18-Oct-2012	COMPULSORY	75.0
1474	6-Sep-1945	14-May-1961	14-May-1961		14-May-1971	COMPULSORY	75.0
1475	13-Jul-1985	25-May-1999	25-May-1999		10-Feb-1997	DISABILITY	67.7
1476	13-Feb-2004	20-Mar-2016	13-Feb-2014	13-Feb-2014	20-Mar-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1477	17-Apr-1947	19-Sep-1969	19-Sep-1969	1-Feb-1979	19-Sep-1979	COMPULSORY	75.0
1478	7-May-1994	20-Nov-2011	20-Nov-2011		8-Nov-1994	RESIGNATION (RPC)	48.0
1479	24-Sep-1993	24-Sep-2008	24-Sep-2008		1-May-1999	DISABILITY	57.0
1480	14-May-2011	14-May-2026	20-Jul-2022		2-Dec-2018	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.4
1481	9-Sep-2007	7-May-2024	7-May-2024				
1482	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	12-Jan-1988	12-Jan-1988	12-Jan-1993	COMPULSORY	75.0
1483	23-Feb-2002	23-Feb-2017	23-Feb-2017	23-Feb-2017			
1484	27-May-1999	27-May-2014	27-May-2014	27-May-2014			
1485	27-Jul-1957	14-Jun-1985	14-Jun-1985		12-May-1990	ELECTIVE	69.9
1486	28-May-1977	14-Feb-1997	14-Feb-1997	11-Apr-1997	14-Feb-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
1487	27-Aug-2005	19-Sep-2022	19-Sep-2022				
1488	5-Sep-2015	1-Apr-2033	1-Apr-2033				
1489	5-Jun-1996	6-Jun-2011	6-Jun-2011	6-Jun-2011	10-Apr-2015	ELECTIVE	73.4
1490	29-Mar-1981	23-Apr-1996	23-Apr-1996		23-Apr-1996	ELECTIVE	65.0
1491	13-Jul-2001	13-Jul-2016	13-Jul-2016	13-Jul-2016	25-Sep-2016	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.7
1492	21-Aug-2020	21-Aug-2035	21-Aug-2035				
1493	8-Dec-1978	10-Jan-1998	10-Jan-1998	10-Jan-1998	10-Jan-2008	COMPULSORY	75.0
1494	4-Aug-2007	23-Sep-2023	23-Sep-2023				
1495	30-Aug-1945	21-Jul-1961	21-Jul-1961		21-Jul-1971	COMPULSORY	75.0
1496	18-Aug-1965	18-Aug-1980	28-Dec-1978	28-Dec-1978	8-Jan-1982	ELECTIVE	73.0
1497	16-May-2015	6-Mar-2033	6-Mar-2033				
1498	15-Feb-1969	9-Jul-1980	15-Feb-1979		9-Dec-1969	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.4
1499	10-May-2014	10-May-2029	10-May-2029				
1500	12-Jul-2020	12-Jul-2035	12-Jul-2035				
1501	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	28-May-2023				
1502	24-Oct-2002	24-Oct-2017	24-Oct-2017	24-Oct-2017	15-Jul-2020	ELECTIVE	71.6
1503	5-Feb-2004	5-Feb-2019	5-Feb-2019	5-Feb-2019			
1504	14-Sep-2013	14-Sep-2028	14-Sep-2028				
1505	7-Feb-1980	22-Nov-1985	7-Feb-1990		22-Nov-1985	ELECTIVE	70.0
1506	4-May-1986	12-Jun-2004	24-Mar-2007	1-Apr-2007	26-Jul-2007	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.0
1507	22-Nov-1959	22-Nov-1974	22-Nov-1974		5-Sep-1966	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.0

1508	11-Mar-1999	11-Mar-2014	11-Mar-2014	11-Mar-2014	12-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE	70.0
1509	25-Mar-1943	20-Feb-1959			25-Apr-1958 DISABILITY	64.2
1510	6-Mar-2005	5-Mar-2020	31-Jul-2018		14-Feb-2010 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.5
1511	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	22-Jun-2019			
1512	22-Dec-1962	22-Dec-1977	22-Dec-1977	9-Jan-1979	26-Feb-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
1513	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	6-Jun-2003	6-Jun-2003	5-Jun-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
1514	29-Jan-2000	4-Mar-2018	4-Mar-2018	4-Mar-2018		
1515	4-Jul-1979	27-Sep-1999	21-Dec-2004		9-Oct-1999 ELECTIVE	59.8
1516	12-Jan-1986	2-Apr-2003	20-Jun-2005	20-Jun-2005	20-Jun-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
1517	28-Jul-1945	4-Nov-1962	4-Nov-1962		3-May-1946 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	48.5
1518	30-Dec-1967	18-May-1980			18-May-1980 COMPULSORY	75.0
1519	2-Oct-2011	9-Aug-2027	9-Aug-2027			
1520	9-Oct-1964	9-Oct-1979	9-Oct-1979	9-Sep-1984	8-Oct-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
1521	5-Jun-2004	6-Jun-2019	6-Jun-2019	6-Jun-2019		
1522	10-Apr-1996	11-Apr-2011	11-Apr-2011	11-Apr-2011	12-Feb-2014 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.9
1523	10-Dec-1972	18-Mar-1991	18-Mar-1991	18-Mar-1991	7-Aug-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.4
1524	9-Sep-1964	9-Dec-1986	9-Dec-1986	8-Jun-1989	10-Jul-1994 ELECTIVE	72.6
1525	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2007 ELECTIVE	72.0
1526	28-Aug-2009	28-Aug-2024	26-Dec-2019		21-Aug-2014 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.7
1527	10-Apr-1972	22-Nov-1991	22-Nov-1991		23-Jun-1993 ELECTIVE	66.6
1528	19-Jun-1985	30-Oct-1999	30-Oct-1999	8-Feb-2000	30-Oct-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
1529	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	29-Dec-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0
1530	4-Nov-2000	26-Dec-2015	26-Dec-2015	10-Apr-2016		
1531	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	27-Jan-2032			
1532	19-Mar-2005	18-Mar-2020	23-Jan-2018	23-Jan-2018		
1533	27-Mar-1988	26-Nov-2002	28-Mar-1998		11-Aug-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.7
1534	8-Nov-1992	13-Feb-2009	13-Feb-2009		16-Feb-2009 ELECTIVE	63.7
1535	24-Sep-1949	24-Jan-1963	24-Jan-1963		9-Jan-1962 DISABILITY	69.0
1536	8-Jul-1999	30-Apr-2015	30-Apr-2015	30-Apr-2015	8-Nov-2018 ELECTIVE	67.7
1537	26-Jul-1962	19-Dec-1984	19-Dec-1984		2-Apr-1977 DISABILITY	57.3
1538	7-Feb-1947	2-Apr-1964	2-Apr-1964		10-Dec-1972 ELECTIVE	73.7
1539	23-Feb-2006	23-Feb-2021	29-May-2018	8-Jun-2018		
1540	10-Sep-2015	10-Sep-2030	10-Sep-2030			
1541	4-Sep-1976	13-Sep-1989	13-Sep-1989		21-Jun-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.8
1542	23-Feb-1996	23-Feb-2011	17-Apr-2010	17-Apr-2010	17-Apr-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
1543	11-Aug-1965	20-Mar-1980	20-Mar-1980	9-Apr-1980	21-Mar-1985 COMPULSORY	75.0
1544	21-Dec-1950	21-Dec-1965	21-Dec-1965		11-Jan-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.1
1545	7-Dec-2018	2-Aug-2034	2-Aug-2034			
1546	10-Dec-1973	11-Nov-1995	11-Nov-1995	11-Nov-1995	11-Nov-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
1547	15-Jun-2019	11-Dec-2036	11-Dec-2036			
1548	5-Jul-1969	5-Jun-1986	5-Jun-1986		12-Jan-1986 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.6
1549	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	8-Oct-2016 ELECTIVE	67.3
1550	10-Feb-2013	10-Feb-2028	10-Feb-2028			
1551	15-Jun-2019	14-Apr-2036	14-Apr-2036			
1552	30-Sep-2007	8-Sep-2024	8-Sep-2024		31-Jul-2010 DISABILITY	49.0
1553	22-Mar-2019	22-Mar-2034	22-Mar-2034			
1554	9-Nov-1963	9-Nov-1978	9-Nov-1978	9-Dec-1978	3-Apr-1984 DEATH (RPC)	73.1
1555	30-Nov-1985	30-Nov-2000	30-Nov-2000	9-Jul-2001	26-Jan-2009 COMPULSORY	75.0
1556	25-Mar-2007	28-Jul-2024	28-Jul-2024			
1557	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	14-Jun-2029			
1558	1-Nov-2003	19-Aug-2019	19-Aug-2019	19-Aug-2019		
1559	21-Oct-1987	13-Jun-2004	4-Feb-2006	4-Feb-2006	19-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE	71.9
1560	21-Jul-1990	11-Mar-2010	11-Mar-2010	30-Oct-2014		
1561	22-Aug-2009	2-May-2026	2-May-2026			
1562	5-Mar-1983	1-Aug-1996	1-Aug-1996	2-Aug-1996	1-Aug-2001 COMPULSORY	75.0
1563	15-May-2020	16-May-2035	16-May-2035			
1564	9-Oct-1971	30-May-1998	30-May-1998	18-Sep-1998	29-May-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
1565	28-Jan-1949	6-Mar-1967	6-Mar-1967		12-Jan-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.9
1566	30-Nov-1985	1-Jan-2005	1-Jan-2005		3-Feb-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0
1567	12-Mar-1977	26-Feb-1999	12-Mar-1999	12-Mar-1999	9-Aug-1999 ELECTIVE	65.4
1568	5-Dec-1952	5-Dec-1967	5-Dec-1967		9-Feb-1973 ELECTIVE	72.7
1569	13-Feb-2004	5-Jul-2018	13-Feb-2014	13-Feb-2014	9-Dec-2015 Early Retirement	72.4
1570	9-Mar-1995	1-Aug-2011	1-Aug-2011	1-Aug-2011	14-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE	68.3
1571	27-Sep-2015	26-Nov-2027	27-Sep-2025		18-Jun-2017 RESIGNATION (RPC)	64.6
1572	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2005	11-Apr-2005	25-Mar-2008 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.8
1573	1-Jun-2018	1-Jun-2033	11-Oct-2032			
1574	18-Dec-2009	30-Apr-2024	18-Dec-2019	18-Dec-2019		
1575	8-Jul-2007	30-Sep-2022	30-Sep-2022			
1576	7-Jun-1969	1-Apr-1991	1-Apr-1991		23-Jan-1990 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.8
1577	6-Nov-2009	6-Nov-2024	27-Dec-2021			
1578	1-Nov-2003	1-Nov-2018	1-Nov-2018	9-Nov-2018	28-Apr-2020 ELECTIVE	71.0
1579	11-Jun-2011	11-Jun-2026	11-Jun-2026			
1580	14-Aug-1992	3-Nov-2009	3-Nov-2009	3-Nov-2009	3-Nov-2019 COMPULSORY	72.8
1581	27-Sep-2015	16-Nov-2028	27-Sep-2025			
1582	24-Mar-2012	25-Mar-2027	25-Mar-2027			
1583	29-Dec-2018	26-Aug-2028				
1584	8-Feb-1969	8-Feb-1984	8-Feb-1984	9-Feb-1984	13-Jul-1985 DEATH (RPC)	70.8
1585	9-Aug-2001	9-Aug-2016	27-Apr-2015	27-Apr-2015	26-Apr-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
1586	1-Mar-2019	1-Mar-2034	1-Mar-2034			
1587	30-Sep-2019	30-Sep-2034	29-Dec-2032			
1588	24-Sep-2016	29-Jun-2031	24-Sep-2026			
1589	24-Dec-1989	24-Dec-2007	24-Dec-2007	24-Dec-2007	8-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE	67.0
1590	26-Oct-1983	4-Dec-2001	13-Jan-2005	13-Jan-2005	13-Jan-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
1591	9-Nov-1964	4-Apr-1981	4-Apr-1981		1-Aug-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	59.3

1592	5-Aug-1972	10-Aug-1991	10-Aug-1991	10-Aug-1991	10-Aug-2001	COMPULSORY	75.0
1593	15-Feb-1987	28-Feb-2007	24-Mar-2007		25-Jul-2007	ELECTIVE	60.4
1594	21-Jul-2017	25-Oct-2032	25-Oct-2032				
1595	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	26-Jan-2026				
1596	13-Jul-1985	13-Jul-2000	13-Jan-1998		5-May-1993	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.3
1597	25-Feb-1984	6-May-2001	16-Jul-2003	16-Jul-2003	16-Jul-2013	COMPULSORY	75.0
1598	10-Aug-1989	10-Aug-2004	10-Aug-2004	10-Aug-2004	11-Apr-2009	ELECTIVE	70.4
1599	1-Apr-1978	24-May-2005	24-May-2005		9-Sep-1990	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	50.3
1600	12-Jun-2020	12-Jul-2035	12-Jul-2035				
1601	28-Apr-1973	27-Apr-1988	27-Apr-1988		25-May-1996	ELECTIVE	74.9
1602	15-Feb-2002	15-Feb-2017	15-Feb-2017		16-Mar-2016	Early Retirement	68.9
1603	11-Mar-1982	11-Mar-1997	11-Mar-1997	11-Mar-1997	9-Feb-2003	ELECTIVE	73.8
1604	4-Jul-1979	4-Jan-2001	8-Jul-2007		15-Jul-2001	ELECTIVE	59.0
1605	18-Feb-1972	2-Feb-1990	2-Feb-1990	18-Feb-1990	2-Feb-2000	COMPULSORY	75.0
1606	4-Jan-1964	24-Jul-1980	24-Jul-1980	3-Aug-1980	8-Oct-1984	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.2
1607	21-Mar-2015	14-Dec-2024			9-Aug-2016	RESIGNATION (RPC)	66.7
1608	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019			
1609	30-Dec-1967	30-Dec-1982	30-Dec-1982	31-Dec-1982	25-Aug-1990	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.9
1610	12-Apr-1984	25-Feb-2002	25-Feb-2002		9-Mar-1996	DISABILITY	59.0
1611	19-Dec-1991	19-Jun-2012	19-Jun-2012	25-Mar-2019			
1612	13-May-1978	13-Aug-1995	13-Aug-1995		9-Oct-1983	DISABILITY	53.2
1613	3-Jul-2019	3-Jul-2034	3-Jul-2034				
1614	1-Oct-1998	1-Oct-2013	1-Oct-2013	1-Oct-2013			
1615	26-Aug-2017	5-Jan-2034	5-Jan-2034				
1616	27-Mar-2014	8-Aug-2023					
1617	26-Jan-1964	26-Jan-1979	26-Jan-1979		17-Dec-1988	COMPULSORY	75.0
1618	9-Jan-2014	9-Jan-2029	9-Jan-2029				
1619	28-May-1985	6-Apr-2000	28-May-1995	8-Jun-1995	6-Apr-2000	COMPULSORY	75.0
1620	26-Sep-2008	8-Nov-2023	8-Nov-2023				
1621	30-Jun-1965	23-Sep-1986	23-Sep-1986	18-Dec-1986	24-Sep-1989	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.0
1622	5-Mar-1983	5-Mar-1998	5-Mar-1998	11-Apr-1998	11-Apr-2005	ELECTIVE	73.5
1623	27-Jul-1984	27-Jul-1999	27-Jul-1999		9-Aug-1999	ELECTIVE	67.5
1624	10-Sep-2019	10-Sep-2034	10-Sep-2034				
1625	18-Jul-2019	30-Nov-2030	18-Jul-2029				
1626	29-Mar-1987	29-Mar-2002	15-Jun-1998	15-Jun-1998	15-Jun-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
1627	5-Jul-2001	5-Jul-2016	5-Jul-2016		10-Apr-2014	Early Retirement	65.6
1628	26-Jan-1961	26-Jan-1976	26-Jan-1976	9-Nov-1979	21-Apr-1984	COMPULSORY	75.0
1629	25-Aug-1973	25-Aug-1988	25-Aug-1988	13-Apr-1991	10-Apr-1994	ELECTIVE	71.2
1630	23-Dec-2006	23-Dec-2021	27-Jan-2019	9-Feb-2019			
1631	13-Aug-1993	20-Jan-2009	20-Jan-2009		28-Jun-2019	COMPULSORY	75.0
1632	20-Aug-1995	17-Jul-2014	17-Jul-2014	10-Jul-2018			
1633	3-Aug-1995	28-Jan-2013	28-Jan-2013	28-Jan-2013			
1634	21-Mar-2003	5-Aug-2019	5-Aug-2019	5-Aug-2019			
1635	22-Dec-1991	23-Feb-2011	23-Feb-2011		9-Oct-2011	ELECTIVE	61.5
1636	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019			
1637	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019	13-Feb-2019			
1638	9-May-1970	22-Apr-1983	22-Apr-1983	22-Apr-1983	21-Apr-1988	COMPULSORY	75.0
1639	31-May-1979	26-Feb-1999	4-Sep-1999	9-Oct-2000	9-Feb-2007	ELECTIVE	72.4
1640	5-Jan-1995	5-Jan-2010	5-Jan-2010	5-Jan-2010	7-Mar-2018	COMPULSORY	75.0
1641	19-Nov-2010	19-Nov-2025	19-Nov-2025				
1642	9-Jun-1961	9-Jun-1976	6-Oct-1971	17-Nov-1973	9-Jun-1976	ELECTIVE	74.7
1643	5-Oct-2006	5-Oct-2021	5-Oct-2021				
1644	9-Jun-1961	7-Aug-1974	9-Jun-1971	20-Oct-1972	7-Aug-1974	COMPULSORY	75.0
1645	5-Sep-1993	5-Sep-2008	5-Sep-2008	9-Oct-2008	7-Apr-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1646	1-Jul-1984	31-Oct-1999	29-Feb-2000	29-Feb-2000	1-Mar-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
1647	7-Jan-1989	7-Jan-2004	26-Aug-2002	26-Aug-2002	10-Dec-2005	ELECTIVE	73.3
1648	18-Feb-2000	31-Jul-2017	31-Jul-2017	31-Jul-2017			
1649	29-Mar-1981	10-Jun-2000	23-Aug-2004	11-Apr-2007	23-Aug-2014	COMPULSORY	75.0
1650	23-Nov-1973	17-Oct-1995	17-Oct-1995	17-Oct-1995	9-Aug-2004	ELECTIVE	73.8
1651	10-Apr-2000	1-Feb-2017	1-Feb-2017	27-Mar-2017			
1652	17-Jan-2015	14-Feb-2032	14-Feb-2032				
1653	8-Oct-1998	8-Oct-2013	8-Oct-2013	8-Oct-2013			
1654	10-Sep-2019	27-Jul-2036	27-Jul-2036				
1655	15-Nov-1996	12-Nov-2012	12-Nov-2012	9-Dec-2012			
1656	7-May-1994	7-May-2009	20-Aug-2004	20-Aug-2004	20-Aug-2009	COMPULSORY	75.0
1657	2-Jul-2017	5-Feb-2034	5-Feb-2034				
1658	9-Sep-2005	25-Dec-2016	9-Sep-2015	10-Dec-2015	25-Dec-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1659	12-Jun-2020	19-Mar-2036	19-Mar-2036				
1660	15-Jun-2013	15-Jun-2028	24-Oct-2024				
1661	13-Jan-1974	17-Aug-1998	17-Aug-1998	17-Aug-1998	17-Aug-2008	COMPULSORY	75.0
1662	25-Feb-1961	14-Dec-1986	14-Dec-1986	14-Dec-1986	25-Feb-1995	ELECTIVE	73.2
1663	21-Mar-1996	6-Sep-2010	22-Mar-2006	22-Mar-2006	6-Sep-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
1664	10-Sep-2019	12-Feb-2035	12-Feb-2035				
1665	16-Jul-2017	21-Jun-2030	16-Jul-2027				
1666	10-May-2014	10-May-2029	10-May-2029				
1667	16-Jul-1960	17-Jan-1979	17-Jan-1979	10-Dec-1979	17-Jan-1989	COMPULSORY	75.0
1668	8-Nov-1975	15-Aug-1999			13-Sep-1992	DISABILITY	58.1
1669	26-Mar-1955	26-Mar-1970	11-Apr-1969	29-Apr-1972	30-Mar-1974	ELECTIVE	75.0
1670	29-Nov-1963	29-Nov-1978	1-Jun-1977	1-Jun-1977	10-Dec-1978	ELECTIVE	71.5
1671	21-Mar-2003	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2020		10-Apr-2017	Early Retirement	59.2
1672	6-Mar-1976	7-Mar-1991	7-Mar-1991	7-Mar-1991	30-Oct-1999	COMPULSORY	75.0
1673	2-Jan-1971	7-Aug-1990	7-Aug-1990	9-Aug-1990	7-Aug-2000	COMPULSORY	75.0
1674	1-Jun-1989	14-Sep-2008	14-Sep-2008	14-Sep-2008	8-Aug-2014	ELECTIVE	66.6
1675	30-May-2008	22-Jun-2024	22-Jun-2024				



1676	17-Jul-1997	7-Feb-2011	17-Jul-2007	17-Jul-2007	7-Feb-2011	COMPULSORY	75.0
1677	28-Sep-1996	28-Sep-2011	28-Sep-2011	28-Sep-2011	8-Nov-2017	ELECTIVE	74.9
1678	26-Sep-2008	11-Mar-2026	11-Mar-2026				
1679	3-Aug-1995	3-Aug-2010	3-Aug-2010	3-Aug-2010	9-Feb-2018	ELECTIVE	73.8
1680	14-Sep-2000	19-Jul-2018	19-Jul-2018	10-Apr-2020			
1681	19-Oct-1991	19-Oct-2006	19-Oct-2006	19-Oct-2006	11-Jul-2011	ELECTIVE	72.5
1682	14-Jul-2012	13-Nov-2025	14-Jul-2022				
1683	13-May-1978	26-Feb-1999	15-Jan-2000	16-Apr-2000	15-Jan-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
1684	21-Sep-2014	21-Sep-2029	21-Sep-2029		11-Oct-2014	RESIGNATION (RPC)	50.9
1685	23-Mar-1985	22-Mar-2000	6-Apr-1996	6-Apr-1996	16-Feb-1998	DEATH (RPC)	71.9
1686	22-Oct-2017	18-Apr-2032	22-Oct-2027				
1687	28-Mar-1996	12-Aug-2013	12-Aug-2013	12-Aug-2013	9-Feb-2019	ELECTIVE	68.1
1688	11-Aug-2018	26-Dec-2028	11-Aug-2028				
1689	16-Dec-1962	16-Dec-1977	16-Dec-1977	5-Jan-1978	14-Dec-1979	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.4
1690	21-Mar-2009	20-Mar-2024	26-Oct-2020	26-Oct-2020			
1691	15-Feb-2019	5-Jan-2027					
1692	22-Mar-2008	25-Nov-2025	25-Nov-2025				
1693	26-Sep-1981	30-Oct-2002	24-Mar-2007	24-Apr-2008	10-Dec-2008	ELECTIVE	65.0
1694	2-Mar-2007	2-Mar-2022	27-Feb-2020	27-Feb-2020			
1695	27-Mar-1982	12-Apr-1992	12-Apr-1992	12-Apr-1992	13-Apr-1997	COMPULSORY	75.0
1696	8-Jan-2021	8-Jan-2036	8-Jan-2036				
1697	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	26-Apr-2018	26-Apr-2018			
1698	27-Jan-1962	27-Jan-1982	27-Jan-1982	27-Jan-1982	27-Jan-1992	COMPULSORY	75.0
1699	22-Aug-1962	5-May-1977	5-May-1977	5-May-1977	8-Jan-1978	ELECTIVE	70.7
1700	13-Dec-1981	3-Oct-2001	23-Jul-2006	23-Jul-2006	23-Jul-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1701	25-Sep-1987	5-Oct-2005	24-Mar-2007	18-Apr-2007	18-Apr-2017	COMPULSORY	73.5
1702	18-May-1995	18-May-2010	18-May-2010		27-Apr-2005	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.3
1703	9-Jan-1978	9-Jan-1993			8-Oct-1979	RESIGNATION (RPC)	54.3
1704	1-Jun-2018	17-Mar-2034	17-Mar-2034				
1705	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	29-Sep-2032				
1706	26-Sep-2003	24-May-2021	24-May-2021				
1707	29-Aug-2019	7-May-2035	7-May-2035				
1708	4-Jan-2004	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019		10-Apr-2014	Early Retirement	61.5
1709	26-Aug-2010	26-Aug-2025	26-Aug-2025		21-Aug-2016	DISABILITY	59.2
1710	23-Aug-2018	14-Dec-2036	14-Dec-2036				
1711	10-Feb-2013	10-Feb-2028	9-Jun-2023				
1712	22-Sep-2017	22-Sep-2032	22-Sep-2032				
1713	25-Apr-1958	25-Apr-1973			21-May-1982	COMPULSORY	75.0
1714	22-Mar-1934	5-Jan-1945	5-Jan-1945		28-Mar-1945	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.2
1715	30-Dec-1951	18-Mar-1975	18-Mar-1975	18-Mar-1975	25-Oct-1975	ELECTIVE	65.6
1716	29-Mar-2018	29-Mar-2033	31-Aug-2031				
1717	24-Jan-1981	15-Jan-1999	15-Jan-1999	15-Jan-1999	15-Jan-2009	COMPULSORY	75.0
1718	7-Oct-1984	26-May-2006	24-Mar-2007	11-Jan-2008	9-Jan-2015	ELECTIVE	67.0
1719	2-Jan-2005	22-Jul-2022	22-Jul-2022				
1720	31-Aug-2018	31-Aug-2033	31-Aug-2033				
1721	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	8-Apr-2022				
1722	16-Nov-1977	20-Oct-1997	20-Oct-1997		24-Mar-1990	DISABILITY	57.4
1723	26-Oct-1983	7-Jul-2002	17-Mar-2006	20-Mar-2015	16-Mar-2016	COMPULSORY	75.0
1724	8-May-1982	28-Dec-1997	28-Dec-1997	10-Apr-1998	28-Dec-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
1725	2-Apr-1977	21-Sep-1992	21-Sep-1992	11-Mar-1993	21-Sep-2002	COMPULSORY	75.0
1726	29-Sep-1991	29-Sep-2006	23-May-2002	10-Dec-2002	9-Feb-2007	ELECTIVE	74.7
1727	4-Jul-1979	4-Jul-1994	4-Jul-1994	4-Jul-1994	25-Dec-2002	ELECTIVE	74.3
1728	14-Mar-1964	30-Jan-1990	30-Jan-1990	14-Dec-1990	19-Jan-1999	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.0
1729	3-Feb-2007	3-Feb-2022	4-May-2017	10-May-2017			
1730	19-Jul-2014	22-Oct-2032	22-Oct-2032				
1731	8-Oct-1999	8-Oct-2014	12-Sep-2010	12-Sep-2010	22-Sep-2015	COMPULSORY	75.0
1732	23-Apr-1958	29-Apr-1971	29-Apr-1971		17-Mar-1966	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.9
1733	22-Sep-2017	1-Jan-2035	1-Jan-2035				
1734	22-Aug-2009	22-Aug-2024	22-Aug-2024				
1735	18-Oct-1980	18-Oct-1995	18-Oct-1995	18-Oct-1995	9-Sep-2000	ELECTIVE	73.6
1736	9-May-2007	15-Dec-2023	15-Dec-2023				
1737	20-Jan-1963	17-Jul-1969	20-Jan-1973		10-Aug-1968	DISABILITY	69.1
1738	14-Jan-1990	12-May-2010	12-May-2010		12-May-2010	ELECTIVE	59.7
1739	28-Apr-1973	7-Jan-1988			31-Jul-1988	ELECTIVE	68.5
1740	28-Sep-1996	24-Dec-2014	24-Dec-2014		10-Dec-1997	DISABILITY	48.0
1741	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2035	28-Aug-2035				
1742	14-Sep-2018	14-Sep-2033	14-Sep-2033				
1743	21-Jul-1990	21-Jul-2005	21-Jul-2005		13-Feb-1994	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	53.8
1744	7-Dec-1956	13-Aug-1978	13-Aug-1978		13-Aug-1988	COMPULSORY	75.0
1745	18-Jul-2019	18-Jul-2034	18-Jul-2034				
1746	15-Sep-1988	6-Jul-2005	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2007	11-Jul-2012	ELECTIVE	70.2
1747	5-Oct-2019	5-Nov-2036	5-Nov-2036				
1748	9-Aug-2003	1-Jun-2021	1-Jun-2021		8-Jun-2020	DISABILITY	61.2
1749	11-Apr-1995	11-Apr-2010	3-Jul-2008		11-Apr-2003	DISABILITY	64.8
1750	12-Feb-1998	5-Oct-2016	5-Oct-2016				
1751	19-Jul-2014	16-Aug-2029	16-Aug-2029				
1752	7-Feb-1947	6-Dec-1967	6-Dec-1967		8-Sep-1976	ELECTIVE	73.8
1753	29-Sep-1991	18-Jan-2005	29-Sep-2001	29-Sep-2001	18-Jan-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
1754	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	31-Oct-2022				
1755	10-Apr-2000	11-Apr-2015	7-Jan-2014	7-Jan-2014	7-Jan-2019	COMPULSORY	75.0
1756	22-Sep-2017	22-Sep-2032	22-Sep-2032				
1757	19-Sep-1998	19-Sep-2013	28-Sep-2011		10-Apr-2013	Early Retirement	71.5
1758	7-Mar-1993	7-Aug-2011	7-Aug-2011		15-Dec-2011	ELECTIVE	61.9
1759	16-Feb-1974	16-Feb-1989	16-Feb-1989	23-Feb-1992	24-Sep-1995	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	72.4

1760	8-Jan-2011	8-Jan-2026	8-Jan-2026				
1761	26-Jul-1962	30-Jul-1983	30-Jul-1983		27-Jun-1985 DEATH (RPC)		66.9
1762	19-Jun-1982	26-Feb-1999	16-Jan-2000	16-Jan-2000	9-Apr-2007 ELECTIVE		72.2
1763	21-Aug-1982	20-Jun-2000	20-Apr-2003	11-Apr-2007	20-Apr-2013 COMPULSORY		75.0
1764	26-Oct-1983	8-Nov-1998	8-Nov-1998	12-Jul-2000	14-Jul-2004 ELECTIVE		70.7
1765	20-Apr-1977	19-Apr-1992	14-Dec-1991	14-Dec-1991	25-May-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		71.4
1766	12-May-1965	11-May-1980	11-May-1980	11-May-1980	11-Mar-1986 ELECTIVE		74.8
1767	21-Jul-2017	21-Jul-2032	16-Nov-2030				
1768	27-Jun-2010	27-Jun-2025	12-Feb-2025				
1769	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	7-Dec-2033				
1770	28-Dec-1967	18-Dec-1990	18-Dec-1990	18-Dec-1990	18-Dec-2000 COMPULSORY		75.0
1771	12-Jan-1986	23-Feb-2005	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	10-Dec-2014 ELECTIVE		70.7
1772	7-May-1972	3-Nov-1998	3-Nov-1998	3-Nov-1998	3-Nov-2008 COMPULSORY		75.0
1773	28-May-1980	12-Jun-1998	12-Jun-1998		12-Jun-1998 ELECTIVE		65.0
1774	2-Oct-2011	2-Oct-2026	23-Sep-2026				
1775	13-Oct-1990	30-Jan-2006	19-May-2006	19-May-2006	18-May-2016 COMPULSORY		75.0
1776	21-Jul-2017	21-Jul-2032	21-Jul-2032				
1777	27-Feb-2004	8-Mar-2020	8-Mar-2020				
1778	3-Aug-1940	30-Jun-1957	30-Jun-1957		30-Jun-1967 COMPULSORY		75.0
1779	9-May-1970	28-May-1991	28-May-1991		20-May-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		58.0
1780	1-Jan-1998	1-Jan-2013	1-Jan-2013	1-Jan-2013	28-Jul-2020 COMPULSORY		75.0
1781	11-Apr-1959	25-Apr-1972	25-Apr-1972		10-Dec-1975 ELECTIVE		73.6
1782	5-Dec-1997	10-Apr-2015			10-Dec-2016 ELECTIVE		64.3
1783	13-Oct-1985	13-Oct-2000	13-Oct-2000	13-Oct-2000	9-Mar-2008 COMPULSORY		75.0
1784	15-Nov-1996	15-Nov-2011	28-Aug-2007	28-Aug-2007	9-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE		74.3
1785	2-Oct-1992	6-Dec-2010	6-Dec-2010				
1786	30-May-1959	30-May-1974	12-Dec-1969		21-Sep-1967 DISABILITY		67.8
1787	7-Mar-1996	23-Aug-2018	23-Aug-2018		23-Aug-2018 Early Retirement		57.5
1788	29-Mar-2018	18-Apr-2033	18-Apr-2033				
1789	10-Feb-1976	10-Feb-1991	24-Apr-1988	24-Apr-1988	10-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE		73.0
1790	27-Mar-2020	19-Jul-2036	19-Jul-2036				
1791	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	31-May-2023		11-Jun-2008 RESIGNATION (RPC)		54.1
1792	25-Sep-1993	22-Jul-2012	22-Jul-2012	18-May-2014			
1793	8-Jul-1972	8-Jul-1987	8-Jul-1987	10-Jul-1987	25-Aug-1994 COMPULSORY		75.0
1794	6-Jun-2002	3-Mar-2019	3-Mar-2019		3-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE		63.3
1795	13-Jan-1963	13-Jan-1978	13-Jan-1978	29-Sep-1979	26-Oct-1983 COMPULSORY		75.0
1796	18-Jul-1981	28-Mar-2000	6-Dec-2003		17-Jul-2005 ELECTIVE		66.6
1797	13-Aug-2005	13-Aug-2020	10-Apr-2019	11-Apr-2019			
1798	13-Jul-1967	28-Aug-1982	28-Aug-1982		19-Oct-1967 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		50.1
1799	28-Jan-2012	28-Jan-2027	2-Jul-2025				
1800	22-Dec-1956	3-Dec-1972	3-Dec-1972		3-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY		75.0
1801	19-Jan-1992	25-Feb-2010	25-Feb-2010		12-May-2009 Early Retirement		61.1
1802	22-Oct-2017	31-Jul-2031	22-Oct-2027				
1803	23-Sep-1964	30-Jan-1985	30-Jan-1985	10-Jul-1988	30-Jan-1995 COMPULSORY		75.0
1804	25-Mar-1972	9-Mar-1996	9-Mar-1996	9-Mar-1996	24-Dec-1998 ELECTIVE		67.8
1805	15-May-1974	15-May-1989	15-May-1989	8-Jan-1990	31-Dec-1994 COMPULSORY		75.0
1806	23-Jun-1965	29-Feb-1984	29-Feb-1984	10-Mar-1984	1-Mar-1994 COMPULSORY		75.0
1807	24-Dec-1995	18-Jan-2011	18-Jan-2011	9-Feb-2011			
1808	9-Aug-1962	28-Jun-1966			28-Jun-1971 RESIGNATION (RPC)		75.0
1809	26-Sep-2010	4-Apr-2027	4-Apr-2027				
1810	11-Oct-2005	1-Jun-2021	1-Jun-2021		16-Mar-2017 Early Retirement		60.2
1811	7-Nov-2008	17-Jul-2023	7-Nov-2018	9-Nov-2018	26-Aug-2020 DISABILITY		72.1
1812	28-Sep-2000	17-Sep-2017	17-Sep-2017		13-Aug-2016 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		61.9
1813	9-May-1997	9-Dec-2012	9-Dec-2012	10-Dec-2012			
1814	21-Mar-2003	9-Jun-2020	9-Jun-2020	9-Jun-2020			
1815	15-Aug-1996	5-Apr-2011	15-Aug-2006	15-Aug-2006	5-Apr-2011 COMPULSORY		75.0
1816	7-Jul-1990	7-Jul-2005	7-Jul-2005	10-Jul-2005	11-Nov-2014 COMPULSORY		75.0
1817	27-Sep-2015	29-Jul-2032	29-Jul-2032				
1818	8-Oct-1989	27-Oct-2006	24-Mar-2007	10-Dec-2009	15-Nov-2018 COMPULSORY		75.0
1819	9-Jun-2001	9-Jun-2016	9-Jun-2016	9-Jun-2016			
1820	25-Jan-1975	10-Sep-1989	25-Jan-1985	26-Jan-1985	10-Sep-1989 COMPULSORY		75.0
1821	1-Apr-1979	2-Jan-1993	1-Apr-1989	9-Jan-1990	2-Jan-1993 COMPULSORY		75.0
1822	29-Dec-1977	29-Dec-1992	29-Dec-1992	29-Dec-1992	28-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY		75.0
1823	2-Feb-1974	19-Oct-1995	19-Oct-1995	19-Oct-1995	11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE		68.5
1824	25-May-1973	24-May-1988	25-Aug-1983	9-Sep-1983	25-Aug-1988 COMPULSORY		75.0
1825	26-Sep-1981	8-May-2002	24-Mar-2007	18-Dec-2007	18-Dec-2017 COMPULSORY		75.0
1826	24-Sep-2016	24-Jul-2034	24-Jul-2034				
1827	8-Nov-1992	8-Nov-2007	8-Nov-2007	8-Nov-2007	31-Mar-2012 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		72.2
1828	15-Feb-2002	9-May-2020	9-May-2020	9-May-2020			
1829	21-Aug-2020	5-Apr-2038	5-Apr-2038				
1830	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	1-May-2024				
1831	23-Mar-2013	1-Jul-2029	1-Jul-2029				
1832	14-Jul-1965	24-May-1982	24-May-1982		14-Oct-1983 ELECTIVE		66.4
1833	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	27-Mar-2029				
1834	22-Mar-2003	6-Sep-2019	6-Sep-2019	6-Sep-2019			
1835	9-Feb-1995	9-Feb-2010	4-Sep-2006	4-Sep-2006	24-Jan-2008 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		71.4
1836	5-Aug-1978	5-Aug-1993	5-Aug-1993	5-Aug-1993	17-Jun-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		68.3
1837	15-Mar-1984	21-May-2000	26-Jul-2001		10-Dec-2002 ELECTIVE		66.4
1838	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	6-Apr-2003	6-Apr-2003	5-Apr-2008 COMPULSORY		75.0
1839	14-May-1983	24-May-2001	2-Jun-2004	7-Jul-2004	28-Feb-2010 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		70.7
1840	2-Mar-2006	2-Mar-2021	2-Mar-2021				
1841	26-Feb-1978	26-Feb-1999	10-Mar-2000	10-Mar-2000	11-Mar-2010 COMPULSORY		75.0
1842	29-Sep-1966	13-Apr-1991	13-Apr-1991	13-Apr-1991	13-Apr-2001 COMPULSORY		75.0
1843	12-May-1993	11-May-2008	11-May-2008	8-Oct-2013	2-Aug-2015 COMPULSORY		75.0

1844	14-Sep-2013	14-Sep-2028	28-Feb-2027					
1845	12-Mar-1977	11-Mar-1992	11-Mar-1992			7-May-1989 DISABILITY		65.2
1846	24-Dec-1999	24-Dec-2014	24-Dec-2014			5-Aug-2007 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		61.9
1847	16-Feb-1997	16-Feb-2012	16-Feb-2012	16-Feb-2012		30-Sep-2020 COMPULSORY		75.0
1848	8-Oct-2015	22-Dec-2032	22-Dec-2032					
1849	3-Dec-1937	31-Oct-1956	31-Oct-1956			10-Jul-1965 DISABILITY		73.7
1850	1-Oct-1998	20-Jul-2014	20-Jul-2014	20-Jul-2014				
1851	9-Sep-1983	9-Sep-1998	9-Sep-1998			24-Dec-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		61.1
1852	9-Jun-1956	13-Aug-1970				16-Oct-1957 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		62.2
1853	9-May-2020	10-May-2035	10-May-2035					
1854	1-Feb-1963	10-Jul-1978	10-Jul-1978	12-Jul-1978		5-Dec-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		71.4
1855	9-Jan-1956	9-Jan-1971	9-Jan-1971			12-Dec-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		61.4
1856	15-Dec-1979	10-Feb-1996	10-Feb-1996	10-Feb-1996		9-Aug-2004 ELECTIVE		73.5
1857	16-Nov-1970	29-Apr-1990	29-Apr-1990			14-Feb-1981 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		55.8
1858	28-Sep-2015	17-Mar-2033	17-Mar-2033					
1859	27-Jan-2017	28-Oct-2036	28-Oct-2036					
1860	10-Feb-2013	10-Feb-2028	23-Jul-2025					
1861	1-Nov-1975	3-Feb-1992	3-Feb-1992	3-Feb-1992	3-Feb-2002 COMPULSORY			75.0
1862	27-Jun-2002	25-Nov-2017	25-Nov-2017	25-Nov-2017				
1863	28-Aug-1976	18-Aug-1993	18-Aug-1993	18-Aug-1993	18-Aug-2003 COMPULSORY			75.0
1864	15-Mar-1986	18-Sep-2008	18-Sep-2008	18-Sep-2008	8-Sep-2012 ELECTIVE			61.5
1865	6-Sep-1945	10-Jun-1965	10-Jun-1965			10-Dec-1972 ELECTIVE		72.5
1866	11-Dec-2020	7-Sep-2036	7-Sep-2036					
1867	8-Oct-1989	29-Nov-2006	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE			72.2
1868	18-Apr-1963	1-Feb-1985	1-Feb-1985	1-Feb-1985	8-Sep-1994 ELECTIVE			74.6
1869	8-Mar-1947	21-Apr-1967	21-Apr-1967		9-Nov-1972 ELECTIVE			70.6
1870	3-Aug-1995	3-Aug-2010	3-Aug-2010		6-Oct-2003 RESIGNATION (RPC)			58.6
1871	9-Feb-1995	28-Oct-2015	28-Oct-2015	28-Oct-2015				
1872	5-Dec-1997	30-Apr-2017	30-Apr-2017	12-May-2017				
1873	8-Nov-1995	8-Nov-2010	8-Nov-2010	8-Nov-2010	10-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY			75.0
1874	2-Apr-1998	7-Apr-2015	7-Apr-2015	11-Apr-2018				
1875	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	29-Sep-2032					
1876	5-Feb-2004	15-Jul-2017	5-Feb-2014	9-Feb-2014	15-Nov-2016 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			74.3
1877	26-Nov-1959	26-Nov-1974	26-Nov-1974	19-Jan-1975	6-Apr-1980 ELECTIVE			74.1
1878	24-Sep-1993	24-Sep-2008	24-Sep-2008		20-Mar-2014 COMPULSORY			75.0
1879	26-Aug-2010	26-Aug-2025	26-Aug-2025					
1880	5-Feb-1948	4-Dec-1959	4-Dec-1959		25-Nov-1950 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			61.0
1881	31-Jul-1994	9-Feb-2013	9-Feb-2013	9-Feb-2013	1-Mar-2019 ELECTIVE			67.5
1882	6-Jun-2015	28-Feb-2027	6-Jun-2025					
1883	9-Nov-1973	9-Nov-1988	8-Sep-1987	22-Oct-1987	8-Sep-1992 COMPULSORY			75.0
1884	22-May-1982	27-Nov-1997	27-Nov-1997	9-Jun-1999	27-Nov-2007 COMPULSORY			75.0
1885	2-Dec-1979	16-Oct-1993	2-Dec-1989	2-Dec-1989	16-Oct-1993 COMPULSORY			75.0
1886	26-Jan-1974	2-Feb-1989	2-Feb-1989	2-Feb-1989	9-Sep-1994 ELECTIVE			70.6
1887	14-Sep-2013	11-Feb-2029	11-Feb-2029					
1888	4-Jan-1969	28-Mar-1986	28-Mar-1986	28-Mar-1986	27-Mar-1996 COMPULSORY			75.0
1889	28-Jul-1951	28-Jul-1966	28-Jul-1966		23-Feb-1957 DISABILITY			59.5
1890	9-Sep-1999	9-Sep-2014	19-Mar-2012	10-Apr-2012	20-Mar-2017 COMPULSORY			75.0
1891	14-Jan-1999	17-Jun-2015	17-Jun-2015	12-Jul-2015	10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE			69.1
1892	15-Oct-1983	4-May-2003	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2007	8-Nov-2012 ELECTIVE			70.0
1893	25-Jan-1975	29-May-1991	29-May-1991	10-Jul-1991	29-May-2001 COMPULSORY			75.0
1894	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	31-Mar-2018		11-Mar-2018 Early Retirement			69.9
1895	12-Jun-1952	2-Feb-1968	2-Feb-1968	9-Mar-1973	2-Feb-1978 COMPULSORY			75.0
1896	17-Nov-1982	17-Nov-1997	16-Dec-1992	16-Dec-1992	16-Dec-1996 DISABILITY			74.0
1897	10-Dec-2009	10-Dec-2024	11-Jan-2023					
1898	2-Mar-2007	2-Mar-2022	2-Mar-2022					
1899	14-May-1994	12-Nov-2013	12-Nov-2013	12-Nov-2013				
1900	10-Jun-1978	10-Jun-1993	10-Jun-1993		14-Sep-1991 DISABILITY			67.1
1901	20-Jul-2003	26-Jun-2021	26-Jun-2021		9-Aug-2019 Early Retirement			60.2
1902	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	10-Sep-2004	10-Sep-2004	10-Sep-2009 COMPULSORY			75.0
1903	10-Dec-1972	18-Dec-1990	18-Dec-1990		18-Dec-1990 ELECTIVE			65.0
1904	16-May-2015	15-Sep-2033	15-Sep-2033					
1905	14-Nov-2010	14-Nov-2025	14-Nov-2025					
1906	2-Oct-1992	31-Mar-2012	31-Mar-2012	10-Apr-2012				
1907	7-Nov-2008	14-Jun-2025	14-Jun-2025					
1908	15-Jul-1965	15-Jan-1972			25-Oct-1968 DISABILITY			71.8
1909	10-Jul-1999	4-May-2016	4-May-2016	4-May-2016				
1910	14-Nov-2010	14-Nov-2025	14-Nov-2025					
1911	24-Sep-2016	24-Sep-2031	25-Apr-2030					
1912	9-Feb-1995	8-Jun-2011	8-Jun-2011	8-Jun-2011	28-Jul-2016 ELECTIVE			68.8
1913	3-Feb-2007	3-Feb-2022	9-Dec-2021		13-Apr-2017 Early Retirement			65.3
1914	28-Sep-2000	14-Apr-2018	14-Apr-2018	30-Jan-2019				
1915	9-Jan-1953	9-Jan-1968	9-Jan-1968		9-Nov-1973 ELECTIVE			71.7
1916	10-Jun-1978	10-Sep-1996	10-Sep-1996	10-Sep-1996	9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE			68.4
1917	23-May-1970	5-Mar-1989	5-Mar-1989	5-Mar-1989	9-Apr-1996 ELECTIVE			72.1
1918	22-Dec-1991	22-Dec-2006	22-Dec-2006	22-Dec-2006	13-Jul-2012 ELECTIVE			72.2
1919	16-Nov-1977	3-Sep-1992	3-Sep-1992	3-Sep-1992	9-Mar-1996 ELECTIVE			73.5
1920	4-Dec-1966	16-May-1982	16-May-1982		21-Nov-1980 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)			63.5
1921	25-Feb-1987	17-Apr-2006	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	8-Oct-2012 ELECTIVE			67.3
1922	16-Jul-1960	21-May-1971	15-Oct-1970		8-Feb-1964 DISABILITY			67.7
1923	16-Feb-1997	5-Feb-2017	5-Feb-2017	10-Dec-2017				
1924	9-Mar-2019	9-Mar-2034	5-Aug-2031					
1925	10-Mar-2012	30-May-2033	30-May-2033					
1926	31-Jul-1968	31-Jul-1983	31-Jul-1983	31-Jul-1983	19-Jun-1986 ELECTIVE			72.0
1927	18-Feb-1972	18-Feb-1987	18-Feb-1987	23-Feb-1987	19-Aug-1995 COMPULSORY			75.0

1928	9-Oct-1963	9-Oct-1978	9-Oct-1978			17-Dec-1967 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	57.8
1929	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	1-May-2024			31-Oct-2019 Early Retirement	63.2
1930	9-Jan-1965	17-Jun-1980	17-Jun-1980			7-Sep-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.2
1931	8-Oct-1989	2-Mar-2017	2-Mar-2017			20-Dec-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	45.8
1932	11-Mar-1972	5-Jun-1987	5-Jun-1987			19-Mar-1973 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	50.8
1933	22-Mar-2008	23-Mar-2023	23-Mar-2023				
1934	28-Jan-2012	7-Aug-2028	7-Aug-2028				
1935	15-Dec-1979	15-Dec-1994	15-Dec-1994	15-Dec-1994	4-Oct-2001 COMPULSORY		75.0
1936	12-Jan-2013	15-Apr-2028	15-Apr-2028				
1937	21-Mar-2009	20-Mar-2024	22-Jul-2019				
1938	3-Oct-1971	21-Jun-1981	3-Oct-1981	10-Dec-1981	21-Jun-1986 COMPULSORY		75.0
1939	6-Mar-1980	7-Mar-1995	18-Mar-1994	18-Mar-1994	18-Mar-1999 COMPULSORY		75.0
1940	26-Jul-1970	26-Jul-1985	1-Sep-1981	9-Sep-1981	8-Feb-1986 ELECTIVE		74.4
1941	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	4-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY		75.0
1942	27-Jan-1962	3-Jan-1979	3-Jan-1979	3-Jan-1979	9-Aug-1983 ELECTIVE		69.6
1943	10-Jul-2004	5-Feb-2020	5-Feb-2020	14-Apr-2020			
1944	19-Jan-2003	10-Nov-2019	10-Nov-2019				
1945	9-May-2007	9-May-2022	16-Jul-2018	18-Jul-2018			
1946	4-Sep-1982	10-Dec-1989			10-Dec-1989 COMPULSORY		75.0
1947	9-May-1998	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015			
1948	25-Feb-1967	25-Feb-1982	25-Feb-1982		22-Nov-1970 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		57.0
1949	24-Oct-1981	30-Jan-1999	30-Jan-1999		30-Jan-1999 ELECTIVE		65.0
1950	28-Apr-1946	10-Sep-1965	10-Sep-1965		10-Sep-1975 COMPULSORY		75.0
1951	3-Feb-2007	31-Mar-2022	31-Mar-2022				
1952	6-Feb-2011	6-Feb-2026	6-Feb-2026				
1953	29-Sep-1991	29-Sep-2006	22-Oct-2003		22-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY		75.0
1954	7-Mar-1993	1-Aug-2010	1-Aug-2010	1-Aug-2010	1-Aug-2020 COMPULSORY		72.6
1955	16-Sep-1999	2-Oct-2015	2-Oct-2015	17-Oct-2016			
1956	17-Aug-1995	17-Aug-2010	17-Aug-2010	17-Aug-2010	11-Jul-2014 ELECTIVE		73.5
1957	14-Jan-1945	28-Jan-1963	28-Jan-1963		16-Feb-1961 DISABILITY		63.1
1958	5-Aug-1988	5-Aug-2003	20-Oct-2001	20-Oct-2001	10-Aug-2003 ELECTIVE		71.8
1959	10-Jul-1993	10-Jul-2008	10-Jul-2008	9-Aug-2008	23-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY		75.0
1960	31-Dec-1983	22-Apr-1999	11-Aug-1999	11-Aug-1999	12-May-2005 ELECTIVE		70.8
1961	28-Aug-2020	4-Nov-2036	4-Nov-2036				
1962	9-Oct-1976	15-Mar-1996	15-Mar-1996	15-Mar-1996	9-Oct-1999 ELECTIVE		68.6
1963	21-May-2010	21-May-2025	21-May-2025				
1964	22-Jun-1990	22-Jun-2005	22-Jun-2005	22-Jun-2005	10-Dec-2008 ELECTIVE		71.7
1965	16-Dec-1962	1-Feb-1979	1-Feb-1979	11-Apr-1979	1-Feb-1989 COMPULSORY		75.0
1966	14-Jun-1984	3-Feb-2000	23-Sep-2000	23-Sep-2000	15-Apr-2004 ELECTIVE		68.6
1967	16-Mar-2000	17-Mar-2015	17-Mar-2015		17-Mar-2015 ELECTIVE		69.3
1968	11-Oct-1975	14-Sep-1993	14-Sep-1993	14-Sep-1993	3-Dec-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		66.2
1969	7-Dec-2018	3-Sep-2034	3-Sep-2034				
1970	8-Oct-1989	8-Oct-2004	24-Jun-2002	24-Jun-2002	24-Jun-2007 COMPULSORY		75.0
1971	2-Mar-2007	29-Sep-2022	29-Sep-2022				
1972	22-Mar-2008	23-Mar-2023	23-Mar-2023				
1973	10-Dec-1942	18-Mar-1967	18-Mar-1967		18-Mar-1977 COMPULSORY		75.0
1974	12-Jan-2013	13-Sep-2028	13-Sep-2028				
1975	10-Jun-1978	26-Feb-1999	16-Aug-2002	16-Aug-2002	7-Jan-2006 ELECTIVE		68.4
1976	20-Jun-2004	26-Apr-2020	26-Apr-2020	26-Apr-2020			
1977	19-Aug-2017	19-Aug-2032	15-Jun-2032				
1978	11-Apr-1954	18-Dec-1974	18-Dec-1974		9-Jan-1970 DISABILITY		60.1
1979	1-Oct-1993	8-Nov-2009	8-Nov-2009		9-Nov-2009 ELECTIVE		63.9
1980	24-Dec-1980	26-Feb-1999	13-Apr-1999	13-Apr-1999	13-Apr-2009 COMPULSORY		75.0
1981	3-Mar-1963	4-Dec-1970	3-Mar-1973		4-Dec-1975 COMPULSORY		75.0
1982	6-Jun-2018	6-Jun-2033	6-Jun-2033				
1983	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	31-May-2023				
1984	9-Jan-2014	9-Jan-2029	9-Jan-2029				
1985	25-Aug-1946	13-Jan-1975	13-Jan-1975	11-Mar-1977	8-Oct-1983 ELECTIVE		73.7
1986	25-Feb-1987	25-Feb-2002	25-Feb-2002		9-Aug-2003 ELECTIVE		67.7
1987	2-Dec-1964	16-Jan-1986	16-Jan-1986	10-Apr-1986	16-Jan-1996 COMPULSORY		75.0
1988	29-Aug-1994	29-Aug-2009	29-Aug-2009	9-Oct-2009	4-Aug-2018 COMPULSORY		75.0
1989	13-Nov-1982	10-Jun-1999	5-Jan-2001	5-Jan-2001	5-Jan-2007 ELECTIVE		71.0
1990	2-Mar-2006	2-Mar-2021	2-Mar-2021				
1991	7-Mar-1993	22-Aug-2011	22-Aug-2011	10-Apr-2012	26-May-2019 ELECTIVE		69.3
1992	28-Dec-1980	28-Dec-1995	4-Jun-1995	4-Jun-1995	3-Jun-2000 COMPULSORY		75.0
1993	8-Jan-1983	8-Jan-1998	8-Jan-1998		13-Jan-1998 ELECTIVE		66.7
1994	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015			
1995	14-Oct-2015	19-Apr-2028	14-Oct-2025		8-Aug-2018 RESIGNATION (RPC)		65.3
1996	25-Dec-1997	3-Sep-2014	3-Sep-2014	3-Sep-2014			
1997	7-Aug-1955	2-Dec-1961	7-Aug-1965		27-Mar-1957 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		65.3
1998	16-Feb-1997	28-Apr-2013	28-Apr-2013		29-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE		63.8
1999	9-Feb-1995	5-Jan-2011	5-Jan-2011	5-Jan-2011	23-Feb-2020 ELECTIVE		73.2
2000	9-Mar-1995	3-Nov-2013	3-Nov-2013	3-Nov-2013			
2001	15-Feb-1968	19-Sep-1973	15-Feb-1978		18-Jul-1974 DISABILITY		70.8
2002	7-Nov-2008	31-Oct-2026	31-Oct-2026				
2003	23-Feb-2002	1-Sep-2017	1-Sep-2017	11-Apr-2018			
2004	3-Feb-2007	4-Apr-2026	4-Apr-2026				
2005	7-Jan-1978	7-Jan-1993	7-Jan-1993		3-May-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		65.4
2006	12-Jan-2019	12-Jan-2034	12-Jan-2034				
2007	15-Feb-2019	12-Sep-2035	12-Sep-2035				
2008	30-May-2008	31-Jan-2025	31-Jan-2025				
2009	14-May-1994	30-Mar-2013	30-Mar-2013	15-Dec-2016			
2010	9-Jan-1965	23-Dec-1981	23-Dec-1981	27-Apr-1983	23-Dec-1991 COMPULSORY		75.0
2011	17-Oct-1959	17-Oct-1974	17-Oct-1974	10-Dec-1976	11-Jun-1981 COMPULSORY		75.0

2012	26-Apr-1961	12-Jun-1971	26-Apr-1971		23-Dec-1965 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.5
2013	13-Oct-1990	13-Oct-2005	13-Feb-2005	11-Mar-2007	13-Feb-2010 COMPULSORY	75.0
2014	15-Jan-1959	15-Jan-1974	25-Nov-1969		17-Jun-1961 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.6
2015	29-Apr-1949	16-Dec-1972	16-Dec-1972	12-Oct-1975	16-Dec-1982 COMPULSORY	75.0
2016	5-Oct-2019	2-Mar-2039	2-Mar-2039			
2017	9-May-2019	30-Jan-2036	30-Jan-2036			
2018	9-Oct-1981	25-Apr-1998	25-Apr-1998	11-Apr-2000	12-Feb-2006 ELECTIVE	72.8
2019	18-Mar-1972	19-Mar-1987	19-Mar-1987	11-Apr-1987	9-Jan-1992 ELECTIVE	70.7
2020	17-Sep-1966	23-Aug-1979	17-Sep-1976	8-Oct-1976	23-Aug-1979 COMPULSORY	75.0
2021	21-Aug-2014	21-Aug-2029	13-Mar-2028			
2022	27-Mar-1988	1-Aug-2000	28-Mar-1998	28-Mar-1998	1-Aug-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2023	19-Sep-1998	9-Mar-2014	9-Mar-2014	10-Dec-2016		
2024	4-Oct-1998	4-Oct-2013	12-Nov-2012	12-Nov-2012	10-Apr-2014 ELECTIVE	71.4
2025	15-Aug-2004	15-Aug-2019	6-Apr-2015		10-Apr-2015 Early Retirement	70.0
2026	1-Jun-1989	1-Sep-2005	1-Dec-2006	1-Dec-2006	1-Dec-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
2027	7-Jan-2012	7-Jan-2027	7-Jan-2027			
2028	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	21-Mar-2030			
2029	20-Feb-1959	11-Aug-1971	11-Aug-1971		21-Jul-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.9
2030	31-May-1979	3-Jun-1997	3-Jun-1997		3-Jun-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2031	10-Mar-1956	22-May-1968	22-May-1968		11-Mar-1973 ELECTIVE	74.8
2032	1-Jun-2018	1-Jun-2033	1-Jun-2033			
2033	12-May-1962	20-May-1979	20-May-1979	22-Aug-1980	20-May-1989 COMPULSORY	75.0
2034	29-Sep-2012	29-Sep-2027	13-Apr-2025			
2035	9-Nov-1973	17-Oct-2000	17-Oct-2000		28-Jan-1982 RESIGNATION (RPC)	46.3
2036	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007	1-Oct-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
2037	25-Dec-1955	25-Dec-1970	25-Dec-1970	10-Mar-1976	18-Jan-1980 COMPULSORY	75.0
2038	29-Nov-1963	29-Nov-1978	21-Sep-1977		19-Mar-1974 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.5
2039	25-Feb-1984	29-Oct-2000	3-Jul-2002		30-Oct-2000 ELECTIVE	63.3
2040	20-Sep-1953	2-Jul-1963	20-Sep-1963		16-Jan-1962 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.5
2041	21-Mar-1959	21-Mar-1974	21-Mar-1974	24-Dec-1976	5-Jan-1979 ELECTIVE	70.7
2042	29-Mar-2018	8-Oct-2034	8-Oct-2034			
2043	30-Jun-1965	12-Apr-1982	12-Apr-1982		15-Aug-1986 DEATH (RPC)	69.3
2044	6-Jun-2015	5-Nov-2032	5-Nov-2032			
2045	30-May-1996	31-May-2011	22-Oct-2007	22-Oct-2007	22-Oct-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
2046	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	21-May-2023			
2047	11-Aug-2017	6-Nov-2032	6-Nov-2032			
2048	15-Feb-1958	15-Feb-1973	15-Feb-1973		10-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE	69.7
2049	5-Jul-2001	5-Jul-2016	1-Sep-2013	1-Sep-2013	1-Sep-2018 COMPULSORY	75.0
2050	2-Jul-2017	2-Jul-2032	2-Jul-2032			
2051	15-Aug-2007	15-Aug-2022	27-Jul-2018			
2052	17-Oct-1975	12-Jul-1997	12-Jul-1997	12-Jul-1997	12-Jul-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2053	27-Jan-2017	18-Aug-2034	18-Aug-2034			
2054	2-Jul-2017	2-Jul-2032	2-Jul-2032			
2055	18-Jan-2003	18-Jan-2018	18-Jan-2018	18-Jan-2018		
2056	17-Jul-1952	25-Jul-1973	25-Jul-1973		25-Jul-1983 COMPULSORY	75.0
2057	5-Feb-2011	5-Feb-2026	5-Feb-2026			
2058	22-Aug-2004	8-Aug-2021	8-Aug-2021			
2059	5-Sep-1985	1-Oct-2012	1-Oct-2012		16-Apr-1991 RESIGNATION (RPC)	43.5
2060	29-Sep-2012	3-Feb-2028	3-Feb-2028			
2061	5-Nov-1955	28-Feb-1965			28-Feb-1965 COMPULSORY	75.0
2062	9-Mar-1995	19-Dec-2010	19-Dec-2010	19-Dec-2010	10-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE	67.2
2063	19-Oct-1991	4-Mar-2008	4-Mar-2008	4-Mar-2008	29-Aug-2012 ELECTIVE	68.1
2064	21-Mar-2015	28-Apr-2031	28-Apr-2031			
2065	2-Sep-1999	2-Sep-2014	2-Sep-2014	2-Sep-2014	10-Dec-2018 ELECTIVE	69.6
2066	16-Feb-1974	6-Sep-1991	6-Sep-1991	6-Sep-1991	9-Apr-1996 ELECTIVE	69.6
2067	11-Dec-1988	15-Mar-2009	15-Mar-2009			
2068	7-Mar-1996	8-Mar-2011	8-Mar-2011	8-Mar-2011	15-Jul-2013 ELECTIVE	70.1
2069	29-Mar-1981	28-Mar-1996	15-Jul-1995	23-Jul-1995	15-Jul-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2070	9-Sep-2020	9-Sep-2035	23-Oct-2034			
2071	24-Mar-1965	27-Jun-1980	27-Jun-1980	27-Jun-1980	27-Jun-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
2072	18-May-2013	17-May-2028	17-May-2028			
2073	17-Dec-1986	26-Oct-2007	26-Oct-2007	2-Sep-2013		
2074	13-May-1978	13-May-1993	13-May-1993	13-May-1993	9-Aug-2000 ELECTIVE	74.7
2075	18-Feb-2000	25-Jun-2016	25-Jun-2016	25-Jun-2016		
2076	19-Nov-1967	14-Aug-1978	14-Aug-1978		4-May-1977 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.7
2077	23-Dec-2006	23-Oct-2024	23-Oct-2024			
2078	8-Oct-1976	8-Oct-1991	8-Oct-1991		10-Feb-1986 DEATH (RPC)	59.9
2079	8-Mar-1992	9-Mar-2007	28-Sep-2002	28-Sep-2002	23-Sep-2007 ELECTIVE	75.0
2080	27-Jun-1996	27-Jun-2011	27-Jun-2011	27-Jun-2011	16-Oct-2018 COMPULSORY	75.0
2081	12-Jan-1990	28-Jul-2010	28-Jul-2010	13-Oct-2010	13-Oct-2020 COMPULSORY	69.7
2082	30-Jun-1991	25-Jan-2011	25-Jan-2011	24-Jul-2014		
2083	8-Sep-2002	9-Oct-2017	9-Oct-2017	9-Oct-2017		
2084	25-Jan-1951	2-Dec-1966	2-Dec-1966		10-Sep-1956 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	54.8
2085	9-Jun-1962	14-Jul-1979	14-Jul-1979	14-Jul-1979	14-Jul-1989 COMPULSORY	75.0
2086	15-Aug-1970	15-Aug-1985	15-Aug-1985	15-Aug-1985	11-Feb-1992 COMPULSORY	75.0
2087	1-Mar-2019	1-Mar-2034	26-May-2031			
2088	6-Jan-2019	10-May-2036	10-May-2036			
2089	15-Dec-1979	15-Dec-1994	29-Nov-1993	29-Nov-1993	29-Nov-1998 ELECTIVE	75.0
2090	11-Mar-1957	9-Jul-1982	9-Jul-1982		1-Dec-1978 DISABILITY	61.4
2091	12-Jan-1986	9-Oct-2001	5-Jul-2002	5-Jul-2002	5-Jul-2012 COMPULSORY	75.0
2092	14-Aug-1992	30-May-2009	30-May-2009	9-Jun-2009	23-Nov-2015 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.7
2093	21-Mar-2003	21-Mar-2018	21-Mar-2018		8-Jan-2017 Early Retirement	66.9
2094	25-Mar-2015	15-Nov-2032	15-Nov-2032			
2095	3-Jul-1987	3-Jul-2002	3-Jul-2002	3-Jul-2002	10-Jan-2009 ELECTIVE	72.9

2096	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	12-Mar-2029					
2097	7-Oct-1984	27-Oct-1994	27-Oct-1994	27-Oct-1994	11-Apr-1999	ELECTIVE		74.5
2098	27-Apr-1974	17-Aug-1996	17-Aug-1996	17-Aug-1996	17-Aug-2006	COMPULSORY		75.0
2099	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2030	21-Mar-2030					
2100	15-Feb-2014	15-Feb-2029	31-May-2027					
2101	2-Mar-2007	2-Oct-2020	2-Mar-2017	11-Apr-2017	2-Oct-2020	COMPULSORY		75.0
2102	5-Jan-1979	26-Feb-1999	7-Aug-1999		24-Dec-2001	ELECTIVE		67.4
2103	14-Sep-2013	5-Mar-2025	14-Sep-2023					
2104	7-Jun-1969	17-Aug-1996	17-Aug-1996		17-Aug-1996	ELECTIVE		65.0
2105	6-Jun-2015	6-Jun-2030	18-Feb-2027					
2106	1-Apr-1978	1-Apr-1993	1-Apr-1993		10-Apr-1993	ELECTIVE		68.6
2107	27-Jan-2017	7-Jul-2034	7-Jul-2034					
2108	6-Mar-2005	5-Mar-2020	5-Mar-2020	11-Apr-2020				
2109	25-Jun-1998	4-Mar-2014	4-Mar-2014	11-Apr-2014	4-Jan-2020	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		70.1
2110	27-Dec-1967	1-Jan-1980	27-Dec-1977	6-Oct-1978	1-Jan-1980	COMPULSORY		75.0
2111	7-Jul-1965	7-Jul-1980	7-Jul-1980	8-Aug-1980	8-Feb-1985	ELECTIVE		73.3
2112	12-May-1993	31-Jul-2011	31-Jul-2011	9-Aug-2011	9-Aug-2013	ELECTIVE		63.8
2113	8-Oct-2013	8-Oct-2028	4-Feb-2024					
2114	31-Aug-2018	10-Dec-2033	10-Dec-2033					
2115	13-Aug-1983	26-Feb-1999	13-Apr-1999	13-Apr-1999	13-Apr-2009	COMPULSORY		75.0
2116	2-Mar-2006	2-Mar-2021	2-Mar-2021					
2117	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	7-Nov-2023					
2118	27-Jan-1962	21-Oct-1973	21-Oct-1973		21-Oct-1978	COMPULSORY		75.0
2119	3-Feb-2018	3-Feb-2033	3-Feb-2033					
2120	11-Aug-2018	11-May-2030	11-Aug-2028					
2121	1-May-1999	13-Jan-2013	1-May-2009	1-May-2009	13-Jan-2013	COMPULSORY		75.0
2122	16-May-2015	16-May-2030	16-May-2030					
2123	30-Jun-1991	26-Apr-2009	26-Apr-2009	26-Apr-2009	11-Jul-2016	ELECTIVE		69.4
2124	6-Mar-1980	27-Jun-1992	7-Mar-1990	7-Mar-1990	27-Jun-1992	COMPULSORY		75.0
2125	3-Jul-1976	3-Jul-1991	3-Jul-1991	29-Mar-1992	1-Sep-1998	COMPULSORY		75.0
2126	4-Jun-1977	3-Jun-1992	3-Jun-1992		19-Mar-1988	DISABILITY		63.5
2127	30-May-2008	31-May-2023	31-May-2023		11-May-2020	Early Retirement		63.3
2128	31-Mar-1984	1-Apr-1999	1-Apr-1999	1-Apr-1999	15-Dec-2006	COMPULSORY		75.0
2129	12-May-1973	15-Aug-1989	15-Aug-1989	15-Aug-1989	9-Oct-1991	ELECTIVE		67.1
2130	17-Jan-1976	17-Dec-1995	17-Dec-1995	17-Dec-1995	17-Dec-2005	COMPULSORY		75.0
2131	21-Aug-1992	13-Mar-2011	13-Mar-2011		9-Dec-2014	ELECTIVE		65.2
2132	24-Dec-1999	24-Mar-2017	24-Mar-2017	24-Mar-2017	9-Oct-2019	ELECTIVE		65.3
2133	22-Sep-2017	22-Sep-2032	3-May-2030					
2134	10-Sep-2019	14-Sep-2034	14-Sep-2034					
2135	30-Sep-2007	30-Sep-2022	30-Sep-2022					
2136	24-May-1985	27-Oct-1997	24-May-1995	24-May-1995	27-Oct-1997	COMPULSORY		75.0
2137	4-Nov-2000	13-Aug-2017	13-Aug-2017	13-Aug-2017				
2138	19-Mar-1972	1-Jul-1998	1-Jul-1998		5-Dec-1983	RESIGNATION (RPC)		50.4
2139	29-Nov-1963	29-Nov-1978	29-Nov-1978	30-Nov-1978	3-Jul-1987	COMPULSORY		75.0
2140	2-Nov-1975	18-Jul-1998	18-Jul-1998	18-Jul-1998	24-Dec-2002	ELECTIVE		69.4
2141	26-Dec-1973	2-May-1990	2-May-1990	2-May-1990	9-Mar-2000	ELECTIVE		74.9
2142	5-May-2002	25-Apr-2018	25-Apr-2018	25-Apr-2018				
2143	10-Aug-1950	16-Mar-1977	16-Mar-1977		8-Apr-1977	ELECTIVE		65.1
2144	12-Feb-1998	28-Jul-2014	28-Jul-2014	10-Apr-2017				
2145	8-Sep-2002	28-Jan-2020	28-Jan-2020		11-Mar-2019	Early Retirement		61.7
2146	7-Mar-1993	23-May-2008	23-May-2008	10-Apr-2011	9-Aug-2018	COMPULSORY		75.0
2147	9-Aug-2018	9-Aug-2033	28-Aug-2032					
2148	25-Dec-2003	25-Dec-2018	2-Aug-2014	2-Aug-2014	2-Aug-2019	COMPULSORY		75.0
2149	10-May-1975	26-Feb-1999	22-Feb-2000	22-Feb-2000	22-Feb-2010	COMPULSORY		75.0
2150	26-Feb-1998	26-Feb-2013	26-Feb-2013	26-Feb-2013				
2151	10-Dec-1956	21-Oct-1966			21-Oct-1966	COMPULSORY		75.0
2152	8-Aug-2015	13-Oct-2033	13-Oct-2033					
2153	21-Jan-1984	10-Dec-2005	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2007	10-Apr-2015	ELECTIVE		67.4
2154	9-Nov-1966	9-Nov-1981	27-Aug-1981		8-Jan-1982	ELECTIVE		70.4
2155	24-Jun-1978	16-Sep-2000	16-Sep-2000		10-Mar-1993	DISABILITY		57.5
2156	22-May-1982	8-Dec-1997	8-Dec-1997		11-Jan-1992	DISABILITY		59.1
2157	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	27-Jan-2032					
2158	18-Jul-2019	18-Jul-2034	1-May-2034					
2159	25-Feb-1984	11-Mar-1999	24-Mar-1999	24-Mar-1999	24-Mar-2009	COMPULSORY		75.0
2160	29-Jun-2001	19-Nov-2016	19-Nov-2016	19-Nov-2016	12-Jul-2020	ELECTIVE		68.3
2161	28-Sep-1996	23-Jan-2014	23-Jan-2014	10-Mar-2015				
2162	14-Aug-1992	24-Apr-2008	24-Apr-2008	3-Jan-2009	3-Jan-2019	COMPULSORY		75.0
2163	10-Sep-2019	10-Sep-2034	10-Sep-2034					
2164	20-Jul-2003	20-Jul-2018	20-Jul-2018	20-Jul-2018				
2165	1-Oct-1998	26-Jul-2015	26-Jul-2015	26-Jul-2015				
2166	13-Oct-1994	13-Oct-2009	13-Oct-2009	13-Oct-2009	11-Apr-2019	ELECTIVE		74.8
2167	11-Feb-1996	26-Aug-2011	9-Mar-2012		10-Dec-2002	RESIGNATION (RPC)		55.8
2168	9-Jun-1991	9-Jun-2006	25-Sep-2003	25-Sep-2003	25-Sep-2008	COMPULSORY		75.0
2169	28-Sep-2000	2-Dec-2018	2-Dec-2018					
2170	26-Aug-2017	26-Aug-2032	26-Aug-2032					
2171	5-Sep-1993	28-Feb-2009	28-Feb-2009	28-Feb-2009	10-Jun-2016	DEATH (RPC)		71.8
2172	18-Sep-1993	22-Jan-2012	22-Jan-2012	9-May-2020				
2173	9-Feb-1995	14-Aug-2012	14-Aug-2012	9-Apr-2016				
2174	7-Feb-1947	2-Oct-1971	2-Oct-1971		8-Apr-1977	ELECTIVE		70.5
2175	13-Aug-1993	15-Mar-2012	15-Mar-2012		12-Aug-2007	Early Retirement		56.8
2176	8-Nov-1990	22-Nov-2009	22-Nov-2009	22-Nov-2009	9-Jun-2010	ELECTIVE		61.5
2177	8-Jun-1995	26-Oct-2010	26-Oct-2010	8-Oct-2013	7-Jun-2020	ELECTIVE		74.2
2178	8-May-1982	8-May-1997	8-May-1997	12-May-1997	30-Jan-2007	COMPULSORY		75.0
2179	25-Oct-1980	21-Feb-1991	21-Feb-1991	21-Feb-1991	21-Feb-1996	COMPULSORY		75.0

2180	15-Dec-1979	1-Jul-1995	1-Jul-1995	1-Jul-1995	20-Apr-2001 ELECTIVE	70.8
2181	12-Jan-1986	12-Jan-2001	19-Jun-1998	8-Oct-1998	19-Jun-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
2182	9-Jun-2001	16-Aug-2017	16-Aug-2017	16-Aug-2017		
2183	1-Nov-1975	1-Nov-1990	1-Nov-1990	1-Nov-1990	13-Jun-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.1
2184	9-Nov-1995	11-Apr-2012	11-Apr-2012	8-Aug-2013		
2185	12-Feb-1998	12-Feb-2013	12-Feb-2013		20-Oct-2000 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	57.0
2186	20-Jul-1974	20-Jul-1989	20-Jul-1989		9-Nov-1986 DISABILITY	66.5
2187	1-Mar-1975	26-Feb-1999	7-Jan-2001	7-Jan-2001	11-Apr-2006 ELECTIVE	70.3
2188	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	10-Jun-2022			
2189	3-Aug-1995	5-Aug-2014	5-Aug-2014	9-Aug-2014		
2190	1-Nov-2003	1-Nov-2018	23-Sep-2014	23-Sep-2014	23-Sep-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0
2191	18-Dec-2009	18-Dec-2024	10-Jan-2020	10-Jan-2020		
2192	9-Feb-1995	5-Oct-2012	5-Oct-2012	5-Oct-2012	15-Mar-2018 ELECTIVE	67.8
2193	8-Mar-1992	25-Mar-2011	25-Mar-2011	25-Mar-2011	9-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE	63.7
2194	12-Jan-1990	23-Apr-2007	23-Apr-2007	11-Apr-2015	31-Jul-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0
2195	26-Aug-2017	18-Sep-2029	26-Aug-2027			
2196	23-Feb-2002	10-May-2019	10-May-2019			
2197	23-Jun-1999	23-Jun-2014	23-Jun-2014		11-Jul-2015 ELECTIVE	67.9
2198	7-May-1972	8-May-1987	8-May-1987		30-Jul-1972 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	52.5
2199	8-Sep-2002	24-Apr-2018	24-Apr-2018	10-Dec-2019		
2200	4-Jan-1941	4-Jan-1956	4-Jan-1956		27-Dec-1960 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.9
2201	15-Jul-1982	15-Jul-1997	15-Jul-1997	15-Jul-1997	9-Feb-1999 ELECTIVE	66.8
2202	9-Jun-1961	9-Jun-1976	9-Jun-1976	10-Aug-1977	4-Sep-1977 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.6
2203	16-May-2015	21-Aug-2031	21-Aug-2031			
2204	5-May-1950	28-Feb-1969	28-Feb-1969		28-Feb-1979 COMPULSORY	75.0
2205	8-Mar-2009	14-Sep-2025	14-Sep-2025			
2206	5-Sep-1981	5-Sep-1996	5-Sep-1996		9-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE	66.1
2207	16-May-2015	22-Dec-2031	22-Dec-2031			
2208	11-Apr-1976	12-Apr-1991		2-Apr-1990	9-Dec-1994 ELECTIVE	74.7
2209	13-Aug-2005	13-Aug-2020	8-Jan-2020		12-Oct-2017 DISABILITY	67.8
2210	19-Jun-1985	24-Nov-1997	19-Jun-1995		11-Jul-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.6
2211	13-Oct-2000	13-Oct-2015	13-Oct-2015	13-Oct-2015	10-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE	66.2
2212	7-May-1994	24-Nov-2012	24-Nov-2012	23-Dec-2012		
2213	22-Feb-1957	22-Feb-1972	22-Feb-1972	22-Feb-1974	21-May-1980 COMPULSORY	75.0
2214	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	29-Sep-2032			
2215	31-Jul-2003	7-Nov-2023	7-Nov-2023			
2216	22-Feb-1975	22-Feb-1990	28-Nov-1988	29-Nov-1988	28-Nov-1993 COMPULSORY	75.0
2217	3-Mar-1963	3-Mar-1978	3-Mar-1978		16-Oct-1979 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.9
2218	9-Mar-2007	5-Jan-2026	5-Jan-2026			
2219	25-Sep-1975	17-Mar-1989	25-Sep-1985	25-Sep-1985	17-Mar-1989 COMPULSORY	75.0
2220	6-Mar-2010	2-Feb-2026	2-Feb-2026			
2221	18-Oct-2015	9-Feb-2031	9-Feb-2031			
2222	9-Oct-1998	9-Oct-2013	9-Oct-2013	9-Oct-2013		
2223	23-Dec-1973	23-Dec-1988	23-Dec-1988		10-May-1984 DISABILITY	62.3
2224	11-Jan-1996	11-Jul-2014	11-Jul-2014	13-Jul-2014		
2225	27-Sep-2009	10-Feb-2025	10-Feb-2025			
2226	13-Mar-1986	13-Mar-2001	13-Mar-2001	11-Apr-2007	6-Jan-2011 COMPULSORY	75.0
2227	9-Mar-2019	9-Mar-2034	18-Feb-2031			
2228	4-May-1958	4-May-1973	4-May-1973	30-Nov-1975	22-Sep-1979 COMPULSORY	75.0
2229	21-Jun-1969	21-Jun-1984	24-Oct-1980		31-Dec-1977 DISABILITY	67.2
2230	2-Nov-1969	1-Dec-1991	1-Dec-1991	1-Dec-1991	12-Dec-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.0
2231	19-Sep-1970	30-Jul-1990	30-Jul-1990	30-Jul-1990	30-Jul-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2232	21-Sep-2014	7-Aug-2031	7-Aug-2031			
2233	5-Aug-2007	5-Aug-2022	5-Aug-2022			
2234	30-Dec-1973	30-Dec-1988	20-Jul-1985	9-Sep-1985	20-Jul-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
2235	4-Sep-1982	4-Sep-1997	4-Sep-1997	4-Sep-1997	2-Oct-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
2236	22-Nov-1959	31-Oct-1976	31-Oct-1976	31-Oct-1976	31-Oct-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0
2237	21-Mar-2015	26-Apr-2030	26-Apr-2030			
2238	12-Feb-1972	14-May-1994	14-May-1994	14-May-1994	13-May-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
2239	11-Apr-1979	12-Apr-1994	12-Apr-1994	12-Apr-1994	8-Apr-2004 ELECTIVE	75.0
2240	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2005	17-Jan-2010 ELECTIVE	70.1
2241	15-Aug-1996	15-Aug-2011	15-Aug-2011	15-Aug-2011	24-Sep-2019 ELECTIVE	75.0
2242	20-Jul-2018	31-Aug-2036	31-Aug-2036			
2243	5-Sep-2015	5-Jul-2031	5-Jul-2031			
2244	31-Jul-1982	16-Oct-1997	16-Oct-1997	16-Oct-1997	16-Oct-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2245	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	15-Oct-2028			
2246	1-Feb-1997	30-Nov-2012	30-Nov-2012	10-Dec-2012	8-Feb-2019 ELECTIVE	70.4
2247	6-Nov-2009	25-Dec-2029				
2248	9-Nov-1995	2-Mar-2012	2-Mar-2012	2-Mar-2012	18-Jan-2016 ELECTIVE	67.6
2249	12-Aug-1999	11-Mar-2015	11-Mar-2015		24-Jul-2014 Early Retirement	63.8
2250	10-Mar-2012	11-Mar-2027	11-Mar-2027			
2251	22-Jan-1972	5-Oct-1990	5-Oct-1990	5-Oct-1990	28-Jul-1999 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.8
2252	22-Mar-2003	18-Mar-2020	18-Mar-2020	21-Mar-2020		
2253	26-Jun-1997	12-Aug-2014	12-Aug-2014	28-Sep-2016		
2254	14-Nov-2010	26-Jan-2027	26-Jan-2027			
2255	21-Mar-2015	21-Mar-2033	21-Mar-2033			
2256	14-Jul-2012	25-Apr-2028	25-Apr-2028			
2257	8-Feb-1964	2-Sep-1981			8-Oct-1990 ELECTIVE	74.1
2258	2-Oct-1992	7-Feb-2009	7-Feb-2009	7-Feb-2009	9-Aug-2013 ELECTIVE	68.2
2259	15-Feb-1987	15-Feb-2002	8-Jul-2000	8-Jul-2000	8-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
2260	8-May-1976	9-May-1991	12-Jan-1987	23-Oct-1987	12-Jan-1992 COMPULSORY	75.0
2261	9-Jul-1977	10-Mar-1999	7-Nov-2005	10-Jul-2008	23-Nov-2014 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.0
2262	8-Apr-1959	8-Apr-1974	30-Oct-1973	27-Nov-1974	4-Feb-1975 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.3
2263	24-Jan-2002	4-Aug-2019	4-Aug-2019	12-Sep-2019		

2264	19-Jan-1974	26-Feb-1999	3-Nov-1999	18-Jun-2000	11-Feb-2004	ELECTIVE	69.3
2265	1-Oct-2005	17-Aug-2020	1-Oct-2015	1-Oct-2015	8-Jan-2020	Early Retirement	74.4
2266	11-Apr-1946	4-May-1966	4-May-1966		7-Apr-1976	ELECTIVE	74.9
2267	18-May-2013	17-May-2028	17-May-2028				
2268	21-Mar-2009	20-Mar-2024	20-Mar-2024				
2269	5-Jun-2005	23-Aug-2023	23-Aug-2023				
2270	13-Jul-1995	27-May-2015	27-May-2015		12-May-2019	ELECTIVE	64.1
2271	18-Feb-1972	18-Feb-1987	12-May-1982	12-May-1982	12-May-1987	COMPULSORY	75.0
2272	16-Feb-1997	14-Jul-2015	14-Jul-2015		9-Dec-2013	Early Retirement	60.0
2273	25-Aug-2019	22-Dec-2033	25-Aug-2029				
2274	14-Jul-2012	14-Jul-2027	14-Jul-2027				
2275	21-Jan-1984	25-Dec-2003	28-Nov-2008		13-Jul-2002	Early Retirement	58.6
2276	20-May-1978	22-Jun-1987	19-May-1988		12-Apr-1988	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.8
2277	14-May-2011	14-May-2026	14-Mar-2022				
2278	20-Jul-2008	14-Dec-2026	14-Dec-2026				
2279	12-Jul-2018	12-Jul-2033	12-Jul-2033				
2280	6-Feb-2011	4-Mar-2025	6-Feb-2021				
2281	10-Dec-1972	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-1987	2-Nov-1988	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.3
2282	26-Jan-1974	10-Nov-1996	10-Nov-1996	10-Nov-1996	9-Feb-1999	ELECTIVE	67.3
2283	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	30-Apr-2022				
2284	26-Feb-1998	16-Oct-2013	16-Oct-2013	16-Oct-2013			
2285	14-Aug-1992	27-Feb-2010	27-Feb-2010		17-Apr-2009	DISABILITY	61.6
2286	18-May-2013	17-May-2028	19-Jul-2026				
2287	1-Aug-1984	1-Aug-1999	1-Aug-1999	1-Aug-1999	23-Feb-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
2288	30-Jun-1988	30-Jun-2003	30-Jun-2003	10-Jul-2003	13-May-2011	COMPULSORY	75.0
2289	9-Jan-2005	9-Jan-2020	9-Jan-2020				
2290	11-Mar-2014	11-Mar-2029	29-Nov-2024				
2291	10-Sep-2019	10-Sep-2034	10-Sep-2034				
2292	10-Aug-2019	28-Jan-2038	28-Jan-2038				
2293	14-Jun-2014	14-Jun-2029	14-Jun-2029				
2294	27-Sep-2009	14-Dec-2028	14-Dec-2028				
2295	22-Jul-1999	22-Jul-2014	22-Jul-2014	31-Jul-2014			
2296	9-Mar-1995	22-Nov-2015	22-Nov-2015				
2297	17-May-2018	17-May-2033	8-May-2033				
2298	27-Oct-1991	9-Oct-1999			9-Oct-1999	COMPULSORY	75.0
2299	14-Mar-1992	15-Mar-2007	15-Mar-2007	15-Mar-2007	11-Sep-2015	COMPULSORY	75.0
2300	9-Apr-2012	23-Sep-2022	10-Apr-2022				
2301	15-Apr-1966	15-Apr-1981	15-Apr-1981	8-Jan-1982	9-Jan-1988	ELECTIVE	73.1
2302	21-Nov-2003	21-Nov-2018	13-Jul-2015		5-May-2007	RESIGNATION (RPC)	61.8
2303	16-Jun-2017	30-May-2033	30-May-2033				
2304	15-Feb-2014	24-May-2032	24-May-2032				
2305	7-Jun-1969	26-Aug-1987	26-Aug-1987	9-Oct-1992	9-Feb-1997	ELECTIVE	74.5
2306	18-Oct-1980	10-Jul-1998	10-Jul-1998	10-Jul-1998	9-Jun-2008	ELECTIVE	74.9
2307	9-Sep-2020	9-Sep-2035	9-Sep-2035				
2308	3-Apr-1991	3-Apr-2006	3-Apr-2006		10-Jun-2003	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.8
2309	20-Jul-2003	20-Jul-2018	20-Jul-2018		20-Nov-2011	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.7
2310	4-Jan-2004	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019	8-Jan-2019			
2311	25-Aug-2019	25-Aug-2034	8-Jul-2031				
2312	19-Jan-1992	27-Apr-2008	27-Apr-2008	11-Apr-2011	8-Oct-2018	ELECTIVE	74.2
2313	13-Oct-1990	12-Nov-2010	12-Nov-2010		12-Nov-2010	ELECTIVE	59.9
2314	1-Apr-1976	16-May-1992	16-May-1992	16-May-1992	9-Aug-2000	ELECTIVE	73.2
2315	1-Oct-1993	1-Oct-2008	1-Oct-2008	1-Oct-2008	1-Oct-2013	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.4
2316	26-Jul-1962	26-Jul-1977	26-Jul-1977		3-Nov-1967	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.0
2317	27-Sep-2015	6-Feb-2034	6-Feb-2034				
2318	18-Jan-2003	18-Jan-2018	18-Jan-2018		20-Jan-2014	Early Retirement	65.7
2319	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	15-Sep-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
2320	14-Jun-1969	14-Jun-1984	5-Mar-1981		23-Dec-1974	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.8
2321	14-May-2011	23-Dec-2027	23-Dec-2027				
2322	8-Oct-1989	8-Oct-2004	8-Oct-2004	8-Oct-2004	27-Sep-2014	COMPULSORY	75.0
2323	9-May-2020	10-May-2035	10-May-2035				
2324	15-Dec-1986	19-May-2005	22-Oct-2008		19-May-1999	RESIGNATION (RPC)	55.6
2325	22-Aug-2009	4-Mar-2018			4-Mar-2018	COMPULSORY	75.0
2326	28-Dec-2007	28-Dec-2022	28-Dec-2022				
2327	14-Sep-1983	31-Jan-1997	31-Jan-1997		11-Aug-1999	DEATH (RPC)	72.5
2328	27-May-1967	27-May-1982	27-May-1982		14-Jun-1991	COMPULSORY	75.0
2329	19-Jul-2014	19-Jul-2029	19-Jul-2029				
2330	7-Jan-2018	30-May-2025					
2331	8-Dec-1978	26-Feb-1999	28-Jun-2001	28-Jun-2001	11-Apr-2010	ELECTIVE	73.8
2332	4-Jul-1979	4-Jul-1994	1-Aug-1992	3-Aug-1994	1-Aug-1997	COMPULSORY	75.0
2333	12-Feb-1972	5-Sep-1981	12-Feb-1982		5-Sep-1981	Compulsory(County Court)	70.0
2334	30-Nov-1985	29-Aug-2001	27-May-2002	6-Jul-2003	26-May-2012	COMPULSORY	75.0
2335	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	13-Jun-2026				
2336	11-Jun-1993	27-Jul-2010	10-Sep-2012		22-Jul-1999	RESIGNATION (RPC)	51.9
2337	22-Jul-1960	28-Jul-1976	28-Jul-1976	2-Feb-1977	28-Jul-1986	COMPULSORY	75.0
2338	1-Apr-1992	18-Jan-2009	18-Jan-2009	18-Jan-2009	8-Aug-2016	ELECTIVE	70.8
2339	17-Jul-1971	20-Aug-1983	20-Aug-1983		10-Jul-1973	DISABILITY	59.9
2340	21-Sep-2014	15-Apr-2026	21-Sep-2024				
2341	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	18-Aug-2018	18-Aug-2018			
2342	1-Jun-2018	1-Jun-2033	12-Jan-2031				
2343	28-Jan-2018	28-Jan-2033	28-Jan-2033				
2344	21-Mar-2009	20-Mar-2024	28-Jan-2022				
2345	24-Sep-1993	24-Sep-2008	24-Sep-2008	24-Sep-2008	10-Apr-2014	ELECTIVE	73.3
2346	7-Dec-2018	7-Dec-2033	7-Dec-2033				
2347	13-Aug-1993	27-Jan-2006	13-Aug-2003	13-Aug-2003	27-Jan-2006	COMPULSORY	75.0



2348	13-Sep-2007	13-Sep-2022	18-Aug-2019	10-May-2020			
2349	7-Oct-1998	7-Oct-2013	6-Sep-2010		28-Sep-2009 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.1	
2350	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	11-Dec-2004	11-Dec-2004	11-Dec-2009 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2351	26-Aug-2010	26-Aug-2025	26-Aug-2025				
2352	6-Mar-2010	6-Mar-2025	6-Mar-2025				
2353	19-Jun-1986	8-Dec-2006	24-Mar-2007	30-May-2007	10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE	65.9	
2354	6-Oct-1984	23-Jun-2002			10-Mar-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2355	13-Aug-2005	19-May-2022	19-May-2022				
2356	2-Apr-2007	21-Oct-2022	21-Oct-2022				
2357	18-Oct-1950	25-May-1967	25-May-1967		10-Apr-1958 RESIGNATION (RPC)	55.9	
2358	19-Sep-1951	16-Oct-1966	16-Oct-1966		20-Dec-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.2	
2359	3-Jul-2019	17-Jun-2035	17-Jun-2035				
2360	18-Dec-2009	18-Dec-2024	18-Dec-2024				
2361	13-May-1962	19-Nov-1972	19-Nov-1972		19-Nov-1977 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2362	6-Aug-2020	6-Aug-2035	5-Jun-2035				
2363	24-Oct-2002	23-Feb-2019	23-Feb-2019	27-Feb-2019			
2364	8-Mar-1992	9-Mar-2007	3-Dec-2003	3-Dec-2003	3-Dec-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2365	6-Aug-1981	6-Aug-1996	6-Aug-1996	6-Aug-1996	9-Jan-2004 ELECTIVE	73.4	
2366	6-Mar-2010	6-Mar-2025	6-Mar-2025				
2367	1-Jul-1972	1-Jul-1987	1-Jul-1987		9-Jan-1974 DISABILITY	55.6	
2368	5-Sep-1981	16-May-1998	16-May-1998	16-May-1998	15-May-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2369	30-Nov-1985	30-Nov-2000	14-May-2000		15-May-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2370	3-Apr-1991	18-Nov-2007	18-Nov-2007	3-Jul-2009	3-Jul-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2371	22-May-1940	9-Mar-1957	9-Mar-1957		11-May-1964 ELECTIVE	72.2	
2372	28-Feb-1996	28-Feb-2011	28-Feb-2011		18-Apr-2006 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.5	
2373	8-Dec-1962	8-Dec-1977	8-Dec-1977		27-Aug-1968 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	57.4	
2374	25-Sep-1982	25-Sep-1997	25-Sep-1997	9-Oct-1997	12-Sep-2006 DEATH (RPC)	74.2	
2375	3-Jul-1968	3-Jul-1983	20-Jul-1981	22-Jul-1981	20-Jul-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2376	21-May-1993	20-May-2008	30-Sep-2004	30-Sep-2004	24-Dec-2008 ELECTIVE	74.2	
2377	8-Nov-1990	10-Feb-2010	10-Feb-2010	10-Feb-2010	10-Feb-2020 COMPULSORY	70.7	
2378	7-Jul-1990	12-Mar-2011	12-Mar-2011		17-Jul-2009 Early Retirement	57.7	
2379	29-Jan-2006	28-Jun-2023	28-Jun-2023				
2380	8-Jan-1986	8-Jan-2001	21-Jul-1999	21-Jul-1999	21-Jul-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2381	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	25-Dec-2011	25-Dec-2011	25-Dec-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2382	15-Jan-1959	15-Jan-1974	24-Apr-1969		8-Sep-1967 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.4	
2383	18-Oct-2007	10-Jul-2022	18-Oct-2017	18-Oct-2017			
2384	5-Aug-2007	4-Jul-2021	5-Aug-2017	5-Aug-2017			
2385	19-Jan-1974	25-May-1996	25-May-1996	25-May-1996	26-May-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2386	26-Aug-2010	26-Aug-2025	5-Oct-2023				
2387	13-May-1978	19-Jun-1997	19-Jun-1997	11-Jul-1997	15-Dec-2003 ELECTIVE	71.5	
2388	27-Feb-2005	27-Feb-2020	27-Feb-2020				
2389	25-Feb-1999	17-Nov-2014	17-Nov-2014		23-May-2009 DISABILITY	58.8	
2390	27-Mar-1988	9-Dec-2003	21-Aug-2004	21-Aug-2004	22-Jul-2010 ELECTIVE	70.9	
2391	10-Apr-1974	10-Apr-1989	10-Apr-1989	10-Apr-1989	10-Apr-1993 ELECTIVE	69.1	
2392	28-Nov-1965	21-Jan-1982	21-Jan-1982		23-Sep-1973 DISABILITY	56.7	
2393	25-May-1985	7-May-2001	19-Apr-2002	19-Apr-2002	9-Jan-2008 ELECTIVE	70.7	
2394	14-Jun-1969	6-Dec-1989	6-Dec-1989	6-Dec-1992	6-Dec-1999 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2395	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	6-Mar-2024				
2396	12-Jan-2013	22-Sep-2031	22-Sep-2031				
2397	29-Mar-1997	26-Sep-2014	26-Sep-2014	10-Dec-2015	9-Apr-2020 ELECTIVE	68.0	
2398	3-Apr-1991	8-Apr-2010	8-Apr-2010	10-Apr-2020			
2399	31-Jul-1994	31-Jul-2009	31-Jul-2009	31-Jul-2009	21-Apr-2018 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2400	17-Oct-1981	23-Oct-1992	23-Oct-1992	23-Oct-1992	23-Oct-1997 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2401	23-Mar-1985	27-Aug-1999	23-Mar-1995	11-Apr-1995	27-Aug-1999 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2402	9-May-1970	7-May-1981	8-May-1980		7-May-1981 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2403	15-Mar-1984	16-Mar-1999	16-Mar-1999	16-Mar-1999	11-Jul-2002 ELECTIVE	70.5	
2404	7-Dec-2018	28-Apr-2033	7-Dec-2028				
2405	9-Nov-1995	9-Nov-2010	9-Nov-2010	9-Nov-2010	18-Jun-2019 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2406	12-Jan-1995	1-May-2013	1-May-2013	1-May-2013			
2407	17-Aug-2014	25-Mar-2033	25-Mar-2033				
2408	3-Aug-1995	3-Aug-2010	3-Aug-2010		23-Sep-2007 DEATH (RPC)	66.4	
2409	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	15-Jun-2034				
2410	14-Aug-1992	14-Aug-2007	14-Aug-2007	15-Aug-2007	18-Jun-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2411	13-Oct-1994	24-Oct-2010	24-Oct-2010		8-Nov-2010 ELECTIVE	64.0	
2412	23-Oct-1975	8-Oct-1993	8-Oct-1993	8-Oct-1993	8-Oct-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2413	8-Mar-1975	8-Mar-1990	17-Dec-1989		25-Mar-1980 DEATH (RPC)	60.3	
2414	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	8-Apr-2020	9-Apr-2020			
2415	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	28-Feb-2003 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.6	
2416	10-Feb-1968	22-Nov-1989	22-Nov-1989		25-May-1985 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.5	
2417	14-May-2011	14-May-2026	29-Apr-2022				
2418	22-Nov-1963	22-Nov-1978	22-Nov-1978	23-Nov-1978	13-Sep-1986 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2419	14-May-2011	15-Oct-2031	15-Oct-2031				
2420	2-Dec-1964	2-Dec-1979	2-Dec-1979	10-Dec-1979	6-Apr-1985 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2421	23-Jan-1996	23-Dec-2007	23-Jan-2006		9-Aug-2000 RESIGNATION (RPC)	67.6	
2422	29-Mar-1981	27-May-2000	25-Jul-2004	11-Apr-2006	25-Jul-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2423	26-Feb-1983	26-Feb-1993	26-Feb-1993	26-Feb-1993	10-Jul-1996 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2424	28-Jul-1973	28-Jul-1988	28-Jul-1988		15-May-1997 COMPULSORY	75.0	
2425	14-Sep-2013	9-Nov-2026	14-Sep-2023		8-Aug-2017 RESIGNATION (RPC)	65.7	
2426	10-Feb-1961	5-Mar-1968			24-Aug-1967 DISABILITY	74.5	
2427	10-Dec-1976	1-Oct-1997	1-Oct-1997		27-Sep-1982 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	50.0	
2428	9-Feb-2006	9-Feb-2021	18-Feb-2016				
2429	1-Jun-1989	7-Apr-2010	7-Apr-2010	16-Apr-2010	21-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE	62.2	
2430	10-Dec-1965	10-Dec-1980			4-Jul-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.5	
2431	14-May-1994	14-May-2009	14-May-2009	14-May-2009	9-Dec-2014 ELECTIVE	71.1	

2432	16-May-2019	16-Apr-2033	16-May-2029				
2433	11-Aug-2018	11-Aug-2033	11-Aug-2033				
2434	9-Feb-2019	24-Mar-2036	24-Mar-2036				
2435	21-Jun-2001	21-Jun-2016	21-Jun-2016	21-Jun-2016			
2436	5-Feb-2004	5-Feb-2019	5-Feb-2019	5-Feb-2019			
2437	18-Dec-2009	18-Dec-2024	18-Dec-2024				
2438	10-May-2008	11-May-2023	11-May-2023				
2439	18-Sep-1993	18-Sep-2008	18-Sep-2008	18-Sep-2008	2-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY		75.0
2440	21-Feb-1976	27-Mar-1996	27-Mar-1996	10-Apr-1996	24-Jul-1997 ELECTIVE		66.3
2441	25-Feb-1999	25-Feb-2014	13-Nov-2013	13-Nov-2013	13-Nov-2018 COMPULSORY		75.0
2442	2-Jan-1997	30-Jul-2012	30-Jul-2012	8-Aug-2012	8-Jan-2019 ELECTIVE		70.9
2443	30-Jun-1991	20-Apr-2007	20-Apr-2007	9-Oct-2013	7-Feb-2018 COMPULSORY		75.0
2444	25-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2022	1-Oct-2020				
2445	19-May-1950	19-May-1965	19-May-1965		9-Oct-1964 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		67.2
2446	6-Nov-2009	6-Nov-2024	6-Nov-2024				
2447	5-Feb-2004	28-Oct-2020	28-Oct-2020		20-Jul-2019 Early Retirement		62.0
2448	31-Jul-1994	31-Jul-2009	7-Jan-2006	7-Jan-2006	7-Jan-2011 COMPULSORY		75.0
2449	18-Dec-1997	18-Dec-2012	18-Dec-2012		7-Oct-2007 DISABILITY		60.2
2450	19-Jan-1992	6-Apr-2009	6-Apr-2009	6-Apr-2009	6-Apr-2019 COMPULSORY		72.8
2451	22-Oct-2017	22-Oct-2032	31-May-2028				
2452	5-Jun-2005	4-Jun-2020	4-Jun-2020	4-Jun-2020			
2453	17-Mar-1965	16-Mar-1980	16-Mar-1980	19-Mar-1980	11-Mar-1982 ELECTIVE		71.5
2454	16-Sep-2017	8-Mar-2033	8-Mar-2033				
2455	11-Oct-1980	12-Sep-2000	12-Sep-2000		21-Apr-1991 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		55.6
2456	19-Jun-1985	5-Feb-2002	24-Sep-2003	24-Sep-2003	10-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE		73.2
2457	7-Mar-1940	6-Jan-1965	6-Jan-1965		4-Sep-1960 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		60.7
2458	10-Mar-2012	12-Mar-2032	12-Mar-2032				
2459	3-Nov-1995	6-Apr-2014	6-Apr-2014	11-Apr-2014	10-Dec-2020 ELECTIVE		68.3
2460	3-Aug-1995	3-Aug-2010	3-Aug-2010	3-Aug-2010	8-Aug-2014 ELECTIVE		71.4
2461	27-Jan-2017	20-Nov-2033	20-Nov-2033				
2462	27-Aug-2005	27-Aug-2020	18-Jan-2020	18-Jan-2020			
2463	7-Aug-2009	7-Aug-2024	7-Aug-2024				
2464	17-Oct-1994	29-Sep-2010	29-Sep-2010	23-Aug-2020			
2465	9-Apr-1981	8-Apr-1996	19-Jul-1991	19-Jul-1991	19-Jul-1996 COMPULSORY		75.0
2466	7-May-1994	3-Aug-2013	3-Aug-2013	4-Aug-2013			
2467	9-May-2020	10-May-2035	10-May-2035				
2468	1-Apr-1992	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	2-Apr-2007	20-Nov-2016 COMPULSORY		75.0
2469	21-Jul-1990	27-Dec-1999			1-Feb-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		70.1
2470	13-Jun-1968	25-Sep-1991	25-Sep-1991	25-Sep-1991	10-Apr-1997 ELECTIVE		70.5
2471	15-Jun-2019	15-Jun-2034	19-Jul-2033				
2472	16-Sep-2017	21-Aug-2035	21-Aug-2035				
2473	9-Sep-1988	9-Sep-2003	23-Sep-1999	9-Dec-1999	23-Sep-2004 COMPULSORY		75.0
2474	16-Dec-1962	20-Dec-1970	20-Dec-1972		9-Oct-1968 DISABILITY		67.8
2475	10-Dec-1975	10-Dec-1990	10-Dec-1990		16-Jan-1988 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		62.2
2476	15-Aug-1996	11-May-2012	11-May-2012	11-Mar-2018			
2477	23-May-1970	17-Apr-1982	22-May-1980	8-Jun-1980	17-Apr-1982 COMPULSORY		75.0
2478	25-Jun-1977	17-Apr-1995	17-Apr-1995		25-Apr-1994 DISABILITY		64.0
2479	25-Feb-1999	25-Feb-2014	12-Apr-2013	11-Dec-2013	12-Apr-2018 COMPULSORY		75.0
2480	4-Sep-1976	23-Dec-1993	23-Dec-1993	23-Dec-1993	23-Dec-2003 COMPULSORY		75.0
2481	8-Jan-2021	12-Mar-2037	12-Mar-2037				
2482	2-May-2009	1-May-2024	1-May-2024				
2483	9-Mar-2018	9-Mar-2033	27-Apr-2031				
2484	17-Aug-2014	17-Aug-2029	17-Aug-2029				
2485	2-Mar-2007	4-Mar-2025	4-Mar-2025				
2486	25-Feb-1987	30-Aug-2005	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	11-Apr-2017 COMPULSORY		73.1
2487	26-Sep-2010	26-Sep-2025	3-Aug-2022				
2488	10-Mar-2012	11-Mar-2027	11-Mar-2027				
2489	8-Oct-1999	19-Jul-2017	19-Jul-2017	19-Jul-2017			
2490	9-Jan-2014	9-Jan-2029	14-May-2027				
2491	23-Oct-1975	26-Feb-1999	22-Mar-2001	10-Dec-2002	26-May-2004 ELECTIVE		68.2
2492	5-Feb-2004	5-Feb-2019	5-Feb-2019				
2493	21-Mar-2009	20-Mar-2024	25-Feb-2020		11-May-2019 Early Retirement		69.2
2494	19-Sep-1981	19-Sep-1996			8-Jan-1998 ELECTIVE		71.5
2495	12-Jan-2013	12-Jan-2028	5-Mar-2023				
2496	1-Aug-2010	1-Aug-2025	1-Aug-2025				
2497	12-Jan-1990	19-Jun-2005	23-Nov-2005		9-Mar-2000 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		59.3
2498	19-Aug-2017	7-Jun-2034	7-Jun-2034				
2499	23-Feb-2006	31-Mar-2022	31-Mar-2022				
2500	29-Dec-1979	20-Dec-1998	20-Dec-1998	20-Dec-1998	11-Apr-1999 ELECTIVE		65.3
2501	9-Oct-1978	30-Nov-1996	30-Nov-1996	30-Nov-1996	11-Mar-2006 ELECTIVE		74.3
2502	12-Jun-2020	11-Jul-2036	11-Jul-2036				
2503	9-Jun-1961	11-Apr-1977	11-Apr-1977	11-Apr-1979	8-Aug-1979 ELECTIVE		67.3
2504	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	7-Nov-2023		16-Dec-2018 Early Retirement		62.3
2505	14-Aug-1992	9-Feb-2010	9-Feb-2010	11-Mar-2018			
2506	29-Sep-1984	29-Sep-1999	29-Sep-1999	29-Sep-1999	16-Jul-2007 COMPULSORY		75.0
2507	12-Jan-1974	4-Mar-1987	12-Jan-1984		31-Oct-1981 DISABILITY		69.7
2508	3-Jul-2019	2-Apr-2036	2-Apr-2036				
2509	8-Feb-1964	8-Jul-1983	8-Jul-1983	8-Jul-1983	8-Jul-1993 COMPULSORY		75.0
2510	5-May-1973	20-May-1993	20-May-1993	20-May-1993	9-Nov-1998 ELECTIVE		70.5
2511	18-Feb-2000	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015	18-Feb-2015			
2512	17-Mar-2000	24-Oct-2016	24-Oct-2016	24-Apr-2017	31-Oct-2020 ELECTIVE		67.4
2513	24-Sep-1986	8-Jan-2002	23-Apr-2002	23-Apr-2002	22-Apr-2012 COMPULSORY		75.0
2514	13-Feb-2004	13-Feb-2019	7-Oct-2017	11-Apr-2019			
2515	30-Dec-1951	30-Dec-1966	30-Dec-1966		27-Apr-1973 COMPULSORY		75.0

2516	12-Jan-1990	12-Jan-2005	12-Jan-2005		23-Feb-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	53.2
2517	18-Jul-2003	18-Jul-2018	18-Jul-2018	28-Jul-2018		
2518	22-Dec-1973	30-Apr-1994	30-Apr-1994	9-Nov-1994	9-Feb-1995 ELECTIVE	65.8
2519	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	3-Jul-2019	10-Jul-2019		
2520	7-Mar-1981	24-Dec-1997	24-Dec-1997	24-Dec-1997	24-Dec-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2521	11-Jun-2011	2-Jul-2028	2-Jul-2028			
2522	14-Jun-1995	4-Jun-2012	4-Jun-2012	4-Jun-2012	9-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE	64.5
2523	18-Mar-1980	19-Mar-1995	19-Mar-1995		27-Jan-2001 COMPULSORY	75.0
2524	15-Jun-2019	26-Jul-2032	15-Jun-2029			
2525	8-Feb-1964	8-Feb-1979	22-Mar-1976		27-Aug-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.4
2526	17-Nov-1982	21-Nov-1999	24-Nov-2001	24-Nov-2001	24-Nov-2011 COMPULSORY	75.0
2527	5-Sep-1993	7-Jul-2011	7-Jul-2011			
2528	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	20-Jul-2014	20-Jul-2014	28-Mar-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.7
2529	8-Dec-1978	8-Dec-1993	8-Dec-1993	8-Dec-1993	9-Aug-2000 ELECTIVE	72.4
2530	8-Nov-1992	3-Jan-2009	3-Jan-2009	3-Jan-2009	9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE	71.1
2531	19-May-1973	16-Dec-1992			9-Oct-2002 ELECTIVE	74.8
2532	23-May-1996	5-Aug-2015	5-Aug-2015		10-Apr-2015 Early Retirement	60.5
2533	23-Sep-1942	28-Nov-1967	28-Nov-1967		23-Jun-1956 DISABILITY	53.6
2534	23-Dec-2006	21-Sep-2022	21-Sep-2022			
2535	5-Jun-2005	4-Jun-2020	6-Sep-2016	8-Oct-2016		
2536	6-Jul-1991	6-Jul-2006	6-Jul-2006		16-Nov-2002 DISABILITY	66.1
2537	7-Nov-2008	14-Nov-2022	7-Nov-2018	7-Nov-2018		
2538	9-Feb-1967	23-Jul-1987	23-Jul-1987	24-Jul-1987	23-Jul-1997 COMPULSORY	75.0
2539	10-Feb-2013	15-Jul-2026	10-Feb-2023			
2540	1-Jun-2018	16-Oct-2035	16-Oct-2035			
2541	12-Jan-1986	28-Jul-2006	28-Jul-2006			
2542	2-Mar-2007	2-Aug-2025	2-Aug-2025			
2543	4-Dec-1975	10-Feb-1993	10-Feb-1993	10-Feb-1993	8-Feb-1995 ELECTIVE	67.0
2544	14-Aug-1992	7-Mar-2010	7-Mar-2010	11-Apr-2010	10-Apr-2020 COMPULSORY	72.5
2545	18-Jan-2003	18-Jan-2018	26-Apr-2015	26-Apr-2015	25-Apr-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
2546	29-Mar-1981	28-Mar-1996	21-Sep-1995	21-Sep-1995	21-Sep-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2547	10-Apr-1976	11-Apr-1991	11-Apr-1991	9-Jun-1991	13-Dec-1997 COMPULSORY	75.0
2548	26-Sep-1981	10-Oct-1998	10-Oct-1998	12-Oct-1998	18-Feb-2006 ELECTIVE	72.4
2549	26-May-1977	26-Feb-1999	2-Oct-2002		9-Feb-2000 ELECTIVE	62.4
2550	8-Oct-1971	8-Oct-1986	8-Oct-1986	12-Apr-1993	5-Dec-1994 COMPULSORY	75.0
2551	23-Mar-1958	4-Oct-1971	22-Mar-1968		1-Nov-1963 DISABILITY	67.1
2552	26-Dec-1976	26-Dec-1991	26-Dec-1991	26-Dec-1991	24-May-1997 COMPULSORY	75.0
2553	1-Nov-1975	31-Dec-1993	31-Dec-1993	31-Dec-1993	8-Feb-1996 ELECTIVE	67.1
2554	16-Jun-1973	16-Jun-1988	16-Jun-1988	16-Jun-1988	9-Apr-1992 ELECTIVE	70.3
2555	24-Dec-1989	21-Jul-2006	24-Mar-2007	9-Aug-2009	16-Jul-2014 ELECTIVE	71.4
2556	28-May-1955	18-Feb-1963	28-May-1965		24-Jun-1967 DISABILITY	74.3
2557	17-Feb-2018	24-Jul-2031	17-Feb-2028			
2558	26-Mar-2003	26-Mar-2018	26-Mar-2018	10-Apr-2018		
2559	12-Feb-1977	26-Feb-1999	2-Oct-1999	8-Oct-1999	2-Oct-2009 COMPULSORY	75.0
2560	17-Aug-2014	17-Aug-2029	17-Aug-2029			
2561	2-Feb-1958	2-Feb-1973	2-Feb-1973		22-Oct-1961 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	54.4
2562	11-Jun-2011	11-Jun-2026	8-Jun-2023			
2563	9-Nov-1995	9-Nov-2010	9-Nov-2010	9-Nov-2010	8-Oct-2017 ELECTIVE	73.1
2564	25-Mar-2007	8-Feb-2022	25-Mar-2017	26-Mar-2017		
2565	8-Oct-1989	8-Oct-2004	19-Nov-2002	9-Jul-2004	19-Nov-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2566	8-Jul-2015	8-Jul-2030	8-Jul-2030			
2567	30-Jun-1965	30-Jun-1980	30-Jun-1980	29-Sep-1980	4-Apr-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
2568	19-Jun-1968	19-Jun-1983	8-Jul-1979	8-Oct-1979	8-Jul-1984 COMPULSORY	75.0
2569	30-Dec-1967	30-Dec-1982	30-Dec-1982	10-Dec-1983	6-Jan-1991 COMPULSORY	75.0
2570	10-Apr-1944	21-Oct-1966	21-Oct-1966		8-Nov-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.0
2571	7-Oct-1987	6-Nov-2004	7-Dec-2006	10-Dec-2006	12-May-2011 ELECTIVE	69.4
2572	25-Mar-1972	26-Aug-1999	26-Aug-1999		4-Dec-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	59.3
2573	13-Jul-1995	13-Jul-2010	13-Jul-2010	13-Jul-2010	8-Jan-2015 ELECTIVE	72.3
2574	4-Jun-1998	4-Jun-2013	4-Jun-2013		9-Oct-2010 Early Retirement	63.2
2575	7-Nov-2008	7-Nov-2023	3-Feb-2022		10-Dec-2020 Early Retirement	68.9
2576	8-Jul-1990	14-Jan-2007	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	8-Feb-2017 ELECTIVE	73.6
2577	16-May-2015	11-Aug-2031	11-Aug-2031			
2578	28-Sep-2000	23-Feb-2018	23-Feb-2018	23-Feb-2018		
2579	10-Jun-2007	23-Nov-2022	23-Nov-2022			
2580	26-Jun-1963	26-Jun-1978	26-Jun-1978		9-Feb-1976 DISABILITY	65.0
2581	22-Aug-2009	6-Jun-2028	6-Jun-2028			
2582	15-Aug-2004	19-Dec-2021	19-Dec-2021			
2583	23-Mar-1958	23-Mar-1973	18-Dec-1970	12-May-1973	8-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE	73.3
2584	28-Jan-2012	20-Jul-2028	20-Jul-2028			
2585	10-Jul-1993	10-Jul-2008	10-Jul-2008		10-Jan-2007 Early Retirement	65.1
2586	12-Aug-1999	11-Nov-2016	11-Nov-2016	11-Nov-2016		
2587	22-Aug-2009	22-Aug-2024	20-Jun-2023			
2588	28-May-1977	27-May-1992	27-May-1992	27-May-1992	9-Jun-1999 COMPULSORY	75.0
2589	6-Jun-2002	6-Jun-2017	6-Jun-2017	6-Jun-2017		
2590	28-Apr-2018	28-Apr-2033	28-Apr-2033			
2591	11-Jun-2011	11-Jun-2026	11-Jun-2026			
2592	28-Aug-2009	28-Aug-2024	28-Aug-2024			
2593	9-Nov-1959	9-Nov-1974	9-Nov-1974		12-Jun-1971 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	65.4
2594	22-Nov-1963	19-Jun-1974	22-Nov-1973		19-Jun-1974 COMPULSORY	75.0
2595	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	11-Apr-1998 ELECTIVE	72.5
2596	31-Mar-1979	7-Nov-1994	7-Nov-1994	7-Nov-1994	7-Nov-2004 COMPULSORY	75.0
2597	27-Jul-1984	13-Nov-2009	13-Nov-2009		24-Nov-1994 DISABILITY	50.0
2598	24-Jun-1967	18-Nov-1989	18-Nov-1989	18-Nov-1989	4-Jan-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.1
2599	12-Feb-2013	22-Jan-2031	22-Jan-2031			

2600	23-Dec-2006	11-May-2020	23-Dec-2016			20-Dec-2015 DISABILITY	70.6
2601	10-Jun-1978	10-Jun-1993	10-Jun-1993			12-May-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2602	29-Sep-1991	29-Sep-2006	29-Sep-2006	29-Sep-2006		9-Dec-2014 ELECTIVE	74.4
2603	5-Oct-2019	5-Oct-2034	5-Oct-2034				
2604	29-Jun-1995	29-Jun-2010	29-Jun-2010	29-Jun-2010		9-Nov-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
2605	15-Oct-1983	15-Oct-1998	6-Dec-1997	6-Dec-1997		6-Dec-2002 COMPULSORY	75.0
2606	30-Sep-1995	30-Sep-2010	3-Jun-2009	3-Jun-2009		3-Jun-2014 COMPULSORY	75.0
2607	11-Dec-1988	11-Dec-2003	23-Nov-2002			13-Jul-1992 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	59.6
2608	6-Sep-2003	14-Jan-2020	14-Jan-2020	14-Jan-2020			
2609	16-Jun-1973	15-Feb-1998	15-Feb-1998	15-Feb-1998		15-Feb-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
2610	7-Oct-1984	28-Nov-2002	18-Jan-2006	18-Jan-2006		9-Oct-2013 ELECTIVE	72.7
2611	5-Sep-1981	25-Jun-1987	5-Sep-1991			8-Mar-1986 DISABILITY	68.7
2612	27-Dec-1980	27-Dec-1995	27-Dec-1995			26-Sep-1992 DISABILITY	64.1
2613	1-Nov-1975	12-Jul-1996	12-Jul-1996			9-Dec-1996 ELECTIVE	65.4
2614	9-Feb-1995	1-Feb-2013	1-Feb-2013	1-Feb-2013			
2615	21-Oct-1972	10-Jun-1990	10-Jun-1990	10-Jun-1990		11-Aug-1994 ELECTIVE	69.2
2616	20-Jul-1974	20-Jul-1989	20-Jul-1989	21-Jul-1989		8-Sep-1994 ELECTIVE	74.3
2617	22-Jun-1990	29-Jul-2007	29-Jul-2007	29-Jul-2007		9-Oct-2009 ELECTIVE	65.1
2618	7-May-1994	11-Jul-2011	11-Jul-2011	13-Jul-2011		26-Nov-2017 ELECTIVE	69.2
2619	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	5-Feb-2022				
2620	31-Jan-1988	19-Mar-2006	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007		8-Feb-2016 ELECTIVE	71.8
2621	4-Aug-1966	4-Aug-1981	4-Aug-1981	4-Aug-1981		19-Feb-1991 COMPULSORY	75.0
2622	26-Sep-2003	29-Dec-2018	29-Dec-2018			7-May-2018 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.1
2623	24-Sep-2016	6-Jan-2029	24-Sep-2026				
2624	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	10-Oct-2018	10-Oct-2018		8-Jun-2020 DISABILITY	71.7
2625	12-Jul-2020	12-Jul-2035	3-Jun-2034				
2626	24-Jun-1967	25-Aug-1983	25-Aug-1983	25-Aug-1983		25-Aug-1993 COMPULSORY	75.0
2627	27-Oct-1988	27-Oct-2003	27-Oct-2003	27-Oct-2003		9-Feb-2006 ELECTIVE	67.8
2628	13-Oct-1985	12-Mar-2002	12-Mar-2002			8-May-1995 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	58.2
2629	27-Oct-1976	27-Oct-1991	27-Oct-1991	27-Oct-1991		1-Dec-1998 COMPULSORY	75.0
2630	11-Oct-1975	11-Oct-1990	1-Mar-1988	1-Mar-1988		10-Dec-1992 ELECTIVE	74.8
2631	18-Jul-2019	22-Jul-2030	18-Jul-2029				
2632	29-Sep-2018	29-Sep-2033	29-Sep-2033				
2633	5-May-2002	20-Sep-2016	4-May-2012	4-May-2012		20-Sep-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
2634	11-Apr-1958	23-Jul-1965	10-Apr-1968			6-Nov-1966 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.3
2635	13-Oct-1994	19-Oct-2011	19-Oct-2011	7-Jan-2012		9-Dec-2014 ELECTIVE	66.1
2636	26-Sep-2010	26-Sep-2025	26-Sep-2025				
2637	27-Aug-2005	10-Oct-2021	10-Oct-2021				
2638	26-Feb-1998	3-Jul-2010	26-Feb-2008	26-Feb-2008		3-Jul-2010 COMPULSORY	75.0
2639	25-Mar-2007	24-Nov-2022	24-Nov-2022				
2640	8-Oct-1999	27-Apr-2016	27-Apr-2016	15-Jul-2018			
2641	29-Sep-2018	29-Sep-2033	10-Jan-2031				
2642	28-Apr-1950	3-Jul-1970	3-Jul-1970			23-Aug-1973 ELECTIVE	68.1
2643	27-Dec-1933	16-Nov-1960	16-Nov-1960			16-Nov-1970 COMPULSORY	75.0
2644	9-Jun-2001	9-Jun-2016	9-Jun-2016	9-Jun-2016		25-Mar-2019 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	70.3
2645	4-Jan-1964	4-Jan-1979	20-Feb-1976	11-Feb-1977		20-Feb-1981 COMPULSORY	75.0
2646	19-Oct-1991	21-Feb-2003				4-Apr-2006 ELECTIVE	74.8
2647	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	27-Sep-2024				
2648	31-May-1969	31-Jan-1989	31-Jan-1989	1-Feb-1989		9-Apr-1995 ELECTIVE	71.2
2649	9-Aug-2001	15-Dec-2019	15-Dec-2019				
2650	29-Mar-2018	29-Mar-2033	29-Mar-2033				
2651	10-Sep-2019	10-Sep-2034	18-May-2033				
2652	10-Feb-1961	4-Apr-1983	4-Apr-1983	8-Oct-1983		4-Apr-1993 COMPULSORY	75.0
2653	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	25-Mar-2022				
2654	21-Mar-2010	25-Aug-2025	25-Aug-2025				
2655	13-Mar-1986	3-Dec-2005	24-Mar-2007	25-May-2007		9-Sep-2012 ELECTIVE	67.0
2656	9-Jan-2014	9-Jan-2029	9-Jan-2029				
2657	30-Mar-1974	20-Sep-1987	20-Sep-1987			9-Dec-1989 ELECTIVE	72.2
2658	12-Jan-1986	12-Jan-2001	7-Sep-1996	7-Sep-1996		23-Sep-1997 DISABILITY	71.0
2659	19-Jul-2014	23-Feb-2031	23-Feb-2031				
2660	12-Jun-1997	12-Jun-2012	12-Jun-2012			8-Oct-2010 Early Retirement	68.1
2661	5-May-2002	15-Jun-2013	4-May-2012	10-Dec-2012		15-Jun-2013 COMPULSORY	75.0
2662	27-Apr-1957	10-Dec-1965	27-Apr-1967			10-Dec-1970 COMPULSORY	75.0
2663	3-Apr-1991	10-Jul-2011	10-Jul-2011	13-May-2013			
2664	21-Mar-2015	25-Jul-2032	25-Jul-2032				
2665	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	26-Sep-2023			27-Dec-2014 DISABILITY	61.1
2666	26-Oct-1963	3-Jan-1988	3-Jan-1988	3-Jan-1988		8-Jan-1993 ELECTIVE	70.0
2667	19-Sep-1998	14-Oct-2015	14-Oct-2015	14-Oct-2015			
2668	27-Mar-2014	19-Feb-2031	19-Feb-2031				
2669	4-May-2000	5-May-2015	5-May-2015			2-Nov-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
2670	14-May-2011	14-May-2026	3-Aug-2021				
2671	20-Nov-1976	20-Nov-1991	20-Nov-1991	20-Nov-1991		7-Oct-1993 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.6
2672	29-Mar-1981	3-Feb-1997	3-Feb-1997	11-Apr-1997		9-Jan-2007 ELECTIVE	74.9
2673	15-Nov-1996	6-Mar-2017	6-Mar-2017	7-Mar-2017			
2674	10-Dec-1982	10-Dec-1997	10-Dec-1997	10-Dec-1997		27-Feb-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
2675	9-Nov-1995	9-Nov-2010	9-Nov-2010			19-Nov-1995 DEATH (RPC)	54.1
2676	26-Nov-1959	26-Nov-1974	25-May-1974			25-May-1979 COMPULSORY	75.0
2677	29-Mar-1981	28-Mar-1996	26-Nov-1991	10-Dec-1991		24-Nov-1996 ELECTIVE	75.0
2678	30-Sep-1995	30-May-2012	30-May-2012			11-Apr-2009 Early Retirement	60.2
2679	15-May-1963	23-Dec-1976	23-Dec-1976	23-Apr-1981		23-Dec-1981 COMPULSORY	75.0
2680	9-Apr-1981	12-Nov-1999	16-Jun-2003			10-Apr-2000 ELECTIVE	61.8
2681	26-Mar-1983	26-Mar-1998	26-Mar-1998	26-Mar-1998		17-Nov-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2682	14-Jun-2014	3-May-2032	3-May-2032				
2683	29-Mar-1987	29-Mar-2002	10-May-1997	11-May-1997		10-May-2002 COMPULSORY	75.0

2684	31-Mar-1979	26-Feb-1999	23-Apr-1999	23-Apr-1999	23-Apr-2009	COMPULSORY	75.0
2685	23-Mar-1956	10-Jan-1975	10-Jan-1975	10-Jan-1977	10-Jan-1985	COMPULSORY	75.0
2686	8-Aug-2015	5-Apr-2031	5-Apr-2031				
2687	27-Sep-2015	7-Mar-2035	7-Mar-2035				
2688	13-May-1993	8-Dec-2009	8-Dec-2009		13-Feb-2008	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.6
2689	14-Jan-1999	14-Jan-2014	31-Dec-2013	31-Dec-2013	10-Mar-2018	ELECTIVE	74.2
2690	14-May-2011	20-Nov-2026	20-Nov-2026				
2691	21-Jul-1990	21-Jul-2005	26-Sep-2002	9-Sep-2006	26-Sep-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
2692	21-Aug-2005	23-Nov-2015	21-Aug-2015		24-Mar-2012	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.3
2693	1-Jan-1998	10-Jan-2013	10-Jan-2013	10-Jan-2013			
2694	12-Feb-1983	12-Feb-1998	12-Feb-1998		11-May-1998	ELECTIVE	69.6
2695	21-Mar-2003	4-Aug-2020	4-Aug-2020	4-Aug-2020			
2696	26-Jun-1997	12-Mar-2013	12-Mar-2013	12-Apr-2013			
2697	21-Mar-2015	7-Feb-2026	21-Mar-2025				
2698	9-Jul-1977	16-Aug-1998	16-Aug-1998	16-Aug-1998	11-Apr-2007	ELECTIVE	73.7
2699	30-Sep-2019	21-Jan-2036	21-Jan-2036				
2700	27-Sep-2015	27-Sep-2030	8-May-2027				
2701	30-Mar-1974	30-Mar-1989	24-Jan-1988		22-Nov-1984	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.8
2702	25-Jun-1998	18-Oct-2014	18-Oct-2014	10-Apr-2016			
2703	8-Sep-2002	20-Dec-2020	20-Dec-2020		11-Oct-2018	Early Retirement	59.5
2704	10-Dec-1976	27-Jul-1992	27-Jul-1992	28-Jul-1992	27-Jul-2002	COMPULSORY	75.0
2705	18-Sep-1993	1-Jun-2011	1-Jun-2011	19-Jan-2012			
2706	26-Aug-2017	7-Aug-2036	7-Aug-2036				
2707	12-Jan-1986	12-Jan-2001	6-Jul-1998	8-Oct-1998	6-Jul-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
2708	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	10-Jun-2022				
2709	14-Sep-2001	14-Sep-2016	18-Oct-2015	18-Oct-2015	18-Oct-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
2710	20-Sep-1986	26-Aug-2002	1-Aug-2003	1-Aug-2003	11-May-2013	ELECTIVE	74.8
2711	23-Mar-2013	22-Mar-2028	10-Jan-2025				
2712	5-Nov-1955	19-Jun-1982	19-Jun-1982	19-Jun-1982	8-Apr-1992	ELECTIVE	74.8
2713	11-Apr-1974	13-Aug-1991	13-Aug-1991	13-Aug-1991	8-Jun-1992	ELECTIVE	65.8
2714	1-Nov-1975	26-Feb-1999	22-Oct-2002	22-Oct-2002	22-Oct-2012	COMPULSORY	75.0
2715	30-Jun-1991	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	30-Jun-2006	26-Oct-2013	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	72.8
2716	15-Aug-1996	20-Apr-2014	20-Apr-2014				
2717	17-Aug-2000	17-Aug-2015	17-Aug-2015	9-Sep-2015	8-Sep-2016	ELECTIVE	70.4
2718	29-Jun-1968	12-Dec-1978	12-Dec-1978		8-Mar-1975	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.2
2719	14-Sep-2013	14-Sep-2028	14-Sep-2028				
2720	2-Mar-2007	26-Oct-2022	26-Oct-2022		10-Dec-2020	Early Retirement	62.5
2721	28-Mar-1996	29-Mar-2011	29-Mar-2011	29-Mar-2011	11-Aug-2016	ELECTIVE	71.0
2722	4-Jan-2004	4-Jan-2019	4-Jan-2019	8-Feb-2019			
2723	14-Jul-2012	14-Jul-2027	6-Feb-2023				
2724	10-Mar-2012	5-Jan-2029	5-Jan-2029				
2725	4-May-1986	4-May-2001	28-Dec-2000		27-Nov-1995	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	64.9
2726	11-Jun-2011	2-Aug-2022	11-Jun-2021				
2727	28-Jul-1965	28-Jul-1980	12-Oct-1979		20-Nov-1971	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.1
2728	6-Feb-1986	6-Feb-2001	6-Feb-2001		1-Feb-1992	DISABILITY	60.6
2729	20-Jan-2008	11-Apr-2025	11-Apr-2025				
2730	5-Jan-2002	5-Jan-2017	23-Nov-2014	26-Nov-2014	23-Nov-2019	COMPULSORY	75.0
2731	9-Mar-1996	10-Mar-2011	20-Feb-2007	20-Feb-2007	20-Feb-2012	COMPULSORY	75.0
2732	6-Nov-2009	28-Dec-2026	28-Dec-2026				
2733	28-Jan-2012	8-Apr-2027	8-Apr-2027				
2734	25-Mar-2000	11-Jun-2015	11-Jun-2015		17-Apr-2013	Early Retirement	62.6
2735	30-Sep-1978	31-Dec-1996	31-Dec-1996	31-Dec-1996	9-Jan-2002	ELECTIVE	70.0
2736	7-Jun-2003	7-Jun-2018	7-Jun-2018	9-Oct-2018			
2737	17-Mar-1996	18-Mar-2011	18-Mar-2011	11-Apr-2011	5-Dec-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
2738	13-May-1978	21-Jul-1993	21-Jul-1993	21-Jul-1993	21-Jul-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
2739	18-May-2013	17-May-2028	17-May-2028				
2740	27-Jan-2017	17-Aug-2031	27-Jan-2027				
2741	26-Aug-1973	25-Nov-1994	25-Nov-1994	25-Nov-1994	20-Oct-1999	ELECTIVE	69.9
2742	9-Mar-2018	19-Jul-2033	19-Jul-2033				
2743	14-May-1994	14-May-2009	14-May-2009		11-Jul-2009	ELECTIVE	69.5
2744	7-Mar-1996	29-Aug-2012	29-Aug-2012	9-Sep-2012			
2745	10-Aug-2019	30-Oct-2033	10-Aug-2029				
2746	13-Jan-1973	26-Feb-1999	25-Jul-2000		25-Jul-2010	COMPULSORY	75.0
2747	9-Jan-2010	9-Jan-2025	9-Jan-2025				
2748	15-Mar-1996	11-Nov-2011	11-Nov-2011	9-Dec-2016			
2749	21-Aug-1992	11-Jun-2012	2-Apr-2017		23-Aug-2003	DISABILITY	51.4
2750	28-Sep-1996	2-Jun-2016	2-Jun-2016	8-Oct-2017			
2751	8-Dec-1994	7-Nov-2009	8-Dec-2004		7-Nov-2009	COMPULSORY	75.0
2752	12-May-1993	11-May-2008	11-May-2008	11-May-2008	16-Dec-2015	COMPULSORY	75.0
2753	10-Feb-2013	10-Feb-2028	10-Feb-2028				
2754	2-Dec-1949	20-Dec-1966	20-Dec-1966		8-Nov-1976	ELECTIVE	74.9
2755	19-Feb-2013	19-Feb-2028	30-Dec-2027				
2756	15-Jun-1989	29-Aug-2008	29-Aug-2008				
2757	15-Mar-1986	23-May-2003	30-Jul-2005	30-Jul-2005	30-Jul-2015	COMPULSORY	75.0
2758	21-May-2010	21-May-2025	22-Sep-2021				
2759	13-Nov-1982	27-May-1999	8-Dec-2000		9-Jun-1999	ELECTIVE	63.5
2760	24-Jul-1974	21-Jun-1993	21-Jun-1993	21-Jun-1993	12-Apr-2002	ELECTIVE	73.8
2761	28-Aug-1976	7-Oct-1998	7-Oct-1998	7-Oct-1998	7-Oct-2008	COMPULSORY	75.0
2762	4-Nov-1983	15-May-2002	22-Nov-2005	22-Nov-2005	22-Nov-2015	COMPULSORY	75.0
2763	14-Jul-2012	14-Jul-2027	16-Mar-2025				
2764	11-Oct-1975	28-Jul-1995	28-Jul-1995	28-Jul-1995	12-May-1999	ELECTIVE	68.8
2765	12-Jun-1997	9-Mar-2013	9-Mar-2013	9-Mar-2013	9-Apr-2016	ELECTIVE	67.3
2766	26-Aug-1973	26-Aug-1988	26-Aug-1988		2-Jan-1988	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	68.8
2767	13-Jul-2001	13-Jul-2016	13-Jul-2016	15-Jul-2016			

2768	9-Nov-1995	27-Jul-2011	27-Jul-2011	9-Aug-2011	9-Nov-2017 ELECTIVE	70.6
2769	10-Jul-1999	21-Sep-2018	21-Sep-2018			
2770	28-Sep-1996	15-Dec-2012	15-Dec-2012	15-Dec-2012		
2771	11-May-1932	21-Sep-1953	21-Sep-1953		21-Sep-1963 COMPULSORY	75.0
2772	27-Mar-2014	22-Apr-2030	22-Apr-2030			
2773	28-Mar-1996	29-Mar-2011	29-Mar-2011	29-Mar-2011	9-Apr-2016 ELECTIVE	73.5
2774	5-Oct-2019	5-Oct-2034	5-Oct-2034			
2775	14-Aug-1942	7-Jul-1957	14-Aug-1952		9-Jun-1961 Appointed for Life	78.9
2776	12-Jan-1986	22-Apr-2001	30-Jul-2001	30-Jul-2001	30-Jul-2011 COMPULSORY	75.0
2777	15-Feb-1968	10-Dec-1982	10-Dec-1982	10-Dec-1982	10-Dec-1987 COMPULSORY	75.0
2778	26-Aug-2017	26-Aug-2032	11-Jul-2030			
2779	9-Sep-1972	10-Nov-1987	9-Aug-1988		10-Aug-1978 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.7
2780	27-Sep-2009	27-Sep-2024	29-Oct-2023			
2781	22-Jan-1956	18-Feb-1966	22-Jan-1966		18-Feb-1966 COMPULSORY	75.0
2782	13-Mar-1986	13-Mar-2001	27-Apr-2000	10-Dec-2002	28-Apr-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
2783	18-May-2013	13-Dec-2029	13-Dec-2029			
2784	8-May-1958	7-Feb-1968			11-Apr-1967 DISABILITY	74.2
2785	9-Jun-1991	9-Jun-2006	10-Feb-2002	10-Feb-2002	10-Feb-2007 COMPULSORY	75.0
2786	26-Mar-1983	29-Oct-2003	24-Mar-2007	24-Mar-2007	9-Aug-2009 ELECTIVE	65.2
2787	29-Mar-2018	29-Mar-2033	13-Nov-2029			
2788	28-May-1977	2-Aug-1995	2-Aug-1995	10-Dec-1995	2-Aug-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0
2789	9-Sep-1957	8-Aug-1975	8-Aug-1975	11-May-1977	9-Mar-1984 ELECTIVE	73.6
2790	28-Apr-1950	28-Apr-1965	27-May-1961		10-Dec-1965 ELECTIVE	74.5
2791	14-Aug-1992	30-Jan-2009	30-Jan-2009		17-Jul-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
2792	8-Mar-1992	4-Jun-2011	4-Jun-2011	4-Jun-2011	10-Dec-2012 ELECTIVE	62.3
2793	5-May-2002	3-Nov-2011			3-Nov-2011 COMPULSORY	75.0
2794	30-Mar-1963	22-Jan-1988	22-Jan-1988	11-Apr-1991	22-Jan-1998 COMPULSORY	75.0
2795	24-Sep-2016	24-Sep-2031	24-Sep-2031			
2796	11-Dec-1988	7-Oct-2002			9-Oct-2004 ELECTIVE	67.0
2797	10-Jun-2007	10-Jun-2022	26-Jan-2022			
2798	8-Nov-1990	26-Dec-2005	11-Feb-2006	11-Feb-2006	22-Mar-2010 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.1
2799	30-Mar-1975	30-Mar-1990	30-Mar-1990		7-Oct-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	66.0
2800	1-Jan-1988	1-Nov-2000	1-Jan-1998	1-Jan-1998	1-Nov-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2801	19-Aug-2018	19-Aug-2033	19-Aug-2033			
2802	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-2002	10-Dec-2002	10-Dec-2002	9-Jan-2010 ELECTIVE	73.8
2803	7-Oct-1984	14-Nov-2006	14-Nov-2006		23-Feb-1995 DISABILITY	53.3
2804	7-Aug-1982	2-Nov-2000	2-Nov-2000		19-Aug-1993 DISABILITY	57.8
2805	27-Oct-1973	17-Apr-1993	17-Apr-1993	17-Apr-1994	17-Apr-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
2806	6-Dec-1963	6-Dec-1978	6-Dec-1978	6-Dec-1978	29-Apr-1986 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.4
2807	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	18-Jan-1998	18-Jan-1998	7-Jan-2000 ELECTIVE	72.0
2808	4-Aug-2007	19-Mar-2024	19-Mar-2024			
2809	21-May-2010	23-Sep-2025	23-Sep-2025		20-Dec-2020 Early Retirement	59.9
2810	11-Dec-1988	2-Dec-2007	2-Dec-2007	9-Apr-2008	9-Aug-2012 ELECTIVE	65.7
2811	31-May-1979	31-May-1994	31-May-1994	31-May-1994	11-Apr-1995 ELECTIVE	67.4
2812	2-Mar-2007	2-Mar-2022	25-Feb-2022			
2813	26-Oct-1983	26-Oct-1998	26-Oct-1998	10-Dec-1998	9-Aug-2004 ELECTIVE	71.7
2814	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2035	31-Oct-2030			
2815	16-Sep-1945	17-Apr-1969	17-Apr-1969	9-Nov-1976	8-Apr-1977 ELECTIVE	73.0
2816	2-Jan-1958	27-Aug-1962			10-Dec-1965 DISABILITY	73.3
2817	11-Jun-2011	14-Oct-2024	11-Jun-2021			
2818	5-Dec-1997	10-May-2014	10-May-2014	10-Apr-2016		
2819	9-Jun-1979	28-Aug-1995	28-Aug-1995	28-Aug-1995	9-Sep-2001 ELECTIVE	71.0
2820	11-Apr-1974	31-Aug-1997	31-Aug-1997		17-Jul-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.9
2821	3-Nov-1995	3-Nov-2010	9-Sep-2006	9-Sep-2006	9-Sep-2011 COMPULSORY	75.0
2822	2-Jul-2017	2-Jul-2032	21-Sep-2031			
2823	18-May-2013	8-Apr-2025	18-May-2023			
2824	19-Jul-2014	19-Jul-2029	19-Jul-2029			
2825	17-Jul-1976	17-Jul-1991	17-Jul-1991	17-Jul-1991	15-Feb-1996 ELECTIVE	73.2
2826	25-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2022	3-Jun-2019		9-Jan-2018 Early Retirement	68.6
2827	6-Jun-2015	16-Jul-2032	16-Jul-2032			
2828	20-Jun-1962	1-Jan-1978	1-Jan-1978		12-Oct-1975 DISABILITY	62.8
2829	21-May-1998	30-Sep-2014	30-Sep-2014	9-Oct-2014	12-Jul-2020 ELECTIVE	69.4
2830	4-Feb-1988	29-Jun-2004	22-Nov-2005		22-Nov-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
2831	25-Feb-1999	20-Feb-2015	20-Feb-2015	20-Feb-2015		
2832	11-Dec-2020	18-Aug-2032	11-Dec-2030			
2833	9-Dec-1979	12-Oct-1996	12-Oct-1996	12-Oct-1996	9-Aug-1997 ELECTIVE	65.8
2834	3-Sep-1987	10-Dec-2007	10-Dec-2007	10-Apr-2008	9-Dec-2013 ELECTIVE	65.7
2835	10-Jun-2007	20-Oct-2023	20-Oct-2023			
2836	12-Dec-1982	12-Dec-1997	12-Dec-1997	12-Jan-1998	30-Jun-2006 COMPULSORY	75.0
2837	12-Jun-2020	1-Jul-2037	1-Jul-2037			
2838	28-Aug-2020	28-Aug-2035	29-Oct-2033			
2839	11-Jun-2008	14-Aug-2023	14-Aug-2023			
2840	10-Apr-1987	10-Apr-2002	10-Apr-2002	11-Apr-2002	7-Nov-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
2841	6-Feb-1971	21-Jul-1987	21-Jul-1987		8-Sep-1984 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.1
2842	8-Sep-2012	8-Sep-2027	8-Sep-2027			
2843	11-Aug-2017	11-Aug-2032	11-Aug-2032			
2844	6-Nov-2009	6-Nov-2024	11-Dec-2023			
2845	12-Jan-2013	12-Jan-2028	12-Jan-2028			
2846	9-May-2020	31-Jul-2037	31-Jul-2037			
2847	20-Jun-2020	20-Jun-2035	20-Jun-2035			
2848	21-Sep-2014	21-Sep-2029	15-Aug-2026			
2849	21-Mar-1959	2-Oct-1969	2-Oct-1969		3-Oct-1962 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	63.0
2850	9-Jun-1991	18-Sep-2009	18-Sep-2009	18-Sep-2009	8-Sep-2015 ELECTIVE	67.7
2851	25-Mar-1972	15-Jul-1995	15-Jul-1995	15-Jul-1995	15-Jul-2005 COMPULSORY	75.0

2852	28-Sep-1996	10-Sep-2013	10-Sep-2013	10-Sep-2013	9-Sep-2019 ELECTIVE	69.0
2853	29-Mar-1987	29-Mar-2002	29-Mar-2002	29-Mar-2002	23-Oct-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
2854	6-Jan-2019	6-Jan-2034	7-Apr-2030			
2855	31-Aug-1972	31-Aug-1987	29-Mar-1987	20-Apr-1987	28-Mar-1992 COMPULSORY	75.0
2856	17-Oct-1991	17-Oct-2006	17-Oct-2006		13-Dec-2004 Early Retirement	63.2
2857	22-Sep-2017	22-Sep-2032	5-Aug-2031			
2858	23-Dec-2006	23-Dec-2021	16-Oct-2018	9-Dec-2018		
2859	6-Sep-2003	10-May-2020	10-May-2020		10-May-2020 ELECTIVE	63.3
2860	24-Mar-2002	9-Oct-2020	9-Oct-2020			
2861	8-Sep-2002	23-Apr-2018	23-Apr-2018		26-Apr-2015 Early Retirement	61.4
2862	16-Jun-1965	4-May-1983	4-May-1983		12-Aug-1978 DISABILITY	60.3
2863	12-Aug-1964	22-Mar-1982	22-Mar-1982		24-Mar-1982 ELECTIVE	65.0
2864	18-Apr-1999	16-Jan-2017	16-Jan-2017	11-Apr-2017		
2865	18-May-2013	16-Jan-2030	16-Jan-2030			
2866	8-Oct-1989	8-Aug-2008	8-Aug-2008	8-Aug-2008	9-Feb-2010 ELECTIVE	62.7
2867	12-May-1993	18-Jul-2011	22-Sep-2014		15-Mar-2002 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	52.5
2868	7-Jan-1989	7-Jan-2004	11-Jun-2000		9-Feb-2005 ELECTIVE	74.7
2869	11-Mar-2015	11-Mar-2025				
2870	30-Jan-2005	30-Jan-2020	30-Jan-2020	30-Jan-2020		
2871	7-Jan-2012	24-Nov-2025	7-Jan-2022			
2872	5-Feb-2004	15-Dec-2019	15-Dec-2019		8-Jan-2020 ELECTIVE	64.2
2873	12-Apr-1977	11-Feb-1995	11-Feb-1995		10-Apr-1995 ELECTIVE	65.2
2874	21-May-1999	16-Aug-2016	16-Aug-2016	16-Aug-2016		
2875	28-Sep-2015	9-Mar-2032	9-Mar-2032			
2876	7-Mar-1993	6-Mar-2008	6-Mar-2008	9-Oct-2008	4-Jul-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
2877	25-Jul-1986	27-Mar-2003	27-Nov-2004	27-Nov-2004	8-Dec-2010 ELECTIVE	71.0
2878	27-Dec-1980	8-Mar-2002	16-May-2008		17-Jul-2002 ELECTIVE	59.2
2879	29-Dec-1977	3-Mar-1997	3-Mar-1997		10-Apr-2005 ELECTIVE	73.1
2880	10-Mar-2012	21-Sep-2026	11-Mar-2022			
2881	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	14-May-2029			
2882	31-Mar-1984	1-Apr-1999	8-Sep-1996	8-Sep-1996	14-Jul-2001 ELECTIVE	74.8
2883	5-Sep-1993	5-Sep-2008	5-Sep-2008	5-Sep-2008	8-Feb-2013 ELECTIVE	73.4
2884	27-Oct-1988	27-Oct-2003	10-Aug-2003	10-Aug-2003	11-Sep-2007 ELECTIVE	74.1
2885	23-Jun-1968	27-May-1991	27-May-1991		21-Sep-1988 DISABILITY	62.3
2886	7-Feb-2002	5-Oct-2017	5-Oct-2017	5-Oct-2017		
2887	9-Feb-1959	29-Mar-1968			29-Mar-1968 COMPULSORY	75.0
2888	6-Jul-1985	3-Jan-1995			24-May-1987 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.4
2889	1-Jun-2018	1-Jun-2033				
2890	12-May-1953	1-Nov-1973	1-Nov-1973		9-Sep-1961 DISABILITY	52.9
2891	26-Apr-1975	26-Apr-1990	15-Jun-1985		15-Jun-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
2892	1-Apr-1992	2-Jul-2011	2-Jul-2011	10-Dec-2011	10-Apr-2018 ELECTIVE	67.5
2893	14-Jan-1999	14-Jan-2014	22-Feb-2011	23-Feb-2011	22-Feb-2016 COMPULSORY	75.0
2894	26-Aug-2017	17-Feb-2036	17-Feb-2036			
2895	5-Aug-1972	5-Aug-1987	5-Aug-1987		9-Aug-1988 DISABILITY	69.2
2896	10-Jun-2007	8-Feb-2024	8-Feb-2024			
2897	16-Aug-1975	28-Nov-1990	28-Nov-1990		8-Oct-1992 ELECTIVE	66.9
2898	6-Oct-1985	16-Feb-2002	28-Jun-2003		9-Jun-2013 ELECTIVE	74.9
2899	27-Jul-2002	30-May-2019	30-May-2019	30-May-2019		
2900	12-Jan-2013	12-Jan-2028	28-May-2025			
2901	6-Feb-2011	6-Feb-2026	6-Feb-2026			
2902	7-Jun-2000	30-Mar-2016	30-Mar-2016	10-Apr-2016		
2903	19-Aug-2017	7-Jun-2034	7-Jun-2034			
2904	1-Oct-1998	1-Oct-2013	1-Oct-2013	1-Oct-2013		
2905	7-May-1983	7-Mar-2000	7-Mar-2000		5-Jun-1996 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	61.2
2906	9-Jun-1991	2-Sep-2010	2-Sep-2010		9-Sep-2009 Early Retirement	59.8
2907	8-Oct-1999	7-Dec-2017	7-Dec-2017	7-Dec-2017		
2908	6-Feb-1986	6-Feb-2001	6-Feb-2001		17-Mar-1990 DISABILITY	57.8
2909	19-Jan-1992	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007	19-Jan-2007	9-Feb-2012 ELECTIVE	74.7
2910	20-Dec-1947	20-Dec-1962	20-Dec-1962		9-Aug-1970 ELECTIVE	73.1
2911	15-Feb-1987	28-Jul-2005	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2009	14-Feb-2015 ELECTIVE	71.1
2912	11-Oct-1980	7-Feb-1998	7-Feb-1998	8-Feb-1998	7-Feb-2008 COMPULSORY	75.0
2913	27-Oct-1988	27-Oct-2003	27-Oct-2003	27-Oct-2003	28-Jun-2007 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.4
2914	16-Oct-2013	27-Mar-2032	27-Mar-2032			
2915	27-Sep-2015	10-Feb-2031	10-Feb-2031			
2916	8-Mar-1969	7-Mar-1984	7-Mar-1984	7-Mar-1984	8-Jun-1990 COMPULSORY	75.0
2917	8-Jul-1999	25-Jul-2016	25-Jul-2016	25-Jul-2016		
2918	4-May-1974	4-May-1989	4-May-1989		5-Jan-1979 DISABILITY	57.1
2919	31-Jan-1981	31-Jan-1996	22-Feb-1995	22-Feb-1995	22-Feb-2000 COMPULSORY	75.0
2920	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015	28-Sep-2015		
2921	18-Dec-2009	3-Sep-2023	18-Dec-2019	18-Dec-2019		
2922	10-Mar-2012	22-Oct-2027	22-Oct-2027			
2923	27-Apr-1974	26-Feb-1994	26-Feb-1994		27-Feb-1994 ELECTIVE	65.0
2924	29-Jan-2000	29-Jan-2015	29-Jan-2015	29-Jan-2015	15-Mar-2020 COMPULSORY	75.0
2925	26-Sep-2010	26-Sep-2025	26-Sep-2025			
2926	12-Jan-2013	8-Apr-2030	8-Apr-2030			
2927	24-Sep-1993	24-Sep-2008	4-Nov-2004	4-Nov-2004	4-Nov-2009 COMPULSORY	75.0
2928	10-Jul-1999	8-Jan-2017	8-Jan-2017		8-Jan-2017 ELECTIVE	62.5
2929	8-Sep-2002	23-Jul-2019	23-Jul-2019			
2930	8-Jul-1966	8-Jul-1981	8-Jul-1981	8-Jul-1981	10-Aug-1989 COMPULSORY	75.0
2931	3-Jul-1987	22-Jan-2004	12-Aug-2005	10-Dec-2005	12-Aug-2015 COMPULSORY	75.0
2932	24-Jul-1997	24-Jul-2012	5-May-2011		9-Feb-2008 Early Retirement	66.8
2933	22-Oct-2017	22-Oct-2032	22-Oct-2032			
2934	29-Sep-2018	1-Jan-2033	29-Sep-2028			
2935	18-Jul-2019	18-Jul-2034	18-Jul-2034			

2936	24-May-1985	16-Oct-1999	16-Oct-1999			22-Jun-1997 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	67.7
2937	16-Aug-2008	16-Aug-2023	31-Mar-2021			10-Dec-2019 Early Retirement	68.7
2938	28-Jan-2018	12-Oct-2034	12-Oct-2034				
2939	9-May-2020	11-Sep-2035	11-Sep-2035				
2940	22-Mar-2003	22-Mar-2018	22-Mar-2018	22-Mar-2018			
2941	16-Nov-1977	24-Nov-1998	24-Nov-1998	24-Nov-1998	24-Nov-2008 COMPULSORY		75.0
2942	29-Jun-2001	22-Feb-2018	22-Feb-2018				
2943	31-Jan-1981	31-Jan-1996	18-Dec-1995			8-Feb-1996 ELECTIVE	70.1
2944	2-Mar-2006	27-Dec-2017	1-Mar-2016			27-Dec-2017 COMPULSORY	75.0
2945	2-Jan-2005	7-Apr-2021					
2946	9-Dec-1949	1-Nov-1961	1-Nov-1961			9-Dec-1964 ELECTIVE	73.1
2947	5-Dec-1997	20-Jan-2016	20-Jan-2016	10-Dec-2016			
2948	10-Jul-1974	1-Jul-1992	1-Jul-1992	1-Jul-1992	9-Jan-1997 ELECTIVE		69.5
2949	9-Sep-2020	22-Jan-2036	22-Jan-2036				
2950	10-May-1975	10-May-1990	24-Dec-1988	28-Dec-1988	8-Sep-1993 ELECTIVE		74.7
2951	11-Aug-1988	11-Aug-2003	23-Aug-1999	23-Aug-1999	23-Aug-2004 COMPULSORY		75.0
2952	9-Sep-1986	9-Sep-2001	9-Sep-2001	9-Sep-2001	7-Aug-2010 ELECTIVE		74.7
2953	26-Jan-1974	24-Nov-1991	24-Nov-1991	24-Nov-1991	24-Nov-2001 COMPULSORY		75.0
2954	6-Feb-1982	1-May-2001	23-Jul-2005	23-Jul-2005	23-Jul-2015 COMPULSORY		75.0
2955	12-May-1957	11-May-1972	11-May-1972	8-Oct-1977	4-Jan-1979 COMPULSORY		75.0
2956	25-Feb-1987	25-Feb-2002	2-Jan-2002	2-Jan-2002	12-May-2002 ELECTIVE		70.4
2957	8-Dec-1978	26-Aug-1996	26-Aug-1996			28-Dec-1995 OTHER	64.3
2958	30-May-2008	17-Apr-2024	17-Apr-2024				
2959	30-Mar-1975	30-Mar-1990	30-Mar-1990	30-Mar-1990	27-Jun-1995 COMPULSORY		75.0
2960	9-Oct-1954	9-Oct-1969				2-Apr-1974 ELECTIVE	74.6
2961	15-Nov-1996	2-May-2017	2-May-2017	10-Dec-2017			
2962	13-Aug-1993	13-Aug-2008	31-May-2008	31-May-2008	1-Jun-2013 COMPULSORY		75.0
2963	2-Apr-1977	26-Feb-1999	23-Oct-2000	11-Apr-2002	29-Jan-2005 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)		69.3
2964	30-Sep-2019	30-Sep-2034	30-Sep-2034				
2965	8-Feb-1964	15-Feb-1980	15-Feb-1980	15-Feb-1980	15-Feb-1990 COMPULSORY		75.0
2966	25-Jan-1975	9-Nov-1993				9-Nov-2003 COMPULSORY	75.0
2967	15-Jun-2019	9-Jun-2033	15-Jun-2029				
2968	8-Sep-2012	23-Oct-2030	23-Oct-2030				
2969	13-Sep-2007	13-Sep-2022	13-Sep-2022				
2970	10-Apr-1968	26-Jul-1977	11-Apr-1978	8-Sep-1980	25-Jan-1981 DEATH (RPC)		73.5
2971	11-Mar-1972	12-Mar-1987	12-Mar-1987	10-Dec-1991	21-May-1995 COMPULSORY		75.0
2972	27-Jan-1962	25-Dec-1972	25-Dec-1972			25-Dec-1977 COMPULSORY	75.0
2973	14-Mar-2007	25-Sep-2024	25-Sep-2024				
2974	1-Apr-1992	2-Dec-2008	2-Dec-2008	2-Dec-2008	10-Apr-2013 ELECTIVE		67.7
2975	7-Oct-1984	14-Dec-1998	7-Oct-1994	7-Oct-1994	14-Dec-1998 COMPULSORY		75.0
2976	15-Jul-1910	30-Jan-1937	30-Jan-1937			7-Aug-1957 Appointed for Life	85.5
2977	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	19-Dec-2027				
2978	9-Apr-1975	9-Apr-1990	14-Jan-1988	14-Jan-1988	14-Jan-1993 COMPULSORY		75.0
2979	8-Nov-1970	11-Dec-1994	11-Dec-1994	11-Dec-1994	23-Nov-1998 ELECTIVE		69.0
2980	4-Mar-1999	4-Mar-2014	4-Mar-2014	4-Mar-2014			
2981	30-Sep-1978	30-Sep-1993	30-Sep-1993			1-Aug-1983 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	56.6
2982	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	27-Jan-2032				
2983	21-Oct-1987	21-Oct-2002	26-Dec-2001	26-Dec-2001	26-Dec-2006 COMPULSORY		75.0
2984	11-Apr-2014	11-Aug-2026	10-Apr-2024				
2985	30-Sep-2020	14-Feb-2036	14-Feb-2036				
2986	12-Jun-2020	12-Jun-2035	12-Jun-2035				
2987	14-Aug-1992	23-Oct-2009	23-Oct-2009	8-Nov-2009	9-Dec-2011 ELECTIVE		64.9
2988	2-Oct-1992	5-Aug-2007	2-Oct-2002	2-Oct-2002	5-Aug-2007 COMPULSORY		75.0
2989	29-Jul-1978	5-Aug-1993	5-Aug-1993			14-Jul-1990 DISABILITY	61.9
2990	12-Jan-1990	29-Oct-2007	29-Oct-2007	14-Aug-2010	14-Aug-2020 COMPULSORY		75.0
2991	18-Apr-1959	18-Apr-1974	15-Mar-1970			15-Mar-1975 COMPULSORY	75.0
2992	10-Aug-1974	10-Aug-1989	7-Oct-1987	9-Oct-1987	10-Apr-1991 ELECTIVE		73.5
2993	22-Oct-1978	8-Oct-1995	8-Oct-1995	8-Oct-1995	8-Oct-2005 COMPULSORY		75.0
2994	11-Jan-1996	15-Sep-2012	15-Sep-2012	15-Sep-2012	12-Jul-2017 ELECTIVE		68.1
2995	29-Sep-2017	29-Sep-2032	29-Sep-2032				
2996	29-Mar-1970	14-Sep-1991	14-Sep-1991	15-Sep-1991	11-Apr-2001 ELECTIVE		74.6
2997	3-Nov-1995	3-Nov-2010	9-Jun-2009	9-Jun-2009	11-May-2012 ELECTIVE		72.9
2998	26-Feb-1998	8-Nov-2010	26-Feb-2008	21-Mar-2008	8-Nov-2010 COMPULSORY		75.0
2999	30-May-1996	21-Jan-2012	21-Jan-2012	21-Jan-2012	10-Apr-2018 ELECTIVE		70.6
3000	5-Feb-1977	26-Feb-1999	4-Jul-2003	8-Oct-2003	4-Jul-2013 COMPULSORY		75.0
3001	16-Sep-1999	25-Sep-2016					
3002	9-Oct-1977	22-Jan-1993	22-Jan-1993	22-Jan-1993	22-Jan-2003 COMPULSORY		75.0
3003	1-Apr-1972	2-Apr-1987	2-Apr-1987	10-Apr-1987	26-Jan-1996 COMPULSORY		75.0
3004	24-Feb-1979	24-Feb-1994	25-Sep-1993	25-Sep-1993	9-Jul-1995 ELECTIVE		71.8
3005	21-Sep-2014	21-Sep-2029	18-Aug-2028				
3006	5-Jan-2010	5-Jan-2025	14-Dec-2023				
3007	6-Jun-2015	6-Jun-2030	6-Jun-2030				
3008	14-Nov-2010	14-Nov-2025	14-Nov-2025				
3009	19-May-1982	26-Feb-1999	1-Oct-1999	4-Jul-2003	1-Oct-2009 COMPULSORY		75.0
3010	17-Aug-1995	23-Dec-2010	23-Dec-2010			11-Mar-2009 Early Retirement	62.9
3011	10-Feb-2013	3-Aug-2031	3-Aug-2031				
3012	25-May-1950	22-Jan-1968	22-Jan-1968	25-Mar-1973	22-Jan-1978 COMPULSORY		75.0
3013	3-Sep-1998	17-Feb-2013	3-Sep-2008	9-Jun-2009	17-Feb-2013 COMPULSORY		75.0
3014	19-May-1973	18-May-1988	18-May-1988	18-May-1988	8-Apr-1996 ELECTIVE		74.5
3015	12-May-1965	16-May-1982	16-May-1982	16-May-1982	15-May-1992 COMPULSORY		75.0
3016	10-Jan-1946	24-Jan-1953	10-Jan-1956			12-May-1958 Appointed for Life	75.3
3017	9-Apr-1981	11-Aug-1996	11-Aug-1996			8-Mar-1994 DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	62.6
3018	11-Dec-2020	11-Dec-2035	11-Dec-2035				
3019	8-Jul-2007	8-Jul-2022	8-Jul-2022				



3020	28-Sep-2000	28-Sep-2015	6-Apr-2015	9-Sep-2015	5-Apr-2020	COMPULSORY	75.0
3021	12-Jun-1947	12-Jun-1962	31-Oct-1960		17-Mar-1965	ELECTIVE	74.4
3022	4-Mar-1978	27-Aug-1997	27-Aug-1997	10-Dec-1997	27-Aug-2007	COMPULSORY	75.0
3023	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	28-Aug-1991	9-Mar-1998	COMPULSORY	75.0
3024	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	2-Aug-2029				
3025	9-Jul-1977	26-Feb-1999	23-Nov-2002	23-Jan-2003	23-Nov-2012	COMPULSORY	75.0
3026	17-Jul-1976	17-Jul-1991	17-Jul-1991	17-Jul-1991	12-Dec-1996	COMPULSORY	75.0
3027	21-Jun-2001	13-Jul-2014	21-Jun-2011	21-Jun-2011	29-Jul-2011	DISABILITY	72.0
3028	29-Jan-1960	3-Apr-1972	29-Jan-1970		3-Apr-1972	COMPULSORY	75.0
3029	9-May-1998	14-Apr-2015	14-Apr-2015	5-Aug-2018			
3030	12-Jan-2013	10-Oct-2030	10-Oct-2030				
3031	10-Feb-1968	1-Apr-1986	1-Apr-1986		12-Jul-1982	DISABILITY	61.3
3032	30-Nov-1985	24-Feb-2005	24-Mar-2007	9-Oct-2008	9-Dec-2013	ELECTIVE	69.6
3033	1-Apr-1978	18-Sep-1993	18-Sep-1993	18-Sep-1993	24-Dec-1994	ELECTIVE	66.3
3034	2-Mar-1967	2-Feb-1986	2-Feb-1986		10-Dec-1982	DISABILITY	61.9
3035	29-Mar-2018						
3036	30-Sep-1959	26-Jan-1965	30-Sep-1969		26-Jan-1970	COMPULSORY	75.0
3037	22-Dec-1991	22-Dec-2006	22-Dec-2006		11-Jul-2004	DISABILITY	64.4
3038	13-Oct-1990	13-Oct-2005	13-Oct-2005	13-Oct-2005	23-Nov-2013	COMPULSORY	75.0
3039	4-Jul-2015	4-Jul-2030	27-Mar-2027				
3040	30-Mar-2014	30-Mar-2029	30-Mar-2029				
3041	8-Jul-1999	29-Oct-2014	29-Oct-2014	29-Oct-2014	8-Sep-2016	ELECTIVE	66.6
3042	28-Aug-1976	28-Aug-1991	21-Sep-1987	21-Sep-1987	21-Sep-1992	COMPULSORY	75.0
3043	1-Apr-1966	31-Oct-1983	31-Oct-1983	9-Nov-1983	31-Dec-1992	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.2
3044	28-Sep-1996	6-Aug-2013	6-Aug-2013				
3045	11-Aug-2018	11-Aug-2033	20-Feb-2033				
3046	24-Jul-1997	24-Jul-2012	24-Jul-2012		9-Aug-2019	ELECTIVE	74.0
3047	8-Nov-1975	8-Nov-1990	8-Nov-1990	9-Nov-1990	9-Jul-2000	COMPULSORY	75.0
3048	1-Feb-1963	3-Jul-1981	3-Jul-1981	9-May-1982	3-Jul-1991	COMPULSORY	75.0
3049	1-Nov-1975	14-Aug-1993	14-Aug-1993	14-Aug-1993	14-Aug-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
3050	8-Jul-1983	22-Feb-2001	10-Oct-2003	10-Oct-2003	10-Oct-2013	COMPULSORY	75.0
3051	10-Jan-1976	1-Oct-1992	1-Oct-1992	1-Oct-1992	10-Apr-1995	ELECTIVE	67.5
3052	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2023	26-Sep-2023				
3053	14-Sep-2000	14-Sep-2015	26-May-2012	26-May-2012	27-May-2017	COMPULSORY	75.0
3054	25-Dec-1987	25-Dec-2002	10-Aug-2000	10-Aug-2000	10-Aug-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
3055	13-Oct-1985	26-Sep-2008	26-Sep-2008		31-Dec-1998	DEATH (RPC)	55.3
3056	11-May-2001	10-May-2016	10-May-2016		11-Jul-2016	ELECTIVE	65.2
3057	13-Oct-1950	22-Oct-1967	22-Oct-1967		22-Oct-1977	COMPULSORY	75.0
3058	29-Dec-1994	29-Dec-2009	29-Dec-2009	29-Dec-2009	20-May-2018	COMPULSORY	75.0
3059	5-Feb-1977	3-Sep-1995	3-Sep-1995	3-Sep-1995	3-Sep-2005	COMPULSORY	75.0
3060	10-Dec-1972	29-Dec-1993	29-Dec-1993	29-Dec-1993	29-Dec-2003	COMPULSORY	75.0
3061	14-May-2011	14-May-2026	10-Jun-2024				
3062	31-May-1969	20-Jul-1979	31-May-1979		20-Jul-1979	COMPULSORY	75.0
3063	4-Jan-1964	28-Sep-1979	28-Sep-1979		1-Jul-1978	DISABILITY	63.8
3064	8-Jul-1999	8-Jul-2014	8-Jul-2014	8-Jul-2014	11-Mar-2019	ELECTIVE	70.4
3065	29-Mar-1981	13-Jul-1999	25-Oct-2002	25-Oct-2002	25-Oct-2012	COMPULSORY	75.0
3066	26-Oct-1983	25-Sep-2001	26-Aug-2004	26-Aug-2004	26-Aug-2014	COMPULSORY	75.0
3067	8-Jul-1999	14-Jan-2013	8-Jul-2009	11-Apr-2011	14-Jan-2013	COMPULSORY	75.0
3068	9-Feb-1974	9-Feb-1989	9-Feb-1989	9-Feb-1989	19-Dec-1991	DEATH (RPC)	71.0
3069	29-Sep-1973	23-Aug-1996	23-Aug-1996		11-Jul-1986	DISABILITY	54.9
3070	23-May-1996	24-May-2011	22-Oct-2009	8-Nov-2009	22-Oct-2014	COMPULSORY	75.0
3071	22-Aug-2010	22-Aug-2025	12-Jun-2022				
3072	1-Jul-1984	17-Sep-2005	24-Mar-2007	9-Oct-2013	10-Dec-2020	ELECTIVE	74.0
3073	19-Apr-1969	30-Apr-1981	30-Apr-1981	30-Apr-1981	10-Apr-1985	ELECTIVE	73.9
3074	13-Oct-1990	20-Jun-2006	25-Feb-2007		8-Jan-2007	ELECTIVE	64.9
3075	18-Oct-1980	27-Feb-2000	27-Feb-2000		8-Feb-1998	DISABILITY	62.9
3076	8-Mar-2008	9-Mar-2023	19-Aug-2020	19-Aug-2020			
3077	16-Jan-1956	1-Nov-1968	1-Nov-1968		1-Nov-1973	COMPULSORY	75.0
3078	14-Jan-1984	16-Jan-2001	18-Jan-2003	11-Mar-2003	13-Feb-2005	ELECTIVE	67.1
3079	29-Aug-2019	29-Aug-2034	1-Dec-2029				
3080	12-Aug-1964	12-Aug-1979	12-Aug-1979		9-Jan-1980	ELECTIVE	67.3
3081	29-Dec-1977	29-Dec-1992	29-Dec-1992	30-Dec-1992	10-Dec-1995	ELECTIVE	70.0
3082	30-Dec-1967	30-Dec-1982	27-Sep-1980	27-Sep-1980	27-Sep-1985	COMPULSORY	75.0
3083	8-Nov-1975	8-Nov-1990	8-Nov-1990		9-Apr-1992	ELECTIVE	68.0
3084	12-Apr-1984	7-Jan-1995	7-Jan-1995	9-Jan-1995	7-Jan-2000	COMPULSORY	75.0
3085	10-Apr-1976	1-Feb-1993	1-Feb-1993	1-Feb-1993	21-Jan-1999	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	71.0
3086	25-Aug-2019	1-Nov-2035	1-Nov-2035				
3087	11-Oct-1997	14-Sep-2014	17-Aug-2016		26-May-2007	DISABILITY	55.8
3088	27-Sep-2015	2-Oct-2032	2-Oct-2032				
3089	8-Mar-1975	27-Mar-1990	27-Mar-1990	11-Apr-1990	26-Mar-2000	COMPULSORY	75.0
3090	9-Sep-2007	9-Sep-2022	9-Sep-2022				
3091	24-Feb-1979	30-May-1989	30-May-1989	30-May-1989	30-May-1994	COMPULSORY	75.0
3092	22-Jan-1954	23-Feb-1974	23-Feb-1974	11-May-1976	23-Feb-1984	COMPULSORY	75.0
3093	25-Aug-1965	25-Aug-1980	10-Jun-1979		10-Jun-1984	COMPULSORY	75.0
3094	27-Mar-2014	27-Mar-2029	25-Dec-2025				
3095	27-Jun-2010	14-Jul-2025	14-Jul-2025		26-Jul-2010	RESIGNATION (RPC)	50.0
3096	29-Sep-1938	29-Sep-1953	29-Sep-1953		18-Nov-1962	COMPULSORY	75.0
3097	18-Sep-1971	8-Mar-1992	8-Mar-1992	8-Mar-1992	11-Apr-1999	ELECTIVE	72.1
3098	25-Mar-2007	25-Mar-2022	13-Sep-2018		9-Dec-2013	RESIGNATION (RPC)	65.2
3099	13-Jan-2001	13-Jan-2016	13-Jan-2016	17-May-2017			
3100	29-Dec-1977	12-Apr-1996	12-Apr-1996		23-Nov-1982	RESIGNATION (RPC)	51.6
3101	7-May-1994	7-May-2009	7-May-2009	10-Dec-2016	27-Jun-2018	COMPULSORY	75.0
3102	7-Jun-2000	23-Aug-2018	23-Aug-2018	23-Aug-2018			
3103	6-Jun-2015	6-Jun-2030	6-Jun-2030				

3104	23-Mar-1985	5-Jul-2004	24-Mar-2007	19-Jul-2007	11-May-2013	ELECTIVE	69.6
3105	13-Jul-1995	14-Jan-2013	14-Jan-2013	19-Feb-2013			
3106	10-Dec-1987	10-Dec-2002	10-Dec-2002	10-Dec-2002	13-Jun-2011	COMPULSORY	75.0
3107	16-Sep-1999	16-Sep-2014	24-May-2013		9-Aug-2017	ELECTIVE	74.2
3108	15-Nov-1996	4-Sep-2014	4-Sep-2014		10-Dec-2020	ELECTIVE	68.5
3109	13-Jun-1953	13-Jun-1968	13-Jun-1968	9-Jan-1973	23-Jan-1974	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	74.6
3110	12-Apr-1984	31-May-2003	24-Mar-2007	11-Apr-2007	11-Apr-2017	COMPULSORY	74.7
3111	8-Jan-2021	17-Apr-2038	17-Apr-2038				
3112	19-Jan-1992	19-Jan-2007	7-Apr-2003		28-Sep-2002	DISABILITY	69.5
3113	13-Mar-1986	13-Mar-2001	13-Mar-2001		10-Apr-1997	DISABILITY	65.6
3114	27-Jan-2017	27-Jan-2032	9-Nov-2030				
3115	30-Sep-2017	26-Sep-2035	26-Sep-2035				
3116	2-Feb-1975	28-Dec-1996	28-Dec-1996	9-Jan-1997	11-Apr-1999	ELECTIVE	67.3
3117	3-Apr-1959	4-Apr-1962			25-Jun-1964	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	72.2
3118	10-Dec-1955	9-Nov-1970	10-Dec-1965		1-Nov-1964	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	69.0
3119	24-Sep-1993	3-Jun-2010	3-Jun-2010	3-Jun-2010	10-Dec-2017	ELECTIVE	70.8
3120	24-Sep-1961	24-Sep-1976	7-Dec-1972		21-Aug-1976	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	73.7
3121	8-Nov-2001	8-Nov-2016	8-Nov-2016	21-Dec-2016	20-Apr-2018	ELECTIVE	66.7
3122	10-Aug-2019	10-Aug-2034	11-Jun-2031				
3123	1-Feb-1963	8-Dec-1984	8-Dec-1984	12-May-1985	8-Dec-1994	COMPULSORY	75.0
3124	13-Nov-1982	8-Mar-1998	8-Mar-1998	8-Mar-1998	7-Mar-2008	COMPULSORY	75.0
3125	1-Apr-1992	30-Apr-2009	30-Apr-2009	30-Apr-2009	10-Apr-2012	ELECTIVE	65.9
3126	2-Mar-2007	2-Mar-2022	2-Mar-2022				
3127	25-Aug-1976	5-Sep-1998	5-Sep-1998	5-Sep-1998	5-Sep-2008	COMPULSORY	75.0
3128	21-Jul-1990	21-Jul-2005	21-Jul-2005		13-Jun-1998	DEATH (SURVIVORS BENEFITS)	60.8

**Variable****Meaning**

ID **Not** the CFJA judge code. For cross reference only.

First Appointment Date of first appointment as a federal judge.

Eligible to Retire Date eligible to retire with a full annuity as per the Judges Act.

Eligible to Elect Date eligible to elect supernumerary status.

Elected Date elected supernumerary status.

Retirement Date of retirement.

Retirement Reason Reason for/type of retirement.

Age at Retirement Age in years at retirement rounded to one decimal.


# Gross domestic product, income and expenditure, fourth quarter 2020

Released at 8:30 a.m. Eastern time in *The Daily*, Tuesday, March 2, 2021

Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew 2.3% in the fourth quarter of 2020, following record fluctuations in the previous two quarters. In 2020, real GDP shrank 5.4%, the steepest annual decline since quarterly data were first recorded in 1961. Final domestic demand rose 0.9% in the fourth quarter, but was down 4.5% for 2020 overall.

**Chart 1**  
Gross domestic product and final domestic demand

quarterly % change, chained (2012) dollars



Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.

Growth in real GDP was strengthened by a large change in business inventories, as well as increases in government final consumption expenditure, business investment in machinery and equipment, and housing investment. Housing investment increases coincided with low mortgage rates and rising demand for housing.

The large inventory drawdowns that were a drag on third-quarter GDP growth were absent in the fourth quarter as inventories recorded a small accumulation. For non-farm business inventories, the sizeable shift was concentrated in the retail sector, with accumulation observed for motor vehicle, building supply and sporting goods retailers. Accumulation of cannabis stocks largely contributed to the increase in farm inventories. The economy-wide stock-to-sales ratio fell from 0.843 in the third quarter to 0.836 in the fourth quarter.



Statistics Canada / Statistique Canada


Canada

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**Chart 2**

**Contributions to percentage change in real gross domestic product, fourth quarter of 2020**

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Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.


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**Housing investment continues to rise**

Housing investment increased 4.3% in the fourth quarter, after rising 30.7% in the third quarter.

### Chart 3 Housing investment

quarterly % change, chained (2012) dollars



Source(s): Table 36-10-0108-01.

The increases were broad-based: new construction grew 4.1%, renovations rose 4.8% and ownership transfer costs were up 4.1%. A substantial increase occurred in new construction of both single-family and multiple-unit dwellings, especially in Ontario and Alberta. The increase in ownership transfer costs was widespread, as home resale activity continued to rise across the country. Compared with 2019, housing investment was up 3.9% in 2020, while household residential mortgage debt expanded significantly over the same period.

### Business investment slackens


Business investment in engineering structures rose 1.6% in the fourth quarter, but investment in non-residential buildings fell 10.9%. This reflected weak demand for office buildings and shopping malls as remote working and online shopping became more common. Increased investment in machinery and equipment (+7.0%) coincided with higher imports of industrial machinery and equipment. Nevertheless, investment in machinery and equipment was down 16.4% in 2020.

### Household spending edges down

Household spending edged down 0.1% in the fourth quarter, after a 13.1% increase in the third quarter. Spending was down 6.1% in 2020, compared with 2019.

**Chart 4**  
**Household final consumption: durable and semi-durable goods**

quarterly % change, chained (2012) dollars



Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.


Outlays for durable goods declined 0.2%, after the record increase (+39.6%) in the third quarter, which followed drops in the second quarter related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Decreases in purchases of new trucks, vans and sport utility vehicles (-3.5%), and new passenger cars (-6.4%) were partly offset by increased sales of used motor vehicles (+4.0%). This reflected consumers' tendency to opt for used goods at times of economic uncertainty.

Excluding these purchases, outlays for durable goods rose 1.6% in the fourth quarter. Household spending on major appliances (+9.0%) and furniture (+2.4%) rose, coinciding with stronger housing investment. Overall, spending on durable goods was down 3.7% in 2020.

Outlays for semi-durable goods fell 4.7% in the fourth quarter, after sharp fluctuations in the previous two quarters. Decline in clothing and footwear (-8.9%) was partly offset by increases in games, toys and hobbies (+0.7%), and equipment for sport, camping and open-air recreation (+6.9%). These movements reflected shifts in spending patterns in the wake of the pandemic. Spending on semi-durable goods was down 7.8% in 2020.

**Chart 5**  
**Household final consumption: non-durable goods and services**

quarterly % change, chained (2012) dollars



Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.

Outlays for non-durable goods rose 0.6%, after rising 4.2% in the third quarter. As consumers spent more time at home and less time travelling, expenditures on food (+3.1%), licensed cannabis (+17.0%) and pharmaceutical products (+7.1%) rose. Expenditures on fuels and lubricants (-5.4%) dropped, owing to reduced use because of new restrictions in British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec in the fourth quarter. Overall, spending on non-durable goods was up 3.1% in 2020 compared with 2019.

Growth in outlays on services slowed from 9.7% in the third quarter to 0.2% in the fourth. Increases in outpatient services (+6.7%), and insurance and financial services (+1.8%) were more than offset by lower spending on food, beverage and accommodation services (-11.1%), and personal grooming services (-7.5%), owing to closures and limited openings of bars, restaurants and salons. Overall, outlays for services were down 10.3% in 2020.


**Export and import volumes slow**

Growth in export volumes slowed from 14.7% in the third quarter to 1.2% in the fourth, reflecting reduced international demand, owing to slowdowns in the economies of major trading partners in the fourth quarter, notably the United States (+1.0%), the United Kingdom (+1.0%), the Netherlands (-0.1%), Germany (+0.1%) and Italy (-2.0%).



## Chart 6 Exports and imports

quarterly % change, chained (2012) dollars



Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.

Exports of energy products (+6.1%) and metal and non-metallic mineral products (+10.8%) increased. Growth in the latter stemmed mainly from unwrought gold, silver, and platinum group metals, and their alloys; this surge reflected exports of refined gold to the United Kingdom, related to the Brexit-induced period of economic uncertainty. Export volumes were down 9.8% in 2020, compared with the volumes in 2019.

Import volumes rose 2.6% in the fourth quarter, following record fluctuations in the previous two quarters. Increases in imports of consumer goods (+5.5%), motor vehicles and parts (+5.3%), and industrial machinery and equipment (+8.3%) were partly offset by a decline in imports of metal and non-metallic mineral products (-10.7%). Overall, import volumes in 2020 were down 11.3%, compared with the volumes in 2019.


### Terms of trade improve

The ratio of the price of exports to the price of imports—the terms of trade—rose 1.7%, primarily because of a 2.4% increase in prices of exported crude oil and crude bitumen in the fourth quarter. However, for 2020 overall, terms of trade declined by 3.4%, owing largely to a 38.6% drop in prices of exported crude oil and crude bitumen.

### Nominal gross domestic product rises

The GDP implicit price index, which reflects the overall price of domestically produced goods and services, rose 1.1% in the fourth quarter. Consequently, growth in nominal GDP (+3.4%) was higher than that of real GDP. Compared with 2019, nominal GDP was down 4.6% in 2020.

Map 1 – Compensation of employees in 2020 compared with 2019 (index 2019=100)



Source: Statistics Canada, Table 36-10-0205-01, March 2021.

Compensation of employees rose 2.5% in the fourth quarter, following a 7.7% increase in the third. Despite this growth in the second half of 2020, compensation was 1.6% lower over the year compared with 2019. The Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy represented 3.3% of total compensation of employees in the fourth quarter, down from 7.3% in the third. Declines varied by region and were particularly sharp in the two oil-rich provinces, Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador, reflecting the impact of lower prices of crude oil and crude bitumen in 2020.

### Households end the year with third consecutive double-digit savings rate

Household disposable income dropped 1.0% in the fourth quarter, mainly because of a 17.2% decline in other benefits received from governments, such as the Canada Emergency Response Benefit. Despite this decline, disposable income was up 10.0% compared with 2019, the largest increase on record in nearly four decades, as governments took extraordinary economic support measures during the year. By the fourth quarter, the extent of this support had diminished considerably; nonetheless, government transfers still exceeded their pre-pandemic levels from the fourth quarter of 2019 by a sizeable margin (+33.2%).

The continued rebound in compensation, albeit at a reduced pace, coupled with still-elevated government transfers and stagnant consumption, kept the savings rate in double-digit territory for the third consecutive quarter. Canadians recorded a similar amount of savings in 2020 as in the previous seven years combined. Some of this savings made its way into currency and deposits of Canadian households, with growth in this asset nearing \$160.0 billion over the first three quarters of the year. The savings rate for the fourth quarter stood at 12.7%, while the savings rate for 2020 was 15.1%. Transfers from governments exceeded losses in wages and self-employment income, resulting in lower-income and younger households recording some of the largest [increases in savings](#).

### **Support program expenditures continue to fuel government borrowing**

Overall, government revenues were far outstripped by expenditures throughout 2020, with the fourth quarter showing a marked increase from the second-quarter peak in governments' net borrowing of \$443.8 billion.

Government revenue remained fairly flat over 2020, the notable exception being the second quarter, when a decline in tax revenue on both income and products reduced government coffers. By the fourth quarter, these components had regained lost ground, but annual government revenue was 3.9% lower than the preceding year.

## Note to readers

### Revisions

Gross domestic product (GDP) data for the fourth quarter have been released along with revised data from the first to third quarter of 2020. These releases incorporate new and revised data, as well as updates on seasonal trends. Given the unprecedented economic situation in 2020, revisions for this period are expected to be higher than normal.

### Support measures by governments

To alleviate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments implemented a number of programs, including the Canada Emergency Wage Subsidy and the Canada Emergency Response Benefit. For a comprehensive explanation of how government support measures were treated in the compilation of the estimates, see "[Recording COVID-19 measures in the national accounts](#)" and "[Recording new COVID measures in the national accounts](#)."

Details of some of the more significant government measures can be found in the footnotes of tables [36-10-0103-01](#), [36-10-0112-01](#), [36-10-0115-01](#), [36-10-0118-01](#), and [36-10-0477-01](#).

For information on seasonal adjustment, see [Seasonally adjusted data – Frequently asked questions](#).

For more information on GDP, see the video "[What is Gross Domestic Product \(GDP\)?](#)"

### Percentage change

Percentage changes for expenditure-based statistics (such as household spending, investment, and exports) are calculated from volume measures that are adjusted for price variations. Percentage changes for income-based statistics (such as compensation of employees and operating surplus) are calculated from nominal values; that is, they are not adjusted for price variations.

Unless otherwise stated, growth rates represent the percentage change in the series from one quarter to the next; for instance, from the third quarter of 2020 to the fourth quarter of 2020.

### Real-time tables

Real-time tables [36-10-0430-01](#) and [36-10-0431-01](#) will be updated on March 8.

### Next release

Data on GDP by income and expenditure for the first quarter of 2021 will be released on June 1, 2021.

## Sustainable development goals

On January 1, 2016, the world officially began implementing the [2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#)—the United Nations' transformative plan of action that addresses urgent global challenges over the following 15 years. The plan is based on 17 specific sustainable development goals.

Data on gross domestic product, income and expenditure are an example of how Statistics Canada supports the reporting on the global sustainable development goals. This release will be used to measure the following goals:



**Table 1**  
**Gross domestic product by income account – Seasonally adjusted at annual rates**

	Third quarter 2019	Fourth quarter 2019	First quarter 2020	Second quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020
	quarter-to-quarter % change						millions of dollars	
Compensation of employees	1.3	1.3	-1.2	-8.6	7.7	2.5	1,167,340	1,196,668
Gross operating surplus	-1.4	0.6	-4.6	-6.9	15.2	-0.5	623,968	620,720
Gross mixed income	1.7	1.8	0.8	-2.2	3.2	1.4	283,192	287,068
Taxes less subsidies on production	1.7	-0.3	-18.2	-121.5	205.3	224.7	19,152	62,196
Taxes less subsidies, on products and imports	1.1	-0.4	-6.4	-16.7	13.7	4.3	136,504	142,364
Statistical discrepancy (millions of dollars)	-2,108	-416	1,252	16	1,876	-3,028	1,384	-1,644
<b>Gross domestic product at market prices</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>-2.9</b>	<b>-12.1</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2,231,540</b>	<b>2,307,372</b>

Source(s): Table 36-10-0103-01.

**Table 2**  
**Real gross domestic product by expenditure account, quarterly change – Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, chained (2012) dollars**

	Third quarter 2019	Fourth quarter 2019	First quarter 2020	Second quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020
	quarter-to-quarter % change						millions of dollars	
Final consumption expenditure	0.5	0.5	-1.5	-11.4	10.3	0.4	1,588,439	1,595,217
Household final consumption expenditure	0.6	0.5	-1.8	-14.1	13.1	-0.1	1,137,117	1,135,859
Non-profit institutions serving households' final consumption expenditure	0.9	0.6	-0.0	-13.6	7.8	4.5	29,840	31,188
General governments final consumption expenditure	0.4	0.5	-0.8	-4.4	4.0	1.5	421,401	427,753
Gross fixed capital formation	1.9	-0.9	-0.3	-13.7	14.5	2.3	436,880	447,012
Business gross fixed capital formation	1.8	-1.0	-0.8	-16.0	16.3	2.6	351,027	359,992
Residential structures	3.4	-0.7	-0.5	-15.6	30.7	4.3	156,314	163,068
Non-residential structures, machinery and equipment	0.7	-1.5	-1.2	-17.9	5.9	1.0	157,280	158,899
Intellectual property products	1.0	-0.0	-0.4	-8.9	5.8	0.5	35,831	36,017
General governments gross fixed capital formation	2.3	-0.3	2.1	-3.3	7.8	1.4	83,974	85,131
Investment in inventories (millions of dollars)	-9,468	36	-9,826	-31,719	-7,427	38,529	-36,808	1,721
Exports of goods and services	-0.6	-1.1	-2.7	-17.7	14.7	1.2	617,230	624,807
Less: imports of goods and services	-0.5	-0.7	-2.2	-23.0	21.6	2.6	611,263	627,163
Statistical discrepancy (millions of dollars)	1,923	361	-1,121	-15	-1,684	2,694	-1,236	1,458
<b>Gross domestic product at market prices</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>-1.9</b>	<b>-11.4</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>1,999,452</b>	<b>2,045,925</b>
Final domestic demand	0.8	0.2	-1.3	-11.9	11.2	0.9	2,023,946	2,041,230

Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.

**Table 3**  
Real gross domestic product by expenditure account, annualized change – Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, chained (2012) dollars

	Third quarter 2019	Fourth quarter 2019	First quarter 2020	Second quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020
	quarter-to-quarter % change, annualized						millions of dollars	
Final consumption expenditure	2.1	2.0	-5.9	-38.5	47.8	1.7	1,588,439	1,595,217
Household final consumption expenditure	2.2	2.0	-7.1	-45.6	63.4	-0.4	1,137,117	1,135,859
Non-profit institutions serving households' final consumption expenditure	3.5	2.5	-0.0	-44.4	35.1	19.3	29,840	31,188
General governments final consumption expenditure	1.6	1.9	-3.1	-16.5	16.9	6.2	421,401	427,753
Gross fixed capital formation	7.9	-3.6	-1.3	-44.4	72.1	9.6	436,880	447,012
Business gross fixed capital formation	7.5	-4.1	-3.3	-50.2	82.7	10.6	351,027	359,992
Residential structures	14.4	-2.9	-2.2	-49.2	191.4	18.4	156,314	163,068
Non-residential structures, machinery and equipment	2.8	-5.9	-4.5	-54.5	25.8	4.2	157,280	158,899
Intellectual property products	4.1	-0.1	-1.4	-31.0	25.1	2.1	35,831	36,017
General governments gross fixed capital formation	9.6	-1.3	8.5	-12.4	35.3	5.6	83,974	85,131
Investment in inventories (millions of dollars)	-9,468	36	-9,826	-31,719	-7,427	38,529	-36,808	1,721
Exports of goods and services	-2.5	-4.2	-10.4	-54.2	73.1	5.0	617,230	624,807
Less: imports of goods and services	-2.1	-2.9	-8.5	-64.9	118.8	10.8	611,263	627,163
Statistical discrepancy (millions of dollars)	1,923	361	-1,121	-15	-1,684	2,694	-1,236	1,458
<b>Gross domestic product at market prices</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>-7.5</b>	<b>-38.5</b>	<b>40.6</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>1,999,452</b>	<b>2,045,925</b>
Final domestic demand	3.3	0.7	-4.9	-39.9	52.8	3.5	2,023,946	2,041,230

Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.

**Table 4**  
Real gross domestic product by expenditure account – Seasonally adjusted at annual rates

	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020		
			Contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product	Contributions to percent change in implicit price indexes	Annualized contributions to percent change in real gross domestic product
	millions of chained (2012) dollars		percentage points		
Final consumption expenditure	1,588,439	1,595,217	0.342	0.277	1.416
Household final consumption expenditure	1,137,117	1,135,859	-0.062	0.275	-0.257
Goods	558,699	556,135	-0.123	0.163	-0.510
Durable goods	169,796	169,514	-0.014	0.056	-0.058
Semi-durable goods	90,207	85,927	-0.196	0.013	-0.812
Non-durable goods	298,206	300,022	0.087	0.093	0.360
Services	581,474	582,666	0.061	0.112	0.253
Non-profit institutions serving households' final consumption expenditure	29,840	31,188	0.069	0.010	0.286
General governments final consumption expenditure	421,401	427,753	0.335	-0.008	1.387
Gross fixed capital formation	436,880	447,012	0.541	0.217	2.239
Business gross fixed capital formation	351,027	359,992	0.484	0.194	1.999
Residential structures	156,314	163,068	0.391	0.164	1.619
Non-residential structures, machinery and equipment	157,280	158,899	0.083	-0.004	0.339
Non-residential structures	98,817	96,193	-0.132	0.010	-0.547
Machinery and equipment	58,095	62,163	0.214	-0.015	0.886
Intellectual property products	35,831	36,017	0.010	0.035	0.041
Non-profit institutions serving households' gross fixed capital formation	2,013	1,985	-0.001	0.001	-0.004
General governments gross fixed capital formation	83,974	85,131	0.059	0.022	0.244
Investment in inventories	-36,808	1,721	1.750	0.042	7.248
Exports of goods and services	617,230	624,807	0.362	0.399	1.495
Goods	518,047	523,179	0.243	0.373	1.006
Services	99,300	101,701	0.118	0.026	0.489
Less: imports of goods and services	611,263	627,163	0.805	-0.115	3.338
Goods	528,193	540,759	0.622	-0.056	2.576
Services	87,339	90,661	0.184	-0.059	0.762
Statistical discrepancy	-1,236	1,458	0.135	0.000	0.559
<b>Gross domestic product at market prices</b>	<b>1,999,452</b>	<b>2,045,925</b>	<b>2.324</b>	<b>1.050</b>	<b>9.619</b>
Final domestic demand	2,023,946	2,041,230	0.883	0.494	3.655

Source(s): Tables 36-10-0104-01 and 36-10-0106-01.

**Table 5**  
**Canadian economic accounts key indicators – Seasonally adjusted**

	Third quarter 2019	Fourth quarter 2019	First quarter 2020	Second quarter 2020	Third quarter 2020	Fourth quarter 2020
<b>Economy-wide</b>						
Real gross domestic income (index 2012=100)	113.5	113.8	109.9	96.6	107.0	110.1
Gross domestic product deflator (index 2012=100)	109.9	110.9	109.8	109.0	111.6	112.8
Terms of trade (index 2012=100)	94.7	95.2	90.6	88.1	93.6	95.2
<b>Household sector</b>						
Household disposable income (millions of dollars)	1,280,168	1,297,208	1,315,952	1,473,096	1,411,416	1,397,720
Household net saving (millions of dollars)	20,424	26,048	67,104	410,016	193,316	177,048
Household saving rate (%)	1.6	2.0	5.1	27.8	13.7	12.7
<b>Government sector</b>						
General government disposable income (millions of dollars)	515,660	525,284	454,360	62,540	263,132	360,360
General government net saving (millions of dollars)	32,084	35,140	-38,128	-422,396	-235,088	-145,184
<b>Corporate sector</b>						
Non-financial corporations' net operating surplus (millions of dollars)	249,380	249,884	220,140	184,856	265,088	262,656
Financial corporations' net operating surplus (millions of dollars)	41,240	41,176	41,008	38,016	40,504	40,844
Non-financial corporations' net saving (millions of dollars)	-11,364	-9,556	-33,400	-61,172	25,120	18,120
Financial corporations' net saving (millions of dollars)	37,336	41,072	42,756	31,220	30,864	25,568
<b>National</b>						
National net saving (millions of dollars)	76,260	90,440	36,932	-37,112	19,508	74,120
National saving rate (%)	4.0	4.7	2.0	-2.3	1.1	3.9

Source(s): Tables 36-10-0105-01, 36-10-0106-01, 36-10-0111-01, 36-10-0112-01, 36-10-0118-01 and 36-10-0116-01.

**Table 6**  
**Real gross domestic product by expenditure account, year-over-year change – Seasonally adjusted at annual rates, chained (2012) dollars**

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2019	2020
	year-over-year % change						millions of dollars	
Final consumption expenditure	2.1	2.0	3.3	2.6	1.7	-4.7	1,640,706	1,562,821
Household final consumption expenditure	2.3	1.9	3.8	2.5	1.6	-6.1	1,184,887	1,112,476
Non-profit institutions serving households' final consumption expenditure	4.7	9.0	0.4	3.3	3.0	-4.8	31,699	30,190
General governments final consumption expenditure	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.9	2.0	-1.1	424,474	419,604
Gross fixed capital formation	-5.2	-4.7	3.3	1.8	0.3	-3.6	442,650	426,793
Business gross fixed capital formation	-6.4	-5.4	2.7	1.3	0.3	-5.3	362,266	343,107
Residential structures	3.8	3.9	2.3	-1.7	-0.2	3.9	139,772	145,193
Non-residential structures, machinery and equipment	-11.3	-12.3	1.9	3.1	1.1	-13.1	185,783	161,377
Intellectual property products	-11.5	-1.7	8.8	5.2	-1.9	-3.8	37,142	35,728
General governments gross fixed capital formation	1.5	-0.1	6.5	4.3	0.3	4.3	78,457	81,865
Investment in inventories (millions of dollars)	-9,178	-779	18,014	-3,714	3,280	-34,299	18,766	-15,533
Exports of goods and services	3.4	1.4	1.4	3.7	1.3	-9.8	675,019	608,603
Less: imports of goods and services	0.8	0.1	4.6	3.4	0.4	-11.3	674,511	598,454
Statistical discrepancy (millions of dollars)	-300	2,116	-2,039	1,275	-374	146	137	283
<b>Gross domestic product at market prices</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>-5.4</b>	<b>2,102,304</b>	<b>1,988,721</b>
Final domestic demand	0.3	0.5	3.3	2.5	1.4	-4.5	2,081,607	1,988,173

Source(s): Table 36-10-0104-01.

Available tables: [12-10-0134-01](#), [12-10-0135-01](#), [34-10-0163-01](#), [36-10-0103-01](#) to [36-10-0109-01](#) , [36-10-0111-01](#), [36-10-0112-01](#), [36-10-0114-01](#) to [36-10-0118-01](#) , [36-10-0121-01](#) to [36-10-0132-01](#) , [36-10-0135-01](#), [36-10-0205-01](#), [36-10-0369-01](#), [36-10-0477-01](#), [36-10-0484-01](#), [36-10-0608-01](#), [36-10-0610-01](#) and [36-10-0611-01](#).

Definitions, data sources and methods: survey numbers [1901](#), [2602](#), [2820](#) and [5169](#).

The document, "[Recording new COVID measures in the national accounts](#)," which is part of *Latest Developments in the Canadian Economic Accounts* ([13-605-X](#)), is available.

The data visualization product "[Infrastructure Statistics Hub](#)," which is part of *Statistics Canada – Data Visualization Products* ([71-607-X](#)), is now available.

The [Economic accounts statistics](#) portal, accessible from the *Subjects* module of our website, features an up-to-date portrait of national and provincial economies and their structure.

The *User Guide: Canadian System of Macroeconomic Accounts* ([13-606-G](#)) is available.

The *Methodological Guide: Canadian System of Macroeconomic Accounts* ([13-607-X](#)) is available.

For more information, or to enquire about the concepts, methods or data quality of this release, contact us (toll-free 1-800-263-1136; 514-283-8300; [STATCAN.infostats-infostats.STATCAN@canada.ca](mailto:STATCAN.infostats-infostats.STATCAN@canada.ca)) or Media Relations (613-951-4636; [STATCAN.mediahotline-ligneinfomedias.STATCAN@canada.ca](mailto:STATCAN.mediahotline-ligneinfomedias.STATCAN@canada.ca)).



Changes to census subdivisions for 2016 resulted in the reduction of Indian reserves. For instance, the following reserve CSDs were deleted because they are not to be populated:

- Ocean Man 69B (CSD 47 01 811), Chief Joseph Custer (CSD 47 15 846), Potato River 156A (CSD 47 18 810), Fond du Lac 229 (CSD 47 18 833), Fond du Lac 232 (CSD 47 18 846), Fond du Lac 231 (CSD 47 18 847) in Saskatchewan
- Charles Lake 225 (CSD 48 16 855), Fort McKay 174 (CSD 48 16 856), Namur River 174A (CSD 48 16 857), Namur Lake 174B (CSD 48 16 858), Kapawe'no First Nation (Halcro 150C) (CSD 48 17 852), Kapawe'no First Nation (Grouard 230) (CSD 48 17 858) in Alberta
- Klahkowitz 5 (CSD 59 33 830), Alexis Creek 24 (CSD 59 41 819), Alexis Creek 25 (CSD 59 41 820), Alexis Creek 17 (CSD 59 41 842), Seymour Meadows 19 (CSD 59 41 843), Toby's Meadow 4 (CSD 59 41 846), Alexis Creek 6 (CSD 59 41 847), Tatelkus Lake 28 (CSD 59 41 865), Kluachon Lake 1 (CSD 59 49 830) in British Columbia

## Classification variants

Although the SGC is the basic system of geographic units used for collecting and disseminating statistics in Statistics Canada, it cannot serve all statistical purposes for which the presentation and analysis of economic and social data are required. Other geographic units that are based on aggregations of the SGC geographic units are included as classification variants of the SGC. Four classification variants have been recognized as part of the SGC 2016:

1. Statistical Area Classification - Variant of SGC 2016

This classification variant includes entire census metropolitan areas (CMAs), census agglomerations (CAs) and the census metropolitan influenced zones (MIZs) within Canada.

2. Statistical Area Classification by Province and Territory - Variant of SGC 2016

This classification variant includes provinces and territories, census metropolitan areas (CMAs), census agglomerations (CAs) and the census metropolitan influenced zones (MIZs). It presents the provincial and territorial parts of CMAs, CAs and MIZs that cross provincial or territorial boundaries.

3. Economic Regions - Variant of SGC 2016

This classification shows the economic regions of Canada.

4. Agricultural Regions - Variant of SGC 2016

This classification variant includes the geographical regions of Canada, provinces and territories, census agricultural regions, census divisions, census consolidated subdivisions and census subdivisions of Canada.

Each classification variant of the SGC is a set of customized groupings that use SGC's census subdivisions as building blocks. In Statistics Canada, variants are created and adopted in cases where the version of the classification does not fully meet specific user needs for disseminating data or for sampling in surveys. A classification variant is based on a classification version such as SGC 2016. In a variant, the categories of the classification version are

split, aggregated or regrouped to provide additions or alternatives (e.g., context-specific additions) to the standard structure of the base version.


## **Statistical Area Classification - Variant of SGC 2016**

The Statistical Area Classification (SAC) - Variant of SGC 2016 groups census subdivisions according to whether they are a component of a census metropolitan area, a census agglomeration or a census metropolitan influenced zone (MIZ). Census subdivisions (CSDs) form the lowest level of this classification variant. The next level of this classification variant consists of individual census metropolitan areas (CMAs), census agglomerations (CAs) and census metropolitan influence zones (MIZs). The highest level of this classification variant consists of three categories that cover all of the landmass of Canada:

- Census metropolitan areas (Canada)
- Census agglomerations (Canada)
- Outside census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations (Canada)

The SAC provides unique numeric identification (codes) for these hierarchically related geographic areas. It was established for the purpose of reporting statistics. The hierarchical relationship of the geographic areas is shown in Figure 2.

### **Figure 2 Statistical Area Classification - Variant of SGC 2016**



► Description of Figure 2

### Census metropolitan area and census agglomeration

A census metropolitan area (CMA) or a census agglomeration (CA) is formed by one or more adjacent municipalities centred on a population centre (known as the core). A CMA must have a total population of at least 100,000 of which 50,000 or more must live in the core, based on adjusted data from the previous census. A CA must have a core population of at least 10,000, also based on data from the previous census. To be included in the CMA or CA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the core, as measured by commuting flows derived from data on place of work from the previous census.

If the population of the core of a CA falls below 10,000, the CA is retired from the next census. However, once an area becomes a CMA, it is retained as a CMA even if its total population falls below 100,000 or the population of its core falls below 50,000. All areas inside the CMA or CA that are not population centres are rural areas.

When a CA has a core of at least 50,000, based on the previous Census of Population, it is subdivided into census tracts. Census tracts are maintained for the CA even if the population of the core subsequently falls below 50,000. All CMAs are subdivided into census tracts.

A CMA or CA is delineated using adjacent municipalities (census subdivisions) as building blocks. These census subdivisions (CSDs) are included in the CMA or CA if they meet at least one of the following rules. The rules are ranked in order of priority. A CSD obeying the rules for two or more CMAs or CAs is included in the one for which it has the highest ranked rule. If the CSD meets rules that have the same rank, the decision is based on the population or the number of commuters (commuting flows) involved. A CMA or CA is delineated to ensure spatial contiguity.

1. Delineation core rule: The CSD falls completely or partly (50% of its population) inside the core.
2. Forward commuting flow rule: Given a minimum of 100 commuters, at least 50% of the employed labour force living in the CSD works in the delineation core, as determined by the

previous rule. These numbers are established based on responses to the place of work question in the previous census.

3. Reverse commuting flow rule: Given a minimum of 100 commuters, at least 50% of the employed labour force working in the CSD lives in the delineation core as determined from commuting data based on the place of work question in the previous census. Before 2016, the percentage was set at 25%.
4. Spatial contiguity rule: CSDs that do not meet a commuting flow threshold may be included in a CMA or CA, and CSDs that do meet a commuting flow threshold may be excluded from a CMA or CA.
5. Historical comparability rule: To maintain historical comparability for CMAs and larger CAs (those with census tracts in the previous census), CSDs are retained in the CMA or CA for at least one other census even if their commuting flow percentages fall below the commuting flow thresholds (rules 2, 3 and 4). By adjusting the historical comparability rule, users are warned that a CSD can be excluded from a CMA or from a larger CA in the next census or the next delineation thereof.
6. Manual adjustments: A CMA or CA represents an area that is economically and socially integrated. However, there are certain limitations in the extent to which this ideal can be met. Since the CSDs that are used as building blocks in CMA and CA delineation are administrative units, their boundaries do not always match other statistical units (e.g., population centre

cores). There are always situations where the application of the above rules creates undesirable outcomes, or where the rules cannot be easily applied. In these circumstances, a manual override is sometimes applied to ensure that the integrity of the program is retained. One of these situations is a core hole, which refers to a CSD located inside another CSD that is part of the core delineation rule, but at least 50% of its population is not within the same core and could not qualify according to any previous delineation rules. Therefore, this core hole must be included in the CMA or CA to maintain spatial contiguity.

Another example of manual adjustment is when the CSD is partially inside the core and, based on data from the previous Census of Population, less than 50% of its population resides in the core. Furthermore, the CSD could not comply with the other previous delineation rules.

Finally, the CSDs that consist of several parts or that contain holes also influence application of the manual adjustment rule.

7. Merging adjacent CMAs and CAs: A CA adjacent to a CMA can be merged with the CMA if the total percentage commuting interchange between the CA and CMA is equal to at least 35% of the employed labour force living in the CA, based on place of work data from the previous census. The total percentage commuting interchange is the sum of the commuting flow in both directions between the CMA and the CA as a percentage of the labour force living in the CA (i.e., resident employed labour force, excluding the no fixed workplace address category),

A CMA or CA represents an area that is economically and socially integrated. However, there are certain limitations to the manner in which this goal can be met. Since the CSDs, which are used as building blocks in CMA and CA delineation, are administrative units, their boundaries are not always the most suitable with respect to CMA and CA delineation. There are always situations where the application of rules creates undesirable outcomes, or where the rules cannot be easily applied. In these circumstances, a manual override is sometimes applied to ensure that the integrity of the program is retained.

CMAs and CAs are statistically comparable because they are delineated in the same way across Canada. They differ from other types of areas, such as trading, marketing, or regional planning areas designated by regional authorities for planning and other purposes, and should be used with caution for non-statistical purposes.

There are 35 CMAs and 117 CAs in 2016. Two new CMAs were created: Belleville (Ont.) and Lethbridge (Alta.). Eight new CAs were created: Gander (N.L.), Sainte-Marie (Que.), Arnprior (Ont.), Carleton Place (Ont.), Wasaga Beach (Ont.), Winkler (Man.), Weyburn (Sask.) and Nelson (B.C.). The CAs of Amos (Que.) and Temiskaming Shores (Ont.) were retired because the population of their cores dropped below 10,000 in 2011.

The naming convention for CMAs and CAs is included in the Naming geographic units section of this classification manual.



## Census metropolitan influenced zone

The census metropolitan influenced zone (MIZ) is a concept that geographically differentiates the area of Canada outside census metropolitan areas (CMAs) and census agglomerations (CAs).

Census subdivisions (CSDs) within provinces that are outside CMAs and CAs are assigned to one of four categories according to the degree of influence (strong, moderate, weak or no influence) that the CMAs or CAs have on them. CSDs within the territories that are outside CAs are assigned to a separate category.

A municipality within a province is assigned to a census **metropolitan influenced zone (MIZ)** category based on the percentage of its employed labour force that commutes to work in one or more of the municipalities (census subdivisions) that are part of the delineation core of a CMA or CA. The calculation of the employed labour force excludes the category of no fixed workplace address CSDs with the same degree of influence tend to be clustered. CSDs with the same degree of influence tend to be clustered. They form zones around CMAs and CAs that progress through the categories from 'strong' to 'no' influence as distance from the CMAs and CAs increases. As many CSDs in the territories are very large and sparsely populated, the commuting flow of the resident employed labour force is unstable. For this reason, CSDs in the territories that are outside CAs are assigned to a separate category that is not based on their commuting flows.

CSDs outside CMAs and CAs are assigned to the following MIZ categories:

1. **Strong metropolitan influenced zone (Canada):** This category includes CSDs in provinces where at least 30% of the CSD's resident employed labour force (excluding the category of no fixed workplace address) commute to work in any CMA or CA. It excludes CSDs from the previous census with fewer than 40 persons in their resident employed labour force.
2. **Moderate metropolitan influenced zone (Canada):** This category includes CSDs in provinces where at least 5% but less than 30% of the CSD's resident employed labour force (excluding the category of no fixed workplace address) commute to work in any CMA or CA. It excludes CSDs from the previous census with fewer than 40 persons in their resident employed labour force.
3. **Weak metropolitan influenced zone (Canada):** This category includes CSDs in provinces where more than 0% but less than 5% of the CSD's resident employed labour force (excluding the category of no fixed workplace address) commute to work in any CMA or CA. It excludes CSDs from the previous census with fewer than 40 persons in their resident employed labour force.
4. **No metropolitan influenced zone (Canada):** This category includes CSDs in provinces where none of the CSD's resident employed labour force (excluding the category of no fixed workplace address) commute to work in any CMA or CA. It also includes CSDs from the previous census in provinces with fewer than 40 persons in their resident employed labour force.
5. **Territories (outside CAs, Canada):** This category includes CSDs in the territories outside CAs.

All of the landmass of Canada outside CMAs and CAs are classified by the five MIZ in the classification variant. For example, all areas in Canada with no metropolitan influence are classified as "No metropolitan influenced zone (Canada)". Where "Canada" appears in brackets, it may be omitted when the context provides clarification.

### The coding structure

Each of the three levels of the classification variant covers all of Canada. For the first level consisting of the census metropolitan categories, an alpha code has been introduced:

- A: Census metropolitan areas (Canada)
- B: Census agglomerations (Canada)
- C: Outside census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations (Canada)

In the second level, three-digit numeric codes are used for individual CMAs, CAs and MIZs.

The codes for a CMA, a CA and a MIZ are shown in the following illustration:

### Codes for a CMA, a CA and a MIZ

<b>Census metropolitan category</b>	<b>CMA/CA/MIZ code</b>	<b>Name</b>
<b>A</b>	001	St. John's



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# Performance Management Program for Deputy Ministers, Associate Deputy Ministers, and Individuals Paid in the GX Range

▼ Program guidelines

**Senior Personnel Secretariat**

**Privy Council Office**

**Last Updated: April 2018**

## 1.0 Introduction

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the Performance Management Program as it applies to deputy ministers, associate deputy ministers, and individuals paid in the GX salary range.

### 1.1 Program Objectives

The objectives of the Performance Management Program are:

- to encourage excellent performance by setting clear objectives and rigorously evaluating the achievement of results;
- to recognize and reward strong performance and identify under-performance; and

- to provide a framework within which a consistent and equitable approach to performance management can be applied.

## 1.2 Compensation Plan

The Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation, composed of senior executives from the private and other public sectors, was established in 1997 to provide independent advice to the government on compensation and overall human resources management matters for public service executives and Governor in Council appointees.

In February 1998, the government accepted the recommendations contained in the First Report of the Advisory Committee. As a result, a new compensation plan for deputy ministers, associate deputy ministers, and other Governor in Council appointees was introduced.

As per the Committee's recommendation, cash compensation for senior personnel has two components - base salary and performance pay. Performance pay has two elements - a variable amount (at-risk pay) which must be re-earned each year and a bonus for performance that surpasses expectations. As in the private sector, it would be expected that most senior personnel would receive some at-risk pay.

An effective performance management program is integral to the success of this compensation plan.

## 1.3 Eligibility


To be eligible for performance pay, incumbents appointed by the Governor in Council must normally hold their positions for at least three (3) consecutive months in the performance cycle. This period allows the incumbent sufficient time to achieve measurable results.

If the period covered by the performance evaluation is more than three months but less than 12 months (full performance cycle), performance pay, if approved, may be prorated.

If an individual is appointed as a deputy minister (or an associate deputy minister or to a position paid within the GX salary range) from an assistant deputy minister (ADM) position during the performance cycle, the individual will be included in the Performance Management Program for the complete cycle.

## 2.0 Program Overview

The diagram below summarizes the performance management program.



► Text version

## 3.0 Performance Agreements

The performance agreement is a mutual understanding between the deputy minister and the Clerk of the Privy Council (or the associate deputy minister/GX and the deputy minister) as to what is expected for the performance cycle.

The performance agreement is comprised of individual commitments, as well as the related performance measures:

### Individual Commitments:

- **Policy and Program Results:** These commitments reflect the organization's priority areas of focus during the performance cycle, related to business plans. They are challenging but achievable with effort through the individual's own influence and control. They must also be results-oriented and measurable or clearly demonstrable. Commitments must be such that the deputy minister will personally make a significant contribution to their achievement. Individuals are expected to develop the following as part of their performance agreements:
  - commitments based on the business plans of the organization; and
  - commitments that reflect priority areas of focus of the Government.

Each commitment must be accompanied by related performance measures which are observations or data that determine and define if and how well the commitments are met. They will form the basis

of reporting at the end of the performance cycle.

- **Management Results:** Individuals with responsibility and accountability for the management of an organization will also be measured on their progress in implementing the management conditions described in the Management Accountability Framework (MAF), with emphasis on the priorities identified by the deputy minister and the Secretary of the Treasury Board or the Chief Human Resources Officer, including people management.

The management conditions set out in the MAF (Management Accountability Framework) translate into generic commitments and serve as benchmarks for expected performance of all deputy ministers (see Annex A). **As such, there is no need for deputy ministers to include management results in their performance agreements unless they wish to highlight a particular initiative.**

- **Leadership Results:** These commitments reflect the expected demonstration of the Key Leadership Competencies which are required to successfully carry out the responsibilities of the position. The Key Leadership Competencies are generic commitments and serve as a benchmark for expected performance of all deputy ministers (see Annex B). **As such, there is no need for deputy ministers to include leadership results in their performance agreements unless they wish to highlight a particular initiative.**
- **Corporate Results:** This commitment reflects a current Government priority. It will be identified on an annual basis by the Clerk of the Privy Council and the results will be evaluated and rewarded based on the contribution of the individual towards the corporate



commitment.

Details on the corporate priorities are posted annually on the [Privy Council Office website](#).

### 3.1 Changes to Performance Agreements

Changes may be made to the performance agreement during the performance cycle, in consultation with the Clerk (or with the deputy minister in the case of associate deputy ministers and persons paid in the GX salary range).

## 4.0 Performance Evaluation

### 4.1 Input on Performance Evaluation

At the end of the performance cycle, each deputy minister completes a self-evaluation assessing achievements against the agreed upon commitments. Deputy ministers also complete an evaluation of their associate deputy minister(s), as well as those paid in the GX salary range, where applicable. **A concise summary of each evaluation (i.e. half a page) should also be completed in addition to the full (self) evaluation.** Both documents will be submitted for consideration by the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO).

Additional information is sought by the Privy Council Office to supplement the self-evaluations including:

- the input of the responsible Minister;
- the comments of central agencies including the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Office of the Chief Human Resources Officer reporting on results in relation to the [MAF](#).

(Management Accountability Framework) and, if appropriate, the annual corporate commitment;

- the input gathered by a retired deputy minister from others as appropriate, such as chairpersons of deputy minister committees and other deputy ministers or deputy heads in the portfolio; and
- the input of COSO (Committee of Senior Officials).

## 4.2 Performance Ratings

Performance ratings depend not only on each deputy ministers' own performance against their commitments, but also on the relative scope and complexity of the challenges they faced. Ratings will be based on results achieved, as well as on the manner in which they were achieved.

Overall performance is evaluated with the following possible results:

- **Did not Meet /Unable to Assess**  
Did not achieve performance expectations or unable to assess the performance during the cycle (due to leave, training, special assignment).
- **Succeeded -**  
Did not fully succeed in meeting performance expectations. Or, while succeeded, it was in a position with performance expectations of less scope and complexity in relation to those of other deputy level jobs.
- **Succeeded**  
Has fully achieved the performance expectations.

- **Succeeded +**  
Exceeded the performance expectations. Or, fully succeeded in a position of greater scope and complexity in relation to those of other deputy level jobs.
- **Surpassed**  
Went well beyond performance expectations.

### 4.3 Performance Awards

The Performance Management Program provides the opportunity to earn the following performance-based compensation:

- **Economic Increase**

An economic increase can be recommended annually by the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation, and if applicable, would reflect a percentage increase in base salary. Eligibility for this increase is normally dependent upon the successful achievement of commitments. An economic increase can also be awarded in cases where performance is unable to be assessed for reasons such as leave, training, etc. Normally, no economic increase is awarded for performance that does not achieve expectations.

- **In-Range Salary Movement**

Movement through the salary range, up to the maximum of the range, is earned through the successful achievement of commitments. Normal progression for successful performance is 5% per year. Higher or lower percentages may be approved based on the degree of performance against expectations. No in-range salary increase is awarded for performance that does not achieve

expectations.

- **At-Risk Pay**

The lump sum payment is equivalent to a percentage of base salary and must be re-earned each year, based on the successful achievement of commitments. The amount of this lump sum may vary, depending on the degree of success achieved, as outlined under the section on Performance Ratings. This payment does not increase an individual's base salary but is included in average salary for pension calculations. At-risk pay can be earned regardless of an individual's position in the salary range; however, no at-risk pay is awarded for performance that does not achieve expectations.

- **Bonus**

This lump sum payment is in addition to at-risk pay and is based on the individual's demonstrated performance that has surpassed expectations. Like at-risk pay, this payment does not increase an individual's base salary but is included in average salary for pension calculations. Bonuses can be earned regardless of an individual's position in the salary range.

In implementing in-range salary increases, at-risk pay and bonuses, the salary used as the base for calculations is that in effect on the last day of the performance cycle; that is, March 31st. Economic increases apply to the upcoming fiscal year and are based on the salary following application of any in-range salary increase.

#### 4.4 Performance Award

The Privy Council Office annually issues information on the range of performance awards available, according to performance achieved and the individual's classification. This information can be found on the [Privy Council Office website](#).

## 5.0 Approval and feedback process

Compensation for deputy ministers and associate deputy ministers is approved by the Governor in Council. Copies of the Order in Council authorizing payment are provided to the individuals concerned for forwarding to their compensation office for implementation.

Compensation for individuals paid in the GX salary range is approved by the Prime Minister.

### 5.1 Feedback

Emphasis is placed on developing and sharing constructive feedback, including any recommendations for strengthening performance. As appropriate, the Clerk of the Privy Council, the Associate Secretary to the Cabinet, or the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Senior Personnel, Business Transformation and Renewal), will provide performance feedback.

### 5.2 Recovery of Performance Pay

The Performance Management Program for Governor in Council (GIC) appointees incents performance by linking a portion of compensation to the achievement of results. A rigorous evaluation process and the ability to accurately compensate for results are essential to the program's

integrity. On occasion, information may come to light following the evaluation period that is relevant to the assessment and performance pay that was provided to an appointee:

- when it has been determined, following due process, that an appointee willfully or recklessly sought to hide or misrepresent their achievements such that any deficiencies would have been difficult to detect at the time of evaluation;
- when it has been determined, following due process, that an appointee committed serious breaches of conduct or mismanagement within a particular performance period that would have had such a negative effect on the rating provided that they would have received a rating of “did not meet”.

In such cases, the GIC may assign a revised performance rating for the period in question and recover any performance pay and associated compensation provided to the appointee during that period:

- the amounts eligible for recovery are deemed under the *Terms and Conditions for Full-Time Governor in Council Appointees* to be an overpayment under s.155 of the *Financial Administration Act*; and,
- the amounts eligible for recovery include any at-risk pay, bonus and in-range movement earned as a result of the initial rating assigned during the performance cycle in question. This also includes a recalculation of pension entitlements, should the appointee have retired and recovery of any overpayments as a result.

### 5.3 Communications

To ensure transparency and understanding of the program objectives and results, as well as alignment in the organization, individuals are encouraged to share their performance commitments with their

organization.

## 6.0 Timelines

Timelines	Actions Taken
<b>January - March</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Clerk sends a call email to deputy ministers requesting the following:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ a self-evaluation of performance during the previous fiscal year against individual commitments, and evaluations of associate deputy ministers and GXs, if applicable;</li> <li>◦ a concise summary of each full performance evaluation; and</li> <li>◦ a proposed performance agreement for the next fiscal year.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Deputy ministers finalize planning processes, meet with management teams on performance commitments, etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Mid-April</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluations and summaries are due.</li> <li>• New performance agreements are due.</li> </ul>
<b>April - June</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A retired DM reviews DM self-evaluations and gathers further assessments on deputy ministers' and associate deputy ministers' performance related to achievements and leadership competencies.</li> <li>• The Clerk seeks input from various sources including Ministers, the Privy Council Office, central agencies and other stakeholders on achievements.</li> </ul>
<b>June</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A <u>COSO (Committee of Senior Officials)</u> meeting is held to provide advice to the Clerk on performance.</li> </ul>

<b>Timelines</b>	<b>Actions Taken</b>
<b>July - August</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performance feedback is provided to deputy ministers.</li> </ul>
<b>September</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performance pay is implemented.</li> </ul>
<b>October</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Final amendments to performance agreements for the year in progress are due, including any changes related to the performance feedback received.</li> </ul>

## Annex A - Management Results Generic Commitments

These commitments reflect the core organizational and management accountabilities, as described in the Management Accountability Framework.

### Leadership and Strategic Direction

Articulates and embodies the vision, mandate and strategic priorities that guide the organization while supporting Ministers and Parliament in serving the public interest.

### Results and Accountability

Uses performance results to ensure accountability and drive ongoing improvements and efficiencies to policies, programs, and services to Canadians.

### Public Sector Values



Exemplifies the core values of the public sector by having respect for people and democracy, serving with integrity and demonstrating stewardship and excellence.

## **Continuous Learning and Innovation**

Manages through continuous innovation and transformation, to promote organizational learning and improve performance.

## **Governance and Strategic Management**

Maintains effective governance that integrates and aligns priorities, plans, accountabilities and risk management to ensure that internal management functions support and enable high performing policies, programs and services.

## **People Management**

Optimizes the workforce and the work environment to enable high productivity and performance, effective use of human resources and increased employee engagement.

## **Financial and Asset Management**

Provides an effective and sustainable financial management function founded on sound internal controls, timely and reliable reporting, and fairness and transparency in the management of assets and acquired services.

## **Information Management**

Safeguards and manages information and systems as a public trust and a strategic asset that supports effective decision-making and efficient operations to maximize value in the service of Canadians.

## Management of Policy and Programs

Designs and manages policies and programs to ensure value for money in achieving results.

## Management of Service Delivery

Delivers client-centred services while optimizing partnerships and technology to meet the needs of stakeholders.

**i** Individuals should consult the Management Accountability Framework, available on the [Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat website](#), for a complete understanding of the [MAF \(Management Accountability Framework\)](#) elements and performance objectives.

# Annex B - Leadership Results Generic Commitments

These commitments reflect the expected demonstration of the Key Leadership Competencies required to successfully carry out the responsibilities of the position.

## Create Vision and Strategy

Leaders define the future and chart a path forward. They are adept at understanding and communicating context, factoring in the economic, social and political environment. Intellectually agile, they leverage their deep and broad knowledge, build on diverse ideas and perspectives and

create consensus around compelling visions. Leaders balance organizational and government-wide priorities and improve outcomes for Canada and Canadians.

## **Mobilize People**

Leaders inspire and motivate the people they lead. They manage performance, provide constructive and respectful feedback to encourage and enable performance excellence. They lead by example, setting goals for themselves that are more demanding than those that they set for others.

## **Uphold Integrity and Respect**

Leaders exemplify ethical practices, professionalism and personal integrity. They create respectful and trusting work environments where sound advice is valued. They encourage the expression of diverse opinions and perspectives, while fostering collegiality. Leaders are self-aware and seek out opportunities for personal growth.

## **Collaborate with Partners and Stakeholders**

Leaders are deliberate and resourceful about seeking the widest possible spectrum of perspectives. They demonstrate openness and flexibility to forge consensus and improve outcomes. They bring a whole-of-government perspective to their interactions. In negotiating solutions, they are open to alternatives and skillful at managing expectations. Leaders share recognition with their teams and partners.

## **Promote Innovation and Guide Change**

Leaders have the courage and resilience to challenge convention. They create an environment that supports bold thinking, experimentation and intelligent risk taking. They use setbacks as a valuable source of insight and learning. Leaders take change in their stride, aligning and adjusting milestones and targets to maintain forward momentum.

## Achieve Results

Leaders mobilize and manage resources to deliver on the priorities of the Government, improve outcomes and add value. They consider context, risks and business intelligence to support high-quality and timely decisions. They anticipate, plan, monitor progress and adjust as needed. Leaders take personal responsibility for their actions and outcomes of their decisions.

### ▼ Performance award percentages

Compensation pursuant to the PMP (Performance Management Program) for 2019-2020

<b>Evaluation Results</b>	<b>Economic Increase</b>	<b>In-Range Increase</b>	<b>At-Risk Pay</b>	<b>Bonus</b>
Did not meet	X	X	X	X
Unable to assess	✓	X	X	X

<b>Evaluation Results</b>	<b>Economic Increase</b>	<b>In-Range Increase</b>	<b>At-Risk Pay</b>	<b>Bonus</b>
Succeeded -	✓	✓	✓ DM-1/GX: up to 10% ✓ DM-2/3: up to 15% ✓ DM-4: up to 20%	X
Succeeded	✓	✓	✓ DM-1/GX: up to 15% ✓ DM-2/3: up to 20% ✓ DM-4: up to 25%	X
Succeeded +	✓	✓	✓ DM-1/GX: up to 20% ✓ DM-2/3: up to 25% ✓ DM-4: up to 30%	X
Surpassed	✓	✓	✓ DM-1/GX: up to 20% ✓ DM-2/3: up to 25% ✓ DM-4: up to 30%	✓ DM-1/GX: up to an additional 6% ✓ DM-2/3: up to an additional 8% ✓ DM-4: up to an additional 9%

▼ 2020-21 Corporate priorities

# 2020 - 2021 Corporate Priorities

In the context of the Government's response to the COVID19 pandemic, our corporate priorities have never been more important in guiding the collective efforts of senior leaders as they set the tone in advancing the mind-sets and behaviours that will result in a more agile, inclusive and equipped public service. Continuing to foster healthy, diverse and inclusive workplaces takes on even greater significance in the current context and will continue to serve us well as a fundamental element of our leadership responsibilities.

In respect of these unprecedented times and realities, the Public Service leadership is expected to carry out the following corporate priorities in 2020-21:

## **Mobilizing in Support of Common Goals in Response to COVID19**

For 2020-21, ensure you have performance commitments that enable measurable indicators of your leadership in:

- Adapting to shifting operational and strategic realities as a result of the COVID19 pandemic in order to deliver services and results for Canadians.
- Promoting the physical health and safety of your organization, particularly in the context of a return to the workplace in 2020-2021.
- Supporting the psychological health of your employees in these challenging times, including the prevention and resolution of harassment and discrimination.

## **Fostering Diversity and Inclusion**

Continue efforts to increase the diversity of the workforce in your organization, and foster the inclusion of a broad range of voices and views in governance and decision-making. See [Deputy Minister](#)

## Commitments on Diversity and Inclusion.

### **Supporting Efforts to Address the Pay System (for organizations served by Phoenix)**

Undertake the necessary initiatives to ensure employees are paid accurately and on time. This includes efforts to manage peaks and reduce intake of pay actions in order to meet timelines and performance measures per the established quantitative methodology and indicators communicated by Public Services and Procurement Canada and the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.

#### ▼ 2019-20 Corporate priorities

## **2019 - 2020 Corporate Priorities**

As the first year of implementation of Beyond2020, it is critical for public service leaders to engage their organizations in exploring and advancing the mindsets and behaviours that will result in greater agility, deeper inclusion, and a better equipped workforce. Success will depend on your leadership in modelling, enabling and empowering this change across your organizations

- **Healthy Workplaces**

For 2019-20, continue building and sustaining a healthy workplace and specifically demonstrate further progress against all three pillars of the Federal Public Service Workplace Mental Health Strategy; and, take meaningful action on harassment and discrimination.

- **Inclusive workplaces**

For 2019-20, continue efforts to increase the social and cultural diversity of the workforce, and foster the inclusion of a broad range of voices and views in governance and decision-making.

- **Pay System (for those organizations served by Phoenix)**

For 2019-20, continue to undertake and report on active contributions to HR-to-pay stabilization to ensure employees are paid accurately and on time. This includes actions within your organization, and contributing to the efforts of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) and Public Services and Procurement Canada in addressing pay challenges. More specifically, as determined by TBS, human resources transactions leading to a pay action (effective April 1, 2019) will meet timelines and performance measures as per TBS-established methodology, and be assessed as part of the Management Accountability Framework.

#### ▼ Contacts

For more information on the Performance Management Program please contact the following:

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## ▼ Supportive documents



### [Program Guidelines](#)

[\[PDF \(Portable Document Format\) - 108 KB \(Kilobyte\)\]](#)



### [2019 - 2020 Performance Award Percentages](#)

[\[PDF \(Portable Document Format\) - 40 KB \(Kilobyte\)\]](#)



### [2020 - 2021 Corporate Priorities](#)

[\[PDF \(Portable Document Format\) - 18 KB \(Kilobyte\)\]](#)



### [2019 - 2020 Corporate Priorities](#)

[\[PDF \(Portable Document Format\) - 13 KB \(Kilobyte\)\]](#)



Template Performance Agreement and  
Evaluation Form

[DOC (Microsoft Word document) - 57 KB  
(Kilobyte)]

**Date modified:**

2020-10-19



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[Canada.ca](#) > [About government](#) > [How government works](#)

> [Government appointments](#) > [Governor in Council appointments](#)

> [Compensation, terms and conditions of employment](#)

# Remuneration guidelines for part-time GIC appointees in agencies, boards, and commissions

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Effective October 1, 2000

## Introduction

These guidelines set out the amounts and conditions of payment for the part-time services of persons appointed to office by the Governor in Council (GiC). They are not an authority in themselves. They set out what can be recommended routinely and without substantiation for the approval of the GiC. Each organization must obtain its own Order in Council for authority to pay.

## Authority

Generally, the statute that creates the organization specifies the authority to fix remuneration for GiC appointees.

## Application

These guidelines apply to all persons appointed to part-time positions in agencies, boards and commissions for which the GiC has the authority to fix the rate of remuneration.

They do not apply to full-time employees or appointees of a Canadian government organization because they are not eligible to receive additional remuneration for a part-time GiC appointment.

## Principles

The Canadian government's compensation policy recognizes the need to attract and retain well-qualified appointees.

Service to the public and not adherence to market rates influences the remuneration of the highest executive levels. This principle also influences remuneration for part-time service. Exceptions are public practitioners such as lawyers, conciliators, arbitrators, etc. whose appointment requires them to provide these professional services.

## Definitions

**Executive Organizations** are those whose primary mission is to make final and binding decisions and/or to produce goods or services.

**Advisory Organizations** are those which engage in investigative, evaluative or research activity to provide opinions or recommendations.

## Amounts and Conditions of Payment

The schedule of per diem rates that follows specifies the maximum

rates that may be submitted for GiC approval on a routine basis.

Submissions requesting rates that exceed those of the schedule must include justification for exceptional consideration by the GiC.

When a statute by which an organization is created limits payment to a particular circumstance, such as for attending meetings, no per diem payment may be made for any other reason.

Only one per diem payment shall be made in respect of a twenty-four hour calendar day.

A per diem rate is normally payable for the following:

- attendance at meetings of the full organization and of recognized committees or sub-committees of the organization (including appointees' participation by electronic means);
- four meetings conducted among a quorum of the organization or its committees or sub-committees by telephone or other similar facility;
- traveling time, if the time required to travel between the meeting place and the normal place of residence exceeds three hours; and
- special executive, analytical or representational responsibilities explicitly designated by the governing members of the organization.

In organizations where the statute establishes a position of vice-chair, or equivalent, the per diem may be set at a rate higher than that for members in acknowledgement of additional responsibilities.

## Category Allocation

The allocation of an organization to a category depends on:

- a. the complexity and diversity of its sphere of activity;
- b. the scope of its activity, ranging from the individual person or single, local facility, to the entire citizenry or whole industries of national significance;
- c. the impact of its activity, ranging from ancillary attributes and peripheral concerns to basic rights, fundamental characteristics or essential well-being.

## Travel Expenses

Subject to any statutory provisions to the contrary, the Treasury Board Travel Directive, as it applies to the Executive Group of the Public Service, shall govern the reimbursement of travel expenses incurred by part-time GiC appointees.

## Schedule - Per Diem Rates

Category	Executive		Advisor	
	Member	Chair	Member	Chair
I	\$475 - \$550	\$675 - \$800	\$375 - \$450	\$550 - \$650
II	\$350 - \$400	\$475 - \$550	\$275 - \$325	\$375 - \$450
III	\$250 - \$300	\$350 - \$425	\$200 - \$250	\$300 - \$350
IV	\$200 - \$250	\$300 - \$350	-	-





See Annexes A and B for the allocation of organizations to categories.

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## **Annex A - Executive Agencies, Boards and Commissions**

### **Category I**

- Canadian Institutes of Health Research
- Energy Supplies Allocation Board
- Indian Specific Claims Commission
- Oil and Gas Committee
- Patented Medicine Prices Review Board

### **Category II**

- Arbitration Board (Inuvialuit)
- Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board
- Environmental Impact Review Board
- National Farm Products Council
- Ship-source Oil Pollution Fund

### **Category III**

- Cree Naskapi Commission
- Merchant Seamen Compensation Board

### **Category IV**

- Nunavut Wildlife Management Board
- Oshawa Harbour Commission

- Renewable Resources Board (Sahtu)
  - Renewable Resources Board (Gwich'in)
- 

## **Annex B - Advisory Agencies, Boards and Commissions**

### **Category I**

- Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety
- Law Commission of Canada
- National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy
- Security Intelligence Review Committee

### **Category II**

- Atlantic Canada Opportunities Board
- Canadian Polar Commission
- International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

### **Category III**

- Canada-Norway Sealing Commission
- Environmental Impact Screening Committee
- Historic Sites and Monuments Board
- International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
- International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
- National Advisory Council on Aging
- National Council of Welfare
- North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission



- Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Commission

**Date modified:**

2018-03-07

Stay at home except for essential travel and follow the [restrictions and public health measures](#).



## Public sector salary disclosure 2020: all sectors and seconded employees

Information on all public sector employees who were paid \$100,000 or more in 2020 and are subject to the *Public Sector Salary Disclosure Act*.

This data is presented in the language in which it was provided.

### Download data

- [Spreadsheet \(https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-en-2020.ods\)](https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-en-2020.ods) 14 MB
- [CSV \(https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-en-2020.csv\)](https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-en-2020.csv) 26 MB
- [JSON \(https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-en-utf8-2020.json\)](https://files.ontario.ca/pssd/2020/tbs-pssd-compendium-en-utf8-2020.json) (UTF-8) 50 MB

Search table



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Table sorted by Sector descending and showing results for law

Sector	Salary Paid	Employer	Job Title	Calendar Year
Universities	\$150,404.03	Brock University	Associate Vice-Provost, Teachi...	2020
Universities	\$115,819.08	Queen's University	Lecturer	2020
Universities	\$153,914.55	Lakehead University	Associate Professor	2020
Universities	\$167,545.22	University Of Toronto	Manager, Ancillary and Capital...	2020
Universities	\$106,721.28	York University	Assistant Professor Teaching	2020
Universities	\$210,703.30	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020
Universities	\$207,955.98	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020
Universities	\$142,437.50	Ryerson University	Head Law Librarian	2020
Universities	\$115,935.06	University Of Western On...	Director of Operations (Faculty...	2020
Universities	\$235,437.06	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020
Universities	\$147,123.97	Carleton University	Executive Director, Centre for...	2020
<b>Universities</b>	<b>\$336,516.04</b>	<b>University Of Toronto</b>	<b>Professor of Law and cross-app...</b>	2020
Universities	\$222,894.00	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law and cross-app...	2020
Universities	\$160,886.17	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020
Universities	\$196,344.77	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020
<b>Universities</b>	<b>\$339,195.00</b>	<b>University Of Toronto</b>	<b>Professor of Law</b>	<b>2020</b>
Universities	\$247,415.89	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020

Universities	\$226,429.02	University Of Toronto	Professor of Law	2020	↑
Universities	\$217,282.04	York University	Executive Director Law Commi...	2020	
Universities	\$177,980.00	University Of Toronto	University Professor of Law an...	2020	↓
					←
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